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Collaboration has been recognised and acknowledged in the public procurement sector 
as an opportunity to obtain better purchase conditions from the market. Against this 
backdrop, this thesis explores how a relatively new form of structural collaboration 
affects the long-term procurement performance of local authorities.  
 
The aim of this research is to evaluate the impact of structural collaborative 
procurement organisations on the performance of local authorities. If it enhances 
procurement performance in the Netherlands, it could be an alternative to organisational 
restructuring, such as the merger of local authorities or entering into shared-services. In 
recent years, the Netherlands has seen key decentralisation operations in a number of 
policy areas (De Klerk, Gilsing, & Timmermans, 2010). These transformations and 
changes have put a spotlight on the optimisation of the current size of the local 
authorities in the business process with the goal of improving the performance of 
individual local government organisations.  
 
Building on the excellent previous research on collaboration, this research studies the 
challenges and opportunities of structural collaboration for local authorities, especially 
in the area of procurement. A review and synthesis of a strategic and economic theories, 
collaborative arrangements and shared service centres identified a gap in the literature 
related to adding value and less uncertainty for lower cost, aimed at local authorities, 
which underpins the concept of structural collaboration.  
 
This study contributes to a deeper and more meaningful understanding of the long-term 
and structural benefits of structural procurement collaboration for organisations. These 
contributions are in value items, which aid the procurement function in the organisation 
to the advanced level of professionalisation. This research demonstrates that structural 
collaboration produces positive results in the field of knowledge, professionalism, 
reputation, innovation, complementary resources, quality of services, information 
asymmetry, cost competitiveness, and economics of scale. Likewise, a point is made in 
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the area of cost savings through improvements in efficiency and effectiveness, in the 
execution of procurement projects, as well in the fields of resource sharing and 
capabilities, control of information, coordination and mechanism, agility and flexibility 
and uncertainty.  
 
This study contributes to the fields of politics and management through supporting 
alternatives for possible amalgamation in municipalities in the Netherlands (Kay, 1995; 
Laar, 2010). Naturally, there are no perfect solutions in such complex discussions; 
nevertheless, this study hopes to contribute to the continuity, professionalism, and 
robust public organisation of the debate. Current existing collaborative (procurement) 
organisations can improve their collaborative organisations based on the Structural 
Collaborative Procurement (SCP) framework developed herein. The contribution of the 
final practitioner, a Chief Procurement Officer of collaborative organisations, is in terms 
of insight into coordination between participants and collaborative organisations, the 
boundary between outsourcing versus insourcing procurement activities, reducing 
(procurement) organisational risks, two-way collaboration, symmetry of information 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 Research background 
Local agreements and collaborations have been studied for some time, showing 
collaboration to be omnipresent among municipalities and local organisations. 
However, these studies have also demonstrated that collaboration on a local level is 
much more difficult than at the central government level, where it is obligatory 
(Janssen, Joha, & Weerakkody, 2007; Kaats, Klaveren van, & Opheij, 2006; Van de 
Laar, 2010). Collaboration is political in the sense that, because there is no formal 
hierarchy among the participants, decisions on the details of how implementation will 
proceed are made collectively (Krueger & McGuire, 2005). Governmental research 
conducted by the House of Commons Communities and Local Government Committee 
in the UK has justified the latter (House-of-Commons-Communities-and-Local-
Government-Committee, 2014). 
 
In the last decade, local authorities (LAs) in the Netherlands have been assigned a 
number of tasks which have been decentralised from the national government. The 
former elected coalition government in 2014 made this one of the priorities of 
municipalities and other local public organisations that are anticipating changes. These 
transformations and changes have shone a spotlight on the optimisation of the current 
process of collaboration, which has been intensified by the economic recession that the 
Netherlands has recently entered.  
 
Researchers in the public procurement field have begun to examine the implementation 
of collaboration in different settings, so structural collaboration procurement (SCP) has 
become a central issue which also needs to be investigated. The term ‘structural 
collaboration’ describes a situation where a number of organisations collaborate on a 
particular function, such as procurement, by using one organisation to provide that 
service for them.  
 
Since there is a stage in the strategic management process of intensive collaboration, 
when many stakeholders need to interact with each other, it is important to take 
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efficiency and effectiveness into consideration in order to create smooth execution 
processes (Meehan, Ludbrook, & Mason, 2016; Proulx, Hager, & Klein, 2014). 
Consequently, there is a growing recognition of the need for effective organisational 
collaboration, especially when considering the introduction of new public procurement 
legislation and regulation in public organisations, as well as the decentralisation of 
public tasks (Afonso, Schuknecht, & Tanzi, 2010; Dijkhoff, 2014; Salianji, 2017; 
Waverijn, Groenewegen, & de Klerk, 2017).  
 
In Chapter 1, attention is drawn to the question of the need to make the procurement 
function of local government organisations more robust. Is the existing form of 
structural procurement cooperation (SCP) now actually a possible solution to be able to 
meet those new challenges? 
 
Section 1 of this chapter briefly summarises the background, followed by section 2 
which outlines the context to which the central research aim relates. Section 3 states the 
significance of this study and its provenance, followed in section 4 by a description of 
the objectives of the study. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the scope of the research and how 
the thesis is structured. 
 
 
Figure 1-1 Outline of Chapter 1 
 Research context: situation in Europe and the Netherlands 
In the Europe 2020 strategy (Barroso, 2010), the Commission emphasises that public 
procurement policy should ensure the most efficient use of public funds and public 
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of serious budgetary problems and economic difficulties in many EU Member States, 
obtaining the best possible procurement results through efficient procedures is essential. 
In view of these challenges, an effective and efficient European procurement 
administration which can meet these ambitious objectives is more important than ever 
(Afonso et al., 2010).  
 
In 2014 the new public procurement package, 2014/23/EU-2014/24/EU-2014/25/EU, 
was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. In addition the European 
Parliament gave its opinion and vision to the European Commission about what should 
be done in the areas relating to public-public and public-private cooperation, awarding 
contracts below the threshold, services concessions, area developments, SMEs, and 
social and green procurement. Another addition is that criteria such as innovation, 
environmental and social aspects have to be taken into account and the administrative 
burden should be reduced (European-Parliament-and-the-council-of-the-European-
Union, 2014). 
 
In the Netherlands, a national public procurement act (NPPA) came into force in 2013. 
The NPPA 2012 implements the European Directives on Procurement and also includes 
national rules under the European thresholds. The NPPA 2012, which was revised in 
2016, implements the European Directives as closely as possible to the Dutch situation 
(Ministry-of-Economic-Affairs, 2016), but goes further than was required under 
European regulations at that time. This is because of the objectives of the National 
Public Procurement Act, which were ahead of the new public procurement package. 
Many LAs already had an individual procurement policy for their organisation.  
 
In order to help LAs apply these policies, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs has 
adopted policy measures. The measures must supplement the revised National 
Procurement Act 2012, give more direction to tender practice, and support and 
encourage professionalisation. These policy measures, also referred to as flanking 
policy, include the regulations and guidelines as:  
 
 Guidelines for Supplies and Services (which were repealed in 2016); 
 Procurement Regulations for Working 2016; 
 Proportionality guideline; 
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 Commission of tender experts / Complaints Desk; 
 System of verification / prequalification / tender passport; 
 Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG) model procurement and 
procurement policy. 
After these regulations became formally lawful, LAs in the Netherlands were struggling 
with implementing and applying both the national act and the flanking policy (Volker & 
Meel, 2012). They experienced more and more pressure from stakeholders such as city-
council members, entrepreneurs and internal audit commissions, who were all asking 
for a robust procurement function. The pressure was amplified by the large amounts of 
money involved in the local government sector, and thus these local authorities’ risk in 
procurement. 
 
Table 1-1 displays disaggregated public spending in 2016, which shows the LA share of 
public sector procurement spend and the associated financial risks.  
 
Table 1-1 Procurement Spend Public Sector (2016) 
Type public authority Total in billion euro 
Central government 22.3 
Local authorities 41.5 
Social funding 0.9 
Hospitals etc. 8.6 
Total 73.3 
 
Many public organisations use a form of procurement collaboration to execute their 
increasingly complex procurement operations. Besides reducing costs directly, the need 
for local authority organisations to get access to resources will also be examined, which 
will have an indirect effect on costs. Therefore, this thesis addresses collaboration 
between LAs and the optimisation of organisational parameters, with particular 
reference to local government organisations in the Netherlands.  
LAs in the Netherlands, which cooperate with each other on a structural basis in the 
area of procurement are viewed in Figure 1-2. There are a range of different ways that 
organisations can collaborate with each other. This research focuses particularly on a 
aspect that has to date been under-researched, the phenomenon of SCP. 
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Although not mandated by the national government, these organisations are essentially 
collaborations between municipalities, local government organisations etc. All the 
partnerships that are included collaborate in various procurement domains such as social 
care, student transport, security, works and IT.  
 
The concept of an SCP can be characterised as an organisational collaborative model, 
which ensures that local authorities keep the supporting procurement processes 
effective and deliver the agreed quality at acceptable and reasonable costs. An SCP is a 
directive for the execution and handling of operational tasks such as procurement 
processes, contract management, procurement legal support, compliance EU 
procurement procedure, procurement expertise and Joint Purchase Groups (JPGs). An 
SCP is an entity within a region and is charged with providing services to the various 
LAs. This often involves providing specialised services to various departments based on 
a service level agreement. 
 
In the last four years, structural collaborative procurement in local government in the 
Netherlands has increased significantly. The table below shows that for approximately 
38% of the Netherlands’ inhabitants, their local authority services have been procured 
through structural collaborative public procurement organisations. Also, 64% of local 
authority organisations in the Netherlands have a structural collaborative organisation 
for procurement (Table 1-2). Structural organisations for collaborative procurement 
have increased by a factor of approximately 2.5 (Ministry-of-Economic-Affairs, 2015).  
 
Table 1-2 Structural Collaboration in Local Authorities 2015 




















Most of these organisations are copies or a hybrid model of the Bizob procurement 
collaboration, which was one of the first SCP organisation in the Southeast of 
Netherlands. These are shown in Figure 1-2, as well as collaboration initiatives whereby 
procurement is integrated in a shared service centre for finance, healthcare, justice, 
taxation, human resource management and information technology. Besides joint 
procurement organisations, there are several forms of less structured strategic and ad 
hoc collaboration for procurement, which have been initiated by procurement functions 
and instigated by product experts supported by public branch organisations.  
 
 
Figure 1-2 Overview of Structural Procurement Collaborations Organisations in the Netherlands 
2018 





 Significance of the study 
In recent decades, the Netherlands has seen a major decentralisation of operations 
taking place in a number of policy areas (De Klerk et al., 2010). The introduction of the 
Social Support Act (SSA) in 2007 marked a new stage in this development. The SSA 
relocates the responsibility for providing social support to the municipal level. The 
principal aim of this move has been to facilitate social participation and self-help or 
independent functioning of citizens.  
 
In the Netherlands, LAs are being increasingly assigned activities that have been 
decentralised from the national government by this change, for example there has been 
a transition of social care. What kind of typology can be used to execute these tasks or, 
more desirably, add value to them? At the same time, local government budgets have 
been cut by at least 10-25%, thus there is less money available to provide quality and 
value for citizens (Dijkhoff, 2014). The scope of this research topic concerns the 
efficiency (how to organise) as well as the efficacy (what is organised) of the services 
that public organisations have to provide to their citizens. Public organisations are 
increasingly outsourcing activities, making procurement the second highest expenditure 
after costs of staff. All decentralised groups of municipalities and their fragmented 
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allied organisations need to find the best fit in relation to these challenges. This is 
something in which a typology or framework may help.  
 
A topical activity that has been decentralised to the municipalities is the social domain. 
Municipalities have been responsible for child welfare, employment and income and 
long-term care for the sick and elderly since 2015. These welfare services are legally 
secured through the Youth law, Participatiewet and Social Support Act (WMO). The 
municipalities and the provinces, in the current situation, execute some of these tasks, 
but the municipalities now have to take on all of these duties from the provinces too. 
The transformation of these tasks and the associated budgets requires a clear division of 
responsibilities and powers, and adequate (information) packages, which must be 
organised by the municipalities (Dijkhoff, 2014; Waverijn et al., 2017). Spending will 
therefore increase and move from the national government level to local organisations. 
Research from the University of Twente (Telgen, 2013) provides an overview of the 
figures and facts, shown in Table 1-3 below. 
 
Table 1-3 Changes in Procurement Spending on Commodities 
Sector  Ca. 1990  Current After 2015  Sparklines 
Facility 25% 20% 15% 
 
Infrastructure works and non 
residential building 
50% 40% 30% 
 
Social domain 25% 40% 55% 
 
 
This research can emphasise the importance of clearly defining and positioning studied 
forms, as different forms imply different research models and have different advantages, 
disadvantages, and critical success factors. The typology or framework can serve as a 
guideline for the responsible local authority or (decentralised) organisations, when a 
suitable organisational form needs to be chosen for collaboration. The problem that this 
study will address is how to prevent local authority organisations from executing tasks 
with waste of resources and limited realisation of the business objectives. Hence, 
procurement performance (PP) will be assessed and measured on the central terms of 
efficiency and effectiveness. Some research has already been conducted on 
collaboration and efficiency for central government, but not at the level of province or 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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region and not taking into consideration the new decentralised activities of the central 
government. That is why carrying out the present research is justified.  
 
Initially, research by Telgen Telgen (2013) shows that total public influenced spending 
will exceed approximately c.€ 15 billion in the coming years. Converted per capita, this 
is about € 1,000 per inhabitant each year, which takes total procurement spending at the 
local government level to c.€ 2,000 per inhabitant per year, assuming an autonomous 
spend of c.€ 1,000 of the local government on facility and infrastructure works and non-
residential building. Public spending has been expressed as the financial amount where 
the LAs spend budgets to realise output, public services for their citizens are those 
which are influenced by the procurement function. 
 
The financial impact of the extension and expansion of these decentralised activities is 
illustrated in Table 1-4. These are the estimated consolidated amounts for the 21 
municipalities in the Southeast of Brabant, which gives an indication of the financial 
value of public procurement in this region.  
 
Table 1-4 Overview of Current and Estimated Spending of Municipalities in Southeast-Brabant 




















€ 187.073.750  € 299.318.000  € 448.977.000  
 
Social domain € 187.073.750  € 299.318.000  € 823.124.500  
 
Total € 467.684.375  € 748.295.000  € 1.496.590.000  
 
 
Extending and expanding the tasks of public services will lead to the allocation and use 
of economic resources, primarily to secure knowledge of and quality in current and new 
products. Alongside changes in internal relations, the break up of departments and the 
balance of political power, there are also likely to be allocation issues. Most of those 
movements depend on internal organisations and political choices, where politicians are 
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assumed to steer and managers to row. On the other hand, it is a fact that local 
authorities budgets will face cuts. Therefore, effective and efficient collaboration 
between these organisations can be a stepping-stone towards realising this target. 
 
Besides the above-mentioned current developments, local authorities are struggling with 
the execution of their corporate procurement function (Sporrong & Kadefors, 2014), as 
mentioned in paragraph 1.2. In the last five years legislation and regulation have been 
extended from the European court and political and social themes have been secured in 
legislation and national guidelines (Table 1-5). These expansions have a direct effect on 
the operation of the procurement function of LAs. In the management area of local 
government, these political, social and legal developments have been established 
without paying attention to the current stage of level and structure of the current 
procurement function of the LAs (Grandia, 2016). Dale-Clough (2015) showed in her 
frame-work for upgrading and extending the procurement function at the LAs that it is 
possible to ensure the implementation of innovation in the procurement activity and a 
clear emphatic relationship between local politics and procurement activities in their 
procurement organisations. She found in her study that the implementation of public 
procurement innovation stays stuck because of the failure to learn from occurrences, 
which could encourage new activities or behaviours that can be adopted in the 
procurement environment and the supplier environment. 
 
Therefore, the implementation of these National and European (procurement) 
legislation and sustainability policies (theme) at the LAs demands clear and structured 
procurement processes. Consequently, several LAs in the Netherlands have joined or 
started an SCP, to concentrate the core procurement activities. It is interesting to explore 
whether this adds to the PP of the LAs. 
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Table 1-5 Development of National and European Procurement Regulations 












































This study examines and analyses intensive collaboration (structural collaboration) 
between local government organisations to identify if efficiency and uniformity can 
reduce costs, even if individual influence or identity are compromised (Niehaves & 
Krause, 2010). Despite the possibility of individual differences, there is one common 
goal that LAs share: maximisation of the value of taxpayer money. The academic 
rationale for this topic is to discover if the LAs in the Netherlands can make savings of 
time and money by creating more efficiency and effectiveness in collaboration between 
local authority organisations.   
 Theoretical perspective 
This topic has been explored by a range of studies previously, however they have 
typically focused on collaboration between individual organisations in the private sector 
as well as in the public sector. In addition, there is a significant amount of collaboration 




Overall, they have often used theories such as strategic and socio-organisational 
theories to shed light on this topic, although a minority of studies are based on 
economic and strategic theories (Richter & Brühl, 2017). 
 
Occasionally, collaboration is aimed at gaining more expertise, which may not be 
available in the organisation. There may be an emphasis on time-saving for some 
organisations in terms of effectiveness, or cost control for efficiency (Kaats et al., 2006; 
Murray, Rentell, & Geere, 2008; Nollet, Calvi, Audet, & Côté, 2008; Urquhart, 2002; 
Van de Laar, 2010; Vestrum & Ramussen, 2013). Hence the interpretations in the 
literature can be primarily filtered through two lenses of theories, namely the RBT 
(Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), and TCT (Coase, 1937). These theories link the 
phenomena of this research because of cost control, and the multiplication of resources 
– both capabilities and professionalisation in the procurement function.   
 
In this study, cooperation between buyers and suppliers, or vertical collaboration (Allal-
Chérif & Maira, 2011; Sumo, Van der Valk, & Van Weele, 2012), will not be 
examined. Game theory (Bierman, Bonini, & Hausman, 1991; Smith, 1982) will not be 
applied as this study will consider the most economic models for horizontal 
collaboration (Bakker, Walker, & Harland, 2006; Schotanus & Telgen, 2007) in local 
governments in the Netherlands. This research therefore focuses on public organisations 
that are buying infrastructure / building works, goods and services rather than their 
relationships with their suppliers (Allal-Chérif & Maira, 2011).  
 
In principle, there are no conflicts of interest between the LAs in the Netherlands and 
LAs have full transparency of information to the society, so probability decision 
calculations are not relevant. From that view the research will be focussed on the RBT 
and TCT, these theories can be used to explore the models that typically apply to 
remove, reshuffle, renew or enlarge the extent of all forms of horizontal collaboration in 
several services used and provided by local authority organisations in the Netherlands.  
 
The purpose of this research is to highlight the collaboration challenges that LA 
organisations in Netherlands are faced with when undertaking new decentralised 
activities as an extension of their current activities, while aiming to secure maximum 
value for tax-payers’ money. Many LAs are now operating a form of horizontal 
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collaboration (SCP) for the procurement function, but to date this phenomenon is 
underresearched. 
 
This leads to the following research aim: 
What impact does SCP have on the effectiveness and efficiency of the internal 
procurement function in local authorities in the Netherlands?  
‘Effectiveness’ here is related to the goals and the objectives of the procurement 
function of the LAs, and ‘efficiency’ to the resources which are required in order to 
meet the objectives of the LAs.   
 
To meet this aim, the research will review literature from three areas: public 
procurement, local authority and collaboration.  
 
As demonstrated by earlier research on the province of North Brabant, despite ongoing 
interest accelerated by pressure from the national government, there has been little 
research conducted on the procurement functions of LAs in the Netherlands. As shown 
in the previous section, collaboration in this area can be based on several choices and 
possibilities, especially in terms of the autonomy and operations of the organisations 
involved. Therefore, first, what is the procurement function phenomenon being studied? 
 
Without rationally investing and analysing their own resources, organisations cannot 
collaborate effectively. Existing LAs have consciously or unconsciously organised their 
procurement functions for some time, in ways linked to their organisational aim and 
operations. On the other hand, new organisations will be established or existing 
organisational tasks will be extended. Therefore, this study will examine the potential 
efficiency savings and effectiveness that fragmented procurement organisations could 
achieve in a particular region through structural collaboration.  
Hence, in order to focus and assess, this main research aim will be guided by three 
research objectives: value, uncertainty and cost reduction.  
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What are value items for LAs in the public procurement function, which can be affected 
by structural collaboration? How can these values increase professionalism in the 
procurement function to apply the renewed EU and national regulation expertly? Does 
structural cooperation influence the desired availability of innovative products and 
services? Renewed European and National regulations have affected uncertainty in the 
procurement processes of LAs in the Netherlands (Volker & Meel, 2012). Due to 
structural collaboration, improvements have affected the uncertainty of the procurement 
function from internal and external aspects. The extended activities which have been 
decentralised with lower budgets (Dijkhoff, 2014) have forced LAs to adopt efficiency 
measurements in the internal procurement processes and to take a critical look at 
existing public horizontal conglomerates (Allers & Van Ommeren, 2016).  
 
These three areas underpin and justify the research context and research problem, 
mentioned in sections 1.2 and 1.3. The provenances of the three issues and objectives 
are considered in the Table 1-6 below. 
 
Table 1-6 Provenance of Research Objectives 
Phenomena Empirical problem Research 
area 
       Reference 
Renewed EU and National 




Impact of SCP on uncertainty in 






Affairs, 2012, 2016) 
Renewed EU and National 
regulations for sustainability, 
green procurement and 
access of SME to public 
tenders  
Value 
Impact of SCP on value in the 
internal business processes of 





Environment, 2016; VNG 
Werkgroep gemeenten 
Amsterdam, 2018) 
Decentralisation of public 
services to LAs with lower 
budgets 
Cost-reduction 
Impact of SCP on cost-reduction 
in the procurement function of 
the LAs 
(Dijkhoff, 2014; Waverijn 
et al., 2017)  
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This lead to three concrete objectives for this research: 
1. To identify the values that LAs encounter as a result of structural collaborative 
procurement; 
2. To explore the effect of structural collaborative procurement on the uncertainty 
that LAs experience in the procurement function;  
3. To examine the cost reduction for the procurement function of the LAs that 
occurs as a result of structural collaboration. 
 
The objectives of this study are thus, first to identify the values involved in intensive 
collaborating for the LAs in the procurement function, and their effects on the output. 
The study aims to ascertain the collaborative values and how they affect the PP of the 
LAs, examining this in practice through a qualitative and quantitative study. For 
example, values such as knowledge and professionalism have been recognised to 
contribute to realising the strategic goals of the LAs such as sustainability and being 
climate neutral. Also, the study aims to examine the effects on the certainty or the 
vulnerability of the business and procurement activities of the LAs and to evaluate how 
these relate to the new renewed EU and National procurement act and regulations.  
 
The economic cost-benefits, caused by collaborative approaches as purchase groups and 
E-procurement systems, have been examined in practice through a qualitative study, to 
evaluate if cost savings have been realised for the LAs. 
 
To identify the nature of efficiency and effectiveness in procurement, the procurement 
function will be divided into various parts, which will be measured using criteria from 
the economic theories. To assess the parts of the procurement function, first the 
components of the procurement function need to be defined. The procurement function 
will be measured using two models, which assume that efficiency and effectiveness are 
not operating independently of each other. PP displays a combination of efficiency and 
effectiveness. Kumar and Gulati (2010) showed that there was a strong correlation 
between output, performance and effectiveness. They also demonstrated that high 
efficiency is not a guarantee of extreme effectiveness. Moreover, strong efficiency 
advance can lead to less effectiveness in the primary output of procurement (Úbeda, 
Alsua, & Carrasco, 2015; Waverijn et al., 2017). Table 1-7 provides an initial overview 
of some key items which are examined.  
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This study will assess whether more efficiency is achieved through collaboration 
between fragmented homogeneous organisations in the Netherlands. Efficiency in the 
organisation of the execution of procurement processes, operating E-procurement 
systems, and procurement capacity will be evaluated. The model that will be applied to 
measure this efficiency is that of Van Weele (2006), shown in Figure 1-3. 
 
 
Figure 1-3 Key Areas of Performance Measurement (Van Weele, 2006) 
To measure the effectiveness of collaboration, the components of the procurement 
process model will be used. To examine the output of conjunction with a quantitative 
study, values such as cycle time of procedures, applying innovation, learning, and 
sharing have been evaluated.   
 
 
Figure 1-4 Procurement Process, adapted from Van Weele, 2006 and Lysons and Farrington, 2006 
 
Figure 1-3 and Figure 1-4 provide an overview of all of the components of the 
procurement function.  
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This thesis will examine if structural collaboration can support LA organisations to 
realise their predetermined goals at a lower cost. It should also contribute to product, 
services and process innovation and reduce local government supply risk (Murray et al., 
2008). This study will also research whether collaboration adds value to the components 
of the procurement function. Finally, performance indicators are needed to verify what 
the results of procurement policies are and how they add value to LAs. To examine this 




Table 1-7 A Global Description of What Can be Measured During the Thesis 
Procurement 
Performance 





Performance to cycle time of 
procurement projects 
Ordinary resources & 
Core competence 
 
Cycle time required to achieve a desired output; the more efficient a 
procurement expert is, the less it will cost; 
These outputs can be split up in the structural procurement 
collaboration into: 




Pre stage and 
sourcing stage 
Performance of cost of execution 
of procurement project  
Ordinary resources & 
Transaction costs 
Cost of executing procurement project. These outputs can be split in: 
- collaborative procurement   
- individual procurement projects 
Procurement 
Effectiveness 
Sourcing stage Performance of quality of 
execution of procurement project  




 - social aspects contracted 
 - green aspects contracted  






Performance of supplier phase of 
procurement project 
Junk resources Administrative lead time 
Lead time delivery suppliers 






Acting and adapting strategic 
vision documents 
Strategic resources  Formally adopted  





Relates to the efforts made to 
improve the information systems 









Management It includes the quality and 
availability of the procurement 
strategies, action plans and 
accounting 
Strategic resources Level of professionalism  
Procurement  
Efficiency 
HRM Education, level, motivation and 
development of procurement 
specialist 
Ordinary resource Level of professionalism of staff. 




 Scope of the research  
This study will investigate structural collaborative arrangements for public 
procurement in the local authority sector in the Netherlands, viewed in Figure 1-2. The 
research will start by using qualitative methods to explore the Southeast region of the 
province North-Brabant, in the Netherlands, which, besides being one of the first, is also 
the largest collaborative organisation for public procurement in the country, followed up 
with exploration in the Netherlands as a whole using quantitative methods. Figure 1-5 
shows a global landscape of this region that initially can be measured in this study to 
examine the opportunity for obtaining better performance between fragmented LAs by 
SCP.  
 
Table 1-8 and Table 1-9 show the local procurement organisations that are the subject 
of the initial qualitative study. Principally, local governmental organisations in this 
region will be studied where the municipalities are economically – financially, 
operationally and legally – responsible. As said before, the study will be conducted 
firstly following a qualitative approach for the Southeast region of the province of 
North-Brabant, with quantitative study of the other SCPs in the Netherlands. In Figure 
1-5, the initial local organisations that will be the subject of this (qualitative) study can 
be seen.  
 
Figure 1-5 Overview of Collaborations in the Southeast of the Netherlands (from Google Maps) 
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Table 1-8 Local authorities from Figure 1-5 
Red: Local Authority Inhabitants (2015) 
A Asten 16.428 
B Bergeijk 18.238 
C Best 28.578 
D Bladel 19.805 
E Cranendonck 20.411 
F Deurne 31.670 
G Eersel 18.143 
H Geldrop-Mierlo 38.821 
I Gemert-Bakel 29.330 
J Heeze-Leende 15.356 
K Laarbeek 21.815 
L Nuenen 22.590 
M Oirschot 17.978 
N Reusel-de Mierden 12.707 
O Someren 18.667 
P Son & Breugel 16.206 
Q Veldhoven 44.179 
R Waalre 16.694 
S Eindhoven 221.101 
T Helmond 89.208 
U Valkenswaard 30.370 
 Total: 748.295 
 
Table 1-9 Public organisations from Figure 1-5 
Green: Public organisation Description 
1 GR de Kempen 4 Shared Service Organisations 
2 GGD Public Health Organisation 
3 Historisch Archief Regional Historical Archive 
4 ODZOB Environment Organisation 
5 SW Sheltered Workshops (Employment Shelves) 
6 SRE Collaboration Region Eindhoven 
7 VRZOB Public Safety and Secure Organisation 
8 VVV Regional Centre for Tourism 
 
The results of this research can be very interesting for other regions or procurement 
collaborations in the Netherlands, as other regions or public branches in the Netherlands 
are facing the same problems. The study will also probably be of interest to other local 
authorities within the European borders, where procurement is fragmented due to a wish 
to uphold their individual autonomy.   




 Thesis outline 
Ensuing the present introductory chapter, the next chapter starts with a critical 
description of the most commonly used forms of collaboration alongside a critical 
analysis of the forms reviewed in the literature and the linked paradigms of 
effectiveness and efficiency.  Subsequently, selected theories are discussed, namely the 
Resource Based Theory (RBT), and Transaction Costs Theory (TCT), for explaining the 
impact of SCP on the PP of LAs. The literature in this chapter provides the focus and 
detail to formulate the three research objectives.  
Chapter Three contains the methodological justification for the research. First of all, 
attention is paid to the methodological design within business and economics research. 
Then the possibilities and limitations of the research are discussed. Finally, the design 
and layout of the research will be worked out and the chapter ends in the formulation of 
three hypotheses, which will answer the aim and objectives of the research.  
Chapter Four offers an overview of the profile of the survey participants and presents 
the analysis of responses to the interviews, followed up by the underlying data and the 
survey questions, which are based upon the previously collected qualitative data. It also 
examines the reliability and the validity of the data, followed up by analyses in order to 
explore the main quantitative findings of the research. Regression analysis of the data is 
performed to explore direct effects between different variables and the directional 
hypotheses. 
Chapter Five consists of merged analysis of the qualitative data in order to explain 
identified and unidentified relationships that have been presented by the main 
quantitative data analysis and to generalise findings. The integration of the qualitative 
and quantitative data occurs through narrative, and for the final generalisations the 
quantitative data have been reported in the final section.  
Chapter Six represents the concluding chapter of the study. It presents an overall 
accomplishment of the research results as well as summarising the contributions and 
practical implications of the study. The chapter concludes by defining the limitations of 
the present study and offering directions for future research. 
22 
 Summary 
In this first chapter, an overview has been provided of the shift in the Dutch landscape 
in the area of public procurement by LAs, outlining traditional and procedure-guided 
procurement organisations as a contemporary fragmented issue. The central 
developments and challenges, changing of central government tasks and procurement 
themes to LAs have been identified. Together, these issues, reinforced by social and 
political debates, have produced a demand for LAs to move to professional business 
modes of organisation, ‘voluntarily’ but with hints from national policymakers about 
merging or amalgamations. In several regions, LAs have voluntarily started to engage in 
structurally collaborative business procurement, with the objectives of saving costs, 
adding more value and being less vulnerable, and this approach has offered an 
alternative to merging or amalgamation. The effect of SCP in bringing more efficiency 
and effectiveness was noted and the contribution of SCP for LAs was identified as an 
empirical gap in the existing literature. This research will test if this SCP concept has an 
impact on the PP of these LAs in the Netherlands and if SCP is an efficient method. 
Based on this foundation, the next chapter will review the current academic literature in 
the field of public collaborative procurement and will explore the theoretical foundation 
for the research design.  
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Chapter 2. Collaborative Public 
Procurement in Theoretical 
Perspective: An Introduction 
 Introduction 
This chapter will demonstrate that this research is fully aware of the present state of 
affairs within this field – what the developments in horizontal collaboration in public 
procurement are, and the controversies and forward thinking in the work of others. This 
process will be structured as followed in Figure 2-1. Section 1 describes the method for 
conducting the literature review, followed by sections 2, 3 and 4, which clarify the role 
of procurement in the public sector in the Netherlands, describe the association of the 
paradigm, review the previous literature landscape of collaboration in public 
procurement, illustrate the gap related to the central aim and justify the research 
objectives. Section 5 connects the theories to the research objectives and section 6 
explains the integrated conceptual model.  
 
 
Figure 2-1 Outline of Chapter 2 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, LAs and their agencies are using SCP for their procurement 
demands. Other regions have copied or made hybrid versions of this model, supported 
by the national government. These local authorities have totally or partly ‘outsourced’ 
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regional or national, does not involve the transfer of assets, there is some delegation of 
activities, or re-arrangement of activities which involve some changes to the way local 
government services are organised, the type of competencies involved, the knowledge 
required, and relationships with suppliers.  
 
Previous studies provide a synopsis of horizontal collaborative procurement, 
structurally, JPG, voluntary, and involuntarily. Most of the literature within the past 20 
years has focused on purchasing groups, organisational context and shared service 
centres. Besides, regularly of studies about SSC are conducted through the lens of socio 
organisational theories (Richter & Brühl, 2017). 
 
The literature has acknowledged that there remain some major shortcomings in current 
academic discussion: insufficient research on implications of structural collaborative 
public procurement as an alternative for the existing techniques, as amalgamation or ad 
hoc cooperations, for procurement synergies. A review of the whole field of 
collaboration would be a formidable task. The subject has attracted scholarly interest for 
many years, especially when considering sociology also.  
 
This section provides a justification for the research topic in this study: increasing the 
potential effectiveness and efficiency of fragmented local procurement organisations in 
an existing formation. The research aspired to inquire if SCP organisations contribute to 
the procurement performance of LAs in the Netherlands.   
 
The aim of the review is to critically appraise the range of research being conducted in 
relation to (horizontal) collaboration, public sector and procurement. For the review of 
the literature related to these themes, journal articles were sourced from databases such 
as Science Direct, Emerald and Business Resource. A mind map has been executed 
which is in Appendix II to organise the various elements and dimensions of the theories 
around the central theme of collaborative procurement.  
 
The search was undertaken by using the following keywords: (collaborative) 
procurement performance, effectiveness, efficiency, shared service centre (SSC), joint 
purchase group, value, outsourcing, transaction costs, dependency, agency, procurement 
costs, control information, and uncertainty. 
Chapter 2 Theoretical Perspective 
25 
Control over quality was achieved by limiting the search to mainly peer-reviewed 
publications and official governmental documents. With this additional restriction, the 
number of resources found was reduced to 320. Full bibliographic details of the articles 
selected for analysis are shown in the references section. In this section, some of the 
earlier contributions in journals in the period 1925 to 2018 concerning these theories 
and collaboration are explored. Analysis of previous publications will show to what 
extent the need for sufficient structural collaboration has been addressed in recent 
literature in the areas of (public) management, collaboration, shared services, business 
capabilities, resource sharing, cost reduction, control of information, flexibility, 
coordination mechanism and uncertainty in the procurement function. The publications 
in the literature are examined as per the criteria mentioned below for Analysing 
Previous Research (Jesson, Matheson, & Lacey, 2013, pp. 46-57).  
 
1. Which characteristics of the theory contribute to the discussion of improvements 
of efficiency and effectiveness by structural collaboration?  
2. Which theoretical lens was applied?  
3. What is the topic of the research and in which environment has it been 
conducted?  
4. What is the research question or purpose of the writing?  
5. What is the level of analysis?  
6. To what strategy dimension does the writing contribute?  
7. What research methodology was pursued?  
8. Are there unanswered questions (gap)? 
9. Are there any controversies or inconsistencies in findings? 
10. Is it new or building on existing, older ideas? 
 
Besides the traditional review of literature, the exploration started with a tabulation of a 
systematic review of the literature of collaboration in the (public) procurement sector. 
This has been included in Appendix I. 
 Role of Procurement in the Public Sector in the Netherlands 
Public procurement is referred to as: “the process by which public authorities, such as 
government departments or local authorities, purchase work, goods or services from 
companies” (European-Commission, 2017); “the procurement by governments and 
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state-owned enterprises of goods, services and works [which] represents a significant 
amount of government expenditure” (OECD, 2015); or “the acquisition, whether under 
formal contract or not, of works, supplies and services by public bodies” (EPA, 2017).  
 
2.2.1 Strategic procurement 
Within the public sector, outsourcing and related contracting are increasingly taking 
place. The government is becoming increasingly dependent on contractors, service 
providers and suppliers for its business operations. Thus, as described in Chapter 1, 
within an increasingly complex regulatory framework, government funds are expended 
on increasingly complex projects. As a result, the role of the public procurement 
function has developed into a main core discipline within government policy and 
government finances. This generates procurement activities that are of vital importance 
for the survival of the organisation (European-Commission, 2017; OECD, 2015). That 
is why it is a combination of specific activities that determine whether procurement can 
achieve its goals and challenge the procurement function to contribute performances of 
suppliers directly to the success of the output, of the public organisation to the citizens, 
‘best value for taxpayer’s money’.  
 
The strategic business objectives for local government can be summarised as applying 
new regulations, development of the environment, and social measures within the 
financial budgets in an effective and efficient organisation (Patrucco, Walker, Luzzini, 
& Ronchi, 2018). The procurement strategy of the LAs is focussed on which strategic 
measures are needed for the organisation to use the opportunities in the procurement 
market optimally to realise these objectives (Van Weele, 2006). The primary challenge 
for the LAs is to transform the procurement function from a legal procedure to a value-
added, non-vulnerable procurement function. The study by Patrucco et al. (2018) 
established a definition of the value of the procurement function for a public 
organisation and compared this with the procurement spend-rate per citizen. Patrucco 
found that there was a low impact of the procurement function on the LAs, on a 
decentralised level which indicated no formal procurement instruments and no linked 
procurement strategy; the procurement department mainly operated reactively. The 
procurement department was primarily focused on legal accountability in the 
procurement procedure. Interesting for this research is the ‘value’ of SCP to the LAs, 
and how this hybrid form of centralisation-decentralisation performs. 
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2.2.2 Procurement process 
What can be called ‘strategic procurement’ covers the entire procurement process and 
concerns the translation of the local council policy into procurement principles and 
procedures, procurement policy, procurement objectives and organisation of the 
procurement organisation. ‘Tactical purchasing’ is about specifying, selecting suppliers 
and contracting. ‘Operational procurement’ is mainly about the administrative process 
(ordering, monitoring, and aftercare) (Lysons & Farrington, 2006). 
 
An important part of the procurement function is the procurement process (from the 
internal customer to the supplier, as shown in Figure 2-2). 
 
 
Figure 2-2 Procurement Process, adapted from van Weele, 2006 and Lysons and Farrington, 2006 
 
This process consists of a tactical phase and an operational procurement phase. The 
tactical or initial phase refers to specifying particular needs and selecting and 
contracting suppliers, while operational procurement involves ordering, monitoring and 
evaluation. Strategic procurement management is concerned with defining a general 
procurement policy that determines the strategic procurement functions of an 
organisation, which are to support the local government business organisations’ 
strategies and the objectives of the local council (Hill, 2005; Lysons & Farrington, 
2006; Van Weele, 2006).  
 
The need for efficiency and effectiveness is an incentive for all organisations to tune the 
structure to the situation (Mintzberg & Ahlstrand, 1998). Structural changes always lag 
behind altered situations: how far behind depends on the pressure to be efficient. The 
decentralisations of health activities to the LAs in the Netherlands (Dijkhoff, 2014; 
Waverijn et al., 2017) have forced closer and more thorough attention to be paid to this 
issue. In recent years, because of these stresses in the public procurement sector, sub-
optimisation has led to high internal procurement costs and legalisation of the 
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procurement function, instead of setting up a professional function that is aimed at using 
taxpayers' money as efficiently as possible.  
 
The rational management response to this is for any form of collaboration to act more 
efficiently and effectively. The next section concerns definitions and further deepening 
of these understandings, and explores how to measure control and grip in the internal 
procurement function and the processes that are part of it.  
 Paradigm: Efficiency and Effectiveness 
In this research, the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness will be used frequently. 
This research will examine the impact of an SCP on the management control structure 
of collaborative procurement services. What changes occur in the institutional 
procurement processes and structures that ultimately aim to increase the effectiveness 
and the efficiency of the PP of the LAs? More attention is necessary to gain a deep 
understanding of this, of performance measures and of governance structures. 
 
Effectiveness and efficiency are shown in Figure 2-3, generally construed as ratios of 
overall output and goals, and input and output respectively. Verlet and Devos (2010) 
extend the work of Barnett, Barr, Christie, Duff, and Hext (2010) and discuss these 
concepts more thoroughly and reflect the concepts to productivity. This section will 
show how a deep understanding of this paradigm supports the research topic of this 
study. 
 
2.3.1 Association with collaboration  
The figure below explains the context of these terms related to this study. The model 
below is based on studies of the national UK government (Audit-Office-Audit-
Commission-Office-For-National-Statistics, 2001; House-of-Commons-Communities-
and-Local-Government-Committee, 2014). The paradigm of this study is to explore if 
SCP will lead to more savings, gaining values and reducing uncertainty by operating 
more efficiently and effectively through the LAs. To analyse those effects, the model 
distinguishes between three types of performance indicators: economic measurement 
focuses on the major costs of the input; efficiency measurement analyses the outputs in 
relation to the invested inputs; and effectiveness explores the extent to which the output 
results the outcomes demanded (Barnett et al., 2010). 
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Figure 2-3 Performance- Information: Inputs, Outputs & Outcome (Audit-Office-Audit-
Commission-Office-For-National-Statistics, 2001; House-of-Commons-Communities-and-Local-
Government-Committee, 2014) 
Verlet and Devos (2010) argue that the abovementioned model is too limited for the 
public sector. To assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector, many 
aspects must be taken into consideration. Thus not only are the inputs (material, 
financial and capacity resources assigned to a specific task for the government) and 
outputs (product, volume, quality and value of goods and services produced by the 
government) important but so too are the outcomes (effects, events or circumstances 
that are the intentional or unintentional result of government action) and the process 
(throughput) involved. Economy is not usually presented as synonymous with 
efficiency. It is rather concerned with the most constructive ratio between price and 
quality in gaining resources (inputs). Realisation of objectives also needs to be carefully 
distinguished from effectiveness. In goals, achievement relates to the question of 
whether the intended effects have been achieved, regardless of whether these effects are 
the result of past policy. This points to the conclusion that the influences of structural 
collaboration can be explored in the procurement processes and organisation at the LAs. 
Thus, the general association for the LAs is the economic argument to gain procurement 
resources in order to execute procurement processes through outsourcing to the SCP.     
 
LA organisations obtain their budgets from the national government with many 
activities assigned to them through decentralisation. Resources of money and time will 
be deployed (economics). The development of those activities, the communications 
involved, the organisations involved, and the (frequency) procurement and supply of 
these services compose the inputs for efficiency. The public organisations then measure 
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the satisfaction of citizens with these products and services, which respectively involve 
the outputs for effectiveness. This means, how your organisation aims to procure cost-
effectively and legally by reducing procurement costs, decreasing supply risks, 
increasing product/service and supplier quality and improving the purchasing function. 
 
From a less abstract to a more business view, Van Weele (2006) transformed the terms 
efficiency and effectiveness into the procurement function, as seen in Figure 2-3. In the 
next sections, the contribution of collaboration to improving procurement performance 
will be analysed and discussed. 
 
 
Figure 2-4 Procurement Performance Combined with Procurement Process, adapted from Van 
Weele, 2006 and Lysons, 2006 
Unfortunately, the model of Van Weele (2005, p. 256) has certain limitations in terms 
of its applicability to this study. Firstly, the model is primarily developed for traditional 
production organisations. Secondly, effectiveness is linked to the overall goal of the 
procurement function in a production environment, rather than the overall organisation 
goal. In the public sector, general objectives can be found in services, final products, 
services and infrastructure works in a public society with sustainability policies. Hence, 
the public procurement function should contribute to the final product and process 
innovation and reduce local authorities’ supply risk. To secure this, the procurement 
processes, as described by Van Weele and Rozemeijer (1996), request an effective 
approach instead of bureaucratic, legal and accountability exportation (Pemer, Sieweke, 
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Werr, Birkner, & Mohe, 2014). This requires a professional procurement function at 
LAs (White, Parfitt, Lee, & Mason-Jones, 2016). Therefore, measuring the performance 
of the procurement function is interesting for this study in connection with the 
procurement process of Van Weele and Rozemeijer (1996) and Lysons and Farrington 
(2006), to find out if the SCP contributed positively to the procurement performance 
(PP) of the LAs in the Netherlands, within a theoretical structure of assumptions and 
principles that hold together the concept of effectiveness and efficiency. This will be 
achieved through examining how efficiently the collaborative organisation is operating 
between its participants, and the effects in the procurement projects on procurement 
costs in the pre-stage, purchase-tender process and contract management, as shown in 
Figure 2-4.  
 
The thesis explores and explains the variables which influence the outcomes of this 
structural form of collaboration (Barnett et al., 2010). Finally, the secondary and 
primary data will be incorporated to construct a conceptual framework for SCP, that 
connects the final sources to the research objectives (Maxwell, 2005, pp. 66-68).  
 
2.3.2 Productivity 
In general, productivity is seen as a ratio between output and input. An increase in 
productivity means that more output is generated from a certain input, or an established 
output is achieved with less input, or a more positive ratio is achieved by a (positive) 
change in the numerator and the denominator. Productivity says, in other words, 
something about converting inputs into outputs. A similar relationship can be 
established between output and effects. Van Weele (2006) showed this from 
procurement science, and recognised that effectiveness fundamentally refers to the 
correlation between actual and planned performance. Moreover, too much efficiency 
can hamper the effectiveness of the performed output. 
 
To analyse the effectiveness of the input of the resources – for example, by executing 
the procurement function – the productivity ratio can be measured in several stages of 
the procurement process (Driedonks, Gevers, & Van Weele, 2010; Úbeda et al., 2015). 
The absolute value of productivity is not of interest in this study but rather the 
difference in productivity between individual organisations and collaborative 
organisations executing procurement functions and procurement projects (Waller, 
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2003). Additionally, Úbeda et al. (2015) identified in their research a strong correlation 
between cost savings and purchasing maturity. Cost savings have been measured with 
productivity in the procurement process. They argued convincingly that most current 
models Keough (1993); Reck and Long (1988) need to be sophisticated, and the 
purchasing tools and methodologies of purchasing maturity necessary must be 
empirically tested. Although they did not examine collaborative factors in their 
research, Úbeda et al. (2015) indicate the demand for academic research in the area of 
effectiveness and efficiency in procurement functions. In short, is an SCP able to 
influence the productivity and maturity of the procurement function of an LA? 
 
2.3.3 Effectiveness and efficiency besides collaboration 
Under the abstract terms of 'efficiency umbrella' and the 'effectiveness umbrella,' there 
are accurate performance indicators. For example, for the concept of ‘procurement 
capacity’ can be considered from an efficiency and effectiveness point of view. The 
performance indicator 'procurement capacity' is important for efficiency, but the 
indicator 'lead-time procurement process' is important for effectiveness. Organising 
professional procurement capacity is an effort for which sacrifices must be made 
(efficiency), and the lead-time / less uncertainty is the extent to which we can meet the 
demand from LAs for that capacity (effectiveness). Also, resources and capabilities 
assume product/service development and innovation (effectiveness). Similarly, sharing 
an e-procurement system in SCP improves the efficiency for the LA. This means there 
is a direct link between SCP and efficiency and effectiveness (Úbeda et al., 2015). 
 
Various studies have shown that procurement professionalism only develops when the 
purchasing population comprises at least a ‘small school class’ of employees. After all, 
a Procurement departments section has different specialisations. On the one hand, this 
can be seen in the procurement structure and on the other hand in the large variety of 
commodities (Albano & Sparro, 2010). Generalists are by definition unable to achieve 
real procurement performance: for this, LAs need a variety of specialists. The 
equivalent of a procurement population of ‘small school class’ of employees is a spend 
of at least a few hundred million euros per year. Ergo, only organisations with sufficient 
critical mass are in a position to achieve a professional procurement function 
(Karjalainen, 2011). Besides, the availability of professional procurement resources is, 
in line with the demands of the civil servants, generalist. By outsourcing to SCP, the 
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principal steps in the procurement process will not change. Moreover, the ‘outside 
provider’ can add innovative and effective procurement techniques to the procurement 
processes.  
 
High frequency of procurement services, through demand aggregation, makes it 
possible to efficiently procure and use the procurement expert capacity needed for the 
delivery of the services ‘in house’, while at the same time benefiting from structural 
communication lines in a strongly connected collaboration (Waverijn et al., 2017). In 
other words: both economies of scale (efficient use of capacity) and transaction costs 
(costs of coordination and availability of these services) indicate that recurring 
procurement services should be done within the SCP. Conversely, incidental, complex, 
customised procurement services are more efficiently governed within the existing SCP 
since centralisation of supporting procurement expert services enables a better use of 
capacity.  
 
Collaboration can influence the goal orientation and effectiveness of the individual 
organisation and the performance that procurement achieves in the procurement 
process. At the strategic level, this consists of achieving the policy objectives, such as 
savings, sustainability, and social return objectives, ensuring availability at the tactical 
level and ensuring at the operational level that the supplier actually delivers the 
procurement performance in accordance with the contract. Aggregation and sharing of 
resources and capabilities can affect this effective performance. In addition to the 
effects of cooperation on the efficiency and effectiveness of the purchasing function, the 
configuration of the structure is also a determining factor for the performances 
(Mintzberg & Ahlstrand, 1998; Mintzbert, Jorgensen, Dougherity, & Westley, 1996). 
 
This suggests that economic motives, technical/operational motives, political motives, 
and strategical/organisational motives and values all have an influence and thus offer an 
explanation for collaboration on efficiency and effectiveness measurements.  
 
Economy of scale motives are caused by a reduction of the (over) capacity of resources 
through consolidation. A concentration of technical, management and operational 
expertise can affect the opportunity to standardise procurement processes and demands. 
Centralising of market and procurement information and consolidation of experiences 
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can supply up-to-date relevant information. Political motives can be found in 
eliminating local barriers, by using the collaborative approach on strategic programmes 
— for example, the implementation of ‘social return’ or ‘small and medium enterprise 
(SME)’ guidelines. This suggests that strategic/organisational motives for collaboration 
can effect synergy, stability, and concentration on innovation and can standardise 
functionality and processes in services. 
 
The academic world describes limited definitions of effectiveness and efficiency in 
collaborative procurement organisations. Schotanus and Telgen (2007) suggest cost-
effectiveness as a dimension of effectiveness. Dyer (1997) claims that effective 
collaboration is a minimisation of transaction costs and a maximisation of transaction 
value. Essig (2000) says that efficiency is the consolidation and reduction of 
administrative costs. Van Weele (2006) combines effectiveness and efficiency in his 
research on procurement performance. Subsequently he splits it up into the efficiency of 
the organisation regarding the procurement function and the effectiveness of the 
execution of the procurement process, whereby efficiency can affect effectiveness. 
However, many authors’ definitions of effectiveness and efficiency are similar to those 
of Alchian and Demsetz (1972); Mintzbert et al. (1996). Nevertheless, in this research, a 
more detailed explanation is sought with regard to the concepts of efficiency and goal 
achievement in the area of structural collaborative public procurement and the 
challenges that the LAs face. 
 
In this study, the definition of Van Weele (2006) is adapted, effectiveness has been 
converted using the procurement process of Lysons and Farrington (2006); Van Weele 
(2006). Effectiveness is related to the aim and objectives of the procurement function: 
the right products or services or infrastructure works from the right source, delivered on 
time and at the best value for money and linked with the organisational goals. Also, 
procurement should act on improvement of innovation and reduce organisation 
dependence and uncertainty (Driedonks, Gevers, & Van Weele, 2014; Eriksson & 
Westerberg, 2011; Úbeda et al., 2015). As authors such as Sporrong and Kadefors 
(2014) have argued, this depends on the degree of professionalism and expertise with 
which LA organisations execute their procurement functions. This can be influenced by 
the performance of the current procurement collaborative organisations. 
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McIvor, McCracken, and McHugh (2011) argued that although outsourced, shared 
collaborative services can offer economies of scales and superior capabilities of 
suppliers, it is unlikely that such benefits will be realised if the participating public 
organisations are tied to their individual internal rules – especially when the autonomy 
in these public organisations is decentralised. McIvor et al. (2011) argued for more 
attention to synchronisation of internal procedures and policies preceding imbedding 
new collaborative contracts. This is realising the procurement savings and to prevent 
misunderstandings with suppliers about the content of contracts. The strategy or action 
that achieves a higher level may then be reflected as more effective than the other. 
McIvor et al. (2011); Van Weele (2006) therefore claim that processes are a significant 
driver for measuring effectiveness. To measure this in the public sector, where the 
procurement process is built around the procedure (Loader, 2015), and to realise the 
goals of organisations, therefore is choosing to convert the procurement process in the 
effectiveness dimension of the procurement performance indicator in this research. 
 
Efficiency in the procurement function is associated with the resources that are required 
to realise the goals and objectives of the procurement function, which are derived from 
the aim and goals of the organisation. In this study, human capital, collaborative 
organisation and IT systems will be part of the research. Therefore, measuring the 
efficiency of procurement functions is related to SCPs and finally the output at the LAs 
(Van Weele, 2006).  
 
The next section reviews the current literature on collaboration, particularly in relation 
to effectiveness and efficiency and collaborations between public organisations.  
 Landscape of Literature on Collaboration in Public Procurement  
Collaboration in public services is a popular phenomenon and has several variants in 
terms of political structures as well as organisations forms. The frequency of 
collaborative relationships in the public sector has been snowballing in recent years 
(Guo & Acar, 2005; McIvor et al., 2011). Nehmelman (2015) stated in his inauguration 
speech as Professor of Public Law at the University of Utrecht that organisations should 
not settle for fragmented collaboration but should work towards amalgamation in LAs. 
In his perception, local government is struggling with its additional activities in the 
realm of unemployment, social protection and healthcare. Aldermen are managing these 
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new activities with neighbouring municipalities through collaborative arrangements (De 
Vries, 2014). From the councils, little democratic control is possible, according to 
Nehmelman (2015). LAs are also having to try and address these new issues on a 
reduced financial budget (Telgen, 2013). Tynkkynen, Keskimaki, and Lehto (2013) 
found in their research a dual approach or requesting for larger LAs or outsourcing  
health care procurement to private service providers, to have an answer to the 
responsibility for providing a range of services to citizens. Academic research is 
therefore needed in this area to provide some fundamental direction to the discussion.   
 
Collaboration seems like a natural option for these types of organisation, as there is little 
to no competition between them. In addition, some services, interests and environments 
are often shared (Murray et al., 2008; Schotanus & Telgen, 2007). Promoters of public 
collaboration suggest that it leads to better results per euro compared with organisations 
working individually. Sporrong and Kadefors (2014) argue that sharing of knowledge 
between technical departments is very costly because knowledge is closely linked to 
culture and identity, and a great deal of technical knowledge is rooted in technologies 
and procedures. Generally, most local government organisations in the Netherlands 
have experience with cooperation (Allers & Van Ommeren, 2016).  
 
2.4.1 Collaboration in this research 
Collaboration is a container-concept that can be approached from many points of view. 
However, this study focuses on the organisation of procurement collaboration between 
LAs, the form of organisation, the autonomy of organisations, and the sustainability of 
cooperation. Collaboration has been investigated in a number of different sectors. One 
of the recent extensions to the framework of the studies is Vereniging Van Gemeenten 
(VNG) and Pianoo (Ministry-of-Economic-Affairs, 2017). However the term 
collaboration needs to be clearly defined, as numerous terms tend to be used, such as 
(joint) purchase groups, SSC, purchase consortiums and joint procurement. 
 
In this research, ‘collaboration’ refers to cooperation between LAs. This is different 
from collaboration between individuals in divisions, teams or projects; although, on a 
tactical and operational level, it is always about collaboration between societies and 
individuals. Organising between organisations means targeting, it must have meaning 
and value, it requires the deployment of resources, and probably this leads to results. 
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The collaboration also develops its dynamic, which can be described as its objectives 
and strategy, management, process design, allocation of resources and management 
style. In this sense, collaboration leads to a kind of community, which is part of other 
communities in the same, existing region. 
 
Collaboration concerns autonomous organisations working together, which must decide 
jointly. Cooperation is therefore about releasing some autonomy in the expectation that 
releasing it will yield benefits. There is no direct control; it is therefore about 
speculation, mutual influence, communication, negotiation and trust in the good 
intentions of the other. Within organisations, control and uncertainty reduction are a 
vital dogma, and that can be at odds with organisation between organisations. 
 
Collaboration is based on implicit or explicit agreements, which can take many forms. 
In this study, cooperation is based on explicit agreements and is formally enshrined in 
legal agreements and established by the municipal council. The collaboration is not a 
one-off, but there is no merger either. In this study, the LAs have a sustainable intention 
of cooperation.  
 
There are various definitions of collaboration, for example of Pazirandeh and Herlin 
(2014 p. 27) ‘sharing or bundling purchasing related information, processes, resources, 
and/or volumes by two or more agencies in a group to improve their performance’. This 
definition is more focused on the incidental cooperate transaction and consolidating of 
demands, but less focused on structural binding and sustainable relationships between 
the participants. 
Regarding SSCs, the definition proposed by Janssen and Joha (2006 p. 102) is more 
focused on collaboration in an internal organisational entity; ‘A SSC is a separate and 
accountable semi-autonomous unit within an (inter)organizational entity, used to 
bundle activities and provide specific pre-defined services to the operational units 
within that (inter)organizational entity, on the basis of agreed conditions’.  
 
For the purposes of his research, Murray et al. (2008 p. 543) defined the procurement 
function within the SSC concept, ‘A procurement shared service is one in which a 
number of councils jointly employ their own dedicated procurement specialist, sharing 
the costs, agreeing the priorities’.  
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This thesis adopts the definitions of Pazirandeh and Herlin (2014)and Janssen and Joha 
(2006), with a slight adjustment: ‘SCP is a separate and accountable semi-autonomous 
organisation which sharing or bundling procurement resources, capabilities, processes, 
knowledge and by two or more LAs to improve their procurement performance’.  The 
rationale for the adjustment in the definition, indicated by parentheses, is the fact that 
SCP involves structure and binding in a region and therefore provides additional 
internal management aspects of the LAs.  
 
2.4.2 Structures of procurement collaboration 
 
Previous perspectives  
Notwithstanding its long history, collaborative procurement, also known as cooperative 
purchasing, has received little attention in business economics or social sciences 
(Dorger, 1999; C. Hill & Lynn, 2003). Compared with research on service centres or 
vertical buyer-seller collaboration, horizontal buyer-buyer structural collaboration has 
not received significant academic attention until now (Janssen & Joha, 2008; Janssen et 
al., 2007; Janssen, Joha, & Zuurmond, 2009; Richter & Brühl, 2017). This seems 
unjustified as cooperative purchasing focuses on purchasing groups and gaining savings 
through economies of scale (Schotanus & Telgen, 2007; Tella & Virolainen, 2005). As 
a result of the economic downturn, questions of centralising or decentralising have 
demanded more research on this subject (Sartor, Orzes, Nassimbeni, Jia, & Lamming, 
2014). They also found that the politics and management can stimulate cooperation 
between municipalities. Walker, Schotanus, Bakker, and Harland (2013) found evidence 
that local politics can hamper collaborative procurement in the public sector. The 
transformational process can be positively affected in the structure of the collaboration 
by prior cooperation structures, which is important when building collaboration on the 
basis of a trustful relationship. However, Niehaves and Krause (2010) did not find 
empirical evidence for cost savings and efficiency advantages by centralising the 
procurement of collaboration. It would have been valuable for them to research the 
financial elements of collaboration in their study to see if money had been saved.  
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Shared service centre 
A shared service centre is a form of cooperation, whereby the forces of individual 
official organisations are consolidated within a new joint organisation. This kind of 
collaboration works on behalf of the participating organisations. Staff from the parent 
organisations are transferred to the new organisation. The shared service centre is found 
in the literature to be particularly suitable for achieving more professional service and 
reducing vulnerability (Richter & Brühl, 2017; Schulz & Brenner, 2010). Also, 
organisation costs will be reduced through economies of scale and cost advantages. In 
addition, a shared service centre can expand its activities with other tasks relatively 
easily, because of the limited shareholders and internal business focus. This form of 
cooperation has been widely used and studied in the Netherlands in recent years 
(Janssen & Joha, 2008; Janssen et al., 2007).  
 
Janssen et al. (2007) analysed the different exchange dimensions that exist between 
clients and shared service organisations through the outsourcing relationships 
framework put forward by Kern and Willcocks (2002) They confirmed the expectations 
of Kern and Willcocks (2002), that this framework can help in analysing relationships in 
outsourcing arrangements based on the social exchange theory. However they did not 
explore a key issue; the underlying components of cost savings and whether these 
influence the relationship between shared service centres and municipalities. On the 
other hand, they showed that potential cost saving is one of the main expected 
objectives in the context dimension. A different approach from Niehaves and Krause 
(2010) showed that cost pressure is the main motive for the emergence of collaboration, 
which justified further research into the cost savings that could potentially be achieved 
through internal collaboration. Niehaves and Krause (2010) showed that cost pressure is 
the major player in the existence and beginning of many examples of collaboration. 
Their research is in contrast with the current situation in the Netherlands shared service 
centres being established to facilitate the decentralisation of youth care services to local 
governments; the major forces at play are expertise, professionals, continuity, and cost 
savings through efficiency and effectiveness (Telgen, 2013). In general line with this are 
the latest findings of Richter and Brühl (2017), which demand more study on the output 





Typologies of cooperative purchasing: groups of purchasing 
Schotanus and Telgen (2007) made a typology of organisational forms of cooperative 
purchasing in the public sector. They appointed groups of purchasing typologies based 
on several dimensions. These dimensions were based on previous studies of D’Aunno 
and Zuckerman (1987); Dyer and Singh (1998); Enthoven (1994); Galaskiewicz (1985); 
Klein Woolthuis (1999); Nollet and Beaulieu (2003, 2005). They measured these 
dimensions on several levels and plotted them in groups. They created a typology per 
purchasing group with specific characteristics, which implies that some of the 
typologies are more suitable to particular situations than others. They did not find 
fundamental evidence of lower transaction costs or more secure resources as a result of 
different forms of cooperative purchasing. They also assumed in their research that 
voluntary purchasing groups perform the best because of the cost-effective driver for all 
of their members. In contrast, fragmented and independent organisations, with their own 
decision-making competences, are often not tooled with a professional procurement 
organisation (Murray et al., 2008; Patrucco et al., 2018). Therefore most decision power 
is mandated to general managers, who are driven by budgets and deadlines. In public 
organisations, these general managers can often use advice from a supportive 
procurement department. Recent research by Patrucco et al. (2018)showed that these 
support procurement units are focused on procedures, without any involvement in 
strategy, product-services content, or planning. This can lead to sub-optimisation, 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness. These organisations often do not have the expertise to 
join the most appropriate forms of purchasing group. Therefore, it would be interesting 
to study if fragmented local government organisations can gain savings or add value 
through a more efficient and effective structural procurement function through 
collaboration with each other. 
 
Voluntary or mandatory 
A significant amount of research has assumed in their research that voluntary 
purchasing groups perform the best because of the driver of cost-effectiveness for their 
members Schotanus and Telgen (2007). On the other hand, fragmented and independent 
organisations with their own decision-making power are often not tooled with a 
professional procurement organisation (Allers & Van Ommeren, 2016). As previously 
stated, so most decision power has been mandated to general managers, who are driven 
by budgets and deadlines. This input from other actors can be gained through business 
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networks. Business relationships and business networks also arise from a certain 
necessity – they are the result of business strategy. This sharing of resources can be 
initiated from politics or from the boards of organisations. Walker et al. (2013) find 
evidence in their study that local politics can hamper collaborative procurement in the 
public sector in their region. This indicates that transformational process can be 
positively affected in the structure of the collaboration by prior cooperation structures, 
which are important for building collaboration in a trustful relationship.  
 
Further development of structuralism in collaboration 
Murray et al. (2008); Sporrong and Kadefors (2014) call for more structural 
collaboration. Moreover, in their case studies they found evidence that voluntary 
collaboration does not lead to maximisation of knowledge exchange. Knowledge is 
closely coupled to each individual person and their skills and role in a particular 
organisation; it also demonstrates competency in a professional, which allows them to 
exercise an exclusive position within their organisation (Levitt, Wang, Ho, & Javernick-
Will, 2012). Although there are benefits from voluntary knowledge-sharing, voluntary 
collaboration can be very expensive and still not produce the desired goals (Carlile, 
2002). Although Sporrong and Kadefors (2014) conducted their research primarily in 
technology communities in the public sector, they suggested that strategic and structural 
policies are essential to gain results from collaboration. Walker et al. (2013) showed a 
significant difference between the applicability of collaboration in the private sector and 
the public sector: the public sector is hindered by local politics, the priorities of the 
professionals and the accessibility of the staff (Levitt et al., 2012).  
 
From that view, Murray et al. (2008) suggests securing structural collaborative 
procurement by establishing or integrating it in an existing or new shared service centre. 
A shared service centre is a form of cooperation, which utilises the forces of the 
individual official organisations within a joint organisation (Janssen et al., 2007). This 
kind of collaboration works on behalf of the organisations involved and staff from the 
parent organisations are transferred to the new organisation, mainly focused on internal 
secondary processes (De Boer, Holmen, & Pop-Sitar, 2003).   
 
This research will focus on local government, exclusively LAs, which are involved in 
several regional collaborative agencies (Proulx et al., 2014). These regional agencies are 
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executing several public obligations and tasks for local government organisations. Some 
of those agencies are shared service centres for IT or human resource management, or a 
hybrid form, for example fire & security organisations, regional innovation centres, and 
regional social youth care centres and environment agencies. These agencies are 
similarly owned by the regional LAs but mainly outsourced and operating as separate 
public organisations. The procurement function of those agencies is integrated in their 
business model; moreover, every agency is obliged to act in line with national 
legislation, European legislation and the procurement policies of their local government 
organisations. In order to prevent inefficiency between LAs, SCPs and agencies in the 
same collaborative region, coordination of procurement activities is necessary (Allers & 
Van Ommeren, 2016). 
 
2.4.3 Gains by collaborative procurement 
Murray et al. (2008) showed the value of collaborative procurement from the 
perspective of hard and soft core. In their case study, they studied six structured 
procurement collaborations at the local level in the UK. One of their findings was that a 
procurement-shared service has benefits from both the intra-organisational hard and 
soft-core models (Van Weele & Rosemijer, 1998) and the inter-organisational 
participation but not non-committal of purchasing group (Nollet & Beaulieu, 2005). On 
the other hand, they did not mention the gains discovered by Janssen et al. (2007) of 
decreasing staff in the context of efficiency of intra-organisational participation through 
structural collaboration. The motivation for most of the cases studied was to save money 
through economies of scale (Niehaves & Krause, 2010). Hence, as shown by Walker et 
al. (2013) too, there is a need for empirical evidence to show that structural 
collaborative procurement brings value and cost savings.  
 
Murray et al. (2008) also show small councils gaining professional procurement 
capacity. Although providing additional procurement capacity can be seen as a 
quantitative gain, it would be more interesting if they had linked these additional costs 
to the procurement results based on efficiency, and reducing risks by pooling available 
resources of the collaboration. Besides direct cost reduction, it would have been 
interesting if they had also researched the value of the qualitative resources provided by 
collaboration. For example, by calculating the costs for a stand-alone individual 
municipality and the costs for a structural collaborative procurement organisation. 
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Transaction costs were expected to be gained through standardisation if collaboration 
was the default option. Unfortunately, this is not measured in their research. However, 
structural collaborative procurement assumes cost reductions and added value (Krueger 
& McGuire, 2005; Murray et al., 2008). Therefore, it would be interesting to find if 
there is any empirical justification for this.  
 
Among the main enablers mentioned in paragraph 2.4.3 are sharing information and 
expertise. According to Murray et al. (2008); Schotanus, Telgen, and De Boer (2010), 
this should help in gaining understanding and exchanging market and product 
information and best practices regarding effective procurement functions. Sharing 
market information would mean that less time would be required for conducting market 
research in the specification phase. Specifications, contracts and procurement 
techniques can be used significantly less. Also, the performance of suppliers can be 
compared in different agencies. In special product commodities, parts of the supply 
stage can be combined – mainly contract management. Finally, agencies can learn how 
other organisations have used procurement functions. In summary, sharing information 
and expertise in all aspects of the purchasing function is beneficial. Dorger (1999) 
argued that through cooperation, cost-effectiveness can be increased.  
 
However, this section indicates that there is a lack of empirical evidence on whether 
collaborative procurement enhances effectiveness and efficiency and brings cost savings 
in professional procurement functions. 
 
2.4.4 Collaboration in public procurement - advantages and disadvantages 
Collaboration in public procurement can bring efficiency advantages by sharing 
volumes because individual organisations spend less time and resources on executing 
purchasing processes. The concept of cooperative purchasing or JPG is often associated 
with collaborative procurement. In this research, structural collaborative procurement 
(SCP) is a much broader internal organisational concept; it focuses more on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of collaborative procurement organisation than joint 
procurement alone. SCP is more comparable with the SSC concept (Allers & Van 
Ommeren, 2016; Murray et al., 2008), meanwhile cooperating with more LAs in an 
internal and external environment. LAs can rely more on an SCP for their primary 
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business procurement activities, than if they had joined a national or regional JPG 
(Nollet & Beaulieu, 2005; Pazirandeh & Herlin, 2014).  
 
Dyer and Singh (1998) distinguished relational enablers of collaboration. Walker et al. 
(2013) used these dimensions in their study to explore the enablers of and barriers to 
collaboration in public procurement.  
Several drawbacks of the operating model need to be kept in mind when considering 
this approach. Pazirandeh and Herlin (2014) could not determine whether collaborative 
procurement can drive, or limit the practice caused by regulations. The cycle time to 
execute procurement projects tends to be longer in the case of purchasing groups aiming 
to maximise their effectiveness (Schotanus et al., 2010). Recent research by Meehan et 
al. (2016) shows from the point of view of behaviour and institutional theory the 
barriers to collaborative public procurement, lack of alignment between national, 
regional and local commitment leading to an unsuccessful national framework. 
Collaborative procurement policies create tensions between cost, compliance and 
quality considerations across intra-organisational stakeholder groups, and between inter- 
organisational collaborating authorities, where different social values, rules and 
rationalities may exist. The large national public organisations have a dominating and 
determining role in the procurement strategy. Therefore, Nollet and Beaulieu (2005) 
argued for homogeneity among members and their interests. These predominant role of 
the large national public organisation can be attributed to the lack of professional 
procurement and material expertise at the small LAs, whereas equal organisations are 
more likely to share knowledge rather than draining it (Sergeeva & Andreeva, 2015). 
 
According to Lysons and Farrington (2006), the disadvantages of centralisation stem 
largely from attitudinal problems (such as maverick buying) and the difficulty of 
controlling processes remotely. Similarly, Van Weele (2006) refers to excessive 
overhead costs and slow responses to divisional matters as a problem of centralisation. 
Another problem is that, there may be a lack of availability of information about the 
decentralised needs of the local government and their agencies after a centralised system 
has been implemented (Proulx et al., 2014; Sartor et al., 2014). However, Kastanioti, 
Kontodimopoulos, Stasinopoulos, Kapetaneas, and Polyzos (2013) call for more 
research into the field of whether centralised or decentralised procurement is more 
suitable for innovation and why public organisations are more costly than private ones. 
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Speed of payment and the capacity to negotiate are the key differentiating factors. In 
certain EU countries with decentralised procurement, there is a clear trend to centralise 
procurement as a way to reinforce market power, bundle knowledge and reduce the 
administrative costs to public organisations (Vogel, 2009).  
 
A frequent complaint of employers’ sector organisations is that small suppliers are 
unable to compete due to the big purchasing volumes required, oligopolies might be 
formed in the market and competition is therefore decreased (Nollet & Beaulieu, 2005; 
Vogel, 2009). According to Pazirandeh (2012), there is real concern that there are too 
few suppliers to fulfil the requirements of governmental invitations for tenders and who 
are able to provide the total volume required. In contrast to the anxiety of the mentioned 
academics to restrict changes for the small and medium enterprises, Schotanus and 
Telgen (2007) argue that improvement of demands and better transparency of 
information through collaboration can lead to more intensive partnerships. Nevertheless, 
in the Netherlands, in the public procurement law, it is forbidden to bundle tenders. The 
scale of the tender must be proportional to the firms on the market. Thus, even in 
collaborative procurement, tenders have to be divided into lots (Union, 2010). This 
requires a professional way of procurement by the collaborative organisation in the pre-
stage where the sourcing strategy is established, as described in section 2.2.2 and in 
Figure 2-5. 
 
According to Essig (2000); Nollet and Beaulieu (2005); Schotanus et al. (2010), typical 
disadvantages of collaborative procurement are start-up costs, coordination costs during 
sourcing and supply, loss of flexibility, loss of control, supplier resistance and anti-trust 
issues. These issues could play a significant role in starting new SCPs. LAs should 
invest in advance in the organisation, structures, and people. This investment is for the 
longer term, rather than incidentally participating in a joint purchasing process. 
Therefore, the goals of an SSC and an SCP are based on issues relating to the continuity 
of the LAs, such as value, securing delivery, and structural cost efficiency. 
 
Walker et al. (2013) studied the benefits and pitfalls of collaboration from a relational 
theory perspective. They found differences in procurement objectives between branches 
of the public sector. This can limit the universal character of participation. Their 
findings argue for more collaboration between equal branches, such as local government 
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or fire organisations or health care organisations. On the other hand, procurement 
objectives concern effective procurement functions, such as SMEs or innovation. The 
aim of this study is not to challenge this view, but rather to examine how structural 
collaboration can be made more efficient and effective, not only in effective 
procurement performance but also in efficiency components, as shown in Figure 2-4. In 
terms of effective performance, this study will fill the gap in the research regarding 
structural collaborative procurement from the perspective of local government in the 
Netherlands.  
 
Also,Walker et al. (2013) found that there was a need for clear calculation methods to 
show the value of collaboration to stakeholders. One contribution of this study will be 
providing empirical evidence to demonstrate if SCP brings additional value or cost 
savings at the local government level.  
 
2.4.5 Outsourcing procurement functions to collaborative procurement 
organisations 
Fundamentally, collaboration or a consortium is a manner of outsourcing the 
procurement function. Outsourcing is a possible solution to decrease costs and is 
compatible with cost reduction drivers (Montresor, 2004; Sporrong & Kadefors, 2014). 
On the other hand, Murray et al. (2008) showed in their research that financial savings 
were expected in the execution of procurement strategies and by sharing knowledge 
using standard documents. Transaction cost reductions were claimed through sharing 
best practice and problems so as to avoid “re-inventing the wheel”. In contrast, these 
public organisations were not obliged to participate as it was on a voluntary basis. Also, 
the researched objects, municipalities, were members of procurement collaborations, 
with several structured arrangements. The study was limited in terms of to what extent 
those shared service gains would continue to be achieved or whether they constituted 
one-off gains, and therefore implied that procurement collaboration may only be an 
interim solution. So a cost-benefit analysis would be advised to analyse if the cost of the 
strategic procurement is recovered from the cost savings gained from the collaboration. 
How larger the local authority, how more professional the financial consideration, stated 
Murray et al. (2008) in his research. 
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Brewer, Wallin, and Ashenbaum (2014) found that anxiety about opportunism defined 
the range of outsourcing of the procurement function. Opportunism signifies the risk 
that one of the parties in the transaction will take advantage of the other if the 
opportunity presents. Focusing on the financial benefits, they find causality between the 
resource position and the potential for opportunism. However they did not research the 
cost saving positive influence, and only addressed the rational costs effects in a limited 
way.  
 
Several researchers have determined reasons and drivers to outsource; a couple are 
displayed in Table 2-1. Ghodeswar and Vaidyanathan (2008) determined that there are 
four potential drivers to outsource a business process. The organisational driver refers to 
achieving more focus on core business processes but also improving the company’s 
flexibility and trying to achieve higher stakeholder value. The improvement driver 
refers to improving operating performance by obtaining expertise, knowledge, skills and 
technologies. The financial and cost driver refers to reducing needed investments and 
costs. The last driver, revenue, refers to growing market access and leveraging capacity, 
processes and systems from a service provider which operates at the best-in-class level. 
Inopportunely, they illustrated their findings on two case studies and analysed two 
generalised parameters: value and core process.  
 
According to Fernandez and Kekale (2007) companies are better positioned to react to 
cost pressures when they have outsourced their procurement function. This outsourcing 
could lead to several benefits but a trade-off needs to be kept in mind. There will be a 
trade-off between the cost savings and the necessary big changes to make outsourcing 
possible. While cost reductions may be seen as the main benefit of outsourcing, other 
possible benefits, which can be created by procurement outsourcing, are efficiency level 
improvements and cycle reductions since these third parties have specialised knowledge 
(Lankford & Parsa, 1999). Further, the company can refocus on other strategic functions 
with more attention (Quélin & Duhamel, 2003). Quélin and Duhamel (2003) state that 
outsourcing a particular business process can help to spread risks more optimally and to 
avoid large investments. However, this statement might be seen as twofold since 




Moreover, Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2002) found that access to external expertise, 
which could lead to improved quality, could also be a driver for outsourcing. Harland, 
Knight, Lamming, and Walker (2005) identified that outsourcing can produce 
“complementary assets” which results in a firm not being chained to its own assets. In 
Table 2-1, the types of drivers that enable activities for outsourcing have been 
summarised. 
 
Table 2-1 Types of Drivers and Advantages of Outsourcing 
Literature Type of Drivers of Outsourcing 
Ghodeswar and Vaidyanathan (2008) Distinction between four kinds of drivers: 
organisational, improvement, financial and cost, and 
revenue drivers; 
Fernandez and Kekale (2007) Cost savings; 
 
(Ghodeswar & Vaidyanathan, 2008; 
Lankford & Parsa, 1999) 
Cost reductions, specialised knowledge of outsourced 
vendor and refocus on core business processes; 
(Quélin & Duhamel, 2003) Cost savings, but also a growth tool for core activities, 
way to increase flexibility and way to gain access to 
external expertise; 
(Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002) 
 
Achieve best practices and enhance cost discipline and 
control skills of manager, improve service quality and 
focus on core competencies, and gain access to new 
external expertise; 
(Harland et al., 2005) 
 
Cost savings, focus on core activities, not limited to 
own assets, external advanced technologies, greater 
workforce flexibility; 
(Brewer et al., 2014) Take account of multiple drivers, stated by RBT and 
the TCT, in considering the outsourcing decision of the 
procurement function; 
(Pulles, Veldman, & Schiele, 2014) Innovation added by strategic suppliers; 
 
(Bals & Turkulainen, 2017) Improve efficiency by increased harmonisation and 
standardisation, as well as effectiveness by increased 
transparency.  
 
This indicates that the main drivers for outsourcing come back to cost-reduction, new or 
improved skills, and innovation. Also, an interesting driver is that besides the direct 
benefits of outsourcing (procurement) processes, even by implementing the processes 
the activities can become more centralised and or standardised. 
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This study will research if savings can be gained through structural collaborative 
procurement. This implies, from the transaction economics view, that local government 
organisations can save money by fully or partly outsourcing their procurement function 
to collaborative organisations. From the perspective of the TCT, the decision to 
outsource activities or execute an activity in-house is mainly concerned with the 
boundaries of the organisation and opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Therefore, Brewer 
et al. (2014) searched for an explanation to provide understanding of the development of 
procurement outsourcing. In their study, they used the framework from McIvor (2009). 
McIvor (2009) found that when an organisation has a weaker resource position and 
there is low potential for opportunism, they are more likely to outsource certain 
activities. These first careful conclusions are interesting.  
 
For outsourcing the procurement function, the rapidly increasing number of initiatives 
taken by LAs to set up SCPs is obvious. Two distinct forms are collaboration through a 
formal and separate third party, and collaboration through informal and virtual 
organisations. An SCP is a form of shared service provider but separate, which advises 
on and executes various public organisation procurement activities (Bakker et al., 2006; 
Murray et al., 2008). Bals and Turkulainen (2017)defines outsourcing as ‘the decision to 
move some of a firm's internal activities and decision-making responsibilities to outside 
providers’. From that point of view, An SCP can be recognised as an outside provider 
for procurement services. On the other hand, the SCP is distinguished by the fact that it 
is bounded in the governance structure of its stakeholders. This means that outsourcing 
can apply in theory to private or public operators, while the SCP is restricted to 
providing services to its stakeholders, the LAs. 
The study by Brewer et al. (2014)showed that outsourcing mainly depends on the 
majority of the procurement organisations, at each stage in the procurement process. 
LAs and public agencies can decide at which stage they can collaborate with a 
procurement collaboration organisation. Also several researchers have different 
approaches. The below-mentioned stages can be used for determining the boundaries of 
the LA  and which should be collaborated with partners (Brewer et al., 2014). 
 
 Providing outsourcing of the strategic procurement function by collaboration 
and value to the core business of the local government organisation. 
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 Providing outsourcing of the tactical procurement function by collaboration and 
value to the core business of the local government organisation. 
 Providing outsourcing of the operational procurement function by collaboration 
and value to the core business of the local government organisation. 
 Establishing a total cost of acquisition versus in-house costs.  
 
In the discussion of the outsourcing procurement function, and in according to the 
notion of the Core-competence theory (Hamel & Prahalad, 1990), it allows LAs to 
break down the procurement function in those mentioned stages to make the final ‘make 
or buy’ decision on each of those. In contrast with the private sector where activity-
based organisation requests more short cyclical demands for procurement expertise 
(Bals & Turkulainen, 2017), the public sector requires more stability in the procurement 
function and a concern for the long term, to secure the strategic, tactical procurement 
function (Harland et al., 2005).  
 
Brewer et al. (2014) researched the extent to which procurement functions are being 
outsourced. They used a five-step framework, narrowed to the procurement process,  
comparable with the structure used in this study and shown in Figure 2-5.  
 
 





















•Dynamic request for 
information
•Analysis and 











Chapter 2 Theoretical Perspective 
51 
This subdivision makes it possible not to outsource core activities with a strategic 
character or to outsource them partially.  
 
Pre-stage 
The procurement strategy contains objectives of the business strategy, which need to be 
realised by entrepreneurs (Mintzberg & Ahlstrand, 1998). For this, it is essential that 
this should be interconnected together optimally. LAs will not outsource this process in 
the first instance, but in order to make good choices they will have to master 
procurement techniques such as conducting value chain analysis, supply market 
analysis, market consultation, conducting a purchase portfolio and, finally, determining 
procurement strategy. The procurement strategy is a essential part of the pre-stage in the 
procurement process, whereby LAs can be facilitated by outside providers (Bals & 
Turkulainen, 2017). The role of the LAs depends on the degree of core activity and thus 
the internal knowledge of the commodity or activity. The strategy of LAs is to perform 
as a management-organisation whereby procurement is the most important critical 
factor to actually realising the benefits of outsourcing (Patrucco et al., 2018).  
 
Purchase/tender process 
More and more of the procurement / tender process is now facilitated by IT software, 
also securing the process and the regulations (Salianji, 2017). This requires skills and 
frequently executing of this process, to prevent failures, besides latent economies of 
scale in the transaction (Karjalainen, 2011). Furthermore, this activity can be 
characterised as non-core and transactional, which means it can be centralised or 
outsourced to facilitated providers (Bals & Turkulainen, 2017). On the other hand, to 
control procurement activities, with potential loss of opportunities in cost, time and 
quality performance, and pay attention to strategic procurement goals (e.g. 
sustainability; innovation), the configuration has to be designed to guarantee the 
normative and regulatory aspects of procurement and to have direct control over 
procurement activities (Patrucco et al., 2018).Therefore, outsourcing to a single strategic 





Centralisation of post-purchasing activities as, monitoring supplier performance, 
identifying improvement opportunities, evaluation and analysing supplier relationships, 
can lead to decreasing of the post-transaction costs (Costantino, Dotoli, Falagario, & 
Sciancalepore, 2012). Reinforced by study of Bals and Turkulainen (2017), although 
they noted to restrict outsourcing to data management and reporting focused on shielded 
activities.  For example contract registration of the activity health care contracts can be 
outsourced to a external provider. While simultaneously internal core employees could 
concentrate on the strategic tasks. 
  
So from this perspective, the most interesting fields to research can be found in the 
preface, sourcing and supply phases. It will be explored at a later stage if local 
governments and their agencies optimise the outsource-gap (more) of (which) parts of 
the procurement function to their structural collaborative procurement organisation. 
Moreover research of Brewer et al. (2014) showed that (>50%) of organisations have 
less access to procurement function resources, in particular procurement strategy, 
evaluating suppliers and less potential for opportunism; outsourcing of the procurement 
function is therefore an interesting alternative, instead of doing the procurement 
function on their own. Worth noting is that Brewer et al. (2014) conducted their 
research in the context of United States-based electronics manufacturing organisations 
rather than public sector organisations. 
However, while there are benefits and drivers associated with outsourcing a business 
process, like procurement, only a few companies have done so (Fernandez & Kekale, 
2007). Aversion to outsourcing seems to result from a perceived loss of control and 
increase of risk (Van Weele, 2006). To encourage companies to outsource their 
procurement function, some researchers have attempted to deal with the issues related to 
outsourcing a business process. Barthelemy (2003) identified some ‘core sins’ which 
cause outsourcing efforts to fail. These sins are mistakes made by the outsourcing 
company and are presented below. 
 
 Selecting the wrong vendor; 
 writing a poor contract; 
 Overlooking personnel issues; 
 Losing control over the outsourced activity; 
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 Overlooking the hidden costs of outsourcing; 
 Failing to plan an exit strategy. 
 
Barthelemy (2003) focused on ‘why’ problems may occur, in contrast with (Freytag, 
Clarke, & Evald, 2012) who researched ‘what’ options firms have when reassessing 
their chosen outsourcing solution. Both works fill the gap in the outsourcing literature 
regarding how firms solve problematic outsourcing experiences or handle new 
possibilities arising from internal or external changes.  
 
Freytag et al. (2012) analysed existing theories for practical cases that provide 
knowledge about what firms do to solve outsourcing problems. As a result, four generic 
solutions were identified when a firm wants to continue with an outsourced activity; the 
different rationales behind each generic solution were given. Three theoretical 
perspectives encouraged these motivations: the cost-based view, competence-based 
view and relationship-based view. By highlighting different rationales behind the four 
generic solutions, the limitations of the three perspectives were demonstrated, and a 
need for a more rich and universal view in the choice of outsourcing solutions was 
emphasised. Changing external and internal environmental factors, or a situation where 
there is no history experience, are confirming (Van Weele, 2006) a matter of 
consideration of the risks. These risks and uncertainties will be covered up by detailed 
contracts.  
 
Outsourcing of the procurement function and the research aim and objectives 
The strategic procurement function brings a long-term change in the procurement 
performance (Murray et al., 2008). Strategic elements of a public procurement 
organisation are related to dimensions of the core-competence theory. Organisations are 
more engaged in outsourcing strategic processes if the outsourcing provides more value, 
reduces costs, extends the scope and scale of government activities, or enhances the 
organisation’s reputation (Bhagat, Byramjee, & Taiani, 2010).  
 
Ghodeswar and Vaidyanathan (2008) determined that there are four potential drivers to 
outsource a business process. The organisational driver refers to achieving more focus 
on core business processes but also improving the company’s flexibility and trying to 
achieve higher stakeholder value. The improvement driver refers to improving operating 
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performance by obtaining expertise, knowledge, skills and technologies. The financial 
and cost driver refers to reducing needed investments and costs. The last driver, 
revenue, refers to growing market access and leveraging capacity, processes and 
systems from a service provider which operates at the best-in-class level.  
 
According to Fernandez and Kekale (2007), companies are better positioned to react to 
cost pressures when they have outsourced their procurement function. This outsourcing 
could lead to several benefits, but a trade-off needs to be kept in mind. There will be a 
trade-off between cost savings and the big changes necessary to make outsourcing 
possible. While cost reductions may be seen as the main benefit of outsourcing, other 
possible benefits which can be created by procurement outsourcing are efficiency level 
improvements and cycle reductions since these third parties have specialised knowledge 
(Lankford & Parsa, 1999).  
 
In Table 2-2, the research objectives of this study are linked to arguments of 
outsourcing the strategic procurement function premised to the PP. The procurement 
activities have been broken down into smaller activities to make the ‘make or buy’ 
decision individually (Bals & Turkulainen, 2017). 
 
Table 2-2 Research Objectives Linked to Outsourcing the Strategic Procurement Function 
 Arguments for outsourcing the strategic 
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 Arguments for outsourcing the strategic 
procurement function premised to PP for 
LAs 
Research objectives 
Flexibility  X   X X 
Professional 
procurement  
  X X X X 
Market 
governance 
 X X X   
Innovation  X X X   
Sustainability  X X X   
Specification X X  X  X 
Sourcing       
Tendering X X    X 
Contracting  X    X 
Contract 
Management 
      
Evaluation  X  X  X 
 
However, to make sure that collaborative procurement achieves its goals – reducing 
waste, improving outcomes for taxpayers and improving the socio-economic situation – 
some enablers need to be achieved (Chapman, Gupta, & Mango, 1998; Proulx et al., 
2014). First of all, some relational and human resource-specific investments in assets 
are required to make collaborative procurement succeed. In the case of SCP, and also 
other hybrid copies of it in the Netherlands, investments are made by multiple local 
governments to found a separate third agency to execute the procurement activities for 
all of them.  
 
Further, there needs to be substantial knowledge exchange to stimulate joint and 
continued learning. Also to enable collaborative procurement, scarce but also 
complementary resources or capabilities must be combined (Caniëls & Roeleveld, 2009; 
Freytag et al., 2012). An example of these resources and capabilities is the manpower in 
the procurement consultancy of SCP which can adjust to every situation and also lead to 
new services, like the execution of the procurement function of local government 
organisations. The last necessary enabler is effective governance, which can help to 
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lower transaction costs or to increase the willingness of the participating organisations 
to engage in initiatives, which could create value.  
 
So for local government organisations and their agencies enabling SCP to execute the 
procurement function, they do need to recognise the core sins and steps of outsourcing. 
Besides that, they also need to keep the enablers of collaborative procurement in mind, 
which are caused by and influence their own organisation (Allal-Chérif & Maira, 2011; 
McCue & Prier, 2007; Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, & Jegers, 2014). 
 
This study seeks to find if similar LAs in the Netherlands and those local authorities that 
are members of existing structural collaborative procurement organisations have less 
access to procurement resources in their own organisations or whether they have too 
much or perform a part of this function insufficiently. Are those organisations 
characterised as less opportunistic, and are there no circumstances surrounding the 
procurement projects that are unknown? Organisations that are considering an SCP can 
use these arguments for their strategic considerations. The next section will view the 
importance and the relevance of the theories which underpin this study. 
 The Relevance of Theories: TCT and RBT 
A better understanding of these questions can enriched by valuable theoretical insights 
for two reasons. First, SCP participation represents conscious managerial and 
administrative choices that change the LA ‘firm’ boundary, which is a central 
component of economic theories (Williamson, 1981). In the practical business 
environment managerial decision making is influenced by their rational business models 
derived from prior experience (Weick, 1993). The business performance of the LAs 
provides an empirical basis for measuring their output alongside the normative 
prescriptions of the economic and strategic theories, including: TCT and RBT. 
Second, although there is large variance in collaborative success in the public sector, 
SCP practices are still emerging and no robust frameworks yet exist to guide, or 
improve such choices. Therefore, understanding the intellectual decision models that 
LAs apply can provide novel insights into SCP practices.  
 
Also, horizontal collaborative (structural) public procurement arrangements are often 
classified in the literature as ‘outsourcing’ internal business processes to shared services 
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agencies (McIvor et al., 2011; Murray et al., 2008; Nehmelman, 2015). Section 2.4.5 
provided arguments for outsourcing vary, and the conceptual frameworks (Bals & 
Turkulainen, 2017; Bhagat et al., 2010; Bustinza, Arias-Aranda, & Gutierrez-Gutierrez, 
2010) which have been used to explain the practice and degree of success achieved 
include RBT and TCT features. 
 
The list of types of collaborative public procurement arrangements before describes the 
various forms which have emerged in the last years. Motives for collaboration vary, and 
the conceptual frameworks which have been used to explain the practice and degree of 
success obtained, through several theories. As might be expected, none of these 
approaches explain all the performance of SCP, observed in practice in collaboration in 
the PP sector, although most explain some of the behaviour, and help to predict the 
likely impact of SCP. This section explains the explanatory principles of these two 
theories and their influence. Although there are theories borrowed from distinct 
domains, this study identifies patterns in three categories. Namely, economic theories 
have been used to theoretically investigate the added value for the LAs, financial 
benefits and coordination between economic agents (SCPs) and the LAs.  
 
The TCT helps to determine which segment of the procurement function can be done 
most cost-effectively in-house by the individual LA organisation and which can be 
outsourced by LA organisations within a particular area without loss of future 
requirements in expertise and limiting the business uncertainty. Is insourcing of 
strategic, tactical and operational procurement capability, essential and expedient for the 
core business of the LA organisation, or is the availability through SCP eligible? 
Arguments on total cost of outsourcing, versus in-house costs and qualified availability 
can be associated with the TCT , which assumes that this collaboration form is chosen, 
with the total of the service costs and the transaction costs being the lowest. This is then 
also the collaborative organisational form, also referred to ‘governance structure’, which 
can be regarded as the most efficient; a hierarchical organisation with central managing 
(Williamson, 1985). 
 
Specifically, transaction cost economics has been used to explore factors in terms of 
transaction costs in the stages of a collaborative procurement project, which can address 
research objective three. TCT identifying avoids the duplication of transaction costs that 
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would arise if each purchasing unit were to conduct the procurement process on an 
individual basis. 
 
Besides, the transaction cost theory investigates the collaboration between SCPs and 
LAs and delivers suggestions for designing and influencing coordination mechanisms 
related to the costs.  This is especially in the outcome of collaboration between SCP and 
LAs, whereby the effective output by the role of information systems in maintaining 
behaviour control can influence the uncertainty in the procurement function of the LAs 
and in the collaborative procurement arrangements.   
 
Through features of the RBT, the research will explore if and how collaboration adds 
value by filling the gaps in the resources and managerial capabilities in the field of PP. 
Warnier, Weppe, and Lecocq (2013) distinguished between strategic resources, ordinary 
resources and junk resources. The critical issues will be if the LA retains 
complementary competences through SCP. Competences in certain stage(s) of the 
procurement process or adding opportunism in the procurement processes (Brewer et 
al., 2014)? The influence of the RBT in the SCP depends mainly on majority and the in-
house capacity of the procurement department of the LAs, including the obtainability of 
robustly professional procurement expertise (Allers & Van Ommeren, 2016).  
 
The present extant literature that specifically examines collaboration in PP is somewhat 
sparse and tends to present narrow and biased theoretical views, mainly core 
competence theory, TCT and institutional theory (Meehan et al., 2016; Richter & Brühl, 
2017). Existing work focuses primarily on savings by consolidation of procurement 
spends, type of collaboration, and autonomy. Therefore in this study the call of 
practitioners and researchers for additional research will be answered, especially in the 
area of SCP, utilising theories which have long been limited in their application to 
collaboration in PP, more specifically the RBT. This is arguably the most influential 
theory applied to the general study of critical and vulnerable strategic procurement 
functions of LAs (Richter & Brühl, 2017). In the PP function there are probably 
resources which are critical for the LA business organisation and/or scarcely available 
on the market.  
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In this section the above-mentioned theories will be explored in relation to the aim and 
objectives of this study.  
 
2.5.1 Transaction Costs Theory (TCT)  
TCT could also serve as one of the fundamental theories for collaboration in local 
governments in the Netherlands. Current calls for increased public sector efficiency and 
effectiveness are, however, making procurement practices more and more collaborative. 
In order to avoid duplication of efforts, there is a strong push for coordination and 
alignment among humanitarian agencies. Based on these thoughts, academics and 
policy have promoted the applicability of collaborative procurement. Transactions cost 
analysis originated from the Nobel laureate economist, Ronald Coase. His paper, ‘The 
nature of the firm’ deals with the ‘make or buy’ question (Coase, 1937). Another Nobel 
laureate (Williamson, 1985) followed up the question and developed the governance 
structure: make, buy or hybrid. Current supply chain management originates from these 
studies. Transaction cost analysis deals with analysing the costs of searching for 
suppliers, negotiating prices and drawing up and enforcing contracts. A recent and 
similar opinion from Lingard, Hughes, and Chinyio (1998) categorised TCT as either 
ex-ante or ex-post. Ex-ante costs include the costs of purchase strategy, tendering, 
negotiating and writing the contract, while ex-post costs may be incurred during the 
execution and policing of the contract or when resolving disputes arising from the 
contracted work. 
 
In 1900, respectable neo-classical economists such as Thorstein Veblen and Alfred 
Marshall assumed that there were no transaction costs. That was why the relationship 
between supply and demand was calculated mathematically as Qd = Qs (Salvatore, 
1995). In contrast, institutional economists such as Williamson (1975, 1981, 1985) 
stated that there exists a transaction cost other than the demand-supply relation based 
prices, such as the issue of framing a contract and selecting entrepreneurs. This is not 
part of the original tangible cost of the product or service. Nonetheless, it has to be done 
by buyers or sellers, or both. Also, information asymmetry must be considered. Neo-
classical economics considered a zero cost for information. In reality, it is assumed that 
information has a cost. Indeed, nowadays with e-procurement systems, information has 
become a direct cost component (Lysons & Farrington, 2006). In the public sector in 
Europe, for the announcement of public contracts, a national e-procurement system is 
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used, which is not free. These two issues, transaction cost and information asymmetry 
(procurement costs) were the establishing blocks of institutional economics 
(Williamson, 1975). Thus it can be clear that transaction cost economics is part of 
institutional economics. 
 
Transaction cost economics 
Economists have long recognised that ‘resource owners increase productivity through 
cooperative specialisation’ (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972, p. 777). The conception of 
optimum utilisation to maximise and optimise output, economising on transaction costs, 
is crucial for any study of public organisations, especially when financial budgets have 
been cut at a national level. The dimensions of transactions should be specified and 
alternative management structures ('governance structures') described, particularly in 
this research to find evidence to gain savings by collaborative procurement. Also, to 
find possible short deficiencies to divert to TCT, in existing SCPs. The economisation 
of transaction costs is achieved by attributing transactions in a distinctive manner to 
individual procurement structures. The approach in this research is applicable to 
determine the efficiency boundaries between local government organisations of internal, 
fragmented procurement transactions. 
 
The TCT of Coase (1937) and Williamson (1970) tries to explain the shift from markets 
with many smaller organisations to hierarchies dominated by a few large companies. 
Alternative forms of economic coordination – market-based and private enterprise – in 
the markets and hierarchies were compared in terms of the difficulties they have in 
realising different types of transactions (labour, products and financial) in a variety of 
environments (Salvatore, 1995). This is in contrast with the decentralisation actions of 
the national government in the Netherlands, where public activities have been assigned 
to many small local government organisations (380 municipalities without their linked 
agencies) (VNG, 2015). This can be linked to a plan to merge local government 
organisations to one organisation per 100,000 inhabitants. However, this merging was 
not feasible after the elections in 2012, so has been taken off the strategic agenda at 
many LAs. Hence, the interest question according to the TCT is, if collaboration may be 
alternative way to reduce transaction costs in executing internal and external 
procurement activities. 
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Dynamics affecting cost of procurement 
In this literature review, TCT is analysed alongside the improvement in effectiveness 
and efficiency due to collaborative horizontal procurement. Williamson (1975) applied 
the transaction cost to the procurement process. Building on Coase (1937) work, he 
proposed a classification of transaction costs in market costs and hierarchy costs. 
Market costs involve costs of selection for the supplier, costs of finding target customers 
for the products of the firm, costs for contract drafting, and approval costs for contract 
enforcing. In this research, this classification is extended and refined using the later 
procurement process models of (Van Weele, 2006). 
 
Earlier research by Williamson (1985) made a distinction between ex-ante and ex-post 
transaction costs. Ex-ante costs include the costs of tendering, negotiating and writing 
contracts while ex-post costs may be incurred during the execution and policing of 
contracts or when resolving disputes arising from contracted work. Ex-post costs 
include direct costs such as the cost of implementing control systems, cost accounting, 
measuring performance, quality assurance systems and layers of the managerial 
hierarchy. Ex-post costs may arise from disputes and litigation may also be high. Ex-
ante costs were tentatively identified as those incurred in (for example) contractor 
selection. Later research by Lysons & Farrington, 2006; Van Weele (2005) reformed 
these statements to procurement process models, as analysed in Chapter 1. 
 
As well as the costs incurred in selling goods and services, the buyer of goods and 
services also incurs costs at each stage. Together, these involve substantial resources, 
which are typically dealt with as overheads. On the other hand, internal hierarchy costs 
correspond to the costs of the entrepreneurial organisations, as defined by (Coase, 
1937). These are formed by:  
 
 costs for human resources selection and management; 
 costs of control on contracts regarding human resources;  
 costs of contract enforcement; 
 costs of coordination and information transmission within the firm.  
 
From a shared-service perspective, Janssen et al. (2009); McIvor et al. (2011) showed 
that, through more structural collaboration, indirect and overhead costs can be saved. 
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On the other hand, Knol, Janssen, and Sol (2014) argued that decision makers must be 
aware of the implementation process of the structural collaboration organisation; they 
also mentioned indirect costs. These can be different between collaboration 
organisations because they are less uniform than is often thought. As said before, this 
requires a long-term strategic decision.  
 
TCT and governance structure 
Characteristics of the TCT can be used and tailor-designed to occasions related to the 
governance of services that are or will be concentrated in a collaborative organisation. 
Minnaar and Vosselman (2009) theorised the impact that a shared service centre has on 
the governance structure or management control structure of service transactions. The 
research was executed in opposition to the conceptual model developed by Vosselman 
(2002). In that model, the concentration of supporting services is linked with the 
horizontalisation of management control relationships. Based on both studies, the 
governance structure partly exercises control through market mechanisms (Minnaar & 
Vosselman, 2009; Vosselman, 2002).  
 
Minnaar and Vosselman (2009) later developed a model with particular attention to 
underlying transaction cost economics theory. In this model, they referred to the 
governance structure of supporting activities (services) and to market mechanisms and 
the customisation of services. They showed that complex customised services might 
efficiently be performed by a collaborative shared service centre, or decentralised in the 
business unit itself. Earlier research argued that this depends on the frequency and 
complexity of the activities in question. It has been argued that a high frequency of 
complex customised services makes it possible to gain efficiencies and use the capacity 
needed for the delivery of services ‘in house’, while at the same time advancing from 
short communication lines. In other words, both economies of scale, an efficient use of 
capacity, transaction costs, and costs of coordination of these complex services indicate 
that cyclical complex customised services should be done within the business unit. On 
the other hand, incidental complex tailored services are more efficiently governed 
within the existing shared service centre, while centralisation of supporting services 
makes better use of capacity possible (Janssen & Joha, 2008). The reduction of 
transactions avoids transaction costs as a result of potential opportunism by an external 
party (Vosselman, 2002; Williamson, 1985).  
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Regular routine customised procurement services can also be organised jointly (Albano 
& Sparro, 2010). Concentration of those activities in a specialised service centre 
generates economies of scale, while transaction costs are relatively low. For simple 
customised services, the role of frequency is such that incidental transactions are better 
governed via the market than via shared service centre. In contrast with their model, in 
their case study Murray et al. (2008) found the opposite – that business units chose to do 
a large part of the transactions themselves, whilst the model would imply an internal 
outsourcing of these transactions to the shared service centre. This is caused by one of 
the restrictions of the model, which is based on strictly economic reasoning, while 
traditionally outsourcing has been a feasible alternative for non-core activities. Other 
gaps in their research were the insufficient attention given to the structural 
implementation of the change from independent business units to a collaborative-shared 
service centre and the hindrance from boards’ distrust of collaboration (Murray et al., 
2008). Therefore, Nollet and Beaulieu (2003) and Schotanus et al. (2010) argue for 
collaborative arrangements on a voluntary basis, initiated by the operational units. The 
contrast in their studies is that they focused on joint procurement groups and not on 
structural procurement collaborations models. Driedonks et al. (2010) observed in their 
research that policy implementation and governance can prevent reluctance to engage in 
time-consuming and potentially frustrating inter-professional collaboration. Grant, 
McKnight, Uruthirapathy, and Brown (2007) state that strategic alignment of the 
governance structure with that of the parent organisations increases managerial 
effectiveness, administrative efficiency and adds value to services rendered.  
 
The TCT can be subdivided into transaction costs, asset specificity or human capital 
specificity – one or both of the parties develops skills or knowledge specific to the 
buyer-seller relationship – and asymmetrical information distribution (Krueger & 
McGuire, 2005; Yigitbasioglu, 2010). In this study, public organisations are viewed as 
governance structures rather than as mere production-distribution entities. Williamson 
(1981, p. 552) reinvigoration of the transaction cost approach made the material 
approachable for economic science. According to Williamson, transaction costs can be 
defined as the ‘comparative costs of planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion 
under alternative governance structures’ (Williamson, 1985 p. 38). In other words, the 
costs of contracting suppliers also depend on the institutions and how they are 
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organised, besides the contract value resulting of tender. Some local government 
organisations create more costs for individually contracting firms than others. Also, the 
management of contracts, varies between the organisations. These costs can also be 
affected by collaborative procurement models. An efficient and effective operation can 
have an influence on the level of the costs to society by actually collaborating in these 
organisations.  
 
TCT in effectiveness of collaborative procurement 
The TCT is applicable for the pre-stage, sourcing-stage and contract management 
stages, which are divided into the tactically and operationally stages of the procurement 
process (Coulson, 1997; Williamson, 1985). Krueger and McGuire (2005) tested the 
proposition that large municipalities, in a collaboration group, are more capable of 
collaborating in the operational stage of the procurement process with suppliers than 
small municipalities; however, his hypothesis was not proved, as large LAs were not 
found to be more capable. Whether or not the reduction of transaction costs in the 
procurement process can be realised by collaboration has not yet been researched.  
 
Lingard et al. (1998) observed that some theorists argue for three stages: search and 
information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing and enforcement costs. These 
stages are generally equivalent to the classification of transaction costs suggested by 
Van Weele (2006) and Lysons and Farrington (2006) as: search costs, product or service 
specification costs, contract selection and negotiation costs, supplier selection costs, 
performance monitoring costs and contract enforcement costs. These are more specific 
than the two argued for by transaction cost economists, and for the purpose of more 
detailed analysis can be re-stated as: pre-tendering work, tendering work and post-
tendering work. However, the third stage is too broad in that it includes regularly 
executing activities as well as dispute resolution. It is more useful to separate dispute 
resolution or claims, especially in the light of contemporary developments in 
procurement practice specifically designed to avoid claims in the first place. On the 
other hand, claims or disputes are more about the tender procedure than about 
performance in the executing phase.  
 
Additionally, Lingard et al. (1998) suggest that transaction costs in the pre-tendering 
phase and post-tendering phase depend on the level of the information given to the 
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bidders. They assume in their research a theoretical model where, at the optimum level 
of information, the total transaction costs in the ex-ante and ex-post stages are on at 
minimum level for the contract authority. The level of information in the procurement 
stages will directly influence the bounded rationality, affecting knowledge, perception 
and awareness of risk from opportunistic behaviour; this in turn influences decisions 
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). Lingard et al. (1998) did not empirically test their 
model; also, the use of several different contractor selection models makes this study 
less effective. Various authors, such as  Eriksson and Westerberg (2011); Lam and Gale 
(2014); Tella and Virolainen (2005), find evidence in their research that trust and 
loyalty in the collaborative purchasing group is a condition for cost savings. They 
showed that suppliers would react to higher prices when organisations are not loyal to 
each other and are buying outside the framework agreements. Through the lens of 
transaction costs theory, game theory and behaviour theory, they find evidence that 
potential cost savings are mainly due to increased negotiating power and economies of 
scale on the market, which directly affect contract prices. This indicates that the 
structure and sustainability of relationships contribute to trust and loyalty in the 
collaboration, which affects the effectiveness of the SCP. 
 
Another source of cost savings is reduced transactions. Through collaborative 
procurement, individual players can lower their number of individual transactions, 
which are proportional related to procurement, especially in pre- and sourcing stage 
activities. This has the same effect as centralisation of purchasing. On the other hand, 
Tella and Virolainen (2005) simplified in their study that procurement costs should be 
regarded equally with purchasing price and that there are also other motives behind 
cooperative purchasing than savings in purchasing costs; especially in this research 
where the enhanced effectiveness and efficiency of procurement performance will be 
studied.  
 
Economies of process  
The effectiveness of the procurement process includes implementing a shared standard 
way of operating while contracting suppliers, during the tendering process, and also in 
the contract management phase (Albano & Sparro, 2010; Faes, Matthyssens, & 
Vandenbempt, 2000). Faes et al. (2000) found evidence claiming for more coordination 
by centralisation or collaboration by global purchasing coordination. Synergy 
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advantages, due to centralisation or collaboration of procurement activities in and with 
organisations, can lead to competitive advantage and stakeholder value. Also, other 
researchers such as Dyer (1997); Essig (2000) discuss less administrative work and a 
decrease in administration duplication, in addition to a reduction of procurement 
organisation expenses and failures, as procurement synergy advantages.  
 
Economies of process for collaborative procurement and transaction costs mean a 
reduction of duplicated efforts in several of the procurement process phases such as 
preparation, tendering and contract management. Additionally, as one specialised unit 
handles the tendering processes, a standardised operating procedure for suppliers is 
easier to establish. For the purposes of this research, the procurement process has been 
split into three stages (Lysons & Farrington, 2006). These are shown in Table 2-3. 
 
Table 2-3 Procurement stages by Lysons & Farrington (2006) 
Stage Description 
Pre stage Developing relationships and selling, including pre-qualification for preferred 
tender lists, forming alliances, establishing reputations (Lysons & Farrington, 
2006). 




Managing the content of the contract, monitoring performance, ensuring the 
carrying out of contractual obligations during the contract period. There are 
two types of dispute resolution after the contract period: agreeing what is 
owed and recovering what is owed, i.e. bad debts. Claims, enforcement and 
disputes are the result of the discharge of contractual obligations (Lysons & 
Farrington, 2006).  
 
The next paragraph will focus on the transaction costs of the pre-stage and sourcing 
stage. 
 
Process costs of public tenders 
Costantino et al. (2012) conducted research into the transaction cost problem in public 
tenders awarded in EU countries under the lowest price awarding criteria (Union, 2010) 
suggesting a probable approach for measuring the opportunity to use a pre-qualifying 
phase to reduce the total cost of purchasing. By presenting a probabilistic model to 
calculate the total cost of the transaction by evaluating, besides the purchasing price, 
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they showed that additional costs of purchasing costs are sustained both by the 
contracting authority and the bidders. By limiting the number of bidders, these 
additional costs can be saved for the buying and selling side. This trial would be more 
interesting if they had not assumed that the bidders’ quality is comparable and that the 
costs after tendering related to the various bids do not differ significantly because public 
contracts are awarded more and more on the Most Economic Advantage Tender 
(MEAT) criteria instead of simple lowest price (Union, 2010). By awarding on MEAT 
criteria, bidders can distinguish their bids on value and quality so quality is mostly not 
comparable. Also, the costs after tendering are often different, mainly due to the 
difference in the level of professionalism between the procurement organisations 
(Johansson, 2012; Ye, Shen, Xia, & Li, 2014). 
 
Also Karjalainen (2011) attempted to develop a formula to calculate the savings of the 
process costs of a centralised procurement project for the public sector. She examined 
the internal costs for a procurement project in the pre-stage and sourcing stage of the 
procurement process. Unfortunately, she did not carry out further research in more 
detailed data into the cost structure and allocation of the central purchasing unit. Other 
researchers including Celec, Nosari, and Voich Jr. (2003); Singer, Konstantinidis, 
Roubik, and Beffermann (2009) conducted similar approaches to estimate unit 
procurement costs. Singer et al. (2009) multiplied the estimated costs of different 
procedures by the number of times that the state avoids repeating the procedures. 
Karjalainen (2011) developed the formula for calculating the savings from centralising 
the pre- and sourcing phase of the procurement process of one product of service 
category. This formula will be extended in Chapters 4 and applied in further research to 
analyse and calculate the output that local authorities achieve through collaborative 
procurement, compared with similar solo procurement. Although the general 
assumptions that Karjalainen (2011) made were based on professional experience and 
data from an agency, it would be interesting to research the effects on SCP: if the 
transaction costs in the pre-stage and sourcing stage can be multiply influenced.  
 
Additional costs of purchasing model 
Comparing the formula of Karjalainen (2011) with a somewhat similar opinion from 
Costantino et al. (2012), it can be concluded that both researchers took into account the 
cost of bidders in their purchase price models. Costantino et al. (2012) calculated the 
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cost of the bidding firm in a diverted formula based on the predictable features of the 
game theory (Krishna, 2009). On the other side, Karjalainen (2011) used earlier work 
from Schotanus, Telgen, and De Boer (2009), which suggests that it is problematic to 
analyse these savings because it is often unknown what prices were paid before 
purchases were jointed and if the contracts were exactly comparable. However, this 
study focuses on the procurement costs of the contracting authority and the gains made 
through collaboration. On the other hand, Costantino et al. (2012) modelled a formula 
per activity for the sourcing phase.  
 
Conversely Costantino et al. (2012) used a probabilistic approach for opening the 
opportunity to reduce the total cost of the pre-procurement and sourcing stages. 
Although they based  their model on a single case study, the model is a method for cost 
reduction. Irrespective of how this eventually worked out, there is no question that 
Costantinto et al.’s understanding of costs in the pre- and sourcing phase is fundamental 
to understanding the cost structure in the public procurement process (Union, 2010). In 
their model, they calculated the total cost for the contracting authority and the total 
social cost, including costs for the supplier. These costs increase in a linear fashion with 
the researched population (=n) and therefore the model can be diverted and used 
independently. Although their study was specific to a single procurement process, their 
method and formula can in principle be used later in Chapter Four of this study, because 
of the similarity in stages between an individual and collaborative procurement process. 
Although the quantity in these (sub) stages can be different. 0 provides the adapted form 
and relevant part of their study. In the next section the contribution of the RBT is 
explained, in the areas of people, knowledge and IT services.  
 
2.5.2 Resource Based Theory (RBT) 
The local government organisations exist to deliver excellent products and services in a 
cost-effective manner. Therefore the RBT is a fundamental assumption for this research. 
Local government organisations have to consider the set of resources available to them 
as the primary driver of their business strategy and determine what can be done using 
their own resources or what has to be outsourced. 
  
Smith, Vasudevan, and Tanniru (1996 p. 42) have outlined the definition of resource to 
include ‘tangible and intangible resources, as well as the capabilities required to deploy 
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firm assets’. Additionally Warnier et al. (2013) show that the development of new 
resources can improve current resources or combining resources together can eventually 
help to craft a new business model. By collaboration at the local government level, 
between current tasks and partly new tasks, resources for strategic and tactical managers 
are important to create value or to lower costs. As reinforced by Kay (1995), successful 
exploitation of new products or services can be achieved by cooperation and 
collaboration. On the other hand, Smith, Vasudevan, and Tanniru (1996) showed that 
organisational learning is a capability that can be considered a strategic resource, which 
can develop dynamically over time. In this study, local governments have to renew 
services from the central government. From this view, organisational knowledge must 
be created and maintained with a shared architecture, whereby sources from existing 
public organisations can be used (Sitlington & Marshall, 2011; Smith et al., 1996). The 
RBT provides complementary resources for the procurement function, such as expert 
centres, specialists, professional staff etc., which enables a better procurement 
performance (Brewer et al., 2014; Tokman, Glenn Richey, Deitz, & Adams, 2012).  
 
Complementing this, Brewer et al. (2014) confirmed through empirical research the 
work of McIvor (2009) and found evidence that organisations with weak procurement 
resources which can be characterised as having low opportunism (Brewer et al., 2014) 
are willing to outsource their procurement functions. Future researchers may be 
interested in the inconsistencies in the findings of Brewer et al. (2014) in the 
overlapping quadrants of weak and strong resources. Organisations have stronger 
procurement skills inside than potential suppliers, who have no independent interest. 
Obviously, estimated performance gains from outsourcing procurement activities may 
not appear. The LAs in this study are mostly willing to ‘outsource’ procurement to the 
SCP, because the SCP is a shared service owned by the LAs in the region and also 
because of the lack of current knowledge of public procurement. 
 
The resource theory encourages companies to look internally, suggesting that value, 
scarcity or distinctiveness can be gained from effectively utilising resources. Ricardo 
(1817) started with some essential thoughts of this theory in his book Principles of 
Political Economy and Taxation. He found evidence that the difference in relative 
commodity prices between two nations is evidence of their comparative advantage and 
composes the basis for mutually beneficial trade. A similar opinion is expressed by 
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Heckscher (1919); Ohlin (1933), who extended this theory on how to explain what 
determines comparative advantage and to examine the effect of international trade on 
the earnings of factors of production.  
 
RBT is a theory, which gives an explanation for the strategy and growth of companies 
from internal availability or scarcity of production (Sanchez & Heene, 2005; Smith et 
al., 1996). Resource theory assumes that companies need production inputs to provide 
services and goods. This is not just about natural resources or capital but also the 
capacity, knowledge and competencies that enable it to produce goods or services and 
deliver them to customers. 
 
Early research by Penrose (1959), makes a distinction between physical resources 
(buildings, technology, materials) and human resources. He emphasised that human 
sources, ergo knowledge, competences and capacity within the company, have a 
dominant effect on the management team. This influence determines how management 
react to developments and the existence of resources in their business environment and 
make decisions (P. Boxall, 2003; P.  Boxall & Purcell, 2003). Penrose’s viewpoints 
were later introduced to the field of strategic management by Wernerfelt (1984), who 
argued that strategic organisational decisions had to be focussed on the application of 
existing resources, or focusing on securing or developing these unique resources. 
Similarly, Barney (1991) and Peteraf (1993) viewed the firm as an exclusive package of 
assets and resources that, if employed in distinctive ways, can create competitive 
advantage. Resources with the latent ability to generate competitive advantage must 
have a number of criteria, including value, rarity, imitability and organisation.  
Conversely Mosakowski (1993) criticised this theory, arguing that there are no strategic 
equivalence resources which are scarce or inimitable. The resources also must relate to 
the organisation to gain value. Barney (1991) commented that resources gain value if 
they remain appropriate to the business environment of the organisation. The mixture of 
complementary resources in the supply chain qualifies greater performance and 
competitive advantage and can make the difference (Tokman et al., 2012; Zacharia, 
Sanders, & Nix, 2011). From the point of view of LAs, the interesting area is whether 
SCP can provide the distinction in procurement resources, whereby the LAs have access 
to rarity and imitability of procurement resources. Are the LAs more capable to meet 
their challenges in the field of decentralisations of public tasks and the new procurement 
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political policies issues? Conversely, have the LAs the needed knowledge and capability 
previously in house or is efficiency obtainable without SCP? 
 
Professional services  
This research is conducted in the setting of the public sector, especially local 
government organisations linked to municipalities. The largest part of internal budgets 
is related to the cost of organisations and civil servants (House-of-Commons-
Communities-and-Local-Government-Committee, 2014). Therefore it is critical in this 
research to explore if savings, less uncertainty or more value can be gained through 
collaboration by focusing on how services are performed through the lens of the RBT, 
besides the efficiency savings (economies of scale) and the additional value of the 
expert resources in procurement.  
 
Also, Hitt, Bierman, Shimuzu, and Kochhar (2001) found direct and indirect effects of 
human capital on the performance of professional services organisations. They claimed 
that resources and strategies interact to achieve positive results. Companies have 
tangible and intangible resources as they develop and implement strategies. Intangible 
resources are more likely to produce a competitive advantage as they are often rare and 
socially complex and therefore difficult to imitate (Barney, 1991; Brewer et al., 2014). 
This corresponds to what Barney (1991) said about the creation of causal ambiguity. A 
complementary research by Becerra (2009) shows that intangible factors are less easy to 
obtain through the market. In his study, he neglected to investigate whether this implies 
that the intangible resources of public agencies are also employable in other public 
organisations by collaboration to gain financial savings or add value and what contains 
the concept value for the LAs. 
 
Aspects of human capital include the education, experience and skills and 
characteristics of top managers, according to Hill (2005). He argues that selecting, 
developing and using these aspects creates the most valuable knowledge for a company. 
Knowledge can be divided into easily transferable knowledge through formal education 
and 'tacit' or implicit knowledge that is often gained by learning (Tokman et al., 2012). 
The latter form is common in the routines and social context of a business’s processes 
and is important for professional skills. This is often unique, difficult, uncertain and not 
easy to imitate. Activities in which the firm maintains a superior resource position or 
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capability, mostly their core competence, are likely to be kept in-house. Those activities 
for which resource position or capability is weak are more suitable for outsourcing. This 
argument recommends outsourcing non-core or niche business activities to structural 
collaborative organisations (Brewer et al., 2014).  
 
Convincingly, Sporrong and Kadefors (2014) argued in their research for more 
competent human resources in the procurement function at municipalities. In their case 
studies conducted on Swedish municipalities, they demonstrated that the procurement 
function must move to a more strategic function. They claimed that more resources 
should be allocated. They found that small municipalities in their case studies did not 
have access to professional procurement practitioners. On the other hand, there was 
strong demand for professional procurement expertise and a generation shift in civil 
servants was needed. One gap in their research is that they did not suggest or only 
slightly noted opportunities for structural collaboration for those (small) municipalities. 
This is inconsistent with Murray et al. (2008) and McIvor et al. (2011) who 
demonstrated that structural collaboration could be a way to allocate professional 
procurement resources in-house. Both studies were conducted at municipalities. 
 
Through the lens of the RBT and the context of the research, this inconsistency can be 
explained. According to Amit and Schoemaker (1993), the RBT made a consequent 
difference between resources non-specific to the organisation and resources which are 
specifically connected to the organisations – so-called competences. Municipalities are 
strongly and integrally associated with their products as they are closely related to the 
politics and citizens they serve. According to Trepte (2004), civil servants have seen 
procurement as a necessary way of contracting suppliers. Deasy, White, Parfitt, and 
Ringwald (2014) showed that within single organisations in the public sector, the 
maturity of the procurement function can be different between departments. Pemer et al. 
(2014) attribute this phenomenon to culture influences, ‘slept’ in the procurement 
organisation. This also suggests that less attention has been paid to professional 
procurement in the case study of Sporrong and Kadefors (2014) on engineers. So there 
is no need to get access to procurement competence resources through traditional 
engineers or structural collaboration by those municipalities. As it is underexposed, 
Sporrong and Kadefors (2014) request a generation shift and movement of the 
procurement function to a more strategic function (McIvor et al., 2011). This shift is 
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necessary to conform Barroso (2010) to previously agreed European agreements in the 
field of sustainability, environment, and savings. 
 
Hartmann, Davies, and Frederiksen (2010) established in their case study that on the 
one hand, contract teams are influenced by contract documents when establishing 
transaction relationships with suppliers. Any gaps in these relationships not covered by 
the contracts have to be addressed as part of an ongoing learning process between the 
various parties involved. On the other hand, deficiencies, contradictions and 
disturbances in the transaction relationships form the basis for adjustments of the 
existing contracts for subsequent transactions. To some extent, contract teams need 
support in interpreting and adjusting contract documents and building up transactional 
relationships. Those findings support Driedonks et al. (2010), who shows that creating 
team structures does not automatically go hand-in-hand with successful empowerment 
and functional integration. Sourcing teams face some typical challenges related to their 
boundary-spanning role, heavy dependence on the commitment of internal stakeholders 
and part-time team member assignments. Managers have a crucial role to fill in enabling 
and enhancing team performance. Driedonks et al. (2014) showed that rewards and 
incentives are very important for the performance and motivation of sourcing teams. 
They conclude that the effects of human capital and resources on performance are both 
direct and indirect for procurement performance. 
 
The organisation’s strategy is to congregate and combine inputs in a way whereby 
comparative advantage is achieved compared to other companies. Or in an in a different 
way, for the public sector, to gain more effectiveness and efficiency by optimal use of 
resources (Brewer et al., 2014; Janssen & Joha, 2008). By continuing to invest in 
developing the skills of employees, organisations retain the properties as described in 
the resource-based view. Employing these sources effectively finally results in savings 
and values. 
 
Many researchers, for example Boschma (2005); Hyvönen, Järvinen, Oulasvirta, and 
Pellinen (2012); Sartor et al. (2014) have discussed that the necessary production factors 
for delivering a product or service are not or are insufficiently available within 
organisations in fragmented or small local government organisations or departments. 
Others such as Albano and Sparro (2010); Sartor et al. (2014) have argued that other 
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organisations, departments or agencies who are specialised in these functions can 
provide this service well. Unfortunately, they neglected to find empirical evidence for 
their discussion and limited their research to case studies and invited future scientists to 
provide further empirical research.  
 
Type of resources  
Complementary research by Warnier et al. (2013) extended the RBT by distinguishing 
the contributions of different typologies of resources, mentioned in Table 2-4. While 
recognising the strategic focus of the RBT, they shifted their focus to reflect other types 
of resources as well. This differentiation uncovers undervalued resources and leads to 
new business models. Warnier et al. (2013) distinguished strategic resources, ordinary 
resources and junk resources. This mapping can be applied to procurement models for 
measuring the procurement function. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) focused more on 
strategic dynamic competences. Also a future study by Sanchez and Heene (2005) 
focused more on strategic competencies. 
 
The need for procurement resources will be analysed from the point of view of LAs. 
These organisations may opt for procurement resources to create value beyond their 
cost, content of execution given their current operations or prices. 
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Table 2-4 Category of resources (Warnier et al., 2013) 
Resources Description 
Strategic resources These resources are scarce on the market and the productivity is higher 
than the expected costs. These, often knowledge-based, resources are 
important for the long-term direction of the organisation (Calantone, 
Cavusgil, & Zhao, 2002).  
Ordinary resources An ordinary resource is a common resource on the market; these 
resources are considered as ensuring competitive parity (Warnier et al., 
2013). Considered collaboration in the procurement functions to fulfil 
the need for these resources to result in high performance. 
Junk resources This resource is not popular in organisations or interesting for the 
market. These resources have the characteristics of full competition in 
economic science (Bierman et al., 1991).  
 
This indicates that all those three distinctions have motives for outsourcing to an SCP. 
On the other hand, the demand of the LAs for a type of resource can depend on the 
scarcity of resources on the market or in-house, costs, niche specialism of resources or 
organisation strategy of insourcing versus outsourcing. Therefore the contribution of the 
RBT is considered in explaining the managerial characteristics of SCP. 
 
2.5.3 Synthesis of enablers of collaborative procurement, theories and the 
research aim and objectives 
Table 2-5 shows an overview of enablers of collaborative procurement built upon the 
research of various scholars and their work reviewed in previous sections. A number of 
possible theories that could shed some light on the research aim, such as Agency theory, 
Resource dependence theory and Core competence, emerged from the review. These 
theories are more deeply focused on the relation and governance between a principal 
(LAs) and agent (SCP), the buyer-seller relationship, and the interdependency between 
LAs and SCP. Since LA organisations increasingly perform their activities as 
management organisations instead of service-production organisations, the core 
competence has become very one-sided and is less relevant to this study(Bustinza et al., 
2010). However, the key theories used in this research are RBT and TCT. These both 
shed light on possible explanations and understandings for the impact of SCP on 
efficiency and the effectivity and this is outlined in detail in the following section. Table 
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2-5 links the enablers of collaborative procurement related to theories and the research 
objectives of this study.  
 
Table 2-5 Enablers of Collaborative Procurement 
Theory 
Perceived benefit gained by 
structural collaborative 
procurement 








Access to resources  X X X X 
Shared risk  X  X  
Efficiency X X   X 
Coordination and seamless X   X X 
Learning  X X   
Decreased personnel X X   X 
Improved service  X X   
Local government can completely 
focus on their management 
organisation 
  X X X 
Flexibility of services  X  X  
Continuity of services  X  X  
 
Consequently, parameters have been derived from the two theories which have an 
influence on the result of a structural purchasing cooperation and provide insight into 
the research objectives: value, uncertainty, and cost reduction. 
 
Table 2-6 presents a summary of the two theories and an overview of the aspects of 
collaborative procurement  
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Table 2-6 Summary of the Theories 
Dimensions TCT RBT 
Key idea Organisations have to make choices 
to minimise the transaction costs in 
the procurement function. 
To increase cost-effectiveness  
through share, reinforce, and extend 
the resources and capabilities.  
Focus  Costs, standardisation an 
uncertainty. 
Costs, value and uncertainty. 
Criteria  Resource specificity, frequency, 
uncertainty, standardise, 
coordination mechanism. 
Valuable, scarce, difficult to imitate 
and difficult to substitute.  
Collaboration  Collaborate, if the collaborative 
costs are lower than the individual 
transactions costs. Minimalise the 
collaboration (transaction) costs.  
Collaboration is a way of obtaining 
access to resources which jointly 
prevent uncertainty with own 
resources and provide synergy by 
collaboration. 
 
The TCT and the RBT provide sufficient core attributes for exploring the research aim 
of this study. The next section links the power of sources of these two theories and 
performance indicators to the research objectives and the central aim of this research. 
 
2.5.4 Multi-dimensional approach 
To address the research problem, two theoretical lenses are applied contributing to three 
different strategy dimensions shown in Table 2-5. The dimensions are drawn from the 
main topic of the research and translated into the research objectives. The philosophy of 
efficiency and effectiveness constitutes the dominant paradigm of this empirical study, 
substantiated by these theories. In Table 2-7, the research objectives linked to the 
theories are shown, which (mostly) clarifies the influence of the theories to the 




Table 2-7 Objectives Linked to Theories Contributing to Collaborative Procurement 
Objectives Theories contributing to 
improved collaborative 
procurement 
Main academic contributors selected for this 
study 





(Coase, 1937; Costantino et al., 2012; 
Karjalainen, 2011; Williamson, 1975) 
(Bals & Turkulainen, 2017; Caers et al., 2009; 
Eisenhardt, 1985; Fayezi, O'Loughlin, & 
Zutshi, 2012; McCue & Prier, 2007) 
(Emerson, 1962; Herlin & Pazirandeh, 2012; 





(Emerson, 1962; Länsiluoto, Järvenpää, & 
Krumwiede, 2013; Malatesta & Smith, 2014) 
Add value RBT 
 
 
(Bhagat et al., 2010; Chen & Lee, 2009; 
Ghodeswar & Vaidyanathan, 2008; Harland et 
al., 2005; Pulles et al., 2014; Quélin & 
Duhamel, 2003;Teece, 2007; Unland & 
Kleiner, 1996) 
(Nesheim & Smith, 2015; Sergeeva & 
Andreeva, 2015) 
(Nesheim & Smith, 2015) 
 
Mechanisms to influences costs in (procurement) costs are principally emphasised in the 
Transaction costs theory. In this research, the procurement costs for LAs in processes, 
ex-ante and ex-post, are of primary influence through structural collaboration in this 
research. Although this tactical research area is extended with the reduction of the costs 
to manage and organise this professional collaboration. The RBT provides insights to 
limit the uncertainty of the procurement and thus the internal business function, through 
securing the availability and capability of professional procurement resources. Besides 
uncertainty, the RBT contributes to values for the LAs. If supposing this dimension 
contents a broad spectrum of benefits, here it is limited to the source of power and the 
performance indicator related to the theory. Each of the two theories contributing to the 
different dimensions will be concisely discussed below. 
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Table 2-8 TCT Influences in the Research Objectives 
Source of power Key performance Indicator Objectives 
Coordination costs Affect tender costs Cost reduction 
Transaction risk Add value in contract management Less uncertainty 
Coordination costs Affect contract management costs Cost reduction 
Coordination 
mechanism 
Awareness of demands Cost reduction 
Coordination 
mechanism 
Transparency of information Cost reduction 
Bonding mechanism Explicit goal alignment Add value 
Reduction of business 
risks 
Standardise procurement processes, 
tender documents and E-
procurement systems 
Less uncertainty 
Agility Less uncertainty Less uncertainty 
 
The TCT  has a strong relationship with all of the activities of the procurement process 
(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). Improvements in the procurement process lead 
among others to cost reduction. Coase (1937) claimed that if the transaction costs are 
more than the bureaucratic costs, the activity should be organised within the 
organisation and vice versa. Arnold (1996) claimed that collaborative procurement 
organisations can fill this gap in the case of a middle level of specificity in which 
neither the market nor the hierarchy can be preferred on the basis of marginal cost 
difference. The advantage of collaborative procurement is directly linked to the 
transaction cost (Arnold, 1996; Tella & Virolainen, 2005). This statement can be 
explained through the economic awareness that collaboration leads to fewer numbers of 
transactions and their pre-calculated costs (Tella & Virolainen, 2005). Inopportunely, 
Tella and Virolainen (2005) did not test their hypotheses empirically. On the other hand, 
it is interesting that they support more structural collaborative procurement instead of 
voluntary; this is because the loyalty the parties have to each other in the purchase 
group affects the savings gained from the collaboration contract.  
 
Civil servants are more and more operating as project leaders and take control in the 
area of infrastructure works, social health or facilities, therefore an efficient and 
effectively procurement process (Bals & Turkulainen, 2017) does not have priority. The 
procurement function is regular, focused on merely executing the tender, instead of a 
decent procurement process in stages. Hence, sources of power as mentioned in Table 




On the other hand the transactions costs can be influenced during the collaboration 
between principals and agents, in this study being municipalities and agencies. Hyvönen 
et al. (2012) argued that institutional entrepreneurs operate on many institutional levels 
simultaneously. On the organisational field level, they must find groups of actors with 
whom they share interests. Conflicts occur in the field of goal conflict between 
differences in aims and objectives and asymmetry information exchanging between 
those entrepreneurs, local governments and their agencies. At the strategic level, and in 
the pre-face of the procurement process, opportunity costs and bureaucratic costs arise 
(Hyvönen et al., 2012; Johansson, 2012; McCue & Prier, 2007; Meehan et al., 2016). 
Although the data of the research of (Hyvönen et al., 2012) only comprises solo distance 
e-interviews, their findings were interesting. Future research in this field would do well 
to study demand, as it is one of the areas of interest in this study. The TCT in this study 
is focused on strategy and policy, as well tactic and operational levels between SCP’s 
and LAs.  
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Table 2-9 RBT Influences in the Research Objectives 
Source of power Key performance Indicator Objectives 
Complementary resources Data Add value  
E-procurement system Add value  
Procurement skills Add value  
Training Add value 
Capability Procurement practitioners Add value 
Critical procurement 
resources 
Dependence or independence Less uncertainty 
 
Strategic contract terms Less uncertainty 
Information asymmetry  Awareness of the demand Less uncertainty  
Control over information/Position in 
the communication flow 
Less uncertainty 
 
Knowledge of the supply market Less uncertainty  
Transparency of information Add value 




Total volume or value in the market Cost reduction 
Reputation Legitimacy  Less uncertainty  
Brand Add value  
Expertise, resources, and know-how Add value  
Size Add value 
Knowledge More professional  Add value 
Product development Add value Add value 
 
RBT identifies some useful issues for this study, as mentioned in Table 2-9. It has 
associations with the core competences theory and TCT (McIvor, 2009). In this 
research, competitive advantages for local government and their agencies come from 
being able to derive the most value for the least taxpayer money (House-of-Commons-
Communities-and-Local-Government-Committee, 2014). This theory explains and 
contributes availability of complementary resources and professional capabilities for the 
local governments and their agencies. These resources contain data, e-procurement 
systems, professional procurement skills, training and procurement practitioners’ 
capability. By having access to these resources through collaboration, the value of the 
procurement function increases (McIvor et al., 2011; Murray et al., 2008; Sporrong & 
Kadefors, 2014; Walker et al., 2013). These values result in more professions in the 
procurement function which eventually gain more sustainability, green procurement, 
product innovation and economic development in the public environment (Rainville, 
2016). There would be no economic advantage, according to the TCT, to organise these 
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resources individually (De Vries, 2014; House-of-Commons-Communities-and-Local-
Government-Committee, 2014). From this perspective, structural collaboration is an 
interesting alternative. 
 
RBT can explain cost reduction as a motivation for more cooperative behaviour in the 
non-profit sector. Malatesta and Smith (2014) found in their research that nowadays 
managers in the public sector base their outsourcing decisions on the RBT rather than 
just the Transaction Costs Theory (TCT). It seems that managers are driven by fear 
related to resource scarcity – particularly when organisations are facing extreme budget 
insufficiencies. Similarly, the theory illuminates the danger of sole sourcing and 
dependence on oligopoly (market) sources. Collaboration in the public sector can create 
more balance between separate powers, which can lead to more cost savings for 
individual local government organisations (Schotanus et al., 2009; Tella & Virolainen, 
2005). 
 
2.5.5 Challenge the research aim and objectives 
Attention has been given to research on how to quantify the benefits achieved from 
collaboration. Pohl and Förstl (2011) called in their research for more linking of the 
performance parameters determined in the procurement strategy of a procurement 
project, to the measuring of the procurement project instead of simply measuring the 
financial savings. Also empirical research, particularly in the area of concrete savings as 
stated by Karjalainen (2011); Nollet et al. (2008), has been limited. Several qualitative 
and quantitative methods have been applied to explore and explain the current situation 
and phenomena mentioned above. Nollet and Beaulieu (2005); Walker et al. (2013) call 
for greater identification of the empirical gains from structural collaborative 
procurement organisations. 
 
The literature review has not found any concepts to affect the current procurement 
performance achieved within existing (structural) collaborative organisations for LAs in 
the Netherlands. Efficiency and effectiveness gains have been mentioned as ceteris 
paribus in line with existing theories, but have not been tested empirically. Therefore, 
the current literature applies limited improvements for more efficiency and effectiveness 
for structured (procurement) collaborations. On the other hand, the literature has 
provided models to adapt, which may transform this study.  
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The present study will contribute and identify the pros and cons of structural horizontal 
collaboration in the field of local government. These identifications will be researched 
relating to potential cost savings and access to resources. This will address the lack of 
academic literature on structural collaborative procurement in local government.  
 
This evidence may contribute solutions as an alternative amalgamation among 
municipalities in the Netherlands (Allers & Van Ommeren, 2016). Most of the current 
fragmented collaborations are not developed on a strategic vision but on fragmented 
sub-optimal ideas from local regions. Hence, connections to other sub regions are not 
sufficiently established and the translation of regional vision to implementation has too 
little clout. This results in collaboration by municipalities and regions with no strategic 
vision or ambition. Therefore, it would be interesting to research if SCP can lead to 
more procurement performance (Úbeda et al., 2015) in this jungle of fragmented local 
government organisations. 
The literature on collaborative (public) procurement, which is still being developed, 
would benefit from more exploratory economic studies. The aim is twofold. On the one 
hand, this research will attempt to investigate shared arrangements and create a better 
understanding of these arrangements and the motivations behind them. On the other 
hand, this research wants to test the use of SCP as a collaborative concept in facilitating 
organisational defragmentation for collaborative (procurement) services. In the next 
section will be composed the features which conform the literature, affect the PP of the 
LAs by SCP, considering the objectives’ costs, value and uncertainty. 
 Conceptual Framework Development of SCP 
After having specified the purpose of this research in the previous section, and related 
this to the theories, which are the empirical foundation of this work, a theoretical 
integrated framework can now be developed (Blaikie, 2010, p. 150) in order to be able 
to answer the stated research objectives.  
 
The integrated framework of the SCP developed in this study should support the 
determination of the nature of interactions between local government organisations and 
the agencies that they are (partly) financially responsible for. This section assesses the 




An essential first step is to exam the impact of collaboration concentration and 
collaboration dimension on procurement performance. First, the core framework will be 
tested to see if it explains the individual performance of the procurement function from 
a LA organisation. To adapt the proportional component of the framework to the 
research aim, the analysis includes several successive steps and a synopsis of the 
agencies associated with the existing collaboration region. Initially, it will test the effect 
of the variables on the degree of collaboration and the effectiveness of the collaboration. 
After that, the impact of the variables on each of the resource elements will be assessed 
to determine the generalisability. Finally, it will analysis whether interaction effects 
exist between the variables and the resource elements used to explain the impact of 
SCP. 
Figure 2-6 provides an overview of these individual steps, each of which includes 
several empirical analyses to determine if the framework is valid and explanatory.  
 
 
Figure 2-6 Validity and Explanatory Potential of the Collaborative Improvement Framework 
(Poppelaars, 2009a) 
The framework helps to assess systematic, structural collaboration in the public sector 
among local authorities and agencies. The framework has been translated to the research 
objectives of this study (Poppelaars, 2009b). These key arguments can be summarised 
in the model below. 
 
SCP = ∑ (𝑇𝐶𝑇 +𝑁𝑟=1  𝑅𝐵𝑇) 
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The legend of the mentioned model: 
SCP   =  degree of structural collaborative procurement. 
 
TCT  =  the importance of the transaction costs theory to increase procurement  
performance (more efficiency and/or effectiveness). 
 
 Coordination costs 
 Transaction risks 
 Procurement risks 
 Standardisation 
RBT  =  the importance of the RBT to increase procurement performance (efficient 
and/or effectiveness). 
 
 Complementary resources 
 Capability 
 Procurement resources 
 Knowledge 
 
The effects of the degree of SCP will highlight the key variables and will be integrated 
into a conceptual framework in more detail in the forthcoming sections. A first step has 
been made in Figure 2-7. 
 
The items that influence the power of the SCP have been identified in this section. 
These items have been connected to the research aim in Figure 2-7 and connected to the 
paradigm of this study. Effectiveness is linked to the performances which SCP affected 
in the procurement process and contributed to the planned political and business 
objectives. If a higher aspiration level is achieved through cooperation than described at 
the individual LA level, higher effectiveness is reflected. The literature and the 
theoretical insights showed five dimensions which can have an impact on the PP of the 
LAs in an SCP. Resource sharing & business capabilities affect the availability, skills, 
training of procurement practitioners, and the E-procurement systems at the LAs. The 
degree of critical procurement resources, the demand aggregation of strategic contract 
terms and knowledge of supply markets affect the uncertainty in the procurement 
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processes. Coordination mechanisms affect the efficacy and lead-time in procurement 
processes. The agility and flexibility of the procurement function can be influenced by 
up-to-date procurement information and the exchange of procurement experts. A 
collaborative approach can affect the transparency and position in the communication 
flow, leading to more control of information in the procurement processes. 
Efficiency relates to the resources that are used to realise a specific activity programme. 
It establishes a relationship between the expected internal LA procurement costs and the 
actual costs incurred by the LAs. Dominancy is recognised by executing purchase 
tenders and contract management. Furthermore, the costs of procurement management 
and IT systems have been noticed in the literature.    
 
 
Figure 2-7 Connection Paradigm and Dimensions 
Regarding the three mains items of the research aim, the effective measure of the 
procurement performance is linked to adding value and influence the uncertainty. Cost 
reduction is primarily addressed to efficiency in the management facets of the 
procurement function. However, there is no strict measure between those measurements 
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(Van Weele, 2006). The importance of a PP lies primarily in understanding that in order 
to be able to assess procurement activities, one must look at both the effectiveness of the 
procurement cooperation and efficiency. 
 Summary 
This topic is interesting for several audiences, namely academics and strategic 
policymakers, board members and politicians. For academics, this research can facilitate 
access to empirical scientific evidence about efficiency and effectiveness in horizontal 
collaboration in the public sector, drawing on two theories. For practitioners, this 
research can show how to improve or optimise current collaborations. Furthermore, for 
new collaborative initiatives, this research can be used to take into account the lessons 
of the past. In this chapter, a literature review has been executed and academic journals 
and books about collaborative procurement, in both the public and private sector, have 
been discussed and highlights a significant gap in the literature.  
 
Without a doubt, the fragmentation of regional local government organisations has been 
discussed at length in business magazines (De Vries, 2014) but has had limited 
treatment in more formal academic publications, such as journals. This research changes 
that. Van de Laar (2010) discussed collaborative arrangements between municipalities 
in the Netherlands, but his overview would have been more interesting if the 
effectiveness and efficiency parameters of the investigated case studies had been 
measured objectively, especially with the motivations of all of the chosen collaborative 
models. Schotanus and Telgen (2007) collected academic publications dealing with 
forms of cooperative purchasing. Their main finding was that most research was not 
focused on effective and efficient structural collaborative organisations but generally on 
the lead-buying, programme and project approach in joint procurement projects. 
 
The previous literature is therefore mainly focused on volunteer purchase groups, 
initiated by procurement managers. More attention has also been paid to the direct and 
short-term gains from collaboration, which may have motivated independent and 
fragmented organisations to work alone or adopt hybrid forms of collaboration. 
Although there is extensive work on shared service centres, this has only given 




Secondly, this research provides new insight by applying an economic and strategic 
theory lens to collaboration, using procurement datasets of fragmented local 
government organisations. The value of the work of Proulx et al. (2014) is its 
identification of the assortment of ways in which non-profit organisations collaborate. 
According to the authors, the most valuable research question concerns the effectiveness 
of these collaborations in achieving programme advances and efficiencies; however, 
their research was solely based on one state in the US.  
 
For practitioners in public procurement, interesting research has been conducted in the 
field of success parameters concerning collaborative procurement – mainly the 
advantages of purchase groups, enablers for vertical collaborative procurement etc. 
Nollet and Beaulieu (2003, 2005); Schotanus et al. (2010). The aim of this study is not 
to contest these views. Rather, it is this study’s intention, in the context of decentralising 
activities from the national government to the local government and all fragmented 
agencies, to provide science-based solutions for management to enhance the efficiency 
and effectiveness of their organisation and their fragmented agencies by using 
improved, extended or initial, structured collaboration. With the SCP framework 
mentioned in this chapter, it is possible to measure several structural procurement 
collaborative organisations in the particular region under study and systematically 
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
 Introduction 
Scientific research does not take place in a vacuum. There is a connection with earlier 
research, social trends, the interest of the researcher and thinking about how research 
should be conducted. The researcher should be aware of these concepts, and in the 
design and implementation of their own research show how it is connected to previous 
research and developments in methodology. Van Weele (2007) critically argues for 
more attention in choosing to use a quantitative or qualitative methodology approach by 
researchers. Why would you use old data from a database rather than conducting case 
study research at an organisation on your own doorstep? Ramsay (2007) convincingly 
suggests more qualitative research to complement the existing quantitative approaches 
in procurement research (Downward & Mearman, 2007; Jick, 1979), on the one side to 
cover a lack of competent quantitative analyses, and on the other side to have a 
significant human element and participant opinions and perceptions, which are an 
integral part of the phenomenon. 
 
The first question that must be addressed is the research philosophy – which ontological 
assumption fits the researcher. Therefore, based upon the problem statement and the 
theoretical paradigms applied, it should be made clear which criteria will be used to 
select the focal organisation of this research and why the study has been set up in the 
way it has been. In many methodological discussions, ontological assumptions are 
implicitly considered. On the other hand, studying the theory shows that some of 
methodological debates within economics and other sciences is just focused on 
ontological assumptions. 
 
Positivist research has prevailed for years in the field of economics. However there are 
also researchers who have collected qualitative data and analysed that new data using an 
interpretative approach. There is now greater demand in procurement science for a 




Hence, several primary sources have been researched. The initial phase used 9 
interviews. Subsequently, statistical analysis of 30 collaborative public procurement 
organisations was used to generalise the findings, substantively deepened with 
fundamental document analysis.  
 
The structure of this chapter is illustrated in Figure 3-1.  
 
Figure 3-1 Outline Structure of Chapter 3 
 Research Aim  
The overall research aim of this study is to address the improvement of PP in LAs by 
the formation of structural collaborative procurement organisations. In the literature 
review set out in Chapter 2, it can be seen that the literature has discussed the value of 
economic and strategic theory to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
procurement functions. However there is also a gap in the current academic literature 
regarding improving procurement performance through structural collaboration. Several 
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case study to show the advances of shared service centres for collaborative 
procurement.  
 
In the context of local government and public organisations, procurement performance 
has received limited academic attention. Meanwhile, in the procurement collaboration 
between public organisations, the number of purchasing alliances has increased 
considerably. A recent descriptive investigation by the Ministry of Economic Affairs of 
the Netherlands (Ministry-of-Economic-Affairs, 2015) measured 46 structural public 
procurement collaborative organisations in the Netherlands. This significant growth of 
256% compared to a previous descriptive investigation in 2011 can be explained by the 
decentralisation of activities of the central government, implementation of new 
innovative guidelines, new procurement legislation, and a lack of amalgamation of local 
governments. For all decentralisation groups of municipalities and their fragmented 
allied organisations, it is worth researching their choices regarding structural 
collaborative procurement organisations; how these organisations are performing; (and) 
how they can improve. Therefore an exploratory and analytical research study in this 
area is necessary. 
 Research Philosophy 
Within economics there is an on-going discussion about ontological assumptions and 
applying research methods. This is not surprising. Similarly, Nancy Cartwright from the 
London School of Economics has argued that research design in the social sciences 
leaves much to be desired: "Now what strikes me is that this methodology is crazy" 
(Cartwright, 1999, p. 324).  
What makes this discussion interesting is that within a part of economic science, 
positivism – more than in other social sciences – has played a central role in thinking 
about methodology for a long time (Blaug, 1992; Cartwright, 1999; Dow, 1997). So, the 
methodological justification for the two theories that were discussed in Chapter 2 is 
found within post-positivism. New methodological developments in economics have 
long been relatively neglected, especially the ideas and insights that come out of the 
corner of social realism and the angle of feminist postmodernism (Blaikie, 2010; Frels 




3.3.1 Ontological assumption 
Ontology is concerned with the nature of ‘reality’. There are two distinct ontological 
positions: objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivism assumes that social work units 
exist, detached from social actors. Subjectivism assumes that social phenomena are 
created by the perceptions and the resulting actions of actors (Blaikie, 2010, pp. 92-95; 
Collis & Hussey, 2014). Ontological questions are concerned with the practice and 
nature of the ‘reality’ that is being studied. This raises questions about the assumptions 
that researchers make about the way the world works and the specific positions they 
might take (Blaikie, 2010, p. 92).  
 
Collis and Hussey (2014, p. 47) distinguish two views of ontology: objectivism and 
subjectivism, where “objectivism assumes that social units actually exist independently 
of the social actors”. In other words, there is one clear reality. Subjectivism, by contrast, 
“assumes that social phenomena [are] created by the perceptions and the ensuing 
actions of social actors, because it is socially constructed”. Mercier (2009, p. 214) states 
that each persons has his or her own individual sense of reality and there are various 
realities. This is in contrast with how the positivist stream interprets this; as positivists 
believe that reality is independent of us, they assume that the act of examining reality 
has no effect on that reality (J. Collis & Hussey, 2014, p. 44).  
 
Blaikie (2007, pp. 12-24) elaborated six types of assumptions, which demand a 
combination of ontological and epistemological assumptions. These six types of 
assumptions have been derived from previous literature but supplemented with more 
recent ideas. It was McCloskey (1983) in his article "The rhetoric of economics" who 
showed that economics as a science increasingly diverged from developments in 
methodology and stated that the one-sided focus on these prescriptive kinds of 
methodologies was not helpful in the dialogue within the economic science (Dow, 
1997). Since then, in the economic science, the methodological discussion has 
broadened significantly with philosophical contributions from critical realism, 
postmodernism, humanism etc.  
 
3.3.2 The assumptions of the researcher concerning reality 
Post-positivism emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century. For post-positivists, 
the proposition is to know ‘reality’ objectively: in this research the approach taken is 
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that reality exists and that it is possible to study it objectively. But post-positivists are 
united in the idea that human knowledge is not based on non-challenging, solid 
foundations. Scientists have reasons to accept things, often these reasons are decent, but 
they are not unquestionable. Motivations for accepting certain things can be withdrawn 
as a result of further research (Marsh & Stoker, 2002, pp. 24-26). 
 
The researcher of this study is able to perceive the ‘reality’ of his study area objectively 
and without prejudice but tested with objective participants experts views. The 
researcher is able to develop new concepts by way of directional hypothesis 
formulation, reviews and theories, which have a universal validity and can be used for 
explanations and rules for human action. The researcher is like a reflective partner 
looking critically to see certain situations and is able to objectively analyse relationships 
and identify changes (improvements). This principle contains the implicit ontological 
assumption that reality is a concrete structure or a concrete process (J. Collis & Hussey, 
2014, p. 49). 
 
In practical business research, especially by specific individual problems, each demand 
has its own proper ‘reality’. For example, a disruption between the contract 
management department and the source unit of the same local government A may have 
other causes than in B and may need another approach to research or sharing knowledge 
can be interpreted in several ways. Due to other elements of inquiry, experience, 
perception, knowledge claims and different contexts form other assumptions (Creswell, 
2003, pp. 5-25). Therefore qualitative research and analysis provides the research 
objectives to a greater extent, with purpose data integration and warranted assertion 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Van Weele, 2007) and bring the reality to a deeper 
and real understanding. This is so in this research, in particular the research objectives 
concerning value and uncertainty. The ‘what’ objectives precede the ‘why’ and ‘how’ 
questions. First one must explore what is going on, before it can be explained why 
organisations behave in this way, before it can be confidently changed. 
 
In this research, the central theme of reality is the improvement of public procurement 
organisations in the Netherlands through structural internal collaboration. The central 
research aim focuses on the realities of identical organisations regarding the typology of 
customers, owners, working areas, outputs (effectiveness) and cost savings (efficiency). 
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There is no direct dependence on the influence of the inner world of human experiences 
in action, with the exception of refining variables. The reality of the LAs will be more 
qualitatively precisely researched, which can be recommended for the quantitative 
research, to conduct variables which confines to real findings and for triangulation in 
the discussion section (Blaikie, 2010, p. 218). The core businesses of the collaborative 
public procurement organisations and the LAs are identical, apart from the fact that they 
are situated in different regions in the Netherlands.  
 
3.3.3 Epistemological assumption 
Epistemology assumptions are concerned with the question of acceptable knowledge in 
a particular area of study (Blaikie, 2010). According to Collis and Hussey (2014, p. 47), 
there are two extreme paradigms which articulate this: positivism and interpretivism. 
Morgan and Smircich (1980) indicate that the positivist paradigm is often used in the 
natural sciences. In contrast interpretivists argue that it is necessary for the researcher to 
understand the differences between people in their role as social actors. They also 
indicate that we interpret the social roles of others in line with our own views. The 
conventional distinctions between ontology and epistemology disappear; what can be 
known is inextricably intertwined with the interaction between an articular investigator 
and an articular object or group (Lincoln & Guba, 2000).  
 
Despite the prevalence of research on SSC and JPGs, there is limited research on SCP 
for local government, and little of recent date. The several forms of collaboration in 
local government so frequently mentioned in literature, and most notably in branch 
business communication magazines, suggest that LAs are collaborating, but in a 
progression. It makes sense to presume that this leads to savings, more value and less 
uncertainty, unless this phenomenon occurs in a managerial way. The absence of an 
instrument to structure these increases in collaboration is perhaps one reason why these 
hybrid forms of collaboration endure. Furthermore it appears obvious that some 
collaboration arrangements are not equipped in the most efficient way and are not 
operating effectively. Probably, the SCP can be a concept to create more understanding 
in this academic gap. 
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 Research Paradigms 
In academic research, it is essential to describe how social phenomena will be studied in 
order to understand and explain the phenomenon to the reader. The term ‘paradigm’ 
was invented by Kuhn (1962) and refers to the arrangement of philosophical 
assumptions which are shared by members of a given research community. Paradigms 
will be described by orientation to the philosophical principles of ontology, 
epistemology and methodology.  
 
Assumptions of paradigms 
This research will be conducted within the post-positivist research paradigm (Collis & 
Hussey, 2014, p. 49). The core assumptions for this choice will be explained below. 
 
The ontological assumption can be found in the ‘world’ that will be researched. In this 
research, this can be described as follows: 
 
 The research information is transparently accessible; 
 The structural collaborative procurement organisations are acting and operating 
in a demarcated area, namely the Netherlands. The ‘world’ for the researched 
public organisations is similar. They have to operate under the same legalisation, 
national politics and governance structure. Besides that, in the Netherlands there 
is a National Procurement Law. This law sets out guidelines for proportionality 
in procurement. Public collaborative procurement organisations are obliged to 
apply these guidelines. Therefore, the present researched organisations of this 
study are seen as singular in executing the procurement processes. 
 Local government organisations have no commercial interest in sharing this 
information, so are objective in providing it. 
 The local government organisations for collaborative procurement that will be 
researched are comparable and are substantially similar.  
 To recognise and understand the social phenomena – improving local 
government organisations in the Netherlands through structural collaborative 
procurement – social science should objectively measure causal relations 
between them (Murray, 2009; Pettigrew, 1987). Otherwise other irrational 
factors, such as behaviour, can disturb the reliability of the research. 
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 To recognise and understand the social phenomena – improving local 
government organisations in the Netherlands through structural collaborative 
procurement – social science should subjectively establish how the LAs 
understand their world, SCP of LAs in their public sector world, before 
generalisation.  
 
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the difference in stances (positivism and 
interpretivism) of this research and the consequences for methods. 
 
Table 3.1: Typology of Assumptions of Two Extreme Paradigms. Adapted from (J. Collis & 
Hussey, 2014, p. 49) 




Reality as a concrete  
structure 
 
The ‘world’ which will be researched: 
“The landscape of public procurement 
for local government in the 
Netherlands” is transparent, 
obtainable and accessible for 
academic research. 
Reality as a projection of human 
imagination. There is no social 
world.  
 
There is no general valid 
knowledge for an answer to this 
problem 




To obtain valid knowledge of the 
public procurement function of local 
government collaborative 
organisations. Validated data from 
the local government organisations 
will be used. 
Individual approach to obtain 
phenomenological insight 
revelation 
This research Worldviews relate to the type of mixed methods design. The data will 
obtained from subjective understanding, experts’ perceptions of the LAs, 
claims on knowledge and specific variables, guiding hypotheses. Therefore 
will be started with insignificant tendency to interpretivism (how, why 
research objectives), and followed up with post-positivism (what research 
objectives).   
Research 
methods 
Surveys, experiments, historical 
business analysis founded on 
documents. 
In depth interviews and 
exploration of pure subjectivity. 
This research Timing:  sequential timing; the strands are implemented in two distinct 
phases, first qualitative followed up quantitative. 
Where: mixing during data collection; qualitative results have been build to 
subsequent collection of quantitative data. and mixing during interpretation. 
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The ontology assumption in this study is that it is conceivable that these sources of 
power can be influenced by structural collaboration.  
 
The epistemological assumption in this inquiry is founded in the researcher’s belief that 
valid knowledge is observable and can be examined and measured, surrounded by the 
two theories mentioned above. On the other hand, the distance between the researcher 
and the research area must be minimised otherwise the single quantitative approach will 
constrain our beliefs and will not provide valid knowledge or will lead to too many 
limitations in the results of this inquiry. 
 Strategic Research Position 
The choice of which research philosophy has implications for the research approach. 
There are four main strategies: inductive, deductive, retroductive and abductive 
(Blaikie, 2010, pp. 85-92). Using the inductive way, data will be collected and in 
response a theory will be developed based on analysis of that data. The deductive 
strategy uses an existing theory to formulate hypotheses and a method will be developed 
to test these hypotheses to explain the causal relations between the variables. The 
retroductive strategy is focused on discovering the structures and mechanisms that are 
proposed to explain observed regularities. This approach will first start with an 
inductive or deductive strategy to provide an adequate picture of a regularity that will 
subsequently be explained in answer to the ‘why’ objectives. The abductive strategy can 
be used to gain more inside information regarding the way a group or community lives 
in daily life. Some underlying mechanisms of the sub-research objectives may require 
another additional research strategy during the inductive or deductive strategy.  
 
The deductive versus inductive approaches in social scholarship are even today often 
compared as two equally valid yet irreconcilable strategies related to knowing. The 
relatively recent trend of mixed methods (Bennet & Braumoeller, 2005; Creswell & 
Clark, 2011) is an effective attempt to bridge the gap.  
 
This study explicitly advances from the proposition that these two traditions should not 
be juxtaposed but should complement each other to genuinely contribute to scientific 
research. That is, clearly identifying, concretising and answering research objectives, 
rather than following a specific methodology as such, should lie at the heart of social 
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sciences. In this study, that attempts to establish generalisations independent of setting, 
the context can not be ignored. Even in social science, deviant business behaviour is 
often an integral component of activities under study, and as such cannot be discounted. 
Claims to knowledge thus require full contextualisation and explanation. The stance of 
the research required reflexivity, by implementing subjectivity from knowledge growth 
and by observing from another perspective to the problem. 
 
This study relies on testing a concept of SCP in the Netherlands and thus proceeds from 
a post-positivist perspective. In this way, the concept that has been developed can be 
explored. It also relies on more interpretative ways of conducting research, both in 
developing the conceptual framework and in suggesting avenues for future research. In 
general, this study is firmly based on the assumption that answering research objectives 
requires a conscious consideration of, and preferably a combination of, several methods, 
but at a minimum an objective attitude must be brought to the entire collection of 
existing methods. This study takes a post-positivist approach, using interviews within a 
case study initially as an exploratory approach which then informs the more generalised 
quantitative survey.  
 
All in all, this study is grounded in a pluralist philosophy of science that will be 
reflected in a strategy of mixed methods. Combining methods, qualitative and 
quantitative, that are used within different ontological and epistemological assumptions, 
post-positivism and interpretivism, has extended the research, considering that 
qualitative data and analysis help address the research objective(s) to a greater extent, in 
particular the research objectives regarding value and uncertainty. 
 
Various academics are charmed by the predictive value of theories attached to 
positivism. In extreme cases, it can be said that the shape is more important than the 
content: if the predictive value of a theory is high, the power of the theory and the 
underlying connections are relatively less important (Dow, 1997; McCloskey, 1983).  
 
The gap between quantitative and qualitative research in public administration and 
political science reflects an enduring fundamental debate between positivists and 
hermeneutics (Ramsay, 2007; Van Weele, 2007). Is it better to deduce hypotheses and 
try to explain and perhaps even predict them, as the logical positivists proclaim, in a 
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reality based on general patterns of behaviour? Or, is it better to understand the 
measured features of reality by interpreting them based on theories, and then derive 
patterns of behaviour from those same features?  
 
In this study the advantages of both schools of thought will be applied. A hybrid model, 
based on ‘the cycle of theory construction and testing’ of Wallace (1971) and De Vaus 
(2002) will be conducted, whereby deductive versus inductive approaches will be 
combined to connect the unbridgeable approaches. This will provide an explicit link 
between theory and research. The need for evaluation of theories and observations leads 
to the use of the bridge between empirical data and rational, logical observations.  
 
An advantage will be that the processes of theory construction and theory testing are 
seen to occur in this cycle process instead of a never-ending repetition between 




Figure 3-2 Research Process, adapted from De Vaus (2002); Wallace (1971) 
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This research explicitly proceeds from the proposition that these two traditions should 
not be juxtaposed but should supplement each other to genuinely contribute to scientific 
research.  
 Refining Research Objectives  
The main research objectives are refined further, just to reinforce their direction and 
context. The sub-objectives are independent and contribute to solving the problem of 
this research. 
 
1. To what extent does collaboration lead to more value in the internal business 
processes of the procurement function (RO1)?  
 
What are value items in the public procurement function for the internal process, which 
can be affected by structural collaboration? This requires an exploration and description 
of the value items in public procurement for the internal process, which can be affected 
by structural collaboration 
 
How can structural collaboration influence value in internal business processes in the 
Netherlands? This requires an explanation of the phenomenon of collaboration in the 
public procurement process to value items. 
 
How can these values be affected by structural collaboration in the Netherlands? This 
requires a change between the value items, which can be realised by public procurement 
in the internal business processes, and the multiplication of value procurement items 
that accelerates through collaboration.  
 
2. To what extent does collaboration lead to less uncertainty in the procurement 
function (RO2)? 
 
What causes uncertainty in the internal business process of the public procurement 
function? This requires an exploration and description of items of uncertainty in the 
public procurement for the internal process, which can be affected by structural 
collaboration. 
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What effect has structural collaboration on guarantees in the internal business process of 
the public procurement function in the Netherlands? This requires an exploration and 
description of the actor and multiplier of structural collaboration in the guarantee in the 
public procurement for the internal process. 
 
3. To what extent does collaboration lead to cost reduction in the procurement 
function (RO3)? 
 
What causes cost reduction in the internal business processes of the public procurement 
function? This requires an exploration and description of cost reduction items in the 
public procurement for the internal process, which can be affected by structural 
collaboration. 
 
What effects does structural collaboration have on cost reduction in the internal business 
process of the public procurement function in the Netherlands? This requires an 
exploration and description of the actor and multiplier of structural collaboration in cost 
reduction in the public procurement for the internal process. 
 
3.6.1 Grouping research objectives 
In Figure 3-3, a breakdown is given of the refined research objectives linked to the 
concepts of efficiency and effectiveness – the theoretical paradigm of this study 





Figure 3-3 Research Objectives Linked to Procurement Performance 
 Concepts, Theories, Hypotheses and Framework 
Excellent business research is problem-based, meaning that the research approach has to 
be developed as an answer to the research objectives, which provides a clear 
understanding of the problem situation. In section 3.5, the deductive and inductive 
strategies have been explained, which will be used in this research. This section will 
outline how actor collaboration has been integrated into the procurement performance 
framework presented in section 2.6.  
 
3.7.1 Pre-development of theoretical conceptual framework 
The theoretical framework that will be used in this research is primarily inspired by 
some neo-institutional economic theories (Williamson, 1975), in particular TCT (Coase, 
1937; Williamson, 1985). However, these theories also comprehend from organisational 
economics and management theories (Donaldson, 1990). In addition, this study has also 
made use of models of procurement processes and theory to measure procurement 
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performance (Úbeda et al., 2015; Van Weele, 2006). The research objective focuses 
(broadly) on two aspects: namely the extent to which structural collaboration of local 
governments in the Netherlands leads to greater procurement performance (more 
efficiency and effectiveness) and the processes underlying them.. These aspects are 
suitable for exploratory, analytical and descriptive research. Based on the literature and 
the theoretical framework, and following on from Chapter 2 of this research, three 
hypotheses will be developed in the next section.  
 
Other researchers have recommended future researchers to report these success factors 
in their studies (Karjalainen, 2011; Pazirandeh & Herlin, 2014). Furthermore a cross-
disciplinary approach has been adopted to look at research into other forms of 
collaborative procurement arrangements in the public and the private sector while 
considering the characteristics of structural arrangements such as shared service centres 
(Murray et al., 2008). Most current structural collaborative procurement organisations 
are founded with the main paradigm of ‘doing more with less’, focused on the market 
scale and market aggregation.  
 
3.7.2 Development of a theoretical conceptual framework and hypotheses 
Collaboration can be the ‘engine’ in firm performance. Cao and Zhang (2011) showed 
that supply chain collaboration has a positive effect on collaborative advantage. 
Through cooperation, supply chain companions can operate if they are one single 
company. In Chapter 2 the source of powers, key performance indicators and 
dimensions of SCP within the theoretical concept framework are analysed. These can be 
classified as: 
 
 ‘what’ are the advantages of collaboration? 
 ‘how’ can they add advantages? 
 ‘what’ are the results for the individual performance of the local government 
organisations? 
 
By extending and transforming the research model of Cao and Zhang (2011) and Van 
Weele (2006) and adapting the framework of the ‘collaboration’ component in the 
research objectives of this study, a conceptual framework can be created, as shown in 





Figure 3-4 Impact of Structural Collaboration Procurement 
 
These hypotheses will be used to secure the academic knowledge by directing for 
association or causality against empirical evidence in the ontology of this research. Thus 
the following hypotheses are put forward: 
 
The first hypothesis tests if the structure in the SCP has a positive effect on the 
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Hypothesis 1 
Structural collaborative procurement has a significant positive effect on collaborative 
benefit. 
 
The essential condition for structural procurement collaboration is that, the members of 
the collaborative effort are able to increase their total value due to cooperation and 
provide these benefits from their individual local government organisation. In a short 
period, LAs can see operational enhancements such as an improvement in productivity 
(Borman & Janssen, 2013; Janssen et al., 2007). Over a longer period of time, local 
governments expect more (product) innovation, more access for start-up and SME 
entrepreneurs to public tenders, more professionalism in staff, fewer legal complaints, 
shorter cycle time of executing procurement tenders, more value from procurement 
procedures, less operational business risk and lower costs (McIvor et al., 2011; 




Collaborative benefit has a significant positive effect on the procurement performance 
of the individual local government organisation.  
 
Procurement collaboration can deliver benefits to all members of the structural 
collaborative public procurement organisation – for instance, and as mentioned above, 
higher efficiency and effectiveness. Conversely, collaboration between local 
government organisations increases additional costs, if not managed well, such as costs 
of coordination, compromise, inflexibility and doing parts of the procurement function 
twice. The effect of structural procurement collaboration on collaborative benefits and 
procurement performance is complex and multi-faceted. Harmonisation between 
individual local government organisations and the collaborative procurement 
organisation is an importance issue of this multi-faceted and intricate procurement 






Coordination between structural collaborative procurement and the individual local 
government organisation moderates the procurement performance of a local 
government organisation. 
 
In Figure 3-5 the conceptual framework and the hypotheses are integrated.  
 
 
Figure 3-5 Conceptual Framework Procurement Model with Integration of Hypothesis 
The next section describes how the data will be gathered to measure the impact of 
structural collaboration on the research objectives, value, reduced uncertainty and cost 
reduction, guided by the conceptual framework viewed in Figure 3-5. 
 Quantitative or Qualitative Data or Mixed? 
 ‘What’ objectives can best be covered by quantitative research (Blaikie, 2010), ‘Why’ 
and ‘How’ through qualitative research (Bowen, 2009). This research demands both 
approaches. The advantage of these combinations is that the power of both types of 
research is combined, which increases the validity and reliability of the results if applied 
correctly. Another advantage is that more research or sub-objectives can be addressed.  
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Design 
In this research, the empirical model of Wallace (1971) and De Vaus (2002) will be 
conducted. Mixed methods will be used, starting with exploratory design (Creswell & 
Clark, 2011, pp. 143-170) (Venkatesh, Brown, & Bala, 2013). The purposes of this 
exploratory sequential design will be to first explore in a qualitative manner with a 
small sample and then to determine if the qualitative findings can be generalised to a 
large sample (Frels & Onwuegbuzie, 2013).  
 
The research uses a form of cooperative inquiry, which is ontologically based on a 
belief in an external open and accessible world. In the public sector, information 
concerning public organisations is obtainable for research (G. J. Murray, 2009). The 
researcher also has access to professional networks within the public sector. In the first 
stage, qualitative research is undertaken with individual local government organisations 
of the Bizob organisation directly to construct measurements; in the second phase, it is 
carried out indirectly with them through the quantitative research approach. 
 
The purpose of this two-phase, exploratory mixed-methods study will be to explore 
public organisations’ views with the intent of using this information to develop and test 
an instrument/model with a regional sample in the Netherlands.  
 
Methods 
The first phase of this study is a qualitative exploration of what it means if procurement 
performance can be extended through structural collaboration by collecting interview 
data from a sample of individuals from these fragmented public organisations to address 
several disciplines related to each of the theories mentioned above. As there are no 
extant instruments to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of collaborative 
procurement performance, an instrument/model needs to be developed based on the 
qualitative views of the participating organisations. Statements and quotes from these 
interviews were used to refine the questions to be used in the survey, which could then 
test the hypotheses. In addition to this initial exploration, the qualitative findings were 
used to develop measures that could be administered to a larger, more general sample 
with the objective of explaining and understanding the phenomenon in question (Hesse-
Biber, 2015; Venkatesh et al., 2013). The qualitative data from 9 interviews informed 
the generation of variables regarding factors potentially associated with PP and 
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structural collaboration.  This occurred at refining the variables before the quantitative 
questionnaire and at the end of the spectrum, in the findings, Chapter Four, where 
integration involved building the quantitative questionnaire with the qualitative analyses 
(Fetters, Curry, & Creswell, 2013).  
 
Interpretation and reporting 
The purpose will be data consolidation, data comparison, data integration and warranted 
assertion through several (mixed) analyses (quantitative & qualitative) (Creswell & 
Clark, 2011, pp. 65-76). Firstly, the quantitative and qualitative findings are synthesised 
through the narrative approach in the discussion chapter, using weaving. Nonetheless, 
of the level of interpretation and integration, the quantitative stage represents the 
dominant strand, regarding the scope of the research into SCP in the Netherlands; it is 
then extended with the qualitative strand being incorporated to address the purposes of 
mixing, triangulation, complementarity and expansion (‘putting the finger on the sore 
spot’) (Fetters et al., 2013). 
 
3.8.1 Qualitative and quantitative research  
The central aim and research objectives of this research contain ‘what, why and how’ 
objectives. The ‘how’ objectives – as in how to improve procurement performance 
through collaboration – require an open-minded approach to unravel the current 
operational practice related to the business processes. This will be done within the case 
study, initially as an exploratory approach.  
 
Due to the complexity of the implementation processes, case study is the most common 
research method in this field (Yin, 2003). Implementation is viewed as a completed 
process over time. Many different variables play a role. Part of it, moreover, does not 
directly influence the cases under study, but it has an indirect effect on them and also 
influences the outputs. The advantage of the case study approach is that the depth of the 
research can be increased. However, the disadvantage to this advantage is that within 
the time that is available for executing the quantitative study, only a limited number of 
cases can be examined. This brings with it objectives about the extent to which the 
results of the research are eligible for generalisation, but this will be covered by the 
quantitative stage of the research. 
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In the past, implementation research, which has been conducted frequently in the field 
of change research, has been criticised for the high percentage of studies carried out 
with case studies as a research method (Goggin, 1986). Bierman et al. (1991, pp. 3-14) 
argued for a more scientific and systematic approach. Quantitative methods should play 
a greater role in applied research (Frels & Onwuegbuzie, 2013). However, case studies 
involve concrete, practical and context-sensitive information; especially viewed from 
the ontological position of subjectivism, each business organisation is distinctive and 
forms a different research topic (Blaikie, 2010; Creswell & Clark, 2011). The social 
scientist stream of subjectivism is convinced that, for the development of social science 
theory, knowledge can only be obtained through case studies (Frels & Onwuegbuzie, 
2013; Yin, 2013). Also, a limited number of cases, if properly selected, can be 
generalised to a wider range of applications (Yin, 2013). The criticism that case studies 
can be manipulated by researchers to underscore their own hypotheses is not true, 
according to Yin (2013). The literature shows that the very opposite is the case. 
Through an in-depth approach to cases, many researchers have concluded that their 
findings do not correspond with their own hypotheses (Yin, 2003).  
 
This study opted for a single case study as it will take an exploratory and analytical 
character in the mixed methods research approach, and will be revisited using a 
quantitative approach (Creswell & Clark, 2011, pp. 53-106). In total, one case will be 
investigated. The case study is conducted at the largest and one of the first SCP 
organisations in the Netherlands (Ministry-of-Economic-Affairs, 2015), called Bizob. 
The value of collaboration will be defined within the internal business processes. 
Initially the case study was used to define what the value items in the public 
procurement function are, and the potential influence of collaboration, derived from the 
research objectives. These findings will result in accepting or rejecting the hypotheses.  
 
Timing, sequence and building data 
The results of the case study were used as a preparation and test for the quantitative 
stage of the research. The sequence of the data collection is influenced by the outcome 
of the interviews, which was firstly for preparing the questionnaire; however, the 
interviews secondly required fundamental research through the document analysis, 
which justified the additional document analysis to gather hard evidence. The timing of 
collection and analysis of the two strands occurs in two distinct phases, with the 
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collection and analysis of one (quantitative) data occurring after the collection and 
analysis of the other (qualitative) data. In the discussion section the two strands are 
mixed during the final step, drawing a conclusion that reflect what was learned from the 
combination of results from the two components of the study. The extending of the 
quantitative strand with the qualitative strand being incorporated to address 
commitment for mixing, triangulation, complementarity and enlargement on the central 
phenomena of this study (Bryman, 2016a). Choosing mixed methods strengthens the 
internal validity of the study (Frels & Onwuegbuzie, 2013; Venkatesh et al., 2013).  
In Figure 3-6 the project-planning of the study is viewed. 
 
 
Figure 3-6 Thesis Planning  
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 Qualitative Study: Data Types, Forms and Sources 
In general, documentation, archives, interviews, direct observation and participant 
observation are common sources for case studies (Yin, 2003). Much more information 
can be collected first hand using semi-structured interviews with stakeholders, focus 
groups and participatory observation (Creswell & Clark, 2011, pp. 148-151). In this 
phase of the research, documents and interviews will be used.  
 
From the extensive reviewed literature in Chapter 2, an initial list of potential items has 
been compiled. Eleven enablers of collaborative procurement and eight components for 
gaining collaborative procurement are inventoried. Business documents and financial 
reports from Bizob will be used to determine survey questions. This initial list will be 
reviewed and evaluated by practitioners from individual LAs organisations who are 
members of the Bizob organisations.  
 
Documents can also be used to identify the interpretations and reactions of stakeholders 
at key moments (Creswell, 2003; Yin, 2003).  Subsequently structured interviews will 
be used to check the relevance and clarity of the questions, assessment, the reliability 
and validity. Based on the feedback and comments from the experts, redundant and 
confusing items will be rejected, modified or added. This process of the case study is 
shown in Figure 3-7. 
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experts of local 
government 
organisations of Bizob






The relevance and 
clarity of the 
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The primary interest lies in determining which group of factors currently accounts for 
the largest part of the variance in procurement effectiveness and efficiency, and as a 
result on which group of factors collaboration should focus to increase the procurement 
performance of the individual local government organisation. Furthermore, the aim is to 
identify individual relationships between factors and specific dimensions of enablers of 
procurement collaboration. Identifying these relationships will provide more insight into 
how structural collaborative procurement effectiveness is actually affected. These 
dimensions of procurement performance will be analysed and discussed in the next 
chapter.  
 
3.9.1 Research set-up 
This section describes the first phase – the qualitative part – of the study, which is based 
on semi-structured interviews with experts who are responsible for the procurement 
function in their public organisation and documents relating to the case study of local 
governments in the South-east of Brabant, which are founded in the Bizob organisation. 
The interviews and document study are conducted to offer the groundwork for the 
quantitative part but also to compare the findings of both studies. The qualitative 
research that has been used and its aims are explained, the findings are discussed and 
the implications for the quantitative primary research instrument are specified. The 
process of this exploratory study is viewed below in Figure 3-8. This figure shows the 
different stages in the instrument’s development.  
 
Research phase                Methods              Products Scale development 
 
Figure 3-8 Qualitative Research Approach. Adapted from Bulling (2005) 
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In this research, a qualitative inquiry has been conducted by using a combination of 
interviews with experts and direct observation of documents relating to the procurement 
performance function of SCP to begin identifying requirements of SCP approaches to 
affect their procurement performance. Phase 1 – the qualitative study – has been 
conducted to gain a deeper understanding of the value of SCP and procurement 
performance. Besides deeper understanding, this can be needed to refine the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 3 for the phase 2 quantitative research.  
 
3.9.2 Case study: local government organisations in Southeast Netherlands 
The aim of this inquiry is to study the enablers and disablers which have an effect on the 
PP of a LA inside a natural population. As an appropriate study of a representative part 
of the population, a case study would be the preferred method (Yin, 2003). The case 
study will be used in this study to explore the actual contribution of collaboration to the 
individual PP of a LA.  
One of the advantages of the case study method is that it provides deeper insight into 
the benefits and disadvantages of PP for a LA. It also shows how these benefits and 
disadvantages are caused. The disadvantage of a case study, according to the 
quantitative category of scientists, is that findings are not statistically generalisable. The 
findings are only valid for that specific organisation, under these circumstances and 
conditions. 
 
Why has this region been chosen for the case study? This region has been selected for 
the case study because most of the local governments there participate in SCP and most 
procurement spending involves SCP. SCPs were among the first organisations in the 
Netherlands to undertake collaborative procurement and began in 2003. They are 
known to represent one of the main players in SCP organisations in the Netherlands 
(Verhagen, 2011). This region is therefore representative and encompasses the issues in 
which this study is most interested: procurement performance, effects of collaboration, 
fragmentation, new public tasks and differences in size and structure.  
 
3.9.3 Interviews 
In-depth interviews offer the opportunity to capture rich, descriptive data about people’s 
behaviours, attitudes and perceptions, and unfolding complex processes (Creswell & 
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Clark, 2011, pp. 230-233). In understanding how the concept of SCP performs, as 
collaboration structure, benefits and the impact of coordination on collaborative output 
as proposed by (Cao & Zhang, 2011), evidence was gathered through a series of face-
to-face interviews with representatives from the management and political functions in 
the Dutch local government sector. In the explorative part of the research, it was 
important to obtain knowledge for the purpose of preparing the survey. While 
interviews take time, they can give you rich, detailed information. From a post-
positivist view, interviews must all be conducted in the same way to avoid interviewer 
bias. Although thorough information was needed in the initial phase, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted. The semi-structured form allows the interviewer to ask 
further questions and request clarification. To ensure that each respondent understood 
the question, in the same way, the interviewees were equally pre-briefed (Collis & 
Hussey, 2014). Open-ended questions were used to support and stimulate interviewees 
into voicing opinions, using examples and reflection. 
 
The literature review in Chapter 2 explained that the main strategic players in SCP are 
general management, financial management in operational business units, and political 
leaders (mayors etc.). For each of the local government organisations involved, initial 
contact was made directly with these key persons. Table 3-1 shows the positions of the 
people interviewed for each of the local governments involved in the study and where in 
the organisational structure they were positioned. The interviewed LAs are a varied mix 
of extent: large/small/medium, and geographical position in the Bizob region. The 
criteria taken into account in the selection process included managerial or political 
responsibility regarding the procurement function in their organisation. 
 
Table 3-1 Interviewees 
 Local authority Seniority / 
responsibility 
Functional area Seniority Date 
1. Municipality Son & 
Breugel 

















Financial control C 03-02-2016 
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 Local authority Seniority / 
responsibility 
Functional area Seniority Date 
5. Municipality 
Deurne 
CEO/ City manager General manager 
operations 
D 18-01-2016 













8. Municipality Oss     CPO Corporate 
procurement 
D 17-05-2016 





Seniority A 0 – 1 year   
B 1 – 3 years 
C 3 - 5 years  
D > 5 years 
 
The semi-structured interviews were held in 2016. Four Chief Executive Officers 
(CEOs) of municipalities, one mayor of a municipality, one Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO) of a municipality and one of a regional fire-security agency, one Chief 
Procurement Officer (CPO) of a municipality and one procurement manager were 
interviewed. All interviewees had a position within their organisation in which they 
were responsible for the strategic position and functioning of the procurement function. 
The exception was the mayor; however, he was administratively responsible to the city 
council for the realisation of the (procurement) policy goals. Most interviews averaged 
100 minutes and were conducted according to the interviewees’ schedules and 
availability at their offices and were selected by mini pre-interviews. The mini pre-
interviews were conducted to avoid disinterest or unprepared performance during the 
main interviews (Ahmed, Qayed, Abdulrahman, Tavares, & Rosenfeld, 2014). The 
author’s personal expertise within the public procurement sector helped to gain access 
to data. The sensitivity of the information gathered during the study was recognised and 
the author personally controlled all of the material. All of the information collected 
during the project has been maintained in a series of protected project files, which 
included data collected from the case studies. The author personally carried out all of 
the interview work in order to maintain a consistent approach throughout. An 
independent transcribing service carried out the transcribing of the taped interviews. 
Case study work was reviewed on an ongoing basis by the researcher’s supervisor in 
order to ensure that the work carried out met the high academic standards of 
professionalism demanded at doctoral level.  
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3.9.4 The content focus of the in-depth interviews  
Table 3-2 shows the content focus of the interviews and the link to the research 
objectives and hypotheses. 
 
Table 3-2 Content Focus Interviews 
Qualitative research focus Subjects for the in-depth interviews Link to RO 
In-depth interviews identify 
the types of value due to 
cooperation and gain these 
benefits. Questions examine 
how structure can be 
implemented in 
collaboration and what the 
values of structural 
collaboration are related to 
procurement. 
Access to Expertise /knowledge 
Access to capacity 
Access to dedicated personnel to 
manage the collaborative processes 
Sharing experiences 
Cross-organisational teams for process 
design and improvement 
Quality 
Resource sharing 
Output value products /services of 
collaborative procurement  
Procurement human resources 
Standardisation 
Cost reduction by cutting budgets 
Reducing organisational risks 
Fragmentation in the organisation of 
Procurement 
Resource dependence diminishing 
Demand share 


















Costs / Value 
Value 
In-depth interviews identify 
the (positive) effects of SCP 
for individual local 
governments. Questions 
examine the advantages 
and disadvantages for the 
operation of local 
governments. 
Resource sharing 
Transparency of information  
Procurement human resources,  
Standardisation of procurement process 
Capabilities  
Demand share  
Product development 












between members of 
collaborations and the 
instruments used to 
harmonise the individual 
members towards the 
common goal. Several 
collaborations and the 
inefficiency between these 
collaborations are studied.  
Goal synchronisation 
Procurement organisation cost 
Symmetry of information 
Transparency of information in the 
collaboration 
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The semi-structured in-depth interviews were mainly focused on what are the variables 
that affect the performance of the SCP, related to costs, uncertainty, and value; after 
identification, further investigation will additionally zoom in on the question of how 
they affect it. 
 
3.9.5 Validity 
This section sets out the validity of the study in phase 1 – the qualitative investigation. 
Any qualitative research must be able to withstand rigorous scrutiny to confirm quality. 
Collis (1995) and other academics developed criteria such as credibility, confirmability, 
transferability, saturation, meaning-in-context and recurrent patterning for reliable 
academic interpretivist study. Blaikie (2010, pp. 167-171) broke down validity into two 
wide classifications – internal and external. Yin (2014, pp. 32-38) recommends five 
tests, mentioned below, to establish the quality of any empirical social research, 
especially using case-studies to establish the quality of the research. Qualitative validity 
comes from the researcher’s analytical procedures, based on information gathered 
during interviews and from document reports. This section will set out the 
trustworthiness of this qualitative research by applying certain criteria. 
 
Construct validity 
In general, in case studies it is essential to ensure that subjective judgments do not 
influence data collection. Operational measurements have been established to secure the 
construct validity.  
 
Appendix V shows the characteristics derived from the theories of the literature, further 
defined and operationalised in dimensions items and collected with key performance 
indicators and techniques of measuring.  
 
The objective of item generation is to achieve the content validity of constructs by 
reviewing the literature (chapter 2) and consulting with local government experts. The 
dimensions are reviewed from the extensive literature, which involves the procurement 
performance of organisations by collaboration. The data has been analysed by the 




These characteristics will be discussed with experts of local government organisations. 
These experts are chief financial officers (CFOs), chief executive officers (CEOs) and 
one mayor. All of these experts were willing to take part in the expert group. The goal 
of the expert group was to check the items and theories generated from the literature 
were relevant to the practical business environment.  
 
Internal validity 
Internal validity is the degree to which the researcher can determine that there is a cause 
and effect correlation among variables. These are accounted for in phase 2, the 
quantitative investigation of the research. Patterns have been matched as a procedure of 
testing the SCP theory in the case: local government in the Netherlands. Hypotheses, 
expected patterns, which are refined by phase 1, will be tested, consists of matching, in 
the local government in the Netherlands, observed pattern, by measured values and 
accepted or rejected. Patterns will be matched or not matched. 
 
In phase 1, risks such as participant attrition and the maturation of participants have 
been accounted for. Participant attrition in the expert group of interviews has occurred. 
Maturation of participants has not affected the data because of the moment in time the 
interviews and the strategic position of the participants in their organisation was similar. 
 
External validity 
External validity is the scope to which the case study results can be generalised 
(Bordens & Abott, 2002; Collis & Hussey, 2014). The external validity challenge is a 
major barrier when conducting case studies. In this study, the post-positivist approach is 
applied; the case study has been used to refine and deepen the hypotheses and 
questionnaire. In principle, the two theories that explain the effect of collaboration and 
the procurement performance on local governments would be the targets to which the 
results could later be generalised. To secure this generalisation, hypotheses will be 
tested in phase 2 in accordance with statistical techniques. The SCP theory will be 
tested by replicating the findings in other regions of the Netherlands through 
quantitative research (R. K. Yin, 2014, pp. 32-40).  
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Content validity 
Cohen, Philips, and Swerdlik (1996) argue that researchers must validate whether the 
content of a research object is a representative sample of the universe of the behaviour 
the test was designed to sample. The scope of the construct is adequately reflected by 
the items as a group (Dunn, Wellman, & Bevan, 1994). Other research scientists (Collis 
& Hussey, 2014) mentioned meaning in context, which has similar characteristics. The 
experts selected for interviews were all responsible for the procurement function of their 
organisation on a daily basis, as well as on a strategic, tactical and operational level and 
selected by pre interviews (Ahmed et al., 2014).  
 
Credibility 
This aspect was achieved by guaranteeing that the interviewees received a short briefing 
about the content and subjects of the interview beforehand to obtain depth of 
understanding. The interviewees were then debriefed on a continual basis after the 
interviews were held concerning the quantitative approach and findings (Collis & 
Hussey, 2014, p. 172). 
 
Reliability 
Reliability refers to the absence of random errors, in theory ensuring that subsequent 
researchers would be able to arrive at the same results if they conducted the same 
research along the same steps again (Collis & Hussey, 2014; Yin, 2014). In this phase 
of the research, the face-to-face interviews were all tape-recorded. All interviews were 
systematically transcribed, which reinforced the recurrent patterning to repeat the 
experiences of sequenced perceptions.  
 
Prevent social desirability bias 
The potential interviewees were first asked by email for cooperation. Two people 
indicated that they had no time or need to participate in the interviews. As a result, a 
select group remained, who independently and professionally fulfilled their position 
towards the researcher. In addition, the interviews were also conducted for verification 




The interviews started with revealing the purpose of the interview, preparing the 
subjects for what was to follow; they, therefore, had the time to prepare their responses 
such that they were socially more acceptable. The interviewees were prepared with a 
guide checklist and assured of the fact that there were no right or wrong answers. 
Limited acceptance or rejection was given while conducting the interviews. Also, 
similar questions, but in another form, were asked about previous topics. So that 
interviewees would feel comfortable and not pushed, the interviews took place at the 
office of the interviewee. Mainly neutral questions were asked, for example: ‘What 
affects the output of joint purchasing?’  
 
Alternative ways to collect information were also used, such as through direct 
documents analysis and report information. However, careful wording of questions and 
the assurance of anonymity were key measures. The interviewees were not subordinate 
or in any way dependent on the researcher, but neutral and objective. None of the 
interviewed CEOs, CFOs, CPOs or the mayor were involved in the creation of the SCP. 
Thus they were not biased and had no inside information on the foundation of the SCP. 
This made it possible for them to give an objective representation of the SCP, which 
endorsed validity. 
 
3.9.6 Document analysis 
Bowen (2009), mentioned that exactness of data should be complemented by zooming 
in for crucial evidence. On the other hand, Yin (2003) noted the difficult availability 
and bias, often only focused on a unique business issue, resulting from document 
analyses. Fortunately, this study had direct access to the required data because the 
organisation under study belonged to the population. Document analysis was conducted, 
to gather ‘hard’ data and to justify some perceptions out of the interviews. The 
document analysis was used for additional research related to a recently executed 
procurement project, which had been conducted by existing SCP. The objective of this 
additional research is to examine evidence of the performance of joint procurement 
projects. 
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Validity 
This data has been uploaded out of an internal locked IT management system of the 
Bizob SCP. This IT system is used to gain reports about the input of resources into 
procurement projects and respective outputs. This system has been occupied with real 
resources, which were needed to execute the procurement projects. The output has been 
registered from a system that calculated and assessed the procurement projects that were 
executed for LAs through the SCP. The data contains procurement projects of facility 
and health commodities for one LA compared with equality JPGs. The measurement 
contains the sourcing phase of the joint procurement process. These reports have been 
reviewed through an external accountant in the context of the annual controlling and 
reporting cycles of the SCP Bizob to its participating LAs. This IT system is annually 
controlled by external accountancy on construction with financial system. 
 Quantitative Study: Data Types, Forms and Sources  
The general aim of a quantitative study is to gather knowledge and experience of 
professional experts who help to address the research objectives of this study. The 
digital survey is a form in which objectively a large, well-known group can receive 
questions and provide responses. A disadvantage of a questionnaire is the long lead-
time; on the other hand, it is a reliable way to collect extensive data. A Likert scale was 
used to provide better responses than to open-ended questions (Bryman, 2016b).  
During the quantitative study, factors that predict an effect on the procurement 
performance of public organisations through structural collaboration were measured. 
Based on the qualitative pre-stage, a questionnaire was prepared. This questionnaire was 
sent out in the Netherlands to all LAs which are members of SCP organisations.   
 
3.10.1 Piloting and pre-testing  
Yin (2013) suggested conducting a pilot study in a representative case. The main reason 
for this was to check content validity with the opinions of experts (department managers 
and chief procurement officers) and feasibility and clarity of questioning. Before 
conducting the questionnaire, it was tested in two specific case situations – two SCPs. 
Firstly the expert panel was asked about the phrasing of the questions and 
variables/items and was invited to sort the questionnaire items into corresponding 
dimensions of the operation scheme – see Appendix V (Gehlbach, 2015). Secondly ten 
procurement managers, employed at different organisations, reviewed the questionnaire. 
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The pilot study, for preparing the document analysis, was executed at LAs in the 
Southeast region of the Netherlands and is included in Appendix VIII. Straub, 
Boudreau, and Gefen (2004) found that out of all of the articles published in three 
widely referenced information system journals over three years, only 19% used either a 
pre-test or a pilot test.  Table 3-3 provides an overview of what is tested. 
 
Table 3-3 Piloting and pre-testing 
Activity Objective Pilot study and pre-testing Secured 
Document 
analysis 










Questions operate well 
Ensuring that the research instrument functions 
well 
Adequacy of instructions to respondents  




Besides the questions, the reliability and validity of the scales was also tested for 
relevance, preventing the use of double-barrelled items, avoiding mismatching item 
types with desired data and clarity (Gehlbach, 2015). In light of the findings from the 
pre-test respondents and the feedback from the members of the expert panel and the 
procurement experts, the questions and the scale were adapted. Comments were: 
 
 some questions could not be understood; 
 some questions were too manipulative; 
 some questions did not flow well; 
 too many questions; 
 some questions were eliminated and others added. 
 
The following corrections were applied to the questionnaire as a consequence of the 
pilot and pre-testing: 
 
 introduction text made more clear and complete; 
 order of questions changed and / or bundling of questions; 
 underlined the essence of questions; 
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 clear description of public organisations: Safety services, municipalities, shared 
service centre, health-care and environment agencies; 
 possible (wrong) suggestions changed; 
 leave the survey organised based on the two theories, but adapted it to bundle 
several topics into one question; 
 ‘never’ and ‘always’ replaced by ‘none’ and to a ‘high degree’; 
 ‘procurement manager’ replaced by ‘procurement-consultant or operation 
manager’; 
 clarified that the answer was about the real situation and not someone's opinion; 
 last page of e-questionnaire made more personal.  
 
The following assumptions were applied to increase the response rate: 
 
 an explanation for the respondent’s selection for inclusion in the study has been 
given; 
 confidentiality and anonymity guaranteed; 
 reminder emails sent two weeks after receipt of questionnaire; 
 a short summary of the results will be available for the respondents. 
 
3.10.2 Communication strategy of the questionnaire 
As mentioned, the current SCPs in the Netherlands had been taken as a starting 
population. These SCPs are affecting the procurement performance of their member 
LAs, mostly municipalities. In advance, the LAs of the 29 registered SCPs in the 
Netherlands have been requested to participate in a large-scale survey. Twenty-two LAs 
replied to this email request positively. To improve the response rate (Bryman, 2016b, 
p. 225), the requests expressly invited the staff of management experts of the LAs who 
were capable of responding to the questionnaire.  
 
Also, an approachable way of answering was used – a Likert scale. Besides the 
improvements mentioned before, the following recommendations have also been 
applied. 
 
Dommeyer and Moriarty (1999) completed in their research two forms of email surveys 
– attached and embedded. The attached form provides significantly more appearance 
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than the embedded version, is easier to respond to and therefore attracts a higher 
response rate. In this study, the survey contains 58 questions/items and has been sent 
out electronically as an attached large-scale survey. The questionnaire has been 
specified and described to the respondents.  A digital electronic survey software 
program was used.  
 
3.10.3 Validity 
Blaikie (2010, pp. 167-171) broke validity down into two wide classifications – internal 
and external. Yin (2014, pp. 32-38) recommends four tests to establish the quality of 
any empirical social research, especially case studies. Qualitative validity comes from 
the analysis procedures of the researcher based on information gathered during 
interviews and from the reporting documents. This section will set out how the validity 
of this quantitative investigation in phase 2 will be secured. 
 
External validity 
External validity is the scope to which case study results can be generalised (Bordens & 
Abott, 2002; Collis & Hussey, 2014). The external validity challenge has always been a 
major barrier in conducting case studies. In this study, a positivist approach is applied; 
the case study has been used to refine and deepen the hypotheses and the observed 
research object. On the other hand, in this case study, the case ‘Southeast region of the 
Netherlands’ has been selected for those types of local government regions within 
which procurement performance has been affected by structural collaboration. In 
principle, the two theories that affected collaboration and the procurement performance 
of local government would be the targets to which the results could be generalised. In 
order to be able to generalise hypotheses have been tested empirically in phase 2. The 
SCP concept was tested through replication of the findings made in other regions of the 
Netherlands using quantitative research (Yin, 2014, pp. 32-40). To secure the external 
validation in this research, the following techniques have been applied: 
 
 inviting 1-3 experts per LA to cover insights into total procurement function; 
 only targeting LAs that are members of SCPs (population validity); 
 SCP for LAs had been supported and promoted for all the regions in the 
Netherlands by the Ministry (ecological validity). 
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Construct validity 
The operational measurement has been established to secure the construct validity. In 
Appendix V and 0, characteristics are derived from the theories of the literature. These 
are further defined and operationalised into dimensional items and collected with key 
performance indicators, and measurement techniques. A research-fellow from the 
Faculty of Computing, Engineering and Science of the University of South Wales 
controlled the SPSS variables. 
 
The objective of item generation is to achieve the content validity of constructs by 
reviewing the literature (Chapter 2) and consulting with local government experts. The 
dimensions have been reviewed from the extensive literature, which involve the 
procurement performance of organisations through collaboration. For triangulation, 
manual parallel analysis has also been conducted to test the reliability of the factor 
analysis. 
 
These characteristics have been discussed with experts from local government 
organisations. These experts are chief financial officers (CFOs), chief executive officers 
(CEOs), two chief procurement officers (CPOs) and one mayor. All of these experts 
have been willing to take part in the expert group. One of the objectives of the expert 
group was to check the items collected from the literature, with the relevance and clarity 
of each item of the theories with the practical business environment, also first-hand 
items where supplementary to the questionnaire.  
 
Internal validity 
Internal validity is the degree to which the researcher can determine that there is a cause 
and effect correlation among variables. These are accounted for in phase 2 – the 
quantitative investigation of the research. Patterns have been matched as procedures for 
testing the SCP theory, in this case local government in the Netherlands. Hypotheses 
(expected patterns), which have been refined in phase 1, will be tested, consists of 
matching, in the local government in the Netherlands (observed pattern) by measured 





Bordens and Abott (2002, p. 125) argue about the value of face validity founded on the 
consistency of measuring. The data from the interviews has been drawn on the coded 
text of the main theme of one of the theories into the matrixes in section 2.4. Also, 
groups of experts have tested the questionnaire in the pilot study, as mentioned in 
section 3.2. This can been seen as determining whether on the face of it the measure 
seems to reflect the concept concerned. Bryman (2016b, p. 159) suggested that face 
validity is an essentially intuitive process. However, the systematic analysis of the data 
from the interviews and the experienced and academic experts for the expert groups 
rejected this critique for this research. The survey had been introduced with a clear 
overview of the purpose and context of the research to improve the appearance validity 
of the interviewees.  
 
Content validity 
Cohen et al. (1996) argue for validity if the content of the research object is a 
representative sample of the universe of the behaviour the test was designed to sample. 




Variables to measure abstract concepts have been translated from the operational 
scheme. In the questionnaire, multiple-item scales have been used. Each item/variable is 
correlated with every other item/variable that relates to construct across the sample and 
the average inter-item correlation is taken as the index of reliability (Collis & Hussey, 
2014, p. 275). To control how consistent the measurement instrument is, the internal 
reliability has been examined (Straub et al., 2004). For inspection of the internal 
reliability of multiple-time scales, Cronbach’s alpha has been tested in all analyses. An 
additional test has been executed to check the correlations in the factor analysis of the 
latent variables. It is also a part of Rietveld and Van Hout (1993) factor analysis 
procedure, which has been examined in chapter four. 
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 Ethical Considerations 
The researcher of this study has spent many years working in the context of this 
research topic. In essence, the concept of the reflective partner position relates to the 
researcher’s relationship to what is being studied. 
 
Since 1998, the researcher has been the CEO or interim CEO of several SCPs in the 
Netherlands. Alongside his regular job, he is a member of the board of NEVI Public 
(Netherlands Association of Procurement) and a strategic advisor to the board of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs regarding the developing of the National Tender Law and 
the development of the professionalism of the procurement policy for municipalities in 
the Netherlands (member of the expert team and supervisory committee). He is one of 
the four co-authors of the Proportionality Guideline. 
 
Griffith (1998) suggests that a person within the group has close information, which can 
give a less objective picture on the study, topic and data, especially concerning personal 
attitude and behaviour. Burns, Fenwick, Schmied, and Sheehan (2012) recommend in 
this situation to balance the position within the middle ground with ethical integrity, 
authenticity and relationality. On the other hand, the insider perspective questions the 
capability of researchers to really understand the situation of the business situation they 
study when they do not have access to intimate insider knowledge (Burns et al., 2012). 
West, Stewart, Foster, and Usher (2013) are convinced that researchers without some 
insider knowledge will never come to realise the richness of a phenomenon that can be 
achieved with insider understanding.  
 
Gaining access to credible knowledge thus requires a researcher to find a balance 
between ‘nearness’ and ‘remoteness’ to avoid what is termed by anthropologists as 
‘going native’ but more of a continuum (West et al., 2013). The researcher in this study 
is working on several levels of collaborative procurement, namely, regional, national, 
strategical, policy and organisational. It is thus possible to have a professional stance 
regarding this topic from several angles (West et al., 2013).  
 
Blaikie (2010, pp. 50-55) suggests three fundamental views which a researcher can 
assume: outside expert, inside learner and reflective partner. The general question – 
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improvement of the public procurement function by structural collaboration – will be 
founded on theories. From that view in this research, the stance of the researcher can be 
characterised as ‘reflective partner’. Also, detachment is required for producing reliable 
and consistent knowledge that can be generalised. Here the social background and 
motivations of individuals will not be explored but rather the rational performances of 
collaborative local government organisations.  
 
As the researcher of the present study works as a professional in this area, he will 
always have access to several interpretations of the researched reality. Based on his 
knowledge and experiences, he can make choices about the several intervention 
possibilities. In this manner, interpretations can be focused to make grounded choices. 
The researcher’s own knowledge of this field is relevant. Moreover, it is necessary in 
the practical situation to precisely understand the extent to which this knowledge 
provides explanation, in order to implement interventions and also to judge the 
individual characteristics of the situation. On the other hand, the researcher must be 
aware of conscientisation: identifying contradictions and taking action against 
oppressive elements of reality (Blaikie, 2010, p. 52). 
 
In addition to these considerations, the researcher has profiled his position and 
standpoint as a scientific research student at the University of South Wales. 
 
This research has been conducted in line with the six key principles of ethical research 
that the ESRC expects to be addressed.  
 
1. The research will be designed, reviewed and undertaken to ensure integrity and 
quality.  
 
2. The supervisors of this doctoral research will be informed consistently and 
periodically on the objectives, methods and techniques that will be used. Special 
arrangements for restricting the circulation of the research during the process 
will be made. Also, potential participants will be fully informed by the 
introduction to the survey or interview if recording equipment will be used. An 
internet software package for conducting and analysing electronic surveys will 
support the surveys and mathematical analysis of them. This will contribute to 
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consistency and ensure the integrity and quality of the research. The research 
will use appropriate means of data collection. Conclusions will be drawn from 
techniques that reflect current professional knowledge on validation, reduction 
of bias, standardisation, design etc.  
 
3. The confidentiality of information supplied by research subjects and the 
anonymity of respondents will be respected. The participants in the study will 
remain anonymous in the surveys. Statistical analysis of the findings will be 
carried out using software, which should reduce defaults and secure anonymity. 
 
4. Research participants participate in a voluntary way, free from coercion. This 
will be guaranteed by the possibility that participants can withdraw at any time if 
they choose. If they do not like participating in the survey, they simply ‘click 
off’ or ‘away’ from the software. The research participant will be informed 
about any foreseeable consequences of declining if applicable.  
 
5. Harm to research participants will be avoided or not be applicable. Because the 
surveys will have a business and economic character, the research guarantees the 
absence of harm to the research participants. Participants will be communicated 
with in their ‘mother tongue’ language. The research participants will be 
protected from any adverse consequences from declining to participate where 
the researcher holds a position of authority relative to them.  
 
6. The independence of the research will be a crucial matter, and any conflicts of 
interest or partiality will be explicit. The researcher will always be sensitive to 
the potential harmful effects of other contacts on their work and on those 
persons with whom they deal. An academic conflict of interest could occur if an 
individual interferes with the peer-review process for some type of intangible 
personal gain. In this research, the doctoral student has no personal interest, in 
order to strengthen his or her own chances for publication or funding. 
 
Only appropriate means of data collection have been used. Probability has been 
reflected to the ‘real world’ of Public Procurement in Local Government in the 
Netherlands. Care was taken to store data securely and confidentially, in accordance 
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with the Data Protection Act 1998. The data were fairly and lawfully processed, 
processed for limited purposes, accurate, not kept longer than necessary, secured and 
not transferred to countries without adequate protection. The conclusions related to 
contributions to science and practice were drawn up from techniques, which reflect 
current professional knowledge and practice.  
 
In the public sector, in principle, data is transparent and public. In the Netherlands, there 
exists a Freedom of Information Act 1991. According to this law, the government has a 
legal obligation to provide information through an approved publication scheme and in 
response to requests. Nevertheless, the researcher has to use the information exclusively 
for his research and never transfer this to third-party or commercial organisations. 
 
In this research, data relating to government administrations were used. These data are 
not confidential or personal in character. However, the information was used 
exclusively for this research and therefore was not be multiplied or divulged. 
Questionnaires and interviews were conducted anonymously to treat with respect and to 
protect the respondents. This includes the findings and publication of the research.  
 Challenges and Summary 
A challenge for conducting the research was to focus on the main three research 
objectives in the quantitative phase. Collaboration is a complex topic to explore in full. 
The questionnaire was at first too extensive and too technically formulated because 
many research variables were chosen. Fortunately, the interviews, the pilot study, and 
the expert group made it possible to funnel the information. Another challenge was 
ensuring that the response rate was high enough. After the first email, only 58% had 
responded. After a reminder email was sent out, the response rate increased to a 
response of all the invited LAs, which covered 30 SCPs in the Netherlands. The 
advance announcement played an important role in obtaining this high response rate. 
  
Besides the explorative character of the interviews, they provided very rich data and 
directions. The daily business position of the researcher did not conflict with the face-
to-face interviewees; they were partly selected for that reason, as they had no direct 
hierarchic relation with the researcher. 
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The document analysis offered interesting findings, which were maybe already thought 
to be known, but produced slight differences. The challenge was also here to demarcate. 
It was always tempting to look a little further than the key objectives. 
 
Chapter 3 has set out the methodology of this research, which is the bridge between the 
topic of the research in the form of the significance of the study and research objectives, 
the literature review and the research being conducted in the ‘real’ world (the local 
public landscape in the Netherlands). In this chapter, the connection between the three 
philosophies of ontology, epistemology and axiology has been shown. Understanding 
and choosing a philosophy is an important step in planning and carrying out research. 
This chapter is summarised in three subjects as shown in Figure 3-9. 
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Chapter 4. Findings      
 Introduction 
This chapter will outline the approaches to data collection and present the findings. The 
data originates from several sources and methods. Qualitative and quantitative data has 
been collected in this research. Bryman (2016b, p. 627) mentioned the difference 
between quantitative and qualitative research; the difference between ontological 
approaches, behaviour versus meaning, is in his opinion a reproduction of that tension. 
Savage, Bagnall, and Longhurst (2001) conducted qualitative in-depth interviews in 
their research and found interesting data about class identity and non-awareness, which 
in their opinion could never have been found using quantitative research because of the 
non-awareness of their own situation in this sociological research environment. 
Qualitative researchers are convinced that a Likert attitude scale does not provide access 
to meanings. Payne and Grew (2005) recommend a more mixed study approach 
whereby qualitative research can be deeper than quantitative research. Surridge (2007) 
advocates for quantitative research, especially when it concerns large-scale surveys, 
with an explanatory objective.  
 
In this research, although LAs are subject to strict rules and accountability from the 
region and national government (Ministry-of-Economic-Affairs, 2016), LAs are 
generally similar in terms of their environment, objectives and governance and face the 
same challenges. In this part of Chapter 4, phase II at the very least has tried to address 
meanings. The exploratory sequential design involves the collection of qualitative data 
before gathering quantitative data.  
 
Janssen et al. (2009) suggested that LAs consider their business processes as individual 
and unique because they have progressed over time and have been tailored to fit their 
specific business situation. Faes et al. ( 2000); Meehan et al. (2016); Walker et al. 
(2013) proposed a higher level of abstraction in their studies, where business processes 
are often relatively similar, and only really vary with regard to a limited number of 
aspects. The leading distinctions have to be in line with the different types of demands 
and the sequence of activities. Although politicians at a central level determine most 
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demands, every LA has its own, local demands. For example, a request for constructing 
sewerage can be demanded by one or more LAs. As far as demands determined at a 
central level are concerned, they may be different in terms of their technology and 
implementation but they have the same general objective and often involve similar 
business processes. This means that there are similarities of behaviours between the 
responses of the LAs in the quantitative phase of the data collection, which is interesting 
for the explanation part of this inquiry. Besides that, data from quantitative research 
behaviours is interesting given the national scope of this business research. 
 
The assumption of SCP is intended to improve the procurement performance of 
individual LAs across the following headline scopes: 
 





These extents are likely to be valued differently by diverse constituents. In practice, we 
might expect a more complicated picture of the performance of SCP across a range of 
performance dimensions (Boyne, 2003) due to potential differences between inputs (e.g. 
cost) and outputs (efficiency) and the experience, satisfaction and perception of quality 
from citizens. Other aspects will be more important for this research, such as the 
measured quality of outputs such as professionalism of procurement services and the 
quantity of outputs such as the number of procurement projects performed, and the 
efficiency by ratio of outputs, number of measured procurement projects to financials 
costs, inputs. Besides, value for money by costs per LA for IT procurement systems and 
the LA satisfaction of their SCP (Boyne, 2003). 
 
The structure of this chapter is illustrated in Figure 4-1. 
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Figure 4-1 Outline Structure of Chapter 4 
 
4.1.1 Overview 
In the qualitative approach, variables/items and key performance indicators have been 
identified through interviews. These were then used to develop a questionnaire. Once 
the key indicators were recognised in the qualitative element, a quantitative approach 
was used to utilise statistical techniques to generalise the behaviour on a national level. 
Creswell and Clark (2011, pp. 68-104) described this method as ‘dominant – less 
dominant’ design. In this study, a dominant-less dominant design was applied with the 
emphasis being on the quantitative instrument (structural questionnaire) over the 
qualitative semi-structured interviews.  
 
A theoretical foundation such as SCP can be used to achieve more value for local 
governments. Phase II of this chapter outlines the exploratory design of this model, 
sourced by the two theories, which respect this theoretical finding in the ‘real world’ of 
local government organisations in the Netherlands. Items that have affected the 
procurement performance of LAs, which are deducted from existing theories, will be 
refined through the interviews and tested at the LAs who are members of an SCP. 
 
In Appendix V, advantages and characters are derived from the theories of the literature, 
further defined, coded and operationalised in dimensions, variables/items and collected 
with a survey, in 0 and Appendix IX. The objective of item generation is to achieve the 
content validity of constructs by reviewing the literature (Chapter 2) and consulting 












 In-depth and Semi-Structured Interviews 
The basic set of questions developed for the interview protocol are given below; they 
illustrate the themes and subjects of Table 3-2. 
 
1. What were the strategical motivations for participating in an SCP? 
2. Do you think that participating in an SCP has resulted in any specific 
organisational outcome?  
3. What sort of outcomes does your LA achieve through the SCP (H2)?  
4. How do these outcomes affect your organisation? 
5. To what extent do they affect the certainty or vulnerability of your 
procurement processes? 
6. Which of the procurement performance outputs does your LA attain 
most? e.g., costs reduction, less uncertainty, value, citizen satisfaction, 
innovation.  
7. Do you think that several collaborative tasks can become more efficient in 
the future (H3) and how?  
8. To what extent does procurement play a role in achieving the results 
(success) of implemented policies?  
9. Have you experienced any professional change in your organisation in 
recent years with SCP?  
10. What effects has structural collaboration had on the guarantee in the 
internal business process? 
11. What have been the results of structural collaboration for cost reduction 
in your organisation? 
12. Does the structure have a significant positive effect on collaborative 
benefit(H1)? 
13. Does coordination with a SCP moderate the procurement performance of 
a local government organisation(H3)? 
 
During the nine interviews undertaken, the words ‘continuity’, ‘too small organisation’, 
and ‘too difficult profession’ were seen as key objectives of using SCP. An 
overwhelming majority of interviewees (9 of 9) across all LAs and public agencies used 
terms such as ‘efficiency’, ‘cost saving’ or ‘measurable’ to describe why their 
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organisation decided to use SCP. The primary qualitative findings are included in the 
Appendix IV and in the following sections, under the themes of RBT and TCT. 
 
In the next sub-paragraphs, the two main themes analysed in ‘thematic analysis’ are 
presented (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Guest, MacQueen, & Nameney, 2012). As well as the 
seven interviews with the CEOs/CFOs and mayor, two CPOs were interviewed to verify 
whether or not there were any gaps or contradictions with the other interviewees (Baker 
& Edwards, 2012, pp. 197-219; Bryman, 2016b, pp. 197-219).  
 
4.2.1 Thematic Analysis of the semi structured in-depth interviews 
Themes and characteristics were drawn out of the literature and identified the 
theoretical framework SCP. The interviews provided data about the phenomenon in 
question, SCP, and helped to refine the quantitative phase. 
To analyse interviews, the process of refining and identifying characteristics in the 
initial exploratory phase is mostly open, tentative and repetitive, with many relevant 
keywords in the margin of the text themes. These themes are taken from the literature 
review and are visible below. 
Resource sharing, resource dependence diminishing, information asymmetry, demand 
share, reputation, goal synchronisation, transparency of information, procurement 
organisation costs reduction, minimising of procurement management costs, 
procurement information costs, procurement human resources, procurement process, 
standardisation, value, and capabilities 
Each theme has been deduced from the theories and analysed from the literature. The 
themes in the margin indicate different subjects and what has been said about them. The 
themes based on theory and field knowledge were previously derived from the literature 
or are new keywords. In addition, each theme has been read from the perspective of the 
respondent: what it contributes, in addition to the subjects. Thus the underlined 
descriptive thematic coded text, in Appendix IV, from the transcripts provides the raw 




As indicated above, this process is repeated nine times, since subsequent themes, or 
those from other respondents, are able to make a point, which had previously not yet 
been recognised. This process produced a large number of keywords. Therefore the 
researcher managed the link between keywords and material themes to keep track of the 
compare keywords in the same themes with each other and the keywords, organising 
and grouping around the subjects, which is affecting PP with effort of SCP. These (sub) 
analytic themes are presented in the matrixes and brief snippets from the data transcripts 
are placed into the appropriate cell in Appendix VI. The researcher looked for 
similarities and differences of content, outcomes, and context within and between the 
descriptive themes, as well as for new interpretative explanations between each of the 
two theories. Replication is one of the most common criteria for establishing whether a 
pattern within a data set warrants being measured as a theme, though replication must 
be relevant to the investigation’s research objectives. The next two sections present the 
thematic analyses of the theories to compile the answers from an analytic view.  
 
4.2.2 Generating analytic themes of Resource-Based Theory  
In this phase of the research, the characterised features of this theory have been 
explored in the Bizob case study. These features of the RBT were part of the interviews, 
constructed on the operational schedule shown in Appendix V. 
 
The dominant theoretical proposition of the RBT is drawn from the theory for the 
strategy and growth organisations and suggests that collaborative organisations are able 
to provide knowledge/experts, limit vulnerably/capacity, and gain more social value, 
recapped in the dimension resources sharing (Brewer et al., 2014).  
 
To what extent can the LA produce what it needs to fulfil its operations without 
conceding effectiveness? Similarly, to what extent is reliance on their SCP necessary for 
LAs to achieve their goals? All of the interviewees stated that their “LAs have direct 
access to professional procurement knowledge” (9 of the interviewees). Seven of the 
nine interviewees mentioned “these resources as critical, which were scarce and new 
on the public sector employment market” (7 of the interviewees). Also, the steadiness of 
resources, which an SCP can provide, is decent for the continuity of LAs and makes 
them less vulnerable to this expertise.  
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On the other hand, concentration in the SCP was not accused of negatively affecting 
separate LAs’ access to critical resources.  Interviewees mentioned that the intensity of 
expertise and resources in an SCP would increase by extending the LA. “The 
combination of decentralised procurement expertise of the SCP at the location has been 
noticed as being conditional to connect the local demands of LAs” (8 of the 
interviewees). 
 
In contrast, one interviewee mentioned “the direction of his LA in recent years towards 
less dependence on the SCP and a change to more procurement expertise in-house as 
basic skills of civil servants” (1 of the interviewees). The motivation for this movement 
was the overcapacity of civil servant resources in his LA and a reduction of their 
budgets.  
 
Also, “the concentration of buying power in monopolistic commodity markets” (9 of the 
interviewees) is mentioned by the interviewees, which they attribute to the arrangement 
of the JPG of the SCP. So taking account of SME markets is a condition 
 
In theory, SCPs possessing the necessary resources are in a powerful position whereas 
LAs depending on others for resources are vulnerable to control.  
 
In a world according to RBT, managerial strategy starts with understanding the nature 
of the LAs’ dependence on the procurement function. Thus, a manager applying RBT 
principles to strategic choices will ask the following types of questions: SCP can be 
seen as an activity, which takes place outside of an LAs control, and is considered part 
of the environment of the SCP region. Looked at in this way, the atmosphere is likely to 
consist of many other LAs in a particular region – a system of interdependencies. The 
theory emphasises three features of the atmosphere: concentration, munificence, and 
interconnectedness. Concentration refers to the degree to which authority and power are 
dispersed within a setting. Munificence refers to the scarcity of critical resources and 
the willingness within SCP to share. Interconnectedness refers to the degree to which 
organisations are linked regarding overall collaboration and governance in their region. 
These three characteristics operate together to determine the resource contribution of an 




The abovementioned dominant theoretical proposition of this theory in this research is 
drawn from the theory for the strategy for the performance of the procurement function 
of the LAs, suggesting that collaborative organisations are able to assure the critical 
resources for their existence, development and to avoid uncertainty. The dimension of 
resources sharing is divided into the themes mentioned in Appendix VI. 
 
Access to expertise/knowledge 
In the interviews, there was a general consensus about the theme of access to 
expertise/knowledge through SCP. The CEOs of smaller LAs with fewer than 40,000 
inhabitants indicated that “their civil servants had general skills and no procurement 
expertise” (5 of the interviewees). Two of them emphasised that “at the start of the 
implementation of SCP, access to expertise/knowledge was the most important 
consideration” (2 of the interviewees).  
 
Access to capacity 
All of the interviewees found “continuity of procurement expertise of the SCP 
important” (9 of the interviewees). The continuity of the unchanged procurement 
expert(s) resources is also an important aspect for LAs. Too often, swift changes of 
procurement resources are experienced, leading to confusion and a lack of clarity for the 
LA, which leads to additional changeover costs. The relationship between the 
procurement expert(s) of the SCP and has been found to be important. Remarkably, 
“one interviewee now used the procurement expert capacity of SCP less and used its in-
house civil servant capacity more” (1 of the interviewees). Another LA found “the 
agility of the SCP important compared with the bureaucratic public shared service 
centre” (1 of the interviewees).   
 
Access to dedicated personnel to manage collaborative processes 
The collaborative procurement project has to be managed by professionals, as 
exemplified by all of the interviewees. On the other hand, “one of the interviewees had 
experienced lead times that were too long, too many meetings, too much 
correspondence and a sluggish process” (1 of the interviewees). 
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Sharing experiences 
The interviewees found it very interesting to share their practices with other regional 
LAs regarding European tendering. One of the interviewees found “sharing experiences 
to be a natural task of a network organisation” (1 of the interviewees), such as Bizob. 
On the other hand, one of the interviewees was “disappointed in the sharing of 
experiences between SCP experts and the civil servants of the LA” (1 of the 
interviewees). The SCP experts execute procurement processes in an organised and 
professional way; this structured and qualified manner has been limited to the working 
attitude of the civil servants of the LA. Most of the interviewees also remarked upon 
“the added value of professionalism in the procurement processes due to collaborative 
procurement projects” (9 of the interviewees).  
  
Cross organisational teams for process design and improvement 
To improve processes or to design new product/services concepts, teams with different 
functions can be meaningful. A few interviewees mentioned “the efficiency of executing 
a pilot first before rolling out to LAs” (2 of the interviewees). 
 
Quality 
Quality refers to the extent to which LAs with the colleague LAs in their region and 
their SCP offer quality products, services and infrastructure works, which creates higher 
value for citizens. Some have argued that companies can respond faster to LAs and thus 
to citizens with high-quality products, infrastructure works and innovative designs and 
processes. Also, an excellent after-sales service supposedly builds customer loyalty. All 
of the interviewees confirmed that “SCP brought more quality to the procurement 
function of LAs than beforehand” (9 of the interviewees). Two of them also confirmed 




Resource sharing was explored in the interviews in relation to the process of leveraging 
capabilities within LAs in the SCP. Two smaller LAs (located in the same sub-region) 
mentioned “restricted sharing of technical expertise with each other and the LA, fire 
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and security agencies, and have shared technical expertise with other homogenous fire 
and security agencies” (2 of the interviewees).  
 
Resource dependence diminishing 
To what extent can the LA produce what it needs to fulfil its operations without 
conceding effectiveness? Similarly, to what extent is reliance on their SCP necessary for 
LAs to achieve their goals? All of the interviewees stated that “their LAs have direct 
access to professional procurement knowledge” (9 of the interviewees). Seven of the 
nine interviewees mentioned these resources as “critical, which were scarce and new on 
the public sector employment market” (7 of the interviewees). Also, the steadiness of 
resources, which an SCP can provide, is decent for the continuity of LAs and makes 
them less vulnerable to this expertise.  
 
On the other hand, concentration in the SCP was not accused of negatively affecting 
separate LAs’ access to critical resources.  Interviewees mentioned that “the intensity of 
expertise and resources in an SCP would increase by extending the LA” (9 of the 
interviewees). “The combination of decentralised procurement expertise of the SCP at 
the location has been noticed as being conditional to connect the local demands of 
LAs” (9 of the interviewees). 
 
In contrast, one interviewee mentioned “the direction of his LA in recent years towards 
less dependence on the SCP and a change to more procurement expertise in-house as 
basic skills of civil servants” (1 of the interviewees). The motivation for this movement 
was the overcapacity of civil servant resources in his LA and a reduction of their 
budgets.  
 
Also, “the concentration of buying power in monopolistic commodity markets” (8 of 
the interviewees) is mentioned by the interviewees, which they attribute to the 
arrangement of the JPG of the SCP. So taking account of SME markets is a condition.  
 
Resource information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry may occur where the SCP has additional or better knowledge 
than the individual LA in relation to procurement transactions. All of the interviewees 
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mentioned “gathering or buying information and the procurement plans of individual 
LAs as tasks of the SCP as well as the SCP’s awareness of the LAs” consolidated 
procurement demands’ (9 of the interviewees). Also, “the central and structural 
communication function of the SCP” (9 of the interviewees) has been seen as a ‘unique 
selling point’. One interviewee mentioned “the reciprocated control and independence 
in the procurement process between civil servants and procurement experts from the 
SCP in procurement projects for his LA” (1 of the interviewees); he described this as 
access to new information. Another interviewee could not give hard evidence on this 
point for his LA but his expectations were positive. Five of the nine interviewees were 
convinced that “LAs had become dependent on IT procurement systems for structural 




All of the interviewed executives are convinced that “the buying power aggregated in 
the SCP makes the individual LAs stronger in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets” (9 
of the interviewees). They feel that this has led to lower costs and less uncertainty. The 
consolidation of the demands of the LAs also leads to the dependence of the SCP on the 
demands of the LAs, although this is not negative. Without the volume of the LAs, the 
SCP has no legitimisation. The executives did not recognise this phenomenon. 
 
Reputation/Legitimacy 
The interviewees recognised legitimacy as an important dimension for their LAs, 
although this has been advanced over the years. In order to gain support from important 
external actors from European and national legal forces, the SCP appointed influential 
developments from the environment and integrated the LAs into the expertise and 
leadership structures of the SCP. By offsetting external opposition through 
collaboration, the SCP boosted its practicability and legitimacy. The external 
performers mentioned by most of the interviewees were “innovation, more access for 
SMEs to public tenders, integration of social shelters and the extension of legislation 




Three of the interviewees noted “the perceived niche vision of the SCP on public 
procurement as a confirmation to their council and stakeholders which enhance the 
procurement firm performance and ties similarly confer legitimacy and status to his or 
her domestic organisation” (3 of the interviewees).  
 
Reducing organisational risks 
One of the interviewees mentioned “the loss of core activities; being leveraged by SCP; 
the loss of strategic flexibility; suffering interruptions to supply; and receiving poor 
quality supply” (1 of the interviewees). These tactical and strategic procurement issues 
are critical to their core competences. He also believes that organisations using SCP risk 
losing vital knowledge, especially in relation to core competences. 
 
Conversely, other interviewees were convinced of the fact that “their critical 
procurement function is more secure in an SCP governed by LAs” (5 of the 
interviewees). Besides securing this function, they felt that procurement failures and 
legal claims were also diminished. 
 
Product development/innovation  / Output value products of collaborative procurement 
products 
All of the interviewees stated that SCP offered LAs sustainable procurement, which can 
be disaggregated to green procurement and social considerations. The coordination and 
stimulating role of the SCP between the LAs was recognised as a contribution; 
additionally, SCP offers a bridge and an independent consulting role between execution 
organisations, LAs, SCP and vendors to implement sustainable procurement.  
 
Three of the nine interviewees have seen that “innovation and product development 
often benefit from external advisors or external organisations” (3 of the interviewees). 
One of the interviewees had expected new ideas, models and processes etc. to be 
applied to their business processes by their civil servants.  
 
Focus on core business LA/insourcing 
One of the interviewees mentioned that “executing procurement procedures is an 
integral part of the profession of a civil servant and not an additional skill” (1 of the 
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interviewees). This interviewee restricted the outsourcing of the procurement function 
to the SCP. In recent years his organisations had challenged whether the activity should 
have been outsourced in first place. Conversely, at the start of SCP, the organisation 
might take into consideration the risk of losing essential knowledge, especially in 
relation to core competences to execute their primary business tasks. If the savings from 
budgets and activities do not cover the costs of SCP, activities should be insourced. 
Hidden costs would occur from executing the procurement function twice. 
 
Another interviewee was convinced that for his LA, “the SCP unburdens their staff so 
that civil servants are more focussed on material aspects and the content of contracts” 
(1 of the interviewees). Their argument was that the SCP adds value in terms of gaining 
and sustaining a competitive advantage on procurement.  
 
Outsourcing procurement function 
Seven interviewees have mostly different motivations for participating in the SCP. It 
varies from more objectivity, independence, distance and visibility to only wanting the 
SCP for difficult procurement issues. The interviewees agreed that “SCP leads to more 
professionalisation in procurement, namely procurement procedures to prevent legal 
procedures and improved consistency of service” (7 of the interviewees). None of the 
interviewees mentioned increased flexibility, cost certainty, reduction of staff costs and 
free management time. 
 
Information about SCP behaviour is critical for limiting opportunistic behaviours 
because information lets LAs know what the SCP is actually doing, and the SCP, of 
course, will realise that it cannot mislead the principals. In the public sector, LAs are 
more and more aware of their regional partnerships with local authorities (Van Puyvelde 
et al., 2014). These critical attitudes are concerned influence, financial control, and 
marginal value. 
  
4.2.3 Generating analytic themes of Transaction Costs Theory 
The interviews reflected the different theoretical perspectives of TCT as “debating 
voices” in search of common ground. The perspectives cover the cost-based view 
encouraged by the transaction cost economic theory, the management view inspired by 
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the Agency Cost Theory Eisenhardt (1985), and the core-based view inspired by the 
Core Competence Theory (Quélin & Duhamel, 2003). These interviews have focused 
on the transaction costs of the procurement organisation and the sourcing phase. These 
questions, related to the costs aspect, often refer to the idea of the cost of providing a 
good or service if it was procured in the market rather than from within the LA. 
 
Procurement organisation costs 
All of the interviewees were convinced that “procurement costs for the sourcing 
process had been extremely diminished, compared to without the SCP” (9 of the 
interviewees). However, the decreasing cost of executing tenders have not been 
measured structurally. Meanwhile the savings of the extent of the contract value are 
measured. Three of the interviewees declared that “they have not had access to equal 
procurement management information regarding the comparable individual costs of 
their LA” (3 of the interviewees). A synchronic and simultaneous procurement project 
in their LA has never been measured in parallel. 
 
Procurement of human resources 
One interviewee noted that “the costs of human resources for procurement are higher 
than before” (1 of the interviewees). In his opinion, nowadays procurement activities 
are executed and organised across several departments of his organisation. Another 
interviewee experienced “lower procurement costs for human resources due to costs 
being spread across more than one LA” (1 of the interviewees). Also this particular 
interviewee noticed “the demand for more exclusive procurement experts on 




Four of the seven interviewees agreed that “SCP contributes to the standardisation of 
procurement processes” (4 of the interviewees). Aspects mentioned include IT 
procurement procedures, framework contracts, and standardisation of specifications for 
commodities, sewerage and standard procurement dossiers.  
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Costs reduction by cut budgets 
Two of the nine interviewees, both CEOs, mentioned “regional projects, like water 
management, sewerage and basic IT, which were started regionally – and not directly 
related to procurement – because of financial cuts to national budgets or national price 
upgrading” (2 of the interviewees). Joint purchase groups also exist for energy, 
insurances and flexible human resources, which have led to lower costs but were not 
initiated on the back of reduced budgets. Budget savings instructed by LA councils are 
directly calculated in budgets and indirectly forced in procurement projects but not 
instructed directly to the procurement function, respectively SCP.  
 
Transparency of information 
All of the interviewees mentioned that “the annual procurement plans for the joint 
procurement projects and individual procurement projects are useful regarding the 
transparency of information between the SCP and its LAs” (9 of the interviewees). 
Also, the decentralised procurement expertise of the SCP to collaborate with civil 
servants of LAs is stated as important by interviewees. In addition, communication and 
information about the exchange of procurement specialists in LAs has been seen as 
critical success factor for executing procurement projects and functions. 
 
The transfer of e-procurement management information about performing of the SCP 
but also responsibility of effort has been noticed as being necessary to improve the 
transparency of information between LAs and their SCP. Critically, control of the SCP 
service through civil servants (principal function) has been remarked upon. Thereby, 
trust and commitment can be reinforced or damaged. 
 
Duplication in collaboration 
All the interviewees presumed that “their collective public partnership organisations 
could use each other’s additional core skills to work more efficiently” (9 of the 
interviewees). SCP and regional public partnership organisations – for example, 
safety/fire services and environment services – are operating individually, focused on 
the demands of the LAs, of their participants. The interviewees mentioned that “their 
organisations participate in regional collaborative arrangements in public primary 
services as well as public secondary services, for example procurement, IT and human 
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resources” (9 of the interviewees). Moreover, these collaborative public organisations 
have too limited coordination of their core skills and activities. Most collaborative 




Three interviewees mentioned that “SCP has converted their fixed costs into variable 
costs” (3 of the interviewees). Five of the nine interviewees declared that their LA did 
not measure the cost before, during or after using the SCP. These LAs do not possess 
hard data regarding the inputs and outputs of the SCP compared to the situation before 
the SCP existed.  
 
Fragmentation in procurement organisation 
Two of the nine interviewees recognised “fragmentation in their LA concerning the 
procurement function”  (2 of the interviewees). In their organisations, setting objectives 
and comparing actual results against predetermined standards had not been carried out 
to monitor the performance of the procurement function. The control department was 
also not measuring maverick buying between business units and the central procurement 
department or SCP. Most of the interviewees were aware of several standards of 
procurement functions in their organisation.  
 
Goal synchronisation 
“The inefficiency of executing joint procurement projects” (2 of the interviewees) has 
been mentioned due to excessive meetings about the details of such processes and not 
the results. The interviewees argued that there was too little discussion about the content 
of specifications rather than structural conversations about cost reductions and other 
themes. Some of the interviewees attribute this to a lack of interest in each other’s goals 
but also the number of participants and the level of majority of the individual 
procurement organisation of the participated LA. Three CEOs mentioned “the 
difference between levels of majority of the individual procurement function of the LA 
as a potential explanation for non-synchronisation” (3 of the interviewees). Their SCP, 
Bizob, had been extended with new members over the last 10 years 
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Summary  
The insights of the CEOs, CFO, CPOs and mayor, regarding themes such as their ‘own’ 
procurement resources and outsourcing to SCP, provided a more precise understanding 
of the research objectives, due to their experience with joint purchasing groups (JPGs) 
within the SCP and their perceptions of the ‘value’ of the professional procurement 
function. Cost reduction was often mentioned as an expectation, even if estimated. This 
called for more fundamental and quantitative research. The findings from the interviews 
will be used to build between the qualitative and quantitative data in section 4.3.3 and to 
support analysis and exploration of the data for the discussion in Chapter 5 (Creswell & 
Clark, 2011, pp. 203-250; Fetters et al., 2013). 
 Document Study 
One of the main findings of the in-depth, semi-structured interviews is the lack of hard 
data available on the performance of procurement functions. The interviewees were 
confident about the positive contribution of SCP to the procurement performance of 
their LAs but could not measure this. In this section, additional research related to a 
recently executed procurement project, has been conducted. The objective of this 




This data has been uploaded out of an internal locked IT management system of the 
Bizob SCP. This IT system is used to gain reports about the input of resources into 
procurement projects and respective outputs. This system has been occupied with real 
resources, which were needed to execute the procurement projects. The output has been 
registered from a system that calculated and assessed the procurement projects that were 
executed for LAs through the SCP. The data contains procurement projects of facility 
and health commodities for one LA compared with equality JPGs. The measurement 
contains the sourcing phase of the joint procurement process. These reports have been 
reviewed through an external accountant in the context of the annual controlling and 
reporting cycles of the SCP Bizob to its participating LAs. This IT system is annually 




4.3.2 Comparative analysis of JPG and individual procurement projects and E-
procurement 
This section sets out an audit-conducted comparison analysing individual procurement 
projects compared with parallel procurement projects executed in collaboration with 
joint purchase groups.  
 
Comparative analysis of collaborative joint purchase groups and individual 
procurement projects 
The comparison between individual procurement projects and collaborative joint 
purchase groups was carried out by comparing the time spent on the sourcing processes. 
Time spent includes the activities of procurement experts for sourcing and tendering 
activities, measured in real days. This is shown in the Table 4-1. 
 
Table 4-1 Comparative Analysis of Joint versus Individual Procurement Projects 
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days 
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€ 112,175 7.05 3.51 
33.2% 

















11.25 7 LAs 
n=2 










6.69 15 LAs 
n=4 
€ 70,122 4.10 2.59 
38.71% 
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5.03 15 LAs 
n=1 






















14.00 9 LAs 
n=2 




‘Procurement costs in days’ contain time in working days (7.2 hours) in the pre-stage and 
sourcing phase. 
The compared individual versus joint commodities included equal product/service 
specifications. 
Procurement experts of the same SCP have executed individual as well collective 
procurement projects. 
The LAs concerned are similar in terms of their local public core activities. 
The LAs provide services to between 15,000 and 45,000 inhabitants.  
57 individual procurement projects were measured.  
19 collaborative procurement projects were measured. 
Internal overhead costs are excluded. 
 
Key finding 
Delta (Δ) 33.2% - 73.5% procurement costs days between PCI versus PCSCP.  
 
Comparative analysis of simultaneous and similar collaborative and individual 
procurement projects 
In this section, two procurement projects executed in 2016 are compared in Table 4-2. 
They are highly similar, which makes an objective comparison more useful. In this case, 
the comparison is made between different groups of the same substantive type. The 
objective of this comparative analysis is to make a contribution in the absence of hard 




The contexts of the two procurement projects have been compared and contrasted. The 
performance of the procurement projects has been measured using financial and 
qualitative indicators. 
 
Comparative analysis has been chosen to compare regional collaborative procurement 
projects versus an individual energy project. These two projects were executed 
simultaneously with similar product specifications, similar time to market and 
correspondingly procurement exerts. The differences are the number of LAs involved. 
Thus, this comparison should show whether there is a difference in performance for the 
LAs using different procurement methods for similar tenders. 
 
Table 4-2 Comparative Analysis of Gas & Electra JPG versus IP 






















































‘Procurement costs in days’ contains time in working days (7.2 hours) in the pre-stage and 
sourcing phase. 
The individual and jointly projects included similar product/service specifications. 
Procurement experts of the same SCP have executed the individual as well as the collective 
procurement projects. 
The LAs concerned provide similar local public core activities. 
Internal overhead costs are excluded. 
 
Key findings 
Delta (Δ) 55.6% procurement costs days between PCI versus PCSCP  
 
Value:  
 advance local supply of solar systems; 
 sustainability 100% green supply ; 
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 re-selling back sale surplus energy;  
 e-invoice system; 
 e-monitoring system. 
 
Comparative analysis of collaborative and individual IT e-procurement system 
In Table 4-3, the costs for an IT e-procurement system between one individual LA and 
the SCP Bizob has been analysed. The IT e-procurement system contains: sourcing & 
tender software, supply/contract management software, and a procurement management 
information system. 
 
Table 4-3 Comparative Analysis of IT Procurement Software 
Tender software LA SCP (25LA’s) 
Software application € 25.740,- € 125.140,- 
Training € 585,- € 7.410,- 
Update In license In license 
Internal app manager € 23.520,- € 58.800,- 
New hardware n.a. n.a. 
Implementation supplier € 14.000,- € 14.000,- 
Projectmanagement € 10.640,- € 10.640,- 
Linked-up with other systems n.a. n.a. 
Maintenance In license In license 
Consultancy € 2.800,- € 2.800,- 
Life cycle 4 years 4 years 
Total IT costs € 77.285,- € 218.790,- 
 
Contract management LA SCP (25LA’s) 
Software application € 8.300,- € 24.200,- 
Training n.a. n.a. 
Update In license In license 
Internal app manager € 23.520,- € 23.520,- 
New hardware n.a. n.a. 
Implementation supplier € 12.800,- € 12.800,- 
Project management € 7.980,- € 7.980,- 
Linked-up with other systems n.a. n.a. 
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Contract management LA SCP (25LA’s) 
Maintenance In license In license 
Consultancy € 1.400,- € 1.400,- 
Life cycle 4 years 4 years 
Total IT costs € 54.000,- € 69.900,- 
 
Management information system LA SCP (25LA’s) 
Software application € 5.940,- € 24.320,- 
Training n.a. n.a. 
Update In license In license 
Internal app manager € 11.760,- € 17.640,- 
New hardware n.a. n.a. 
Implementation supplier € 16.940,- € 16.940,- 
Projectmanagement € 6.790,- € 6.790,- 
Linked-up with other systems n.a. n.a. 
Maintenance In license In license 
Consultancy € 10.560,- € 10.560,- 
Life cycle 4 years 4 years 
Total IT costs € 51.990,- € 76.250,- 
 
Assumptions:   
 LA  
 SCP (25 LAs) 
 Software application  
 Training   
 Internal application manager  
 Implementation supplier 










1 Local Authority with 3 users  
25 Local Authorities with 38 users  
SAAS (cloud), licence costs  
Costs based on users  
Variable rate  
Fixed amount from tender  
Fixed amount  
Fixed amount 
 
Key findings   






SCP 25 LAs 
 
218,790 
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Key findings   
Supply/contract management 







Quality of services Information symmetry 
Complementary resources 
Quality of services 
 
Comparative analysis of collective procurement expert capacity  
Economies of scale are often mentioned in up-scaling discussions in the public sector, 
especially in the local sector. This study suggests that there are opportunities for 
structural collaboration in the area of public procurement, which could have an internal 
and external financial impact. Figure 4-2 considers a cost-comparative analysis between 
up-scaling execution procurement projects inside LA or executed by the SCP. 
 
Figure 4-2 Comparison analysis, SCP versus up-scaling procurement costs for LA 
This analysis shows that the internal costs of up-scaling are higher than the costs of 
procurement resources being delivered through SCP. In this case, economies of scale 
related to procurement costs through centralisation or merging can be more inefficient 
than the procurement costs of SCP. 
 
Assumptions:   
 1 LA 
 2 LA  
 3 LA 
 Procurement expert capability 
average costs LA (total) 







LA (< 50.000 inhabitants)  
LA ( 50.001 < Inhabitants < 100.000  
LA > 100,000 inhabitants 
 
Fixed amount  
Fixed amount  
 
1 2 3
Average costs  LA € 598 € 619 € 648


















Key findings   






















 Comparative analysis of spend day-rate during JPG 
The data shown in Figure 4-3 compares the spend time during the execution of JPGs 
projects. Several different commodities have been compared in spend time during 
several stages in the procurement process. How further in the procurement process, 
relatively less time has been spend. Also the type and characteristics of commodities 
affect the required cycle time.  
 
Figure 4-3 Time Spend in Stages JPGs 
 
Assumptions: 
 Spend day : 7.2 hours  
 Commodity groups 
JPG’s (Kraljic, 1983) 
 
















 Limitations : 8 cases 
 








Pre-stage	 8.9	 21.3	 4	 11.9	 11.2	 6.5	 52.6	 11.2	
Sourcing	 12.6	 18.5	 14.7	 5.6	 12.2	 3.4	 71.7	 24.2	
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Key findings  
Spending days increased affected through Type of commodity, complexity of supply 
market and financial risk 
Pre-stage Strategic and bottleneck products 
Sourcing Strategic and significantly LAs  
Contract management Strategic and significantly LAs 
 
Furthermore, the findings supported cost efficiency in JPGs as well as in collaborative 
IT procurement systems. 
 
4.3.3 Integration through methods: qualitative into quantitative  
This initial study informed the generation of variables regarding factors potentially 
associated with better performances and identified themes that influence the key effects 
of SCP and contribute to the procurement performance of LAs. The qualitative database 
informs the data collection approach of the questionnaire (Fetters et al., 2013). Table 
4-4 presents how the qualitative data were used to build quantitative questionnaire 
variables / items. 
 
 Table 4-4 Using qualitative data to build questionnaire items for the quantitative study 
Domains, quotations from 
thematic coded text and 
interviews 
Corresponding Variable / item Code 
Questionnaire 
Access to 
expertise / knowledge 
‘Procurement knowledge 
and expertise are necessary 
for small LAs; civil servants 
are too generally skilled, 
therefore procurement 
cooperation is valuable for 
us‘. 
LAs have access to professional procurement 
specialists to manage individual procurement 
projects through SCP 
 
LAs have access to strategic procurement 
management to improve strategic position 










‘SCP is mainly known for 
downsizing procurement 
costs’. 
SCP leads to minimising of transaction costs 
in the sourcing phase, tender phase 
 
SCP lead to minimising of transaction costs in 








Domains, quotations from 
thematic coded text and 
interviews 
Corresponding Variable / item Code 
Questionnaire 
Product development 
‘Improving sustainability in 
procurement [is] certainly 
something we see as [a] 
value of SCP: Embedding 
national guidelines such as 
sustainability and social re-
entry of unemployed 
people, in our local 
procurement policy and 
strategy’. 
 
Our LAs have more advantages to access 
product/technological developments 
compared to without structural collaborative 
procurement organisation 
 
Our LAs have more access to innovation via 










In Table 4-5, the findings of this qualitative section are summarised and connected the 
two strands. In 0  the coded variables / items are included. 
 
Table 4-5 Findings Qualitative Research 
Objective  
- Collect primary data 
- Qualitative data used for refining the variables for the quantitative 
study 
Interpreted in the 
variables / items  
Qualitative Quantitative 
Interviews Case study Code Questionnaire 
Themes: 
 
 access to expertise/knowledge 
 access to capacity 
 access to dedicated personnel to manage the 
collaborative procurement processes 
 sharing experiences 
 cross-organisational teams for process 
design and improvement 
Comparative 
analysis: 
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 resource dependence diminishing 
 demand share 
 legitimacy/reputation 
 output value products 
 goal synchronisation 
 symmetry of information 
 transparency of information 
 cycle time of procurement projects 
 duplication collaborations 
 procurement organisation costs 
 procurement human resources/capacity 
 standardisation 
 flexibility in (procurement) planning 
 reducing organisational risks 
 focus on core business  
 outsourcing procurement function 
 insourcing 
 increase lower costs 
 product development 


































Phase I stipulated three-fold information. Firstly, rich data to get close to the social 
actors, meanings and interpretations. Interviewees were invited to offer their strategic, 
tactical and operational considerations and point of views regarding SCP and “what’s in 
it for their LA”. The findings pointed to a conclusion that several indicators directly 
influenced the outcome of the SCP.  
 
It materialised that the RBT, and TCT might be more appropriate for explaining internal 
individual considerations. Besides, TCT explains the efficiency and effectiveness of 
SCP for LAs, which had been recognised as a key performance indicator. An efficient 





Secondly, the document study established the assumptions of the TCT; fundamental 
evidence was required to  confirm the suspicion of lower transaction costs experienced 
by JPGs.  
 
Thirdly, the inquiries of phase I delivered valuable material to refine the research 
themes and enhance the variables for the quantitative phase. 
 Phase 2: Quantitative Investigation  
In this section, quantitative research has been executed to gain primary data from the 
questionnaires conducted at the LAs.  
 
Hypothesis Qualitative research focus 
Hypothesis 1 
Structural collaborative procurement has a 




In-depth interviews identify the types of value 
due to cooperation and gain these benefits. 
Questions examine how structure can be 
implemented in collaboration and how 
structure can have an impact on the output of 
the collaboration model. 
Hypothesis 2 
Collaborative benefit has a significant 
positive effect on the procurement 
performance of the individual local 
government organisation.  
 
 
In-depth interviews identify the (positive) 
effects of SCP for individual local 
governments. Questions examine the 
advantages and disadvantages for the 
operation of local governments. 
Hypothesis 3 
Coordination between structural 
collaborative procurement and individual 
local government organisations moderates 




In-depth interviews investigate coordination 
between members of collaborations and the 
instruments used to harmonise the individual 
members towards the common goal. Several 
collaborations and the inefficiency between 
these collaborations are studied.  
 
4.4.1 Implications for the quantitative study arising from the  qualitative study 
Several key viewpoints from the findings from the qualitative study were coded into 
themes and variables/items for the questionnaire as analysed in 4.3.3. and included in 0. 
The findings pointed to a central understanding that SCP improves the procurement 
performance of LAs, as all interviewees stated this and this was also supported by the 
document investigation.  
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The interviewees revealed the influencers that affected the output of the SCP, which 
affected the performance of the LA, such as access to expertise/knowledge, capacity, 
dedicated personnel to manage the collaborative processes, quality and resource 
sharing. The collaborative knowledge must be shared with the LAs. 
 
The interviewees were all convinced that the buying power aggregated in the SCP 
makes the LAs stronger in monopolistic or oligopolistic markets. The most frequent 
negative belief reported was that SCP could involve loss dependency. 
 
A minority of the interviewees reported negative beliefs about the financial benefits of 
SCP, mainly concerned with the fact that there are no facts or figures laying out the 
benefits.  
 
The majority of the interviewees mentioned goal synchronisation and symmetry of 
information as a factor that can contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency of 
collaboration between LAs in their region.  
 
All of the interviewees have indicated that procurement costs have been diminished 
through SCP. In some cases there was a lack of procurement information of comparable 
individual costs of their LA. 
 
All of the interviewees recognised that organisational risks have been diminished and 
more value added via partly outsourcing the procurement function through SCP, and 
procurement has become more professional. However, one negative aspect – loss of 
control and fragmentation in their LA – was also mentioned as a result of outsourcing 
procurement. 
 
These experiences have underlined important positive and negative experience and 
attitudes, which need to be taken into consideration when designing a  questionnaire 
tailored towards measuring and extracting influencers of and barriers to advancing 
procurement performances of LAs through collaboration.  
 
The operational scheme has been revised and adapted in response to the findings of the 
qualitative part and has been adapted in the code scheme and questionnaire. Hence the 
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questionnaire was developed, drawing on both the theory, outlined in the literature 
review, and the insights gained from the interviews.  
 
4.4.2 Analytical generalisation 
An important discussion in this research is about the extent to which, based on the 
findings in the case study and the questionnaire, relevant contributions to science and 
businesses can be drawn for other corporations, community organisations and 
governments. Below the analytical generalisation will be discussed – a technique that 
results from mixed studies linked via the two theories to provide a wider and new 
collaboration theoretical application range. 
 
There are two types of generalisation: statistical and analytical generalisation (Collis & 
Hussey, 2014). In the case studies, however, finding quantitative numbers is not the 
goal of the investigation. Case studies are, however, in a different way suitable to 
generalise data to a broader theoretical framework of measurement (Creswell, 2003; 
Venkatesh et al., 2013; Yin, 2003). This can be done by means of analytical 
generalisation, also referred to as theoretical generalisation. Analytical generalisation 
means that the results of one or more cases can be associated with the existing literature 
on the subject in question. Here the data from the cases can strengthen, qualify and 
supplement the existing theory (Blaikie, 2010; Collis & Hussey, 2014). According to 
Blaikie (2010, pp. 200-228) the possibility of generalisation primarily depends on the 
persuasiveness of the theoretical reasoning. In this research the figures of the document 
study support the findings of the interviews and questionnaire. The expected cost 
reductions were proved in the document studies in section 4.3.2. 
 
4.4.3 Preliminary considerations 
The data has been examined prior to analysis. The natures of the variables have also 
been examined. This is the first step before conducting specific statistical techniques to 
explore the data. The distribution of the data has been assessed in terms of normality 
and checked for outliers. Also, missing data have been analysed. Firstly, the background 
of the respondents will be described. This is central for the representativeness of the 
sample (Blaikie, 2010; Bryman, 2016b). This is to determine if the respondents are 
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capable of judging the procurement performance of their LA related to the contribution 
from SCP, and if they are representative of LAs across the Netherlands. 
 
4.4.4 Descriptive statistics  
In this section, univariate analyses have been applied to the data from the questionnaire 
of  Appendix IX. Frequency distributions, central tendencies and dispersion of the data 
have been investigated. While descriptive statistical methods are important for 
organising and characterising data, this allows patterns to be recognised that are not 
apparent in the raw data and positively aids subsequent hypothesis proofing (Berenson 
& Levine, 1996, p. 3; Lovie, 1986). It also helps to support the qualitative findings from 
the first part of this chapter (Creswell & Clark, 2011, pp. 203-250).  
 
Twenty-three cases were deleted as a high percentage (over 40%) of the variable items 
required for analysis were missing. Thus, the total valid number of cases was 112. 
In Table 4-6, the response rates are outlined.  
 
Table 4-6 Number of Requests and Respondents 
Number of SCPs 
requested  
Number of SCPs 
responding  
Number of LAs 
requested 
Number of LAs 
responded 
30 30 91 112 
from 91 separate LAs 
  
The respondents have been requested for their knowledge or experience with 
procurement performance and collaboration. Table 4-7 shows the organisational 
functions of the respondents. 
 
Table 4-7 Organisational Function 
Organisational Function 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strategic-policy maker 24 21.4 21.6 21.6 
Operational 1 0.9 0.9 22.5 
Tactical, senior servant 13 11.6 11.7 34.2 
Management 73 65.2 65.8 100.0 
Total 111 99.1 100.0  
Missing System 1 0.9   




Most of the respondents (65.2%) had a management function involving procurement. 
Secondly, 21.4% had a strategic function or strategic policy function in the area of 
procurement in their organisation. A small group of 11.6% were more tactically 
involved with procurement activities.  
 
Table 4-8 shows the professions of the respondents. The targeted respondents were 
financial experts, infrastructure work experts and social care experts. 
Table 4-8 Domain Function 
Profession 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Financial/controller 65 58.0 58.0 58.0 
Infra structural works 21 18.8 18.8 76.8 
Social Domain 8 7.1 7.1 83.9 
Other 18 16.1 16.1 100.0 
Total 112 100.0 100.0  
 
Most of the respondents (58.0%) had a financial position. This could be a strategic, 
financial or more cooperative control function. Secondly, 18.8% of the respondents had 
infrastructure work functions. Lastly, 7.1% of respondents had a function in the social 
care domain. These last two groups had primarily business positions within 
procurement activities. A group of 16.1% had ‘other’ functions than financial/controller, 
infrastructural works or social domain.  
 
Table 4-9 provides an overview of the number of inhabitants of the LA that the 
respondent represented.  
 
Table 4-9 Distribution Size of LAs 
Inhabitants 





Valid 0     – 15,000 Inhabitants 15 13.4 13.4 13.4 
15,001 – 25,000 Inhabitants 29 25.9 25.9 39.3 
25,001 – 35,000 Inhabitants 26 23.2 23.2 62.5 
35,001 – 50,000 Inhabitants 22 19.6 19.6 82.1 
50,001 – 65,000 Inhabitants 5 4.5 4.5 86.6 
65,001 – 100,000 Inhabitants 7 6.3 6.3 92.9 
100,001 - > 8 7.1 7.1 100.0 
Total 112 100.0 100.0  
 
Most of the respondents were working in a LA organisation representing 15,001 – 
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25,000 inhabitants. This was followed by the group of LAs with 25,001 – 35,000 
inhabitants. LAs with 35,001 – 50,000  inhabitants were situated in third place. In fourth 
place was LAs with 0 – 15,000 inhabitants. Larger municipalities were less represented 
at just 6.3% and 7.1%.  
 
Qualitative public policy themes such as sustainability, green procurement, social 
aspects, and access for SME firms in the LA questionnaires are shown in Figure 4-4. 
 
Figure 4-4 Importance Policy Procurement Goals  
 
The degree of using several collaborative arrangements by some public agencies are 




Table 4-10 Public Organisations and Procurement Issues 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
 Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic 




are integrated and 
executed 
91 1 7 4.36 .176 1.683 
 
4.4.5 The choice of parametric algebraic analysis technique 
The normality assumptions for each question, variable/item have been initially tested 
with reference to an inspection of both the histograms and the Skewness and Kurtosis 
values. The majority of the items/variables had mesokurtic distributions (bell-shaped), 
which indicated normality. However, some items/variables had platykurtic 
characteristics (large spread of results at the fringes).  
 
The overall rule is that if skewness and kurtosis are in excess of +/- 1.96, this indicates a 
violation of normality and the data is normally distributed (Berenson & Levine, 1996, 
pp. 273-318). Appendix XI data from the skewness analysis, which indicated that 0 
items were outside the skewness and kurtosis interval. This skewness and kurtosis 
analysis indicates that the data is normally distributed.  
 
Besides the skewness and kurtosis analysis, a search through the extreme-value box 
plots discovered a small number of outliers for a large number of variables and a small 
number of extreme outliers connected with highly skewed variables. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk analysis has also been conducted. These levels of statistical 
significance were mostly zero and thus below p > 0.05. Several researchers have 
discussed the sensitivity of this test by misreporting with lager samples (n > 30) and the 
applicability of this test when using seven-point Likert scales (R. Kennedy, Riquier, & 
Sharp, 1996; Pallant, 2010). 
 
Hence, when statistical tests were conducted – scale analysis, factor analysis and 
multiple regression – alongside the foregoing descriptive analysis, the data generally 
appeared to have relatively normal distribution.  
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4.4.6 Missing value analysis 
There are several ways to deal with missing data. On one hand, statistical inference can 
be used to replace missing data. On the other hand, cases with missing data can be 
deleted pair-wise or list-wise, which often results in shrinkage of the sample size 
(Pallant, 2010, p. 58). In this study, the impact of the missing values for the scale items 
was not considered a significant issue as all of the items had less than 25% of their 
values missing and any variable/items had control function. Green and Salkind (2014); 
Pallant (2010) recommended the option in SPPS to exclude cases pair-wise whereby 
cases are only excluded if they are missing the data required for the specific analysis. 
The missing data was analysed as Missing at Random (MAR = H0) or Not Missing at 
Random (NMAR = H1). The Little (1998) test was executed and showed that the data is 
missing at random (df >0,5).  
 
4.4.7 Scale consistency 
This section sets out the internal consistency of the scale that has been used in the 
questionnaire. This refers to how the items that make up the scale are connected with 
the dimensions. First the scale consistency is tested on a general level and subsequently 
it is tested on a dimension level. The statistical calculations for first data set – resource 
sharing – are shown in this section. In the last paragraph, Cronbach's Alpha values are 
summarised. The analyses for the scale consistency of the other data sets are included in 
Appendix X. 
 
Scale consistency general 
This quantitative study espouses restricting multi-scale measurements to the descriptive 
part of the questionnaire. In the main part of the questionnaire, selected respondents 
have been requested to give qualitative assessments. A semantic differential rating scale 
(Rosencranz & McNevin, 1969) has been applied in the questionnaire. When utilising 
multiple indirect measurements (Francis et al., 2004), beginning and end points are 
recommended (Francis et al. (2004). The respondents are asked to rate a professional 




For the reliability of the SCP, an assessment was calculated to indicate the degree to 
which it was free from random errors. Therefore, this study used four all-inclusive 
internal scale reliable tests in SPSS v23. The tests conducted are Cronbach α and the 
interim correlation matrix. Regarding the SCP scale, a Cronbach α coefficient of 0.970 
was produced, which indicated respectable internal consistency/reliability in Table 4-11 
Reliability Statistics below. Cronbach α composes the average covariance between 
item-pairs, and the variance of the total score. It measures internal consistency in terms 
of how closely related sets of items are as a group. If an item is deleted, the values of 
Cronbach’s Alpha are not higher than the final alpha value, so no item has to be 
removed from the scale  (Pallant, 2010, p. 100).  
 




Cronbach's Alpha based on 
standardised items 
N of items 
 
.970 .971 50 
 
 
Item analyses were conducted on the 50 items assumed to assess the two theories, which 
hypothetically affect SCP and the performance of LAs. Initially, each of the 50 items 
were correlated with the total score of the two theories (Table 4-12).  
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Table 4-12 Item SCP Item-Total Statistics 
Structural Collaborative Procurement: Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 






Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
SCPRBT9 180.90 1741.690 .561 .862 .964 
SCPRDT1 180.26 1710.230 .747 .854 .963 
SCPRDT2 180.90 1719.457 .674 .837 .964 
SCPRDT3 180.61 1709.443 .839 .942 .963 
SCPRDT4 180.97 1715.999 .787 .946 .963 
SCPRDT5 180.64 1714.734 .797 .959 .963 
SCPRDT6 180.31 1711.118 .797 .933 .963 
SCPRDT7 180.23 1697.580 .853 .957 .963 
SCPRDT8 179.97 1728.599 .678 .920 .964 
SCPRDT9 180.25 1728.889 .717 .935 .964 
SCPRDT10 180.51 1730.221 .634 .932 .964 
SCPAT1 180.72 1740.338 .524 .882 .964 
SCPAT2 180.18 1759.517 .436 .842 .965 
SCPAT3 180.89 1744.803 .460 .769 .965 
SCPAT4 180.93 1755.662 .378 .826 .965 
SCPAT5 181.64 1819.101 -.083 .743 .967 
SCPAT6 180.59 1687.079 .680 .903 .964 
SCPAT7 181.28 1710.771 .681 .932 .964 
SCPAT8 181.61 1717.543 .549 .897 .964 
SCPAT9 181.23 1776.080 .210 .830 .966 
SCPAT10 180.69 1730.685 .555 .866 .964 
SCPAT11 180.95 1695.014 .693 .895 .964 
SCPTC1 180.69 1718.551 .741 .946 .963 
SCPTC2 181.66 1728.930 .584 .882 .964 
SCPTC3 181.28 1719.171 .737 .950 .963 
SCPTC4 181.74 1742.730 .449 .872 .965 
SCPTC5 180.66 1749.896 .543 .911 .964 
SCPTC6 180.84 1754.673 .477 .919 .964 
SCPTC7 180.84 1694.539 .830 .945 .963 
SCPTC8 182.08 1739.877 .562 .810 .964 
SCPTC9 181.49 1720.287 .667 .884 .964 
SCPTC10 180.64 1738.901 .667 .914 .964 
SCPTC11 180.54 1716.586 .793 .943 .963 
SCPTC12 180.82 1721.050 .743 .938 .963 
SCPCCT1 182.08 1746.543 .529 .891 .964 
SCPCCT2 182.02 1723.383 .601 .847 .964 
SCPCCT3 181.26 1715.997 .702 .887 .964 
SCPCCT4 180.64 1711.001 .750 .955 .963 
SCPCCT5 181.25 1714.255 .690 .916 .964 
SCPCCT6 181.72 1751.071 .465 .856 .965 
SCPCCT7 181.38 1695.972 .795 .919 .963 
SCPCCT8 181.28 1712.538 .635 .950 .964 
 
Sub-scale consistency dimension: resource sharing 
With regard to the consistency subscale of resource sharing, four significant tests are 
executed. 
First a Cronbach α coefficient of 0.904 was found, which indicated very good internal 




Table 4-13 Reliability Statistics: Resource Sharing and Business Capabilities 
Reliability Statistics: Resource Sharing and Business Capabilities 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardised Items N of Items 
,904 .906 9 
 
 
Table 4-14 Inter-Item Correlation Matrix: Resource Sharing and Business Capabilities 
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix: Resource Sharing and Business Capabilities 
 SCPRBT1 SCPRBT2 SCPRBT3 SCPRBT4 SCPRBT5 SCPRBT6 SCPRBT7 SCPRBT8 SCPRBT9 
SCPRBT1 1.000 .571 .604 .538 .616 .472 .402 .391 .519 
SCPRBT2 .571 1.000 .797 .508 .602 .535 .413 .409 .527 
SCPRBT3 .604 .797 1.000 .582 .591 .517 .552 .506 .542 
SCPRBT4 .538 .508 .582 1.000 .567 .468 .561 .646 .441 
SCPRBT5 .616 .602 .591 .567 1.000 .587 .419 .412 .541 
SCPRBT6 .472 .535 .517 .468 .587 1.000 .416 .382 .562 
SCPRBT7 .402 .413 .552 .561 .419 .416 1.000 .584 .408 
SCPRBT8 .391 .409 .506 .646 .412 .382 .584 1.000 .434 
SCPRBT9 .519 .527 .542 .441 .541 .562 .408 .434 1.000 
 
Secondly, the inter-item correlation mix has been executed in Table 4-14, which 
checked for positive correlations as this indicated that each item/variable is measuring 
the same construct.  
 
Thirdly, the statistics dimension of resource sharing, in Table 4-15, shows only positive 
correlations, which suggest that each item is measuring the same underlying construct 
and the corrected item-total correlation is above the recommended 0.3 level (Pallant, 
2010, p. 100; Pavot, Diener, Colvin, & Sandvik, 1991).  
 
Fourthly, Cronbach α, if deleted, examined the impact of removing each item/variable 
from the scale by comparing the original scales value and the “if deleted value”. Here, 
the Cronbach α will be lower if an item/variable would be deleted. The items/variables 
fit this scale.  
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Table 4-15 Item-total statistics: Resource Sharing and Business Capabilities 
Item-total statistics: Resource Sharing and Business Capabilities 
 
Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 







if Item Deleted 
SCPRBT1 37.23 110.987 .671 .503 .894 
SCPRBT2 36.14 105.213 .719 .678 .890 
SCPRBT3 36.15 99.987 .783 .722 .884 
SCPRBT4 36.81 106.135 .718 .576 .890 
SCPRBT5 36.86 107.152 .708 .561 .891 
SCPRBT6 36.97 109.524 .639 .463 .895 
SCPRBT7 37.29 103.481 .618 .461 .899 
SCPRBT8 37.53 106.110 .621 .506 .897 
SCPRBT9 37.10 110.333 .646 .457 .895 
 
To close, two internal consistency estimates of reliability were computed for the 
resource sharing scale: a split-half coefficient expressed as a Spearman_Brown 
corrected correlation and a coefficient alpha. For the split-half coefficient, the scale was 
split into two halves such that the two halves would be as similar as possible. In 
splitting the items/variables, one of the halves included even and odd item/variables of 
resource sharing. The values for the coefficient alpha and the split-half coefficient were 
the same at 0.920/0.921, each indicating acceptable reliability, as shown in Table 4-16. 
 
Table 4-16 Reliability Statistics: Resource Sharing and Business Capabilities 
Reliability Statistics: Resource Sharing and Business Capabilities 
Cronbach's Alpha Part 1 Value .836 
N of Items 5a 
Part 2 Value .793 
N of Items 4b 
Total N of Items 9 
Correlation Between Forms .852 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient Equal Length .920 
Unequal Length .921 
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient .908 
a. The items are: SCPRBT1, SCPRBT3, SCPRBT5, SCPRBT7, SCPRBT9. 
b. The items are: SCPRBT2, SCPRBT4, SCPRBT6, SCPRBT8. 
 
Sub-scale consistency dimension: data sets 
Table 4-17 summarises the Cronbach's Alpha coefficient and the Spearman-Brown 




Table 4-17 Reliability Statistics Sub-Scale Consistency Dimensions 
Data set  Cronbach α coefficient Spearman-Brown coefficient 
Resource Sharing 0.904 0.920/0.921 
Resource Dependence 
Diminishing 
0.706 Two variables 
Information Asymmetry 0.890 0.882/0.882 
Demand share 0.708 Two variables 
Reputation 0.849 Two variables 




Procurement costs 0.896 0872/0.874 
Standardisation 0.856 Two variables 
Value 0.740 0.834/0.834 
Capabilities 0.843 0.851/0.851 
 
4.4.8 Latent variable: factor analysis 
Introduction 
This section explores if there is any underlying consistency between the 50 measured 
variables. These variables are measured through the questionnaire and are recognised as 
primary data measured on a Likert scale. This is mentioned as an independent method, 
whereby no difference has been made in the independent and dependent variables. The 
objective of this analysis is to understand the structure of the data through reducing the 
data: is it possible to construe the latent variable or underlying variable (Green & 
Salkind, 2014, pp. 282-285). The statistical tests and analyses to produce robust fact 
analyses have been included in  Appendix X and Appendix XI. 
 
The factor analysis examines the correlation between the pairs of underlying variables 
measured on seven scale-rating scales (Pallant, 2010, pp. 181-201). This is called 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA). It is also appropriate if a group of indicators is 
presupposed. IT will be used to test whether the presumed quantity and nature of the 
dimensions are indeed reflected in the data. The aim of factor analysis is to expose any 
latent variables that cause the noticeable variables to determine. 
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Exploratory factor analysis is a complicated technique. Rietveld and Van Hout (1993, 
pp. 289-294) described in a diagram how to execute effective exploratory factor 
analysis. This is described in Figure 4-5.  
 
 
Figure 4-5 Process Factor Analysis 
 
The statistical tests and analyses mentioned in Figure 4-5 to produce robust factor 
analyses are included in Appendix XII. 
 
Results: factor loadings & factor score 
 Finally, the rotated component matrix, in Table 4-18, shows the factor loadings for 
each variable.  
  










3.8.5 Factor Extraction 
Technique
3.8.6 Number of factors to be 
retained
Stage 2: Results





Interpretation in this 
research
•The dimensions can be 
marked as latent variables 




Table 4-18 Rotated Component Matrix 


























VI 7 8 9 10 11 
SCPRBT2 ,781           
SCPRBT3 ,767           
SCPRBT1 .729  .342         
SCPRBT5 .675      .313     
SCPRDT1 .638 .331          
SCPTC11 .611 .449  .311        
SCPAT11 .591     .513      
SCPCCT4 .562 .399   .331       
SCPRDT7 .534 .529 .302         
SCPRBT4 .530   .304     .399 .379  
SCPRBT9 .529  .465         
SCPRBT8 .509   .385     .365   
SCPRBT7 .500   .427       .437 
SCPCCT8 .492 .304   .421   .325    
SCPTC7 .489 .459 .321   .337      
SCPRBT6 .437 .359 .428    .343     
SCPTC3  .805          
SCPTC12  .719          
SCPCCT3 .363 .717          
SCPTC1  .669 .331         
SCPTC6  .643  .360        
SCPTC5  .605  .378        
SCPTC2  .568     .390     
SCPTC4  .516  .470        
SCPTC10  .499  .339       -.368 
SCPRDT5 .402 .437 .387         
SCPTC9 .330 .436        .343 -.370 
SCPRDT8 .327  .741         
SCPRDT10   .731 .436        
SCPRDT9  .311 .715         
SCPRDT6 .355  .700         
SCPRDT2   .683         
SCPRDT4 .481 .389 .532         
SCPRDT3 .455  .528         
SCPAT2    .815        
SCPAT1    .751        
SCPAT10    .485   .331  .345   
SCPCCT1     .775       
SCPCCT6     .709      -.328 
SCPCCT2  .306   .610      .366 
SCPTC8 .309 .446   .556       
SCPCCT7 .301    .403 .327 .399     
SCPAT8      .739   .304   
SCPAT7 .369     .710      
SCPAT6 .386     .686      
SCPAT3       .664 .358    
SCPCCT5 .309    .340 .329 .629     
SCPAT4        .783    
SCPAT9         .835   
SCPAT5          -.816  
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4.4.9 Linear regression 
Collis and Hussey (2014, pp. 281-287) state that linear regression is more advanced 
than correlation in factor analysis. Additionally, in factor analysis a linear regression 
provides an indication of an independent variable’s ability to predict an outcome for a 
dependent variable. Pallant (2010, p. 110) recommends linear regression for complex 
real-life research questions based on theoretical or conceptual models. If factors are 
correlated in reality, orthogonal rotations can generate false solutions, thus threatening 
theory building. Therefor instead suggest oblique rotations can be used (Treiblmaier & 
Filzmoser, 2010).  
 
Krishan, Kanchan, and Sharma (2012) found results in their research which suggest that 
the range of error in the estimation of stature from the regression analysis method is 
lower than that of the factor method. This confirms that the regression analysis method 
is superior to the factor analysis in stature estimation. For this research, regression 
analysis has been executed as well as exploratory factor analysis. 
 
In Appendix XIII, the variables related to the corresponding factors have been 
determined. A factor pattern matrix presents coefficients (analogous to regression beta 
weights) that reflect the unique contribution of each variable to each factor (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2006). 
 
In this paragraph several analyses have been executed for the control of the analysis, 
because the assumptions are analogous to those of the analysis of variance, since they 
fall under the general heading of linear models and are different in the assumptions 
made by the regression model and by correlation (Berenson & Levine, 1996, pp. 781-
846). A linear regression for the dimension ‘resource sharing & business capabilities’ is 
executed in the following paragraphs. 
 
Linear regression ‘Resource sharing & business capabilities’ 
Factor 1: resource sharing & business capabilities has been put in the multiple 
regression model for the dependent variable. Variables SCPRBT2, SCPRBT3, 
SCPRBT1, SCPRBT5, SCPRDT1, SCPTC11, SCPAT11, SCPCCT4, SCPRDT7, 
SCPRBT4, SCPRBT9, SCPRBT8, SCPRBT7, SCPCCT8, SCPTC7, SCPRBT6, have 
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been moved as independent variables to the model. A description of the values/items 
can be viewed below: 
 
 SCPRBT2 LAs have access to dedicated personnel to manage the collaborative 
process through the SCP 
 SCPRBT3 LAs have access to professional procurement specialists to manage 
individual procurement projects through SCP 
 SCPRBT1 LAs use cross-organisational teams for process design and 
improvement through the SCP 
 SCPRBT5 LAs have more advantages to product/technological developments 
through the SCP 
 SCPRDT1 LAs share/get access to critical/special procurement knowledge, 
expertise and resources through the SCP 
 SCPTC11 LAs have more standardisation and uniformity in the procurement 
services through the SCP 
 SCPAT11 LAs have access to a legal tender helpdesk through the CPS 
 SCPCCT4 LAs have established procurement decisions on the right levels in the 
organisation through the SCP  
 SCPRDT7 LAs have more access to professional procurement experts and less 
external through the SCP 
 SCPRBT4 LAs share technical knowledge through the SCP 
 SCPRBT9 Civil servants of local governments are indirectly trained in business 
skills through the SCP 
 SCPRBT8 LAs pool procurement and knowledge (training, time, money) 
through the SCP 
 SCPRBT7 LAs share equipment (network, IT, computers) through the SCP 
 SCPCCT8 LAs reduces (procurement) organisational risks by outsourcing to the 
SCP 
 SCPTC7 LAs reduces failures in the procurement procedures through the SCP 
 SCPRBT6 LAs have better relationships with suppliers through the SCP 
 
Research questions 
Multiple regression analysis explains in this research how much of the variance in the 
dependent variable Resource sharing (internal) by the SCP can be explained by the 
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independent variables. It also provides an indication of the relative contribution of each 
independent variable. This has been translated into several statistical research questions.  
 
Research question I:  
How well do the measures of 16 independent variables/items predict perceived 
“resource sharing & business capabilities”? How much variance in perceived 
“resource sharing & business capabilities” can be explained by scores on these scales? 
 
Research question II: 
Which is the best predictor of “resource sharing & business capabilities”? 
 
To explore these two questions, a standard multiple regression will be executed. This 
model includes variables/items that were uncovered using factor analysis in section 0. 




Multiple regression is one of the most exacting statistical techniques (Berenson & 
Levine, 1996, pp. 714-785). Therefore, appropriate application depends on starting with 
an analysis of a set of assumptions, which are necessary for a regression and correlation 
analysis (Berenson & Levine, 1996; Pallant, 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). The 
five major assumptions are normality, homoscedasticity, independence of errors, 
linearity and (no) multicollinearity.  
 
To determine these assumptions, the data have to be checked for outliers, normality, 
homoscedasticity, independence of residuals and linearity. The normal probability plot 
of the regression standardised residual and the scatterplot were investigated. The P-P 
plot in Figure 4-6 shows a reasonably straight diagonal line from the bottom left to the 
top right. This indicates no major deviations form normality. Homoscedasticity testing 
requires the variation around the line of the regression to be constant for all values of X. 
Also, the scatterplot in Figure 4-7 showed no systematic pattern to the residual values. 
Correspondingly, as per Tabachnick and Fidell (2006) outliers are defined as more than 
3.3 or less than 3.3. The scatterplot shows a minimal presence of  outlying residuals of 
more than 3.3 or less than -3.3.  
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For controlling multicollinearity, the variance inflationary factor (VIF) and tolerance are 
checked for each explanatory variable. If a set of explanatory variables are uncorrelated, 
then the VIF will be equal to 1. If the set is highly intercorrelated, then VIF might even 
exceed 10. Marquardt (1980) suggests that if VIF is > 10, there is too much correlation 
between one variable and the other explanatory variables. However Snee (1973) 
suggests a more conservative criterion that would imply alternatives to least squares 
regression if the maximum VIF were to exceed 5. Examining the data of factor 1, 
‘resource sharing & business capabilities’, in Table 4-21, (2 < VIF < 6). It can be 
concluded that there is no reason to suspect any multicollinearity for the variable 
resource sharing.  
 
The parameter tolerance has been checked on the value > 0.10. If not, this indicates high 
multiple correlations with other variables, suggesting the possibility on 
multicollinearity. The tolerance in Table 4-21 is > 0.10. 
 
 
Figure 4-6 Normal P-P Plot of Regression 
 
Figure 4-7 Scatterplot 
 
Evaluating the model 
The second step in the multiple regression procedure of Pallant (2010, pp. 160-161) 
starts with analysing the model summary, as viewed in Table 4-19. The R Square and 
Adjusted R Square present a high value of 0.901 and 0.864, explaining 90.1% and 
86.4% of the variance in perceived “resource sharing & business capabilities”. In this 
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study, the objective of this analysis is to determine which predictors are statistically 
significant and how changes in the predictors relate to changes in the response variable; 
R-squared is therefore relevant (Berenson & Levine, 1996; Green & Salkind, 2014). 
 
Nevertheless, the regression equation with all sixteen strength predictors was 
significantly related to the “Access to professional Public Procurement knowledge 
(internal) by the SCP” index, where R2 =0.90, adjusted 0.86 (see Table 4-19). 
 
Table 4-19 Model Summary Regression 
Model Summaryb 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .949a .901 .864 .37517673 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SCPRBT6, SCPCCT8, SCPRBT4, SCPRBT1, SCPRBT9, SCPRBT7, SCPRBT2, 
SCPTC7, SCPRBT8, SCPAT11, SCPRBT5, SCPRDT1, SCPRDT7, SCPCCT4, SCPTC11, SCPRBT3 
b. Dependent Variable: FAC1_1 
 
In Table 4-20, the statistical significance of the result has been checked. The model 
reaches statistical significance at p< .0005. Besides this, the df is equal to the number of 
independent variables.  
 
Table 4-20 ANOVA Analysis 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 54.023 16 3.376 23.988 .000b 
Residual 5.912 42 .141   
Total 59.935 58    
a. Dependent Variable: FAC1_1 
b. Predictors: (Constant), SCPRBT6, SCPCCT8, SCPRBT4, SCPRBT1, SCPRBT9, SCPRBT7, SCPRBT2, 
SCPTC7, SCPRBT8, SCPAT11, SCPRBT5, SCPRDT1, SCPRDT7, SCPCCT4, SCPTC11, SCPRBT3 
 
Evaluating each of the independent variables 
The value of the variables in Table 4-21 are checked first in the column marked Sig.. This 
value must be less than 0.05 so the variable makes a significant and unique contribution 
to the prediction of the dependent variable. 
The marked variables make a significant and unique contribution to the prediction of the 
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dependent variables. Thereafter, it is interesting to compare the contribution of each 
independent variable where the Beta of the marked variables has been checked. 
 


















Bound Zero-order Partial Part 
Toleranc
e VIF 




.000 -3.816 -2.918 
     
SCPRBT2 .285 .058 .475 4.943 .000 .168 .401 .791 .606 .240 .255 3.928 
SCPRBT3 -.019 .063 -.035 -.297 .768 -.145 .108 .722 -.046 -.014 .174 5.762 
SCPRBT1 .335 .053 .460 6.378 .000 .229 .441 .750 .701 .309 .451 2.217 
SCPRBT5 -.003 .051 -.005 -.065 .949 -.106 .100 .624 -.010 -.003 .371 2.697 
SCPRDT1 .025 .059 .038 .430 .669 -.094 .145 .675 .066 .021 .300 3.328 
SCPTC11 .183 .069 .258 2.639 .012 .043 .324 .703 .377 .128 .246 4.059 
SCPAT11 -.036 .044 -.067 -.823 .415 -.125 .052 .608 -.126 -.040 .356 2.812 
SCPCCT4 .112 .063 .163 1.770 .084 -.016 .239 .643 .264 .086 .277 3.611 
SCPRDT7 -.140 .065 -.208 -2.168 .036 -.271 -.010 .508 -.317 -.105 .256 3.905 
SCPRBT4 -.134 .051 -.215 -2.611 .012 -.237 -.030 .472 -.374 -.127 .348 2.878 
SCPRBT9 -.015 .049 -.023 -.315 .755 -.114 .083 .562 -.048 -.015 .444 2.250 
SCPRBT8 .095 .042 .171 2.270 .028 .011 .179 .534 .331 .110 .414 2.415 
SCPRBT7 .060 .038 .118 1.554 .128 -.018 .137 .560 .233 .075 .407 2.457 
SCPCCT8 .052 .042 .096 1.225 .228 -.033 .137 .551 .186 .059 .381 2.624 
SCPTC7 -.003 .056 -.005 -.058 .954 -.116 .110 .571 -.009 -.003 .301 3.320 
SCPRBT6 -.079 .047 -.122 -1.676 .101 -.174 .016 .411 -.250 -.081 .444 2.253 
a. Dependent Variable: FAC1_1 
 
Recap 
Multiple regression analysis was conducted to evaluate how well the strength measures 
predicted the “resource sharing & business capabilities” variable. Six variables made a 
significant and unique contribution to the prediction of “Access to Professional Public 
Procurement Knowledge (internal) by the SCP” (Question 1). 
 
The best predictor of “Access to Professional Public Procurement Knowledge (internal) 
by the SCP” is SCPRBT2, where b* = 0.475 0 (Question 2). Preliminary analyses were 
conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity, 
multicollinearity and homoscedasticity. After entry of the six variables at the second 
step, the total variance explained by the model as a whole was 90.1%, where F (16,42) 
= 23.99 and p < .001.  
 
In the final model, SCRBT2 and SCPRBT1 have strength relations with Factor 1, 
resource sharing, and are determined explainable in this latent variable. SCPRBT2 (b* 
0.475, p < .001), access to dedicated personnel to manage the collaborative process, 
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has been recognised by the LAs as the most significant value of the dimension resource 
sharing of the SCP to perform the procurement function. SCPRBT1 (b* 0.460, p < 
.001), structurally using cross-organisational teams of the SCP for process design and 
improvement in procurement projects, have been seen by the LAs as the second most 
significant value of the dimension resource sharing produced by the SCP. 
 
SCPTC11, SCPRBT4, SCPRDT7 and SCPRBT8, are excluding deeper determined in 
this latent variable, Factor 1, resource sharing & business’ capabilities. 
SCPTC11 (b* 0.258, p < .001), uniformity in the procurement services of the SCP 
SCPRBT4 (b* 0.215, p < .001), LAs have access to dedicate personnel to manage the 
collaborative process. 
SCPRDT7 (b* 0.208, p < .001), LAs have more availability of procurement 
practitioners of SCP and therefore less needs of external consultants.  
SCPRBT8 (b* 0.171, p < .001), SCP causes for more exchange of capacity, knowledge 
and training between LAs. 
 
Multiple regression 
In this section the output of the regression analyses for the other five dimensions is 
summarised in line with Pallant (Pallant, 2010, pp. 153-162). The corresponding 
analyses have been included in Appendix XIII. 
 
Table 4-22 Multiple regression Model Dimension Coordination Mechanism 
Model/Item Model Coordination 
Mechanism 
SCPAT1 SCPAT2 
R .851   
R2 .724   
Adjusted R2 .714   
Std. error of the estimate .525   
F 73.490   
Sig. .000 .000 .011 
β  .662 .250 
 
 SCPAT1, LAs have agreed procurement goals and strategies in the SCP. 
 SCPAT2, LAs have agreements about how to execute joint procurement groups 
in the SCP. 
 
182 
Table 4-23 Multiple regression Model Dimension Procurement Costs 
Model/Item Model Procurement Costs SCPTC3 SCPTC6 
R .856   
R2 .733   
Adjusted R2 .683   
Std. error of the estimate .554   
F 14.912   
Sig. .000 .000 .050 
Β  .552 .262 
 
 SCPTC3, LAs have fewer management costs for the procurement function 
through the SCP. 
 SCPTC6, External-independent costs of legal know-how of procedures or 
contracts. 
 
Table 4-24 Multiple Regression Model Dimension Agility & Flexibility 
Model/Item Model Agility & Flexibility SCPCCT1 SCPCCT6 SCPTC8 
R .874    
R2 .764    
Adjusted R2 .746    
Std. error of the 
estimate 
.502    
F 43.587    
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .046 
β  .370 .428 .169 
 
 SPCCCT1, LAs have quicker, new and innovative product/services through the 
SCP. 
 SPCCCT6, LAs has more access for innovation in their products/services/works 
by outsourcing the procurement function by the SCP. 
 SCPTC8, LAs has shorter cycle time during execution of procurement 
procedures by the SCP. 
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Table 4-25 Multiple Regression Model Dimension Uncertainty 
Model/Item Model Uncertainty SCPRDT8 SCPRDT10 SCPRDT9 SCPRDT6 
R .898     
R2 .807     
Adjusted 
R2 
.781     
Std. error of 
the estimate 
.402     
F 30.468     
Sig. .000 .000 .032 .001 .034 
β  .505 .216 .397 .239 
 
 SCPRDT8, LAs together have more volume in the market through the SCP. 
 SCPRDT10, LAs use the legitimacy of the SCP. 
 SCPRDT9, LAs hitchhike on the collaborative brand of the SCP. 
 SCPRDT6, Procurement processes are more transparent through the SCP. 
 
Table 4-26 Multiple Regression Model Dimension Control of Information 
Model/Item Model Control of information SCPAT6 SCPAT8 
R .867   
R2 .752   
AdjustedR2 .739   
Std. error of the estimate .526   
F 55.739   
Sig. .000 .000 .004 
β  .521 .290 
 
 
 SCPAT6, LAs make annual joint procurement plans with the SCP. 
 SCPAT8, LAs jointly decide the exceptions and deviations about the joint 




4.4.10 One-Way Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2006) suggest conducting an independent-samples t-test to 
compare the mean scores of different groups or conditions. For more than two groups, 
Pallant (2010, pp. 203-205) recommends using the analysis of variance, MANOVA. For 
this research, it is interesting to see if the respondents of the LAs differ in their 
responses. In this phase of the study, quantitative data have been separated in several 
groups, presented below in Table 4-27.  
 
Table 4-27 Population Groups 
D1Profession:  Which key commodity are you executing in your profession? 
    1 = Financial 
    2 = Infrastructure works 
    3 = Social Domain 
    4 = Other   
D2Function:   In which organisational level are you executing your profession? 
    1 = Policy 
    2 = Operation 
    3 = Tactical 
    4 = Management 
D3Frequence:    How often do you deal with procurement issues in your organisation? 
    1 = Never 
    2 = Rarely, half yearly 
    3 = Sometimes, monthly 
    4 = Often, daily 
D4Inhab::   How many inhabitants has your LA or service area? 
    1  0 - 15,000 
    2  15,001 - 25000 
    3  25,001 - 35,000 
    4  35,001 - 50,000 
    5  50,001 – 65,000 
    6  65,001 – 100,000  
    7  > 100,001 
 
One-way between the above mentioned groups multivariate analysis of variance was 
performed to investigate D1 profession, D2Function, D3Frequence, D4Inhab. 
Preliminary assumption testing was conducted in earlier paragraphs to check for 
normality, linearity, homogeneity of variance and covariance matrices. No serious 
violations were noted.  
 
MANOVA has been tested on the variable/items with the highest multiple regression 
analysis of the early dimensions. These dimensions have been determined by factor 
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analysis, conducted in paragraph 3.8. These analyses have been included in Appendix 
XIV. Table 4-28 shows the results of these MANOVA analyses. 
 
Table 4-28 Finding MANOVA Analyses 
Dimension Findings MANOVA analyses 
Resource sharing & 
business capabilities 
D4Inhab: The “Inhab group was significantly different from each 
other. Wilk’s Lambda value, shown in Appendix XIV of .789 with a 
significance value 0.017. This is less than 0.05; therefore there is a 
statistically significant difference between the number of 
inhabitants of the LAs and the contribution of resource sharing by 
the SCP for the LA. 
Cost reduction The ‘Frequency’ group was significantly different from each other. 
Wilk’s Lambda value, shown in Appendix XIV, was 0.844 with a 
significance value 0.029. This is less than 0.05; therefore there is a 
statistically significant difference between how often the 
respondents are dealing with procurement of the LAs and the 
contribution of cost reduction by the SCP for the LA. 
Uncertainty The groups were not significantly different from each other. 
Co-ordination 
mechanism 
The groups were not significantly different from each other. 
Agility & flexibility The groups were not significantly different from each other. 
Control of information The ‘Inhab’ group was significantly different from each other. Wilk’s 
Lambda value, shown in Appendix XIV, was 0.714 with a 
significance value of 0.010. This is less than 0.05; therefore, there is 
a statistically significant difference between the number of 
inhabitants of LAs and the contribution of transparency of 
information by the SCP for the LA. 
 Summary 
In this quantitative part of this mixed methods research, the observations of the 
qualitative research, interviews and documents have been studied in a larger population 
in the Netherlands. This section presents the findings from the quantitative data. 
 
One of the interesting findings of this research are the dimensions, mentioned in Table 
4-29, which interrelated variables to investigate concepts/dimensions. The latent factor 
analyses established clusters of groups of variables, which tended to bunch together 




Table 4-29 Findings Latent Factor Analyses 
Dimensions: Description of the cluster of variables belonging to the 
dimension 

















 Control of information 
 More access to professional procurement: (special) experts, 
in collaboration, at LA locations, legal, innovation, helpdesk, 
technical sharing, training, procurement IT, indirectly 
training, and standardisation. 
 Less procurement management costs through outsourcing, 
lower transaction costs, less external costs, lower IT 
procurement costs, less contract management costs. 
 More buying power, ‘hitchhike’ onto collaborative brand, 
legitimacy, more transparency, less depended on 
monopolists, more control of information, and more 
awareness of alternative specifications. 
 Effective and effectively SCP by covenants on procurement 
goals and strategies, guidelines about executing JPGs. 
 Faster innovative product/services, extending flexibility and 
agility in procurement services, outsourcing procurement 
function SCP to gain flexibility of services, shorter cycle time 
of procurement projects by SCP. 
 Jointly drawn up, using procurement plans; joint decisions 
about mutations and exceptions of procurement plans.  
 
The understandings of the experts responsible for procurement functions in their 
organisations who completed the questionnaires provide a general objective insight into 
the output of SCP. 
 
The multi-regression analysis provided the variables, which stipulated the relationship 
with the hypothesis constructed in chapter three. The analysis indicated a statistically 
significant difference of p <. 05 among the measured variables, which are linked to the 
dimensions and related to the hypotheses. This was used to test the predictive power of 
the set of variables and to assess the relative contribution of each individual variable in 
the dimensions between the contexts of the hypotheses. Table 4-30 shows the multi-
regression findings linked with the most powerful variables to the corresponding 
dimension, exploratory to the hypothesis.  
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Table 4-30 Hypotheses and Multi Regression 
Hypothesis  Dimension Variable R2   
 
I Structural collaborative 
procurement has a 
significant positive 
effect on collaborative 








.724 .662 .000 
.724 .250 .011 
 
II The collaborative 
benefit has a significant 
positive effect on 
procurement 






































.901 .475 .000 
.901 .460 .000 
.901 .258 .012 
.901 .208 .036 
.901 .215 .12 
.901 .171 .28 
 
.733 .552 .000 
.733 .262 .050 
 
.764 .370 .000 
.764 .428 .000 
.764 .169 .016 
 
.807 .505 .000 
.807 .216 .032 
.807 .397 .001 























.752 .521 .000 




Structural collaboration has a significant positive effect on collaborative benefits. 
Commitment to strategic and tactical procurement objectives are indispensable for an 
effective and efficient SCP. In successive order of importance are joint agreements 
about procurement policy, goals and strategy and a guideline of execution collaborative 
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arrangements. These techniques are characteristic of structures in collaborative 
arrangements.  
 
The dimensions of ‘Resource sharing & Business capabilities’, ‘procurement costs’, 
‘agility & flexibility’ and ‘uncertainty’ contribute to positive effect on procurement 
performance of the LAs’ collaborative arrangements. The valuable output of the SCP 
for the LAs was predicted through the set of variables in the multi-regression analysis. 
These variables cover the dimension Resource sharing/Business capabilities, in order of 
decreasing strength: access to professional procurement experts for executing 
collaborative procurement arrangements, access to innovative & product development 
collaborative projects, extending of uniformity & standardisation in the procurement 
function, more exchange of procurement capacity, less dependent on external 
procurement consultants, and sharing procurement knowledge between LAs. These 
variables have been predictable for improving procurement performance.  
 
For the dimension procurement costs, the connected variables in order of decreasing 
degree of strength are: reduction of the management costs of the procurement function 
in the LAs, and less hiring of external procurement legal capacity in the procurement 
process. For the dimension agility & flexibility, the connected variables in order of 
decreasing strength are: innovation and product development are faster implemented, 
and more innovation have been realised and lead-times are shorter. The last dimension 
forming a part of the second hypothesis is uncertainty. The connected variables in order 
of decreasing strength are: jointly larger volume leads to stronger buying dominance, 
piggybacking on the SCP’s ensured unambiguous appearance. This also ensured a 
legitimising effect of excellence to internal stakeholders. The last variables, and thus 
less determined, procurement processes, had been executed by the SCP with greater 
transparency. The last dimension has been theoretically substantiated by the RBT. The 
quantitative data set generalised for this hypothesis the contribution of the SCP for LAs.  
 
The dimension control of information has an effect on the coordination between 
structural collaborative procurement and individual LAs. It moderates the procurement 
performance of local government organisations and is measured using planning 
instruments. Coordination between the SCP and the LAs has been predicted through the 
set of variables in the multi-regression analysis. These connected variables for the 
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dimension control of information, in order of decreasing strength, are: prepare 
collaborative (regional) procurement plans annually and jointly, with the region, 
decisions on exceptions, and deviations from the joint procurement plan. 
 
The MANOVA analysis provided significant evidence to compare the six dimensions, 
which are connected with the three hypotheses, on the four single dependent variables: 
profession, function, frequency, and number inhabitants of the LAs. There was a 
statically significant difference between:  
 the number of inhabitants of the LAs and the contribution of 
Resource sharing & Business capabilities by the SCP for the LAs; 
 how often the respondents deal with procurement of LAs and the 
contribution of cost reduction by the SCP for LAs; 
 the number of inhabitants of LAs and the contribution of control of 
information by the SCP for LAs. 
 
In the next chapter, the two databases are narratively compared and integrated, to extend 
the initial qualitative exploratory findings with the inclusion of the quantitative findings. 









Chapter 5. Discussion 
 Introduction 
In Chapter 5 the quantitative findings are explained and illustrated in relation to the 
qualitative findings and the literature. The qualitative and quantitative strands have been 
brought together to compare the findings from the qualitative (interviews and case 
study) and quantitative (questionnaire) data sources and finally confronted with the 
hypotheses. It involved collecting both types of data at different times; assessing the 
information using parallel constructs for both types of data; separately analysing both 
types of data; and comparing the results through procedures such as side-by-side 
comparison in discussions, transforming the qualitative data set into quantitative scores, 
jointly displaying both forms of data and drawing conclusions.  
 
In this chapter, the findings from the research are analysed in relation to the literature 
and the theoretical foundation. It therefore begins again with the configuration of the 
research objectives and the conceptual research framework. This chapter draws on the 
key findings from Chapter 4, including the qualitative detail in phase I and the 
quantitative detail in phase II. The results will determine whether or not the research has 
added to the existing body of knowledge.  
 
Grounded in the theoretical framework outlined in chapter 2, the main research 
objectives and problem statements, initially presented in Chapter 1, will now be 
addressed. Section 1 of this chapter starts with attaching the PP of the LAs and SCP in 





Figure 5-1 Outline of Chapter 5 
Section 2 will discuss and interpret the research objectives and the recognised actors, 
section 3 will look at the findings from a quantitative perspective, before finishing by 
testing the hypotheses in section 4. 
 
5.1.1 Procurement performance of SCP conceptual framework 
A precursory conceptual framework-procurement model was set out in chapter 3. This 
model was developed to give direction to this study. Van Weele (2005, p. 256) 
proposed a model for purchasing performance. Li, Ragu-Nathan, Ragu-Nathan, and 
Subba Rao (2006) measured the effect of organisational performance using both 
economic and market criteria, including return on investment, market share, profit 
margin on sales, growth of return on investment, progress of turnover, growing market 
share, and overall competitive position. Both studies developed or used models created 
to measure procurement and organisational performance in the private sector.  
 
In Figure 5-2, a breakdown is given of the refined research objectives, value, 
uncertainty and cost reduction, regarding the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness – 
the theoretical paradigm of this study (Barnett et al., 2010). In the next section, these 
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Figure 5-2 Research Objectives Linked to Procurement Performance and the Paragraph  
 
5.1.2 Preliminary findings  
Business and organisation research is mostly centred on qualitative studies to study real 
phenomena. In the case of this research, a mix of several different research approaches 
has been chosen (G. J. Murray, 2009; Van Weele, 2007).  
 
The findings of this study indicated that the procurement performance that LAs receive 
from collaboration meet the expectations of the performance of the SCP organisation 
(resource sharing, reducing internal costs, more value, transparency). In addition, 
fragmented or double organised procurement functions of several collaborative public 
organisations in existing regions contribute to the performance of the SCP, leading to 
more synchronisation of goals, procurement plans and strategy. Friction can be caused 
by outsourcing procurement activities versus insourcing (Bals & Turkulainen, 2017) 
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and a lack of coordination mechanisms (Meehan et al., 2016) between the activities of 
the collaborative partners of LAs in a particular region.  
 
The findings of this study indicate the consequences of extending the participants in 
JPGs - a collaborative protocol contributes to less inefficiency in joint purchase groups. 
The contribution of more standardisation of processes, exchanging technical expertise 
and pooling procurement expertise suggests more effectiveness and efficiency in the 
procurement function of LAs. 
 
SCP has been found to accelerate innovation in public products and services. This 
research indicates that by outsourcing the procurement function to the SCP, LAs have 
more access to innovative products and services. This study explains the contribution of 
the procurement performance of LAs through collaboration by linking the primary and 
secondary data with the existing academic literature. 
 Interpretation and Reporting 
The first research objective of this study focuses on the value for internal business 
processes that are influenced by SCP. Notwithstanding the emerging meaning of value 
of shared procurement services for the internal business processes for individual LAs 
(Richter & Brühl, 2017) there has been no investigation of the outcome of regional 
shared services of procurement of value in the business processes of their shareholders' 
organisations in the Netherlands. The findings of this study therefore represent a 
significant contribution to understanding structural cooperation and the value of in-
house procurement functions of regional LAs and the impact on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of their businesses. This first section uses both the qualitative data and 
quantitative data to illustrate the important aspects of higher value, less uncertainty, and 
cost reduction. 
 
5.2.1 What are valuable items in the public procurement function for internal process, 
which can be affected by structural collaboration (RO1)? 
RO1 requires an exploration and analysis of value items in public procurement for 
internal processes, which can be affected by structural collaboration. 
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In a departure from the previous literature, additional tactical values in internal 
procurement processes indicate human resources, which adds significance to the 
procurement functions of LAs. Olson (2010) explained that functions may even be 
outsourced altogether so that the remaining resources can focus on higher-value 
activities and assets can be redeployed or retired. Olson (2010) asserts that it can be 
valuable for an organisation to periodically evaluate its the value chain and which 
activities to insource which to outsource. Often the motivation for outsourcing 
procurement, like outsourcing in general, is to hand over a non-secondary activity. 
Other academics Hamel and Prahalad (1990); Teece et al. (1997) assert that resources 
must add value to business activities. Barney (2001) stated that economies of scale can 
be valuable resources for organisations if LAs are able to establish strategies that 
improve their effectiveness and efficiency or offset potential risks.  
 
To understand value in this study, firstly the sources for reducing scarcity or enlarging 
leverage will be recapped. Suggestions of sources of power in previous literature from 
Chapter Two, include professionalism, reputation, product development, 
complementary resources, quality of services, information asymmetry, cost-
competitiveness and economies of scale. Assuming these features, some SCP 
organisations gain supplementary procurement performance, expressed in value for the 
individual LA (Pfeffer & Leong, 1977; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
 
Figure 5-3 shows the valuable items for the LA, which can have an effect on the 
business procurement processes and accordingly the procurement performance of the 
LA(White et al., 2016; Zheng, Knight, Harland, Humby, & James, 2007). The 
relationship and these effects for this research will be explored in following paragraphs. 
Figure 5-3 provides an overview of these recognised value items from the previous 





Figure 5-3 Value Items of SCP Affecting the PP 
 
Economies of scale 
Organisations streamline their value chains by organising activities either within or 
outside the group, facing the make-or-buy question (Williamson, 1981). Previous 
researchers showed that aggregation allows improvements in procurement performance 
to extend beyond individual procurement performance to LAs. The procurement 
organisation facility increases in extent. The average execution cost per LA decreases 
because each new LA absorbs part of the fixed costs of the procurement projects or 
operation, and coordination costs in the chain can be diminished. This is assuming that 
larger firms would be more efficient and labour is more specialised than in smaller 
firms, as stated by the TCT (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985).  
 
This can create economies of scale and opportunities for learning from each 
procurement activity to another. These potential benefits content economies of scale in 
sharing procurement organisation costs, economies of skills, economies of learning and 
Value 























Chapter 5 Discussion 
197 
economies of scope. This can be explained by several theories as transaction cost 
economics theory and resource-based view theory (Arnold, 1996; Tella & Virolainen, 
2005).  
 
Waller (2003, pp. 770-771) argued, in contrast with economies of scale, for 
diseconomies of scale whereby the average cost increases with output. This might arise 
because the SCP is working for too many LAs or there are too many procurement 
consultants at the SCP and management therefore becomes complex. Economies of 
scale will be given in several fields, because these have an effect on value items 
whereby up-scaling has contribution to the fixed costs per LA, because each new LA 
absorbs part of those costs (Waller, 2003, p. 868).  
 
The advantages of economies of scales were ranked highly in the findings from the 
qualitative component of this study. Researchers in the field of procurement identified 
economies of scale as value caused through collaboration, savings in buying prices 
(Kastanioti et al., 2013), standardisation of services, improvement of service delivery, 
upgrading e-procurement systems (Borman & Janssen, 2013), access to professional 
procurement personnel, suppliers’ continuous improvement capabilities, and better 
technology utilisation (McIvor et al., 2011), which is generally in line with the findings 
of this study. Paagmana, Tateb, Furtmuellerc, and DE Bloomd (2015) found that their 
target group attributed no value to SSCs in relation to item innovation. This is in 
contrast with the research group of this study, SCPs. 
 
Previous researchers, including Janssen and Joha (2008), stated that shared services do 
not add value through simple cost-cutting initiatives like outsourcing but by turning 
support activities into core activities as well, which results in new services for the 
shared services. Tynkkynen et al. (2013) discovered demand for exclusive public 
procurement services because of the difficulty of the procurement process in litigated 
public procurement cases. However, the private service market is developing to more 
larger general service providers, therefore a public SCP or SCC can be considered. 
One interpretation could be that economies of scale in this study are not isolated solely 
to cost reduction. Besides the hard cost reduction findings of the document analyses, the 
qualitative and quantitative findings also support a positive effect of economies of 
scales to paybacks, as discussed in this section and summarised in Table 5-1. 
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Table 5-1 Economies of scale - Support, Disagreements, and Contributions 
Author Main research topic Support, disagreements, and 
contributions 
Williamson (1981) Transaction costs theory is 
applicable for each 
organisation but must be 
tailor-made for each 
individual situation. 
The study contributes the 
effects on economies of scale.  
Arnold (1996) Introduced horizontal 
cooperation as a definition of 
purchase consortiums 
between companies or 
departments. 
These findings are further 
developed on his thoughts 
about collaboration, but more 
grounding focused on optimal 
performance for the LAs. 
Kastanioti et al. (2013) Cost savings by centralisation 
of procurement tenders in the 
health sector. 
This study shows financial 
savings from economies of 
scale through collaborative 
procurement.  
Borman and Janssen (2013) Economies of scale in 
transactions have been 
recognised as critical success 
factors in SSC. 
These findings argue for a 
broader value scope of 
economies of scale for SCP 
and challenge economies of 
scale with collaboration of 
scale. 
Tella and Virolainen (2005) Economies of scale are found 
due to increased negotiation 
power, which directly affects 
prices and is caused by a 
lower volume of transactions, 
which are related to 
purchasing activities. 
These examinations confirm a 
partly lower volume of 
transactions and extend the 
value of economies of scale to 
resource sharing, product 
development, and reputation, 
quality of services, 
information asymmetry, and 
professionalism.  
McIvor et al. (2011) Argues for diseconomies of 
scale to have attention for the 
failure to implement a 
standardised approach. This 
will hinder an organisation 
from fully leveraging the 
specialist capabilities of 
contracted suppliers. 
This research supports the 
differentiated supplier 
approach for contracting and 
indicated this as a value which 
can be extended by SCP. 
Janssen and Joha (2008) Collaboration reduces 
diversity, avoids replication of 
energies, and finally results in 
cost reductions. In addition, 
The study’s findings support 
this earlier research whereby 
economies of scale have been 
further recognised rather than 
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Author Main research topic Support, disagreements, and 
contributions 
bundling services resulted in 
economies of scale. 
cost reductions alone. 
Paagmana et al. (2015) They argued about the real 
cost reductions from 
economies of scale, especially 
in smaller collaborative 
organisations, whereby 
departments are obliged.  
Economies of scale have been 
acknowledged as the main 
finding of this study; the area 
of institutionalisation was not 
researched. 
Meehan et al. (2016) Up-scaling leads to 
monopolistic suppliers, with 
nationally consolidated 
volumes and consequences 
such as damage to supply 
chains and product 
development/innovation. 
Regional up-scaling in the 
structural approach leads to 
greater supply-demand 
balance. 
Economies of scale This study’s definition Grounded on the findings and 
paradigm of economies of 
scale – lower unit costs 
through use of larger 
facilities. This has been 
defined as more value for the 
LAs, proven by key 
performance indicators, 
which can be affected by up-
scaling through structural 
collaborative procurement.  
 
Knowledge 
Sharing and extending knowledge has been embraced by the literature and the primary 
findings of this study. Also the CEOs interviewed mentioned that knowledge 
encourages people to think and interact to improve production processes, and is strongly 
linked to increased productivity. The key will be that an organisation can accumulate 
knowledge, and contribute to the main goal of the organisation. The central objective 
related to this section is – can knowledge, multiplied by structural collaboration, be 
recognised as value for LAs? 
Previous literature viewed knowledge in the field of collaborative procurement mostly 
on a tactical level. Meehan et al. (2016) mentioned insufficient sharing of knowledge 
and experience in operational practice and in forthcoming tenders. They found in their 
research that technical information is shared across technical collaborative forums and 
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networks but procurement is not involved in many of these technical forums. Technical 
staff were found to not be involved in regional procurement meetings. Meehan et al. 
(2016) concluded that business challenge is missing in the procurement processes.  
 
In general, the study's findings do not support the research of Meehan et al. (2016). In 
this research, the outcomes of the regression analysis support “the expertise/knowledge 
value of dedicated personnel to manage the collaborative procurement processes” 
(regression b* 0.475, p< .001), by strong relation with resource/knowledge sharing. 
Also, the outcome of the regression analysis support, “LAs share technical knowledge 
by the SCP” (regression b* 0.215, p< .01), does not support the findings of Meehan et 
al. (2016).  
 
Paagmana et al. (2015) found in their research supporting motives for the exchange of 
internal capabilities by easily operating together. They link the value of knowledge 
directly to the general goal: deliver the services they are legally obliged to offer citizens 
and business, which was probably not capable without SSC. Comparing this with 
Meehan et al. (2016) and the present research, structural collaboration and SSC are 
structured organisations with the commitment of policymakers and the board (Borman 
& Janssen, 2013; McIvor et al., 2011). 
 
Bordass and Leaman (2013) suggest gathering and maintaining knowledge of 
professionals in public procurement. They state that it is especially important for 
professionals not to lose their knowledge when they jump into new projects. In this 
study, initial analyses exposed that procurement knowledge is more secured for LAs by 
the SCPRDT7 (regression b* 0.208, p< .036) – LAs have more access to professional 
procurement experts and less external by the SCP. The triangulation of this research 
supports this finding: the interviewees were unambiguous that SCP values access to 
expertise and knowledge. Knowledge and expertise were identified as value. In the 
interviews with the expert group, the interviewees highlighted the characteristics of 
knowledge and expertise.  
The knowledge and expertise of the SCP covers knowledge of clear and functional 
specifications of programme of demand (Al-Karaghouli, Ghoneim, Sharif, & Dwivedi, 
2013; McIvor et al., 2011), leverage information, market knowledge (Malhotra, Gasain, 
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& El Sawy, 2005), knowledge about the demands of the LAs, and how to integrate and 
apply new knowledge to LAs (Cao & Zhang, 2011).  
 
The findings from the study and the interviews demonstrate the exchange of 
specifications and experiences of products and services; these have been seen as 
contribution to achieving improved qualitative specifications: 
 
“Sharing material expertise of LA in joint purchase groups empowers quality”.  
Interviewees A, C, D, F, G and H  
 
“[The] commodity approach is very functional to get access to technical and 
operational information”. 
Interviewees A, D, G and H  
 
Moreover, the findings from the qualitative interview are supported:  
 
“Procurement knowledge and expertise are necessary for small LAs; civil servants are 
too generally skilled, therefore procurement cooperation is valuable for us”. 
       Interviewees A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H  
  
“[It is] necessary at the start to develop a fundamental procurement attitude, civil 
servant has learned ‘on the job’, the procurement skills of the professional of the 
collaborative organisation”.  
       Interviewees A,B,C,D,E,F,G and H  
 
These comments support the findings of  Lu, Meng, and Goh (2014) findings. Their 
results explained that knowledge transfer depends on features of knowledge. Moving 
tacit knowledge would be more difficult than obvious knowledge because it is neither 
urgent nor indispensable. Some of the interviewees mentioned:  
 
“Civil servants must do most of the procurement activities as part of their primary 
function”.  




Harland et al. (2005) mentioned in their study that there is a difficult decision regarding 
how “close to core” outsourcing should be. Some organisations choose to retain some 
capability and capacity in-house and outsource part of an activity. McIvor et al. (2011) 
suggest engaging key stakeholders in key project decisions to win support for proposed 
sourcing options.  
  
Recent branch research from a Dutch public knowledge centre (Faasse & Koens, 2017) 
demands attentiveness to the decentralisation of central government tasks to LAs in 
relation to accessibility of knowledge in their health and youth care. In an earlier 
situation, those forms of knowledge were available at national public knowledge 
organisations. Those organisations are not decentralised. Faasse and Koens (2017) 
indicated the risks where individual LAs have to “do it themselves”, with the 
probability that research will be done twice, or perhaps, on the LA level not be 
executed. This could mean that knowledge and knowledge sharing is not available for 
every LA. Exchange and accumulation or multiplication of good and bad practice and 
knowledge are important for organisations implementing new services (Dewah & 
Mutula, 2014; Sergeeva & Andreeva, 2015). To prevent sub-optimisation on stage of 
the LAs, SCPs can take positions in this gap. SCPs must be linked up with a national 
knowledge-sharing organisation otherwise sub-optimisation will emerge between SCPs. 
 
These findings confirm the added value of procurement knowledge acquisition for the 
decentralised LAs through the SCP. However, attention must be given to sharing, 
transferring this exclusive knowledge to the stakeholders, the LAs; the knowledge is 
passed on to the LA and vice versa, with the responsible national organisations as 
discussed in this section and summarised in Table 5-2. 
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Table 5-2 Knowledge - Support, Disagreements and Contributions 
Author Main research topic Support, disagreements, and 
contributions 
Faasse and Koens 
(2017) 
Focus on decentralisation of 
(social) care to LAs. They argue 
that there is a shortage of 
structural knowledge, caused by 
temporary financing of resources. 
Fragmentation in collaboration 
between sub domains. 
Support the need for structural 
collaborative arrangements and 
clearness regarding tasks and 
responsibilities. SCP receives no 
attention in their research. 
Strategic procurement is 
integrated in the policy functions 
and not mentioned as a 
profession.  
Meehan et al. 
(2016) 
Restrict sharing of knowledge 
because technical staff has been 
limited involving JPGs. 
SCPs share a great deal of 
knowledge between their 
members. Technical staff are 
involved in JPGs via multi-
disciplinary procurement teams. 
Paagmana et al. 
(2015) 
Integrative literature review and 
empirical validation of motives for 
introducing shared services in 
government organisations. 
Exchange of knowledge ranked 
high. 
Supported structural approach by 
SSC. For mitigation of risks, 




Evaporation of knowledge of 
professionals. 
SCP gathers experiences and 
knowledge of procurement 
projects. 
Knowledge This study definition SCP has the possibility to gather 
and share experiences and 




Do the LAs become more or less professional in the procurement function, by using the 
SCP? Are LAs better off with regional SCPs or do they not bring the professionalism? 
Previous literature, most recently Pazirandeh and Herlin (2014), refined the marginal 
contribution of value-professionalism by collaboration and found differences in the 
findings in their cases, both positive and negative. They recommended considering the 
effect of the strategy on all sources of power, substitutability, interconnection, 
information asymmetry, demanding share, reputation and procurement regulation, to 
design the process so that latent critical impacts are reduced. These sources of power 
affect, whether positively or negatively, the perception of professionalism of SCPs 
 
204 
through LAs. White et al. (2016) found that professionalism was hampered by a lack of 
support in training skills and a personal lack of appreciation of the meaning of 
continuing professional development in both the public sector and the private sector. 
Therefore, they suggest that for a full power approach, procurement professionals 
should be more concerned with their own professional development and that 
organisations should support their procurement staff in such development. Furthermore, 
training and education in other disciplines should incorporate exposure to relevant skills 
and practices. In this study, one of the interviewees mentioned:  
 
“Civil servants, in all several disciplines, have learned from procurement experts, 
nowadays themselves”. 
          Interviewee E  
 
Absorbing information from procurement experts can be seen as learning on the job; 
however, this may or may not be sufficient for professionalism. Sporrong and Kadefors 
(2014) noted that technical staff prefer safe and low-cost methods with a high focus on 
price, whilst professional procurement staff favours more sophisticated methods.  
 
In this study, initial quantitative analysis revealed that LAs can share procurement 
knowledge through SCP: SCPRBT8 (regression b* 0.171, p< .28), LAs pool 
procurement and knowledge (training, time, money, etc.) by the SCP. Therefore, 
SCPRBT8 generalised the early findings of the qualitative research of phase I. This 
study’s initial analysis showed that procurement knowledge is more secured for LAs by 
the SCP: SCPRDT7 (regression b* 0.208, p< .036) LAs have more access to 
professional procurement experts and less external, by the SCP. This reinforced the 
recommendation of the research by Murray et al. (2008), who recommended SSC 
procurement for municipalities to increase the professionalism of their procurement 
function. Complementary research would be interesting to see how much public 
procurement spending is channelled through collaborative professional buying 
organisations such as SCPs (Meehan et al., 2016), especially for national or European 
policy makers. However, the findings of this study did not provide recommendations 
but established that LAs have greater access to professional procurement experts 
through SCPs, as discussed in this section and summarised in Table 5-3.   
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Table 5-3 Professionalism - Support, Disagreements and Contributions 




It was found that in addition to 
increased volumes, the effect of the 
strategy on other sources of power 
such as professionalism is also of 
importance. 
Support the valuable item of 
professionalism through 
collaborative arrangements.  
White et al. 
(2016) 
Continue development capabilities 
in order to gain opportunities to 
make further contributions to 
organisations’ successes of 
procurement staff and increase 
professionalism. Full power: 
individual, procurement 
departments, and other disciplines.  
This encourages and contributes the 
concept of SCPs. SCPs contain 
dedicated professionals who are 
continuously trained on internal and 
external procurement programs. 
Murray et al. 
(2008) 
A procurement-shared service 
appears to be a practical structural 
option for smaller councils, whether 
or not they have access to 
procurement professionals.  
This research contributes evidence 
to fundamentally cover this 
proposition and also extend the 
professionalisation contribution to 
the total business processes of the 
LA instead of just the procurement 
staff.  
Professionalism This study definition SCP distributes direct and indirect 
strategic and tactical procurement 
professionalism within LAs as well 
for the procurement function as 
other business functions in the LAs 
and provide a bridge between 




Ingold and Leifeld (2014) described reputation as the perceived importance of actors 
weighed by their colleagues or other stakeholders in a process. The underlying 
assumption is that performers who have a reputation for being powerful can 
significantly influence collective decision-making. 
 
LAs gain reputation value when the SCP, in the long term, is a powerful and well-tried 
organisation. This phenomenon is recognised by stakeholders (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Pazirandeh (2012) and Pazirandeh and Herlin (2014) situated reputation in the 
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context of the individual buyer. They found in their research that the practice of 
cooperative purchasing increased the demand share and thus the reputation of buyers. 
This study found that SCP reputation has been predictable as a source of power that can 
be explained by the SCP: SCPRDT10 (regression b* 0.216, p< .032), ‘LAs use the 
legitimacy by the SCP’. Also, the finding SCPRDT9 (regression b* 0.397, p< .001) 
‘LAs government hitchhike with collaborative brand’ of the SCP’, has been recognised 
as a predictive variable which constrains the uncertainty from the LA internal business 
process by hitchhiking on the strong brand of the SCP. Being part of the SCP creates 
positive perceptions for the stakeholders of the LA. In previous academic studies, 
membership of an SCP has not been shown as a ‘marketing’ value instrument for a 
public organisation.  
 
Earlier external control accountant reports in five LAs in the region Southeast of the 
Netherlands showed that procurement procedures executed by procurement experts of 
the SCP were entirely compliant with national and European law. Similar external 
control accountants have found the procurement procedures conducted in-house by civil 
servants in LAs to fall short of national and European law (De-Groene-Rand, 2010). In 
the interviews, numerous interviewees mentioned:  
 
“In the region of Southeast of the Netherlands, several LAs joined the SCP because of 
[its] reputation and [at the] request of the local council”. 
        Interviewees A, B, C, D, E, F & G  
“Hitchhiking on the collaborative brand: request of political council and SME 
entrepreneurs”. 
        Interviewees A, B, C, D, E, F & G  
 
“Local authorities use the reputation of Bizob for their internal control to be entirely 
accountable with national and European lawfulness”. 
        Interviewees A, B, C, D, E, F & G  
 
"Large (political) procurement issues control questions of mayors if their SCP has been 
consulted". 
        Interviewees A, B, C, D, E, F & G  
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In contrast with Meehan et al. (2016), legitimation in this study is supported by 
commitment and alignment at the mayors in fragmented LAs in the region. This can be 
attributed to the regional restrictions on SCP servicing LAs, which ensures cohesion 
and togetherness between the members of the SCP and control over several stages and 
numerous public bodies in the region (Nollet & Beaulieu, 2005). The regional scope of 
the SCPs is commonly linked to the scope of the LAs within a region from structural 
safety organisations to environment cooperatives and health services.  
 
In the interviews, it could be seen that connecting with public governance organisations 
in the same region reinforces the power (Schalk, 2013) and publicity of the SCP, 
particularly regarding joint procurement issues or those associated with entrepreneurs. 
Frequently aldermen or mayors of LAs hold board member functions in public 
governance organisations in the same region, whereby their experiences in the SCP can 
be applied to that particular public organisation and to other representatives of other 
LAs (Carpenter, 2010; Van de Laar, 2010). The rate of reputation depends on the 
performance of the SCP (Pazirandeh & Herlin, 2014). Ingold and Leifeld (2014) stated 
that to attract more attention and gain a better reputation, organisations must allocate 
scarce resources. This study supports scarcity, translated to the distinctiveness of value 
of the procurement performance. This value can be attributed to the scarcity of 
consolidated procurement volume, power, and transparency of conducting of 
procurement processes. These values were also confirmed in the quantitative phase of 
this research: SCPRDT8 (regression b* 0.505, p< .000), “LAs have together more 
volume in the market by the SCP” and SCPRDT6 (regression b* 0.239, p< .034), 
“Procurement processes are more transparencies by the SCP”. The SCP has a 
distinctive reputation value also on consolidation of procurement volume and 
transparency. Transparency in procurement processes prevents legal complaints about 
entrepreneurs, negative external audit commission reports (Trepte, 2004), and finally 
higher procurement costs and longer cycle times (Loader, 2015).  
 
This study confirms that LAs perceive added value in the ‘brand’ that the SCP spreads, 
both to internal and external stakeholders, such as councillors and to a lesser extent 
entrepreneurs. This is reflected in the professional procurement processes, characterised 
by transparency, which contributes to the trust of entrepreneurs in professional and 
business-like LAs, as discussed in this section and summarised in Table 5-4. 
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Table 5-4 Reputation: Support, Disagreements and Contributions 





Demand share by cooperative 
procurement improves the 
reputation of the individual buyer. 




Two drivers of influence reputation 
correspond to political actors, 
vertical integration into the political 
system by means of formal authority 
and horizontal integration into 
policy-making or implementation 
through informal collaborations. 
SCP is a formal authority with access 
to formal decision-making; venues 
are more influential (vertical 
integration). On the other hand, civil 
servants with binding decision-
making rights are more influential in 
the negotiation or implementation 
process (vertical integration), and 
these actors can gain additional 
influence reputation by oppressing 





Reputation has been noticed as a 
source of power through the 
consolidation of the demands of 
collaborative organisations. 
An excellent reputation legitimises 
the influence of vertical integration 
of professional procurement.  
Reputation This study definition The experience of LAs in 
contributing to professional 
procurement adds to the legitimacy 
of the SCP. Formal authority is not a 




In departure from the foregoing research of multiplying innovation through shared or 
collaborative procurement arrangements, the study operationalised the increased 
implementation of innovation/product development through SCP. 
International agreements have led to national action plans concerning sustainability 
(Zoeteman, Mommaas, & Dagevos, 2016) and social welfare (Waverijn et al., 2017). 
This has coincided with the national government decentralising supplementary 
assignments to LAs (Dijkhoff, 2014). Paagmana et al. (2015) showed that barely ten 
articles out of 64 reviewed regarded the innovation potential of shared services as a 
reason for implementation. Meehan et al. (2016) noticed that joint procurement 
contracts destruct supply chain innovation. Consolidated single-source contracts were 
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also found to stifle innovation. Fear of being accountable for executing the right 
procurement procedure, as well as the obligation to their members to get the best 
technical specifications, leads to organisations missing the local and regional 
background This conservative approach may result in failing to achieve the 
organisation’s goals.  
 
“Improving sustainability in procurement [is] certainly something we see as [a] value 
of SCP: Embedding national guidelines such as sustainability and social re-entry of 
unemployed people, in our local procurement policy and strategy”.  
        Interviewees A, B, C, D, E, F & G  
  
In the interviews undertaken for this research, the LAs were unanimous that SCP 
brought value in terms of product development and innovation. The difference with 
Meehan et al. (2016) is that the collaborative procurement organisation researched in 
this study operates with consolidated spend of LAs in the same region in Southeast 
Brabant. Passing accountability and securing technical specifications has been 
perceived as a required normality. This has been reinforced by the quantitative phase in 
this study: SPCCCT1 (regression b* 0.370, p< .000), “LAs have quicker new and 
innovative product/services through the SCP” and SCPCCT6 (regression b* 0.428, p< 
.000), “LAs have more access to innovation in their products/services/works by 
outsourcing the procurement function through the SCP”.  
 
This research has evinced that innovation can be multiplied through collaborative 
procurement projects on a regional scale. This contribution to knowledge refines the 
earlier research of Nollet and Beaulieu (2005), which argued that purchasing groups can 
act as barriers to new suppliers who provide innovative products. This occurs when 
collaborative procurement groups tender at the lowest price. Marvel and Yang (2008) 
also argue about their struggle to innovate as the stiff rebates that establish challengers’ 
competition strengthen consumer preferences for a supplier's product. They found that 
although suppliers face keen competition due to non-linear prices, these prices also give 





The difference with the present study is that in the public sector, spending is locked by 
budgets and cannot be affected by the willingness of citizens. On the other hand, SCP 
can influence the fitness for purpose of the joint purchasing group. The study's 
quantitative findings indicated that increasing innovation has been recognised as the 
second highest value of SCP (SCPCCT6, 0.709, factor loading) and the most significant 
value of the dimensions of the SCP in fulfilling procurement functions, which is highly 
relevant to the value of the SCP. This is reinforced by SCPCCT1: (0.775, highest factor 
loading) “LAs have quicker innovative products/services or infrastructural works 
through the SCP”. The SCPCCT1 dimension is concentrated on the lead-time of new 
products and services to citizens. This indicates that the processes of persistent 
innovation and product development are involved in collaborative arrangements of SCP 
in the Netherlands (Kamal, 2012).  
 
The qualitative and quantitative phases of this research can be distinguished by the fact 
that the main findings of the qualitative interviewees were that product 
development/innovation is gained from external advisors or external organisations and 
that those gains are adopted less often by civil servants. 
 
“External advisors or external organisations add product development/innovation”. 
         Interviewees B, D & F  
 
“Civil servants have applied less external product development/innovation expertise, 
which were working in our municipality”.  
         Interviewee B  
 
The findings of the quantitative study accepted product development/innovation as 
added value of collaboration through the SCP. The findings from the quantitative 
component of the research suggested that outsourcing procurement through an SCP 
brought more innovation to LAs; this was the second most important value with a factor 
loading of 0.709: SPCCCT6, LAs have more access to innovation in their 
products/services/works by outsourcing the procurement function to SCP. SPCCCT1, 
LAs have quicker new and innovative products/services through SCP, was ranked in 
first place for the value component with a factor loading of 0.775. The triangulation 
undertaken in this research is not inconsistent; nonetheless, the quantitative data 
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strengthens the observations from the interviewees. According to  earlier research, the 
SCP can reinforce innovation in products and services, by motivating cooperation 
between LA policymakers and suppliers (Yan, Yang, & Dooley, 2017), where suppliers 
are selected with similar business objectives (Pulles et al., 2014) and distinctive 
capabilities and technologies (Pulles et al., 2014).  
 
Additionally, the case study analysed the performance of joint-purchase groups versus 
individual procurement projects. One joint-purchase group was ‘contracting flexible 
employees capacity’. The higher procurement costs per LA in individual procurement 
projects was due to the longer cycle time required to develop a new, innovative way of 
integrating these service into the LAs’ business organisations (Yan et al., 2017). The 
new contracted services required a new way of working for management, which gained 
efficiency and effectiveness. It also introduced high procurement risks due to the high 
volume of money and risk of degradation involved. The SCP had an integral initiating 
role in the business model and by developing and implementing of probabilities that the 
business model in interaction with the suppliers market and LAs, gain those innovation 
(Chang, 2017). In this case, the final output service has not been changed, ‘contracting 
flexible employees capacity’, the introduction of new business organisational structures, 
improving processes and reducing organisational issues that lead to enhance services 
which improves the core competence of the LA (Ljungquist, 2013). In this case, this 
study has shown that SCP contributes to innovation of this nature (Chapman, Soosay, & 
Kandampully, 2003). 
 
The contribution of the SCP in the innovation processes compared with the procurement 
function of the individual LA has been found in this study to result in reduced lead-time 
and improved decision-making (Chapman et al., 2003): SCPCCT2 ‘SCP leads to more 
flexibility and agility regarding procurement capacity’ with a factor loading of 0.610. 
The SCP’s core business is to organise an excellent procurement function for their LAs. 
Hence, LAs demand and expect innovative procurement proposals from their regional 
SCP (Lu et al., 2014). This study has established that LAs enjoy more innovation in 
product/services, product services and processes (Chapman et al., 2003) through 




The influence of the SCP related to this dimension is that the SCP has expertise 
regarding public procurement procedures and relevant law and the know-how of the 
supplier market and can assist start-ups or new companies with clear information about 
public procurement rules, managing technical competences for specifications, 
organising competences for cooperative demand, managerial control, allocation of 
resources for public procurers, organising commitment management and political 
support (Zelenbabic, 2015).  
Furthermore, the SCP has the opportunity to use the regional platform to launch 
innovative improvements, unrestricted by any form of product of service specialisation. 
This is because procurement is integrated into all of the different value chains of the 
LAs (Edler et al., 2005).  
 
These findings from the present study are consistent with those from previous research, 
which have acknowledged the contribution of procurement to the innovation processes. 
Murray et al. (2008) showed that small LAs benefit from SCP but not necessarily from 
SSCs. Proulx et al. (2014) suggest smaller, formal collaborative arrangements to start 
building trust between members. Paagmana et al. (2015) more recently identified that 
SSCs are not really involved in innovative questions and do not receive particularly 
high attention from their stakeholders. The distinction that must be made is that 
innovation can be in the form of new organisational structures, refining processes and 
reducing organisational matters that lead to value-added services (Chapman et al., 
2003). In Proulx et al. (2014), SCPs are a collaborative organisational form of an 
innovative organisation model that has developed over time. The majority of these 
collaborative organisations push the boundaries and consequently the identities of LAs.  
 
Membership in a collaborative activity results in the loss of at least some of a 
government's autonomy (Tsasis, 2009; Williams, 2013). In this study, LAs have found 
ways to retain and manage their boundaries concerning innovative projects to still 
outsource procurement to their SCP voluntarily. The LAs are facilitated and advised in 
the innovation progress and carefully balance the loss of autonomy and securing risks. 
In this study, the SCP participates in collaboration equally to avoid domination. 
Nevertheless, the SCP has to assure the common goal of the innovative JPG – to 
guarantee trust between LAs (Rolfstam, Phillips, & Bakker, 2011; Williams, 2013). 
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This study found that product development/innovation is recognised as a valuable item 
in public procurement functions for individual LAs. Their performance in this area can 
be improved through SCPs. This is consistent with the forgoing research and extends 
the opportunities for LA product development/innovation by adding the independent 
professional role of SCPs and guaranteeing boundaries for LAs. This discussion is 
summarised in Table 5-5.  
 
Three variables made a positive contribution to the performance of SCP and the 
dimension “Agility & Flexibility”: 
 SPCCCT1, LAs have quicker new and innovative products/services through the 
SCP. 
 SPCCCT6, LAs have greater access to innovation in their 
products/services/works by outsourcing procurement through SCP. 
 SCPTC8, LAs have shorter cycle times during execution of procurement 
procedures by SCP. 
 
Table 5-5 Product Development/Innovation - Support, Disagreements and Contributions 
Author Main Research topic Support, disagreements, and 
contributions 
Yan et al. (2017) Innovation value does not only 
come from the resources the 
suppliers retain but also from 
resources that the supplier has 
access to through its value 
network. 
Innovation ideas come mostly 
from members of the SCP.  
Proulx et al. (2014) They described several types of 
collaborative organisations for 
innovation in order to secure 
resources and to increase the 
potential to more effectively 
meet each collaborator’s 
mission. 
They identified several types of 
collaborative organisations, 
from those with a low degree of 
innovation and those with a 
high degree of innovation 
(finally merged). 
The most valuable practical 
research question concerns the 
effectiveness of these 
collaborations in achieving 
programme advances and 
efficiencies. Even when 
collaborations result in 
advances and efficiencies, they 
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Author Main Research topic Support, disagreements, and 
contributions 
may provide no more 
advantage than what is 
achieved separately, or what 
might have been achieved by 
one stronger organisation 
alone. 
Pazirandeh and Herlin 
(2014) 
Incidental procurement 
initiatives, from the cases 
studies, did not contribute to 
increased power. It was found 
that in addition to increased 
volumes, the effect of the 
strategy on other sources of 
power such as interconnections 
is also of importance.  
Collaborative arrangements are 
hampered by innovation and 
product development output 
caused by the design of the 
collaborative processes. 
Paagmana et al. (2015) Innovation was a less significant 
feature of the political agenda 
at that time. Government 
spending on technology was 
significantly lower than in the 
private sector. 
Benefits of collaborative 
models could be extended in 
future to include soft 
innovation. 
Meehan et al. (2016) National consolidated, single-
sourced contracts restrict 
product 
development/innovation.  
This strong professional core of 
operational staff is valued 
internally within authorities but 
is an area of tension and 
competition between 
authorities. 
The regional SCP approach has 
access to the local needs of the 
LAs and prevents huge 
standardised contracts.  
Product development/ 
Innovation 
This study’s definition Innovation, technically and 
processually, is multiplied 
through the SCP. Value does 
not only come from the 
resources the suppliers retain 
but also from the resources 
that the SCP has access to 
through its LA structural 
network. Innovation in 
products and processes for LAs 
has been enforced.  
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Complementary resources 
The literature review identified complementary resources derived from the RBT, which 
enables additional assets to improve LAs’ procurement function. The RBT explains 
several effects of collaborative procurement. In the interviews, the complementary 
resources for LAs through the SCP have been investigated, derived from the strategic 
and economic theories that form the basis of this study. In this study, among others, the 
relationship between the contributions of resources through the SCP and the 
procurement performance of the LAs has been explored. One of the theoretical 
contributions is that the RBT influences the procurement performance of the LA. 
Brewer et al. (2014) find that the RBT has more influence on procurement outsource 
spending than the TCT. This study underlines that conclusion from both the qualitative 
perspective and the quantitative.  
 
“Gaining access to critical resources, motivation for joining SCP” 
Interviewees A, B, C, D, E, F and G  
 
“Continuity [in] access to critical resources, motivation for joining SCP” 
Interviewees B, C, E, and F  
 
For small and mid-sized LAs, it is difficult to implement and continue a professional 
procurement function (Murray et al., 2008; Sporrong & Kadefors, 2014). Proulx et al. 
(2014) argue that each group member provides complementary or similar resources in 
JPGs. If a group participant does not put in the required effort, then the other group 
members might see this as unfair. This could lead to conflicts and LAs could leave the 
group or adopt a much more passive attitude towards it. To be successful, the necessary 
efforts and activities need to be carried out.  
 
Hamel and Prahalad (1990) made the case for RBT by encouraging organisations to 
focus on their core business and produce excellent services to citizens. This study found 
64.1% of LAs to have completely or partially outsourced their procurement activities to 
SCPs. Which complementary resources for the LAs have been deducted of the RBT 
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1990) and studied if significantly recognised via the LAs. These 
complementary resources not only relate to capacity assets but also to technological, 
knowledgeable and human capital assets. The quantitative part of this study investigated 
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if a combination of complementary resources in the procurement function enabled 
greater procurement performance for LAs, suggesting that procurement performances 
can be improved by effectively applying procurement function resources that are 
valuable, infrequent, incorrectly imitable and not switchable (Barney, 1991; Brewer et 
al., 2014). In the interviews, the following items were mentioned. 
 
“The SCP provides our organisation with more ‘social return’ aspects in the 
procurement function [and] more attention [to] green procurement items”.  
Interviewees A, C, E, and F 
Besides this, they also mentioned in this area, 
 
“SMEs have better entry to public procurement tenders, and public information 
sessions and conferences contributed to that”.  
Walker et al. (2013) suggested early support for SMEs through collaborative 
procurements. On the other hand, they also argue for more balance with SMEs, 
preferring SME buying, which could become a barricade to effective collaborative 
procurement. Nonetheless, there is a deeper balance in local SME preferences and 
globalisation through distinctive customising of strategies to source commodities. 
Loader (2015) identified that a lack of knowledge about procedures and opportunities, 
prohibitive contract volumes, intimidating contract lengths and uncertainty of work 
within framework contracts are barriers for SMEs and were causing increasing changes 
in the public sector. Her recommendation of micro lots to advance access for SMEs can 
be argued in the context of the TCT (Costantino et al., 2012; Coulson, 1997; 
Karjalainen, 2011; Williamson, 1985), and can be avoid via solidly applying 
commodity sourcing strategies. In addition to this, the importance of the ‘entrance gate’ 
function of the SCP can be considered a complementary resource regarding effective 
business (A. Flynn & Davis, 2016; Anthony Flynn, McKevitt, & Davis, 2015).  
 
The quantitative side of this study has not directly looked at how SCPs can enlarge 
SMEs. However, in the context of TCT (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985), which was 
criticised by Loader (2015), tenders should be less inflexible regarding requirement, and 
tender specifications need to be more encouraging for SMEs. Similarly, procurement 
specifications need to be more standardised and savings in procurement costs can be 
realised by uniformity and standardisation of procurement processes and tender 
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documents (Albano & Sparro, 2010; Costantino et al., 2012). Regarding this, the 
variable/item SCPTC10 suggests a connection with the component ‘Cost reduction’ 
where r = 0.499 and p < 0.05. This verifies that LAs perceive, through uniformity and 
standardisation of specifications, cost reductions as increased performance. This 
confirms the earlier views of Murray et al. (2008) in their research on collaboration in 
local governments. A. Flynn and Davis (2016) argue for more standard procurement 
concerning e-tender procedures to encourage SMEs to engage in public procurement, to 
reduce transaction costs in bidding proceedings (Costantino et al., 2012), and to increase 
innovation in green procurement (Rainville, 2016).  
 
From the point of view of complementary resources, variable/item SCPTC11, “SCP 
leads to standardisation and uniformity of the procurement services”, shows that LAs’ 
control and consistency regarding procurement services has been noticed as a 
complementary resource which gains value for LAs. The LAs linked this 
complementary resource as benefits, which firstly gain ‘Access to knowledge and 
capacity’ where r = 0.611 and p < 0.05, secondly ‘Cost reductions’ where r = 0.449 and 
p < 0.05, and thirdly ‘Goal Alignment’, where r = 0.311 and p < 0.05. Therefore, this 
complementary resource, “SCP leads to standardisation and uniformity of the 
procurement services”, has significant causality with the dimension Access to 
Knowledge. 
 
The variable item ‘SCPCCT2 SCP leads to more flexibility and agility regarding 
procurement capacity’, has a significant positive correlation with r = 0.610, p < 0.05, 
which identified a strong connection with the dimension ‘value’ for LAs. The regression 
analysis (regression b* 0.169, p< .046) of the dimension ‘Agility & flexibility’ shows a 
relatively strong relationship with the variable item ‘SCPTC8 SCP reduction of cycle 
time of the execution of the procurement process’. This is in line with Khoshlahn and 
Ardabili (2016), who stated that organisational agility has a positive effect on service in 
the public sector. Structural (regional) collaborative procurement organisations are 
capable of embedding flexibility and agility, to organise resources and capabilities to 
meet the ‘turbulent’ procurement demand of the LAs. LAs are conventional business 
organisational structures, without full-bodied procurement planning IT systems. They 
are driven by forecasts and budgets and procurement has been integrated into this 
systematic process; however, it is not equipped for situational factors and ad hoc 
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decisions or demands (Khoshlahn & Ardabili, 2016; Makkonen, Olkkonen, & Halinen, 
2012).  
 
Item SCPRBT7, ‘Our LA share procurement equipment (network, IT, computers) with 
the members of the SCP’, where r = 0.500 and p < 0.05, shows a moderate correlation 
with the source of power Resource sharing & Business capabilities.  
 
SCPRBT8, ‘Our LA pool procurement and non-procurement resources (training, time, 
money, etc.)’, is moderately correlated with the source of power Resource sharing & 
Business capabilities, where r = 0.509 and p < 0.05. 
 
SCPRBT9, ‘Civil servant of LAs are indirectly trained in business skills through the 
SCP’, is moderately correlated with Resource sharing & Business capabilities, where r 
= 0.529 and p < 0.05, which indicates positive causality.  
 
In the qualitative phase of this study, in-depth, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted as a complementary resource, indirectly ‘copying’ the knowledge and 
business attitude of procurement experts through the civil servants of LAs. 
 
“Disappointed in the way of sharing experiences of the way SCP experts execute 
procurement processes”.       
Interviewee B  
  
Wei, Zheng, and Zhang (2011) explain this phenomenon to distance and structural 
similarities. Knowledge sharing is also affected by the robustness of the embedding of 
the procurement experts in LA teams and reinforced by the learning culture of the SCP 
and the LAs. Although not proven empirically, Nesheim and Smith (2015) stated that 
external experts share knowledge to a lesser degree than conventional staff. Wei et al. 
(2011) empirically show that the integration of experts into organisational teams 
reinforces cooperative behaviour such as interest in the exchange of knowledge, 
concepts, and processes. The findings in the qualitative and quantitative phases of this 
research confirm the positive causality of Resource sharing & Business capabilities in 
terms of the quantity of autonomous motivation, perceived organisational support and 
the level of trust. When procurement experts believe that an LA values his or her 
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contribution and is concerned about their welfare, they will respond with cooperative 
performance, such as involvement in the exchange of ideas, methods, and experiences 
(Nesheim & Smith, 2015). Furthermore, commitment to the politics of the LAs has a 
constructive impact on knowledge sharing performance, especially regarding integrating 
into collaborative arrangements in the public sector. As well as the commitment of the 
board, the commitment of the middle management and decentralisation of procurement 
experts from the SCP in the business organisation of the LAs reinforces the exchange of 
knowledge between the SCP and LAs (Pazirandeh & Herlin, 2014).  
 
The literature also highlighted SCPs’ access to e-procurement systems as resources on 
behalf of LAs. Variable item SCPRBT7 has been analysed as a latent variable where r = 
0.500 and p < 0.05, which indicates positive causality with the power source component 
Resource sharing & Business capabilities. This finding has been quantified in the case 
study of this study. Borman and Janssen (2013) found that consolidation and 
standardisation of IT ERP (enterprise resource planning) systems reduced workforces, 
and that wholesale licenses lead to discounted contracts and savings in operating costs 
as critical success factors for the outcome of SSCs. Their findings were founded on 
interviews. The present case study analysed the positive and negative quantities of this 
statement. SCP in this case study uses three IT software packages to complete their 
operational and tactical business processes. The next section will set out a comparative 
analysis of the total IT costs of a procurement administrative tendering system. The 
total costs of IT software are defined as costs for software and hardware to manage the 
total IT sourcing tender process. In general, however, the total costs of IT software 
include items such as investment/leasing, training, updating, internal applications, 
hardware, implementation suppliers, project management, linking up with other 
systems, maintenance, and IT consultancy.  
 
The analysis in Table 4-3 confirmed and expanded the findings of Borman and Janssen 
(2013). The costs for sourcing/tendering software for one LA are approximately nine 
times more expensive than for another LA in an SCP. The costs of supply/contract 
management are approximately 19 times more expensive for one LA than for an LA in 
an SCP. Similarly, the costs of management information system are approximately 17 
times more expensive than a single LA than for an LA in an SCP. 
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Besides the financial consequences, improved communication capabilities led to the 
formation of a professional tender system in which there was a greater degree of 
visibility and transparency. It enabled problems and tasks to be addressed quickly and 
resources to be used more efficiently (Smith, Winchester, Clegg, & Pang, 2013; 
Williamson, 1975). Four CFOs mentioned structural IT procurement information 
systems as contributions to their LAs, especially for building up hard data and facts and 
figures to benchmark performance against other members of the SCP. 
 
“Developing structural IT procurement information for LA to build up consistent key 
figures for benchmarking”. 
Interviewees A, B, F&G  
 
From the perspective of resources, an individual LA depends on the power of the 
resources of the supplier of the procurement IT system software. This supplier inversely 
has the power of the individual LA (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The individual LA 
position is consolidated in SCP where the proportion has been distorted. In relation to 
this study, complementary IT procurement systems have been geared towards business 
information power and improving their self-sufficiency policies and purchasing 
strategies (Pazirandeh & Norrman, 2014).  
 
The findings suggest that LAs network positions, such as regional located and copy 
organisations, influence the knowledge transfer, while the influence is reduced by 
manner of integrated of knowledge between SCP and LAs. The similarity between LAs 
and regional connectivity influences knowledge transfer (Wei et al., 2011), supported 
by short distances between the LAs and more equivalence in their organisational 
contexts. One interpretation could be that these findings extend the contribution of 
structure and thus the services of the SCP and the supported commitment in the region. 
This discussion is summarised in Table 5-6.  
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Table 5-6 Complementary Resources -  Support, Disagreements and Contributions 
Author Main Research topic Support, disagreements, and 
contributions 
Walker et al. 
(2013) 
Supporting access to  public 
procurement tenders for SMEs. If 
local SME preference leads to JPGs 
that cost more or are less efficient, 
this could present a barrier to 
effective JPG.  
SCP organises information sessions to 
widen access to public tenders for 
SMEs. SCP advises LAs in sourcing 
strategies to optimise the use of 
power of SMEs. 
Murray et al. 
(2008) 
Shared services for PP enables 
standardisation in specifications and 
tender phases. 
LAs identify standardisation of 
specifications through SCP as an 
enabler of cost reductions. 
Murray et al. 
(2008) 
Shared services for PP do not 
improve procurement services for 
the LAs. 
 
LAs identify standardisation and 
unambiguity of procurement services 




There is no difference between 





Reducing costs for ERP system for LAs 
via SSC. 
Identified information regarding 
lower costs for sourcing/tender IT 
systems. Supply/contract 
management IT systems and IT 
management systems. Also justifies 
less dependence on IT supplier(s). 
Complementa
ry resources 
This study definition Calls for more structural and 
regional professional organised JPGs 
(Schotanus et al., 2010) whereby 
complementary resources are 
provided or organised by the SCP to 
unburden participants. The RBT 
provides complementary resources 
in the procurement function, such as 
expert centres, specialists, 
professional staff etc., which enables 
better procurement performance. 
 
Quality of services 
In the public sector, budget cuts are always being discussed and quality squeezed. 
Paagmana et al. (2015) showed that improving service quality was rated in second place 
as an aim for shared services in previous academic literature, although their discussion 
mixed quality improvements for shared service back office organisations and final 
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output products and services for society. This research has studied the quality of the 
procurement services provided by the SCP.  
 
The interviewees indicated that LAs are critical to the final performance of SCPs. 
Although LAs are member of SCPs, the output must be at least what they have agreed. 
Consequently, the performance of the SCP can be considered from two perspectives: 
whether or not the endeavour matches what was agreed with the members, and the level 
of procurement performance of LAs endorsed by the SCP. The quality of service in this 
research comprises the resources of the SCP, which can be expended to realise the 
objectives of the procurement of the LAs. The SCP has researched these resources on 
quality of the procurement experts of the SCP, procurement management of the SCP, 
procurement procedures and policies and procurement information and knowledge 
activities. 
 
The interviews reflected and extended the service quality debate in the literature with 
the interviewees generally defining SCP as an operational execution procurement 
organisation. 
 
"SCP is not a network organisation but an operational execution procurement 
organisation". 
Interviewees A, B, D, F & G  
 
Differences in interests between member LAs, caused by local policies or coalition 
agreements, are not an obstacle in the business operations of an SCP. Schalk (2013) 
suggests that even though fundamental organisational interests in the collaboration, 
contain the chance for manoeuvre of singular organisations by activating of actors as 
domain similarity and size similarity and number of members. 
 
LAs are facilitated and accelerated by the SCP in the execution of strategic, tactical, and 
operational procurement, but it is the LAs that make the individual business decisions. 
This is in contrast to a network organisation where policy issues between LAs have 
been harmonised, in that way that LAs expect more service and operational organisation 
from the SCP (Hudson, Hardy, Henwood, & Wistow, 1999). This strategic vision 
prevents dangerous initiatives such as the exertion of financial resources to expand 
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activities that are not the core business of the SCP or the gaining of other private 
benefits. This can lead to agency costs and risks of opportunism if management pursue 
other objectives (Eisenhardt, 1989; Hudson et al., 1999) than the owners of the network 
organisation. Schalk (2013) found in his research that individual organisations are 
limited in restraining the manoeuvre room for individual organisations. For 
collaborative organisations, it is possible for network members to influence the 
perceptions of other players in such a way as to arrive at common policy strategies and 
solutions, as well if these suit the individual participant organisation or not. This has 
been averted by the narrowed scope of the primary business activities of SCP, the 
facilitate function/role and the associated financial funding (Bizob, 2017). Meanwhile, 
the output of the facilities of the SCP is sharply expected and controlled by their 
members. 
 
Most of the interviewees considered ‘improving the quality of procurement service’ to 
be a key motivation, which aligns well with new policy directions in public 
management. Other important motives include internal quality considerations such as 
‘exchange of internal capabilities’, and ‘access to external resources’. These new policy 
directions in public management can be found in transparency and accountability 
drawback to spending public expenses. Therefore, the quality of SCP experts goes 
further than traditional procurement knowledge alone. Most of the interviewees agreed 
that SCP services offer legal, benchmark indicators, specialism in the procurement of 
special classes of services, infrastructure works, materials, and subsidies. From the point 
of view of core competence theory, these additional demands are explainable, whereas 
small LAs hold small business organisations in esteem. Also, in recent years this has 
moved from more of a support function to a primary activity. New policy directions 
such as sustainability, environmental awareness, fostering SMEs, and new public 
services such as health, safety, and home care, have expanded the boundaries of the 
business organisation of LAs to a maximum, effectively increasing the scope of the 
SCP. Williams (2013) suggests appropriate training and development programmes for 
civil servants in this case. Williams (2013) importantly states that collaboration is not a 
panacea for all issues in public services, as has been identified in this study’s 
interviews, case study and quantitative questionnaire. This research has identified 
demand for a high-level supply of procurement, focused herein on public procurement. 
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Qualitative public policy themes such as sustainability, green procurement, social 
aspects, and access for SME firms were shown to be of significant importance in the LA 
questionnaires. 
Service quality has been measured in the quantitative phase of this study by the 
variable/items SCPTC11 and SCPTC12: 
 SCPTC11 SCP leads to standardisation and uniformity of procurement services; 
 SCPTC12 SCP leads to standardisation and uniformity in the procurement  
demands of LAs. 
 
SCPTC11 has a positive correlation with the component “Resource sharing & Business 
capabilities”, where r = 0.611 and p < 0.05. This indicates medium to strong causality 
of standardisation and uniformity of the procurement services and processes. Possible 
interpretations include that quality of services has been recognised within the strategic 
objectives of the LAs, such as sustainability, environment, and EU legislation. This 
discussion is summarised in Table 5-7. 
 
Table 5-7 Quality of Services -  Support, Disagreements and Contributions 
Author Main research topic Support, disagreements, and 
contributions 
Paagmana et al. 
(2015) Walker et 
al. (2013) 
Showed that improving service 
quality was high rated as an aim for 
shared services, although their 
discussion mixed quality 
improvements for shared service 
back office organisations. 
This study supports the importancy 
of service quality of earlier research.  
Schalk (2013) Found in his research that 
individual organisations are limited 
in restraining the manoeuvre room 
for individual organisations, which 
can limited the quality of provided 
services. 
This study shows, that SCP has 
narrowed their services to exclusive 
public procurement. 
Murray et al. 
(2008); Williams 
(2013) 
Importantly states that 
collaboration is not a panacea for 
all issues in public services. 
This study shows that an effective 
scope of the SCP, meet the demands 
of the LAs. 
Quality of 
services 
This study definition This research has identified demand 
for a high-level quality of services, 
supply of procurement, focused 
herein on strategic public 
procurement and the new policies.  
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Information asymmetry 
In addition, an important role has been provided for the SCP in obtaining the relevant 
information for procurement. However, previous literature has mainly focussed on 
awareness of the demands of individual members. 
 
Faes et al. (2000) identified economies of information as one synergy of global 
sourcing, based on the definition of global sourcing of Birou and Fawcett (1993). This 
definition can also be moved to collaboration, whereby ‘worldwide business units’ have 
been shifted to homogenous LAs; it can then be questioned whether SCP leads to 
economies of information. Meehan et al. (2016) noticed the lack of involvement of 
procurement experts in knowledge sharing diagonally across technical settings, which 
leads to an absence of business gains in the procurement processes in their research. 
Williams (2013) points out that it is essential for influencing the results of collaborative 
arrangements and that control of information is crucial. In the situation of collaboration, 
the use of rational and independent power is restricted, probably because of the status of 
the autonomous LAs, who are responsible for their own individual business 
organisations. On the other hand, LAs are members of SCP with one of their objectives 
being to diminish their external risk with contractors. Therefore, distinction between 
control of SCP and the bundle of information in the procurement pre-phase and 
procurement process, are actors that influence the result of the SCP for the LAs. 
 
This part of the present study has researched whether LAs receive better information 
regarding procurement with or without the assistance of SCP. Information asymmetry is 
the basic cause of agency costs (Eisenhardt, 1989). The classical transaction theory 
suggests that LAs will use the least costly and most inefficient forms of organisation in 
their procurement processes(Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975). 
 
First, in the LA business, communication with entrepreneurs mainly concentrates on the 
procurement processes, which are obliged in procurement law, such as “open 
procedure”. This can ensure the transparency of LA procurement function’ pursuit with 
the interests of the present procurement project, whereas decentralising execution of 
tendering in one LA can lead to no company-clear of publication of information of the 




Information asymmetries are studied in this research in the context of principal-agent 
problems where they are a major cause of misinformation and are essential in every 
communication process between LA and SCP and other linked collaborative 
arrangements. Several linked collaborative arrangements of LAs are described in the 
pilot study in Appendix VIII, which cause information asymmetries between the 
fragmented collaborative organisations, SSC and SCP by executing overlapping tasks or 
functions. Information asymmetry is in contrast to perfect information, which is a key 
assumption in neo-classical economics (Eisenhardt, 1985; McCue & Prier, 2007). 
Possible interpretations include that coordination between regional collaborative 
arrangements, like security, health-care, taxes, innovation, contribute to the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the transcending regional public organisations. This discussion is 
summarised in Table 5-8. 
 
Table 5-8 Information Asymmetry - Support, Disagreements and Contributions 
Author Main research topic Support, disagreements, and 
contributions 
Faes et al. ( 
2000) 
Exploring the bridge and the gap 
between the literature stressing the 
need for achieving purchasing 
synergies on the one hand and 
specific implementation guidelines 
for managers on the other. 
Internal collaboration improvement 
leads to insight in the market and 
learning, advanced exchange of 
information, and increases in market 




Information is shared through 
technical collaborative meetings but 
procurement is not involved in many 
of the technical forums and the 
technical staff is not involved in 
regional procurement meetings, 
limiting opportunities for 
collaborative procurement options in 
the exploration phases. This reduces 
the commercial challenge in 
procurement processes. 
Supports the structural approach of 
collaborative arrangements. 
Overlapping and shortages of 
information can also be a risk for 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness and 
not using the present professions. 
Williams 
(2013) 
This research focuses on the role of 
agency within collaboration, its 
identification of different types of 
opposition and resistance, and its 
critical analysis of the competencies 
and challenges they face in 
contemporary public management.  
It is necessary to influence outcomes 
through informal aspects because 
the collaboration arrangement has 
not a merged autonomous status. 
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This study definition The demand and value of the central 
coordination of activities by LAs in a 
region. Also the allocation of the 
information around the 




This study assumes structural collaboration between LAs, as proposed by Murray et al. 
(2008). The view assumes that sources of cost-competitiveness might be an enabler for 
LAs, just as collaboration and professional procurement strengths are considered to 
deliver competitive savings within LAs in a competitive market. 
However, Meehan et al. (2016) outlined the movement of goals in the public sector for 
competitive bidding over the years, from cutting unit prices (Erridge, 2007) to integrity 
(Schooner, 2013; Schooner, 2002). Scholarly attention has been increasingly focused on 
value in recent years (House-of-Commons-Communities-and-Local-Government-
Committee, 2014). National government programmes for the environment, social care 
and unemployed people have led to lobbying of branch organisations and also 
challenged the market to come up with innovative solutions (Rainville, 2016; Rolfstam 
et al., 2011).  
The interviews showed integrity to be a fundamental pillar of demand in LAs for 
professional procurement – an additional control mechanism in the decision-making 
process.  
"The four-eyes principle in the procurement function has been in place for our LA since 
the start, [and is] an important motivation”       
  (Interviewees A, G)  
 
Despite the clear mandate to deliver value for money, the need for public bodies to 
comply with the European Union and National Public Procurement Directives can result 
in propriety and transparency requirements taking precedence over more commercial 
goals (Erridge, 2007). This can be reinforced by the need for LAs to show 
accountability in their procurement functions and to operate in accordance with 
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European and national procurement laws and regulations. 
Based on this study’s interviews, in the case of cost-competitiveness, the concept of 
value for money ensures that (low) cost considerations do not override the 
accountability and integrity of the products and services procured. On the other hand, 
small LAs use the cost-competitiveness argument to avoid merger/amalgamation 
discussions with province directors (Petersen & Houlberg, 2017; Van Houwelingen, 
2017). In the Netherlands, at the national government level, there is currently pressure 
to create LAs and municipalities with a minimum of 100,000 inhabitants (Nehmelman, 
2015). The arguments for this are more political rather than based on organisational 
efficiency and cost efficiency (Van Houwelingen, 2017). In this study in particular, the 
interviewees from LAs with fewer inhabitants than 20,000 showed that their councils 
were collaborating with other organisations to avoid this pressure. 
“SCP is necessary for small organisations to survive, to have maximum procurement 
resources and the lowest costs.”       
Interviewees A, C, F 
 
Complementary to the early research of Allers and Van Ommeren (2016), this study 
suggests cost-competitiveness as an enabler of SCP. Table 4-1 shows the financial 
benefits for LAs from JPGs. Procurement does not require merging or reclassification 
(Allers & Van Ommeren, 2016; Van de Laar, 2010). The procurement costs of joint 
purchasing groups are independent of the size of the LA involved. The SCP in the case 
study calculates and divides its costs over its members (Bizob, 2017) in accordance with 
the Treaty on the European Union, Article 19, “Het leerstuk kosten voor gemene 
rekening”. Alternatively, it could be an effect of avoiding merger discussion, to search 
for alternate cost-reduction possibilities. This discussion is summarised in Table 5-9.  
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Table 5-9 Cost-competitiveness - Support, Disagreements and Contributions 
Author Main research topic Support, disagreements, and 
contributions 
Murray et al. 
(2008) 
This research provides evidence of 
some smaller LAs benefiting from 
collaborating in inter organisational 
procurement shared services.  
Cost-competitiveness suggested as 
an enabler of SCP. The research 
highlights the need to adopt an 
incremental approach and also sets 
out suggestions for a strategic 
approach to a shared services 
procurement strategy. They call for 
research into new emerging 
procurement structural model. 
Meehan et al. 
(2016) 
The findings represent select 
mechanisms in public procurement 
by exploring tensions arising from 
collaborative procurement 
strategies within and between 
organisations. 
Cost-competitiveness has been 
pushed by the central government. 
LAs could struggle to legislate 
strategies of resistance, particularly 
as the government reports that 
reduced strain and potential cost 
savings could be gained through 
collaboration. This supports the 
motivation of this study for SCP.  
Cost-
competitiveness 
This study definition This study suggests cost-
competitiveness as an enabler of 
SCP.  
 
5.2.2 How can structural collaboration influence value in internal business 
processes in the Netherlands (RO1)? 
RQ1b – how can SCP influence value in internal business processes in the Netherlands 
–requires an explanation of the phenomena of collaboration in the public procurement 
process.  
 
The ground analysis in the case study and the interviews suggests that the data was 
reviewed against theories to locate the underpinning values, beliefs and behaviours 
related to the espoused barriers. In places this was supported by quantitative stance from 
the questionnaire.  
 
Section 2.5.4 explained the scope and content of the conception of value viewed from 
LAs’ perceptions. This section will narrow down the reasons why SCP is an alternative 
for LAs to improve the value items produced by their business processes.  
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It is essential for the (continued) existence of an SCP that LAs obviously recognise why 
they should collaborate. Based on the agency cost theory, Chapter 2, paragraph 4.4.2. 
presented explanations for the extent of opportunities and effective challenging of 
problems of value items in the business procurement processes from a theoretical 
examination. The nature of the interrelationships between LAs regarding collaboration. 
In other words, according to the findings, LAs do not conclude the fulfilment of their 
mutual relation to the nature of their mutual relationship. This is unlike what is expected 
from the theory; a similarity between theoretical stance and execution would be the 
most efficient relationship. 
 
Hudson et al. (1999) addresses five issues at play in 'agency relations' to explain 
collaborative involvement in the effective output of valuable items. The first problem 
arises when the LA (principal) and SCP (agent) interests are not the same. The second 
problem arises through bounded rationality; the third is asymmetry of information; and 
the fourth is transparency of information. The fifth issue is goal synchronisation.  
 
In certain situations, it is difficult for the LA to find out what the SCP actually does. 
Difficulty arises when the LA cannot find out if the SCP has operated appropriately 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Another issue relates to the distribution of risk ("problem of risk") 
as LAs and SCPs may prefer different ways of operating regarding risk (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Hence, this theory has been applied in this study to explore and explain the 
function of collaboration in the business procurement processes of LAs.  
 
Self-interest 
In this examination of the procurement productivity of organisations in collaborative 
environments, the role of control is to provide measures and rewards such that 
individuals pursuing their own self-interest will also pursue collective interests. 
Consistent with the principles of theories, the view adopted here assumes that SCPs are 
rational, self-interested utility maximisers. However, it is not assumed that SCPs behave 
inconsiderately or with guile. In contrast to Williamson (1985) transaction cost 
economics framework, although it is assumed that people are opportunistic in the sense 
that they will, in a self-interested manner, try to fulfils their needs with minimal effort, 
it is not assumed that they will willingly misrepresent. Hudson et al. (1999) suggest that 
collaboration be recognised as a largely self-interested activity, which therefore requires 
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identification of the benefits for all participants. Hudson et al. (1999) argued in their 
research that collaboration takes place because it is in the self-interest of the 
organisations and their people involved to do so. Levine and White (1961) noted that 
exchange between organisations will be reinforced if interaction is voluntary.  
 
In this research, all the of interviewees defined the SCP as a consulting and execution 
organisation, 
 
“For the LAs and from the LAs”.  
(Interviewees A, B, C, D, F & G) 
 
The interviewees mentioned the SCP as their own procurement organisation, whereby 
there is no financial profit for external or commercial organisations. The council 
commits the financial forecast and financial annual account (Bizob, 2017). Also, 
external supplies are formally contracted on the name of the LAs. Likewise, the 
financial stream to suppliers is directly from the LAs. The financial earnings model of 
the SCP is budget-neutral. 
 
Bounded rationality 
Where it can be shown that organisations can achieve the same ends more efficiently by 
working together rather than separately, there is a general consensus that they will 
collaborate, although managers and policymakers do not always have access to all of 
the conditions necessary for such purely rational decision-making. In addition, external 
factors may also affect the rationality of decisions, such as limited time and information 
or a hierarchy within an organisation. In contrast with Challis et al. (1988), who 
suggested that the rhetoric of rationality is permanent because it reflects and embodies 
the ideology of public bureaucracies, the interviewees in this study confirmed the 
general tendency of ‘bounded’ rationality. Three of the interviewees requested evidence 
of savings gained from collaboration – an assessment of equal procurement projects 
carried out by an organisation singly and in a collective.  
 
 




Interviewees B, C 
The case study showed that for several procured commodities, the procurement tender 
costs in joint purchasing groups executed through SCP are significantly lower than costs 
for individual organisations. Also, the quantitative research showed a strong correlation 
between the dimension of cost reduction and several variables, with savings 
descriptions caused by SCP. 
 
Symmetrical information 
McCue and Prier (2007) indicated that it is merely assumed that the principal and agent 
do not share the same levels of information, and as such, the agent can opportunistically 
take advantage of situations, sometimes to the disadvantage of the principal or vice 
versa. More to the point, it is merely assumed that as a result of agency theory, LAs and 
SCP do not share the same levels of information. Therefore the SCP can 
opportunistically take advantage of the situation, sometimes to the disadvantage of LAs. 
This is often the result of asymmetric information, a lack of strategic vision and to little 
structure in local collaborative initiatives and sub coordinated bodies (Hudson et al., 
1999). 
 
There is a strong relationship between information symmetry and the effectiveness and 
efficiency of SCPs, LAs and other regional collaborative organisations. Research 
indicates a number of key issues. Firstly, the fragmented and overlapping procurement 
activities in the same region. As shown in Table 4-9 and Appendix VIII, the descriptive 
statistics of variables show that SCP procurement is fragmented between different 
collaborative organisations for the same LAs. In the semi-structured, in-depth 
interviews, it was mentioned that management has recognised this issue. Subsequently, 
an action task group of business and finance controllers has been initiated and ordered 
by the councils of those LAs represented to investigate several collaborative activities 
and to stream and harmonise these activities. 
 
The study findings indicate sharing information on a tactical level – activities, progress, 
and bottlenecks of procurement projects – and on a strategic level regarding annual 
procurement plans and goals. The quantitative phase mentioned in the dimension, 
component Coordination Mechanism, analysed on factor loadings. Variables SCPAT1 
and SCPAT2 were mentioned as latent variables for this dimension. These two variables 
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represent the relative importance of the variable to the factor/dimension Coordination 
Mechanism (Pallant, 2010). SCPAT1 represents the importance of harmonisation of 
procurement policies. The procurement policy concerns strategic procurement 
objectives like sustainability, green procurement, cost reduction and local sourcing. 
Harmonisation and agreement on these procurement objectives amongst LAs in the 
same SCP have been seen as an important key performance enabler for the 
factor/dimension Coordination Mechanism.  
 
The case study analysed nine joint purchase group projects, viewed in Table 4-1; one 
such project was simultaneously executed (commodity electric), viewed in Table 4-2. 
Here there were strong demands for green procurement, social return, relations with 
current regional suppliers and extent of outsourcing/insourcing/scope of the 
commission. The dissimilarities between LAs on green procurement and social return 
policies are caused by differences in the council procurement policies of the LAs in the 
SCP region. This constraining factor has resulted in several LAs realising the need for 
and requiring regulation/policy harmonisation (Pazirandeh & Herlin, 2014). 
 
The interviews also made reference to the sluggish execution of JPG projects. The 
analysis identified operational-level barriers between users of LAs and the collaborative 
pressures of the SCP.  
 
"In any joint purchase groups, I perceived a sluggish process, with a lot of meetings 
and communications emails, which resulted in a long cycle time of joint purchase group 
projects. In some cases, LAs dropped out because of the unbelievably slow process”.  
Interview I, CEO LA 
 
Variable SCPAT2 has been loaded strongly as the latent variable in the factor analysis. 
This variable represents the statement that LAs in the SCP agree about operational 
execution. LAs have guidelines for the execution of each step in joint purchase project 
with detailed (sub) activities, time planning, cycle time and responsibilities. The target 
of this guideline is to encourage effectiveness and efficiency in JPG projects. 
Transparency of information 
Transparency of information adds to the performance of collaborative processes and the 
exchange of transparent information between managers to contribute to goal objectives 
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(Schalk, 2013). The argument here is that since information systems inform the 
principal about what the agent is actually doing, they are likely to limit agent 
opportunism because the SCP will understand that he or she cannot misinform the LAs 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Based on Nocon (1994),  Hudson et al. (1999) set out several stages 
of collaboration from networking, via federation, to the unitary model. These last steps 
can be followed by amalgamation. Information is shared at the second stage for 
procurement plans. 
 
Appendix VIII shows several collaborative agencies where LAs in the case study are 
connected. Eight of those public organisations execute public services for the whole 
region of Southeast Brabant. The other six execute services at the sub-regional level, for 
example, the development of local industry and SSC services. The SCP is a regional 
organisation, executing procurement services for the whole region, including the sub-
regions. Transparency and symmetry of procurement information between LAs is 
necessary for the exchange of demands, experience and benchmarking, which can add 
to service plans, a joint strategic plan, joint procurement planning, and joint execution 
(Hudson et al., 1999). Transparency of information also enhances better cost 
predictability, according to Janssen and Joha (2006), through benchmarking in contract 
management systems, which can be shared and used by all LAs.  
Examination of the semi-structured, in-depth interviews conducted in this research 
indicated that role of joint planning was ranked high by the interviewees.  
 
“The availability of the annual procurement plans of the LAs would reinforce the 
transparency of information between the procurement units of the LAs, with the goal of 
a further structural approach towards joint purchase groups and exchange of 
experiences.”  
Interviewees A, D and F 
 
The low importance of the dimension SCPAT10 in the quantitative research of this 
study is remarkable. SCPAT10, LAs of the regional SCP have joint procurement 
planning systems strategically, tactically and operationally, is low factored in the factor 
analysis. The contradictory statistic demonstrated that joint procurement planning 
systems have low importance for the dimension Coordination Mechanism. The majority 
and the importance of procurement operational planning in the public sector depends on 
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the majority of the business organisations of the firm (Deasy et al., 2014). The SCP 
studied in the case study and in the interviews was founded in 2003. The SCPs studied 
in the quantitative study were founded after that period. The degree and scope of 
collaboration in the region of Southeast Netherlands in many activities are shown in 
Table 1-8 and Table 1-9. Also the regular meetings of aldermen, mayors and policy 
staff regarding issues such as safety in the region, development and innovation, regional 
industries, dust management, social return, social care, and collaborative procurement, 
require greater structural coordination (Hudson et al., 1999) to enhance transparency of 
information. This affects the effectiveness and efficiency of collaboration and prevents 
fragmentation and sub-optimisation.  
 
Finally we come to the unitary model. This model pools resources to serve a single set 
of objectives. However, this must be limited to partial pooling otherwise the best 
description of the end result would be a merger (Allal-Chérif & Maira, 2011). 
 
Goal conflict 
This study has recognised the influence of goal synchronisation on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of collaboration between organisations. Existing evidence showed that a lack 
of goal consensus at the network level (Hudson et al., 1999) leads to a negative effect 
on network performance (Percival, 2009; Provan & Kenis, 2007). Primarily, the 
complexity of the modest concept of ‘goals’ will be discussed. There are usually several 
goals, some of which are explicitly pronounced, while others remain unspoken or a 
matter of course. The nature of goals can vary widely or be hybrid. It therefore seems 
difficult to identify clear goals of cooperation practices. This was mentioned in the 
interviews: 
 
"Too few discussions about the content, possibilities and consequences of goals and 
their translation into specifications".  
     Interviews B, D, E and G 
 
 
“Disinterest in each other’s goals”.     




“Inefficiency is perceived as many meetings with no output”.  
Interviews A and B 
 
McCue and Prier (2007) analysed specific relationships, definitions, and concepts to 
build three models of cooperative public purchasing within the context of agency 
theory. They showed that goal synchronisation can be organised by using several roles 
and modelling the collaboration arrangement. One of the main difficulties that they 
found was the number of split loyalties among principals, whose goals are often in 
conflict. In contrast with the present research, this can be explained by the diversity of 
governance of the participants at local, regional and national level (Meehan et al., 
2016).  
 
The SCP model in this research is exclusive for and from the LAs and most of those 
have regional delimitations. However, the diversification between regional LAs can be 
significant, although on a regional level there is more harmonising of the policy of value 
items, recognised in the qualitative phase of this study. 
 
"The regional group of mayors forced the aldermen and town managers to conduct one 
main policy for social return and an action plan for applying sustainability in 
procurement plans". 
          Interviews A, B, C, and G 
 
Nevertheless, the degree and combination of value items varies in most of the JPGs for 
each individual LA. The present study implies that even though fundamental political 
interests limit individual LAs’ room to manoeuvre, it is possible for network members 
to influence the perceptions of other actors in such a way as to arrive at common policy 
strategies and solutions. This emphasises the importance of structural guidelines for 
JPGs and harmonising strategic procurement objectives of different LAs to foster 
efficient and effective collaboration. 
 
The quantitative phase mentioned in the dimension Coordination Mechanism with the 
highest factor loadings, > 0.7, were SCPAT1 and SCPAT2, which concerned agreement 
on goals and strategy, and agreement on the execution of collaborative procurement 
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projects. These systems are necessary to define the goals and objectives of procurement 
projects.  
The situation discussed above can be explained through transaction cost economics. 
Transaction costs are presumably lower when LAs are similar in their policies, goals 
and demands as there may be less uncertainty and less need for fine-tuning and 
communication.  
 
5.2.3 How can these values be affected by structural collaboration in the 
Netherlands (RO1)? 
RO1c requires a change between the value items, which can be realised through public 
procurement for internal business processes, and multiple acceleration through 
collaboration.  
 
Symptoms of diseconomies of scale were marginally mentioned in the interviews. One 
interviewee mentioned: 
 
“In any joint purchase groups, I perceived a sluggish process, with a lot of meetings 
and communications mails”. 
Interviews A and G 
 
The utility of value items, which can be affected by SCP, can also be affected by the 
SCP’s organisation and boundaries. Nollet and Beaulieu (2005) asserted that regional 
purchasing groups are closer to users to facilitate closer user commitment and 
involvement. Civil servants, aldermen, mayors, and LA managers are more familiar 
with their SCP. The span of control of SCPs was mentioned several times in the 
interviews. 
 
“The SCP must be manageable, controllable and recognisable”. 
         Interviews A, B and G 
 
5.2.4 What causes uncertainty in the internal business processes of public 
procurement function (RO2)? 
RO2a requires exploration and description of uncertain items in the internal processes 
of public procurement, which can be affected by structural collaboration. The current 
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trend of activities being decentralised from the national government has ensured, among 
other things, that the working area of a public service has exceeded municipalities’ 
boundaries (Allers & Van Ommeren, 2016). This regionalisation movement has shown 
the limitations of traditional models of managing procurement functions in LAs by 
revealing the interdependence of LAs operating in the same market and the risks 
resulting from vulnerable procurement functions in a more complex procurement 
environment.  
 
In the existing quantitative research, it has been broadly recognised that LAs are less 
dependent on their procurement function, which contributes to the continuity of the 
business processes and operations (Malatesta & Smith, 2014). Other reasons to 
cooperate are that some municipalities are simply too small to perform every task 
independently (Van Houwelingen, 2017). Analyses of the interviews conducted in this 
study also noted less dependence on the scarce supply of employees in the procurement 
market. Lower dependence on coaching, training and guidance in procurement 
functions as well as standardisation and availability of tools were also mentioned 
(Murray et al., 2008).  
 
“My LA has sustainable access to procurement knowledge and is less dependent on 
externals”. 
          Interview A, B, C, D, E, F and G 
 
“Our organisation has direct and quick access to legal procurement knowledge and is 
thereby less dependent on external legal offices”. 
           Interview D, E, and F 
 
“We have tried several times to organise an in-house professional procurement unit 
and collaborative network structure but [there has been] no continuity and [we are] 
still dependent on external offices” 
           Interview B and C 
In the quantitative phase, variable SCPRDT1, “LAs get access to critical procurement 
knowledge, and resources”, showed a high factor loading ranking in the dimension 
Resource sharing & Business capabilities.  
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Organisational success in the RBT is defined as LAs minimising their scarcity on 
procurement resources. RBT also usually helps LAs to formulate business-level 
strategies and link these to their social challenges (Van Houwelingen, 2017). Although 
the RBT is limited in explaining of behaviour, structure, stability, and change in 
organisations.  
 
What can be concluded is that the nature of LAs’ strategies and strategic participation in 
SCPs are being made according to using internal resources as they continue their 
business processes and strategies are being made to get effectiveness with respect to 
external resources (Nemati, Bhatti, Maqsal, Mansoor, & Naveed, 2010). Besides SCP 
has been noticed as external resources, can it also be noticed as internal resources, 
because most of the activities are executed at the outlet of LAs and SCPs are owned by 
LAs in terms of their financing and governance. 
 
Information asymmetry 
The source of power “information asymmetry” contributes in this study by the RBT. 
From the view of RBT, it is the availability of procurement management information. 
Procurement information is applicable for the SCP and not for the individual LA 
(Nemati et al., 2010). In the qualitative phase, LAs’ demand for procurement 
information is mentioned. This is obtainable from SCP but only on request and with 
permission from the SCP. On the one hand, this is a unique selling point of the SCP but 
on the other hand constitutes information asymmetry, which generates independence 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
 
“Gathering of buying information and procurement plans is an activity of the SCP”. 
Interview A, B, C, D, E, F and G  
 
The IT function in the publication of tender in business processes has been noted as 
asymmetry information for the LA, that creates a dependency from the LA to SCP. On 
the other hand, LAs recognise the unique contribution of SCP to their business 
processes. This concerns unlocking data, developing procurement publication templates, 
and publishing public tenders on national and European IT websites.  
 
“Our LA remains dependent on the SCP for the procurement IT system resources”. 
Interview F and G  
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In the quantitative analyses, the dimension SCPRDT6 “Procurement processes are 
more transparent for my LA through the SCP”, has a factor loading of 0.70 in the factor 
analysis. This indicates that transparency in the procurement processes is a source of 
information about component/dimension uncertainty to keep up the contribution of the 
SCP for the LAs. 
 
In addition, the dimension SCPRDT4 “My LA has more control and grip on the 
information and communication in the procurement processes via the SCP”, has a 
positive factor loading. This means that the transparency and control of procurement 
processes via the SCP is an underlying variable to the dimension of uncertainty, which 
contributes to less uncertainty in the procurement process for LAs.  
 
Demand share 
Coalitions are formed due to their combined purchasing power (Schotanus et al., 2009). 
In addition, there should also be a driving factor such as high monopolistic supplier 
power driving up prices to motivate the formation of such a confederacy. The SCPs in 
the Netherlands were formed to capitalise on powerful purchasing through bundling 
volumes, to offset high transaction costs, and to leverage organisations’ combined 
demand share regarding procurement (Richter & Brühl, 2017). 
 
The triangulation in this research supports the double-sided conviction that the purchase 
power source ‘demand share’ supports purchase power in oligopolistic and 
monopolistic supplier markets. In the dimension ‘uncertainty’, the factor loading of 
SCPRDT8, “LAs have more dominance in the supplier market by buying together”, 
scores a very high loading factor, which indicates significant exploration of the RBT. 
The dominant positions of the joint LAs have been identified as a collaborative source 
of power (Karjalainen, 2011; Kastanioti et al., 2013) whereby the uncertainty in and 
dependence on oligopolistic and monopolist supplier markets have been diminished. 
Strengthened by the factor loading of variable SCPRDT2 "My LA has more influence on 
the conditions of monopolistic suppliers by the input of the SCP", the power source 
demand share has been recognised as limiting uncertainty in the procurement processes. 
 
Dimension uncertainty and power of source demand share, have been studied in this 
research similarly from another perspective, namely sharing capacity and knowledge, to 
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be less dependent on external organisations (Malatesta & Smith, 2014). The variable 
SCPRDT7 “My LA has more access to professional procurement experts, by 
exchanging capacity and knowledge in the SCP, causing less dependence on external 
organisations” has scored high in the factor loading analysis for the dimension 
Resource sharing & Business capabilities.  This understanding suggests an important 
contribution to reducing resource and knowledge uncertainty for each individual LA. 
 
Reputation/Legitimacy 
The reputation of the SCP with its participant LAs also impacts its dependence and 
authority. One example of an authority indicator related to reputations is legitimacy, 
comprehended as the endorsement and recognition of the outcome of the SCP activities 
by its participants – the LAs (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
 
The high ranking of the factor loading of the variable SCPRDT10 “My LA goes along 
with the publicity of the SCP” indicated that the reputation and legitimacy of the SCP 
reduce the uncertainty in the procurement processes for each individual LA. An 
ambitious presentation to the supplier market required more professional appearances to 
entrepreneurs, branch organisations and other relational LAs (Herlin & Pazirandeh, 
2012). Pazirandeh and Norrman (2014) found evidence that purchasing strategies have 
an impact on reputation as a source of power.  
 
In previous research, interviews have explained that procurement organisations’ 
reputations are built up over a number of years on two sources of power: procurement 
strategies, and strategies concerning the governance of collaborative organisations. 
Responses to each power source are discussed below. Cost leadership arguments and 
accountability are the heart of the matter, in the opinion of the interviewees. 
Researchers have also mentioned contributions to lower procurement costs achieved by 
consolidation of purchases in and with LAs; competitive tendering; and single or multi-
sourcing strategies depending on the procurement project, goals and market situation 
(Gelderman & Van Weele, 2003). Corporate liability regarding (EU) procurement 
procedures were also argued to show a solid internal organisation to citizens and 
councils. Previous literature has also mentioned strategies such as increasing SMEs’ and 
local suppliers’ access to public tenders (A. Flynn & Davis, 2016). Besides output 
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arguments, continuity and structural governance of SCPs have also been discussed 
(Richter & Brühl, 2017).  
 
“Never rarely our LA receives negative information about the SCP” 
Interview A, B, F and G  
 
“The lateral information on political level is positive for the brand of the SCP”. 
Interview A, B, C, D, E, F, G and H  
 
“Seminars organised for entrepreneurs by the SCP boost their reputation at the 
political level of the LA”. 
Interview B, D, F, G, and H  
 
“SCP is mainly known for downsizing procurement costs”. 
Interview A, B, F, G and H  
 
This is reinforced by SCPRDT9, “SCP has legitimacy effect for my LA of excellent 
commissioning”. This variable has a strong factor loading for the dimension/component 
of uncertainty, which indicates a robust fundamental position of the existence and 
continuation of the SCP to its stakeholders with as management, councils, and citizens 
and entrepreneurs representing excellent public procurement authority. A positive 
reputation adds legitimacy to being a member of SCP to align with internal 
stakeholders. Continuity of knowledge and resources is hereby secured and thus the 
procurement function is more granted in the business processes of the LA (Nollet & 
Beaulieu, 2005; Paagmana et al., 2015). 
 
5.2.5 What causes cost reduction in the internal business processes of public 
procurement functions (RO3)? 
RO3a requires exploration and description of cost reduction items in public 
procurement for internal processes, which can be affected by structural collaboration. 
 
Internal business processes in the public procurement functions of LAs in the previous 
study mainly emphasised the pre-stage and sourcing stages and in JPGs supplemented 
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with evaluation part of contract management. Collaborative procurement in previous 
research goes beyond JPGs (Nollet & Beaulieu, 2005; Schotanus et al., 2010).  
 
In phase 2 in Chapter 4, the causes of cost reductions in the internal business processes 
of public procurement functions are analysed using quantitative analysis. Variable 
SCPTC12 “LA has more standardisation in the procurement processes, which leads to 
financial savings” has a significantly high factor loading in the dimension/component 
cost reduction. This indicates that “standardisation in the procurement processes” has 
been recognised as an important contribution to cost reduction by SCP. Standardisation 
in the procurement processes also refers to the pre-stage, sourcing and contract 
management stages. Pazirandeh and Herlin (2014) roughly reinforced these findings and 
suggested in their study that greater formalisation of procurement processes and 
procedures would ensure the commitment of participants. The current findings argue for 
more standardisation and formalisation during the procurement process to secure cost 
savings.  
 
Zooming in on “standardisation in the procurement processes” of LAs and translating 
this into business processes, there are learning processes before it will arrive at its 
optimum ability. This learning concept impacts productivity costs and savings in all 
phases of the procurement process. There is a mathematical relationship between the 
cumulative days per procurement procedure and the number of executed procurement 
procedures. In the case study, data has been collected regarding the spent procurement 
capacity measured in the resource IT system. It has been assumed that days spent 
executing a procurement procedure is not a proportional variable.  
 
The mathematical relationship has the exponential form: 
 
 𝑃𝐶𝑛 = 𝑃𝐶1  ∗ (𝑛
𝑏)       (1) 
    
𝑃𝐶𝑛  = Procurement capacity spend per day when n procurement procedures are 
executed.         (2) 
𝑃𝐶1 = days spent executing the first procurement procedure. (3) 
n = the unit procurement procedure executed.   (4) 
b = a constant representing the slope of the curve.   (5) 
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Table 5-10 Algorithm of Number Procurement Procedures and Days Spend 
Procurement 
procedure(s) 
1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2028 4056 
Days spent 10 9.5 9.03 8.58 8.15 7.74 7.35 6.99 6.64 6.31 5.99 6.29 6.60 
 
In an exponential 95% learning curve, a 5% learning rate can be assumed based on data 
from the Bizob information system. Figure 5-4 displays this relationship graphically. 
The curve declines slowly at first, and then evens out, declining very rapidly as 
additional procurement procedures are executed. When the number of procurement 
procedures n > 1029, the optimum point of the learning curve has been reached and a 
slight decline follows. 
 
 
Figure 5-4 Learning Cure Procurement Projects and Days Spend 
 
The expression 𝑃𝐶𝑛 = 𝑃𝐶1  ∗ (𝑛
𝑏)    (1) 
can also be converted into the logarithmic form to give the straight-line relationship: 
 
 log𝑒 𝑃𝐶 =  log𝑒 𝑃𝐶1 + 𝑏 ∗  log𝑒 𝑛    (2) 
 
The slope of the straight line is b, and this can be rewritten as: 
 
𝑏 =
log𝑒 𝑃𝐶𝑛 −  log𝑒 𝑃𝐶1
log𝑒 𝑛

















Learning Curve Procurement Procedures
Learning Curve Procurement
procedures
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If Lc denotes the learning rate, the value of b can be calculated considering the days 
spent to executing the first procurement procedure, and the time spent executing the 
second procurement procedure. The time to execute the second procurement procedure 
is given by 𝑃𝐶1 * Lc. Substituting this expression for 𝑃𝐶𝑛 in the equation for b gives: 
 
𝑏 =
log𝑒 𝑃𝐶2− log𝑒 𝑃𝐶1
log𝑒 𝑛2
 = 
log𝑒 𝑃𝐶2∗𝐿𝑐− log𝑒 𝑃𝐶1
log𝑒 2
  (4) 
𝑏 =





           (5) 
 







 =  
−0.05
0.6931
 = - 0.07  (6) 
 
That is a negative slope indication that days spent decreases as the number of 
procurement procedures increases until the optimum point mentioned in Figure 5-4. 
 
Substituting this value (6) in the exponential equation gives: 
𝑃𝐶200 = 10 ∗ 200
−0.07 = 6.90  
 
The learning concept in executing procurement procedures has been demonstrated 
above. From this calculation, days spent for any number of executed procurement 
procedures can be determined. Similar calculations can be made for other learning 
principles in procurement business processes.  
  
The existence of the learning rate in procurement processes has been recognised in the 
analysis of the interviews and quantitative analysis of the present study.  
 
“Procurement costs have diminished extremely for my LA by joining the SCP”  
                  Interviewees A, B, C, D, E, F & G  
 
It has been noted that savings on project costs, budget investment costs and 
maintenance costs can be measured by LAs and their SCP. On the other hand, three of 
this study’s interviewees stated that there is no access to equal project management 
information of comparable individual costs for their LA. 
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“The savings and gains are plausible but not measured… and there is a lack of 
synchronisation of the results.”       
Interviewees A, B, & D 
 
In-depth analysis in Chapter 4, regarding efficiency and inefficiency has been explored 
in JPGs compared with similar individual procurement projects. This analysis, viewed 
in Table 4-1, confirms the feelings of the interviewees and the questionnaire that SCP in 
the case of JPG reduces procurement costs, compared with individual similar purchases. 
 
This research reveals the characteristics of ‘outsourcing’ and structurality in 
collaboration (Williams, 2013). SCPTC3, “LAs have lower management costs 
regarding their procurement function”, has not been tested in the literature review but 
from the view of business practice general collaboration literature. It is found to have a 
strong factor loading in the dimension/component cost reduction. Previous works in the 
literature mostly found evidence of reduced operational, administrate costs and IT cost 
(Bals & Turkulainen, 2017). Brewer et al. (2014) found an explanation based on a 
degree of resource position and opportunism in outsourcing procurement activities 
based on the framework of McIvor (2009) divided in the stages of the procurement 
processes as shown in Figure 2-5. Variable SCPTC3 indicates that SCP reduced 
procurement management costs in the sourcing phase for LAs. On the other hand, 
another interesting finding from the case study, represented in Figure 4-3, is that the 
costs in JPGs are separated in stages of the procurement process. Communication costs 
and costs in the pre-stage of procurement processes have an increasingly proportional 
character with the more LAs participating in the JPG, the greater the costs of these 
components for each participating LA. The consolidated procurement costs (pre-stage, 
sourcing and contract management stage) decrease as the number of LAs in the JPG 
increases (Albano & Sparro, 2010; Dyer, 1997; Karjalainen, 2011). 
 
The assessment of process costs is completed by finding out the time spent on the 
tendering process for both the LA operating model (where each LA tenders their own 
contract) and the JPG (where one contract is tendered for more than one LA) and 
estimating the associated costs. The tendering processes were both executed via SCP 
and in accordance with Dutch and European procurement law. 
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Comparative analysis has been conducted to measure time spent tendering in the single 
LA tenders and the JPG to measure the cost effects of collaboration. The time spent 
tendering is measured separately in a compatible IT time registration system. 
Multiple overlapping tendering processes imply a significant increase of the process 
costs of procurement in comparison to tendering one contract for more than one LA. 
The differences in costs, Δ PCDI PCDJPG, as shown in Table 4-1, are affected in the 
stage of the procurement of the procurement process specified in Figure 4-3. 
 
5.2.6 Summary  
White et al. (2016) found that public organisations did not perceive procurement to be a 
value-adding function but merely the execution of administrative tasks. This study, by 
contrast, shows that procurement functions can be improved by delivering six value 
aspects (knowledge, profession, reputation, product innovation, economies of scale and 
quality of services) through the use of SCP. Therefore, this study highlights the value 
that SCP adds to procurement functions.  
 
In the sections to follow, the quantitative findings of this study will be discussed. 
Grounded in statistical analysis, the key variables will be highlighted and arranged into 
an order that helps to determine a framework.  
 Challenging the Research Objectives from a Solely Quantitative 
View 
In this deductive approach, the research objectives and hypotheses have been derived 
from gaps in the literature relating to structural collaborative procurement. The scales to 
measure the procurement performance of LAs were analysed in chapter 4. The 
extrapolative quality of the six dimensions of actors of SCP have been tested using 
regression analysis, using the procedures of Pallant (2010). In this section, firstly the 
factor and regression analysis are viewed, secondly the three research objectives are 
discussed and tested to provide generalised answers. 
 
Chapter 4 investigated the factor loadings (extracted values of each item under six 
variables) of the 37 variables on the six factors extracted. The higher the absolute value 
of the loading, the more the factor contributes to the variable. Loadings less than 0.5 
were suppressed as well as analysed in Chapter 4. Figure 5-5 shows the correlations 
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between the dimensions/components measured >0.5. Factor analyses provided empirical 
support for the six dimensions and highlighted the key variables affecting the SCP in 
these six dimensions. This established evidence of content validity. Further, the SCP’s 
construct validity was apparent by the positive association of each of the dimensions 
with enablers of structural collaborative procurement. Additionally, in Chapter 4 each of 
the factors’ reliability for consistency across the sample for generalisability was 
examined (Pallant, 2010, pp. 187-201). This section examines each of these dimensions.  
 
Figure 5-5 Best Variables in Outcome by Factor Analyses 
5.3.1 To what extent does collaboration lead to more value in the internal 
business processes of the procurement function (RO1)? 
In this section, the factors have been analysed which answer this study’s first research 
objective. The dimensions Resource sharing & business capabilities and Agility and 
flexibility are connected to this objective.  
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Resource sharing & business capabilities 
Table 5-11 displays the variables/items which have been measured in the factor loading 
analyses in chapter 4 via the quantitative questionnaire.  
 
Table 5-11 Variables - Resource Sharing and Business Capabilities 
Variable/Item Economical Theory Description  
SCPRBT2 RBT LAs have access to dedicated personnel to manage the 
collaborative process by the SCP. 
SCPRBT3 RBT LAs have access to professional procurement specialists 
to manage individual procurement projects through 
SCP. 
SCPRBT1 RBT LAs use cross-organisational structural teams for 
process design and improvement through SCP. 
SCPRBT5 RBT LAs have more access to product/technological 
developments by the SCP. 
SCPRDT1 RBT LAs share/get access to critical/special procurement 
knowledge, expertise and resources through SCP. 
SCPTC11 TC LAs have more standardisation and uniformity in 
procurement services through SCP. 
SCPAT11 RBT LAs have access to legal tender helpdesks through SCP. 
SCPCCT4 RBT LAs can focus more on the content of their 
products/services through SCP.  
SCPRDT7 RBT LAs have more access to professional procurement 
experts and less external procurement consulting 
through SCP. 
SCPRBT4  RBT LAs share technical knowledge through SCP 
SCPRBT9 RBT Civil servants of local governments are indirectly 
trained in business skills of the collaborative 
procurement organisation by the SCP. 
SCPRBT8 RBT LAs pool procurement and knowledge (training, time, 
money etc.) through SCP. 
SCPRBT7 RBT LAs have better relationships with suppliers through 
SCP. 
SCPTC7 TC LAs reduce failures in procurement procedures through 
SCP. 
SCPRBT6  RBT LAs have access to dedicated personnel to manage the 
collaborative process through SCP. 
 
The first factor involved the availability of Resource sharing & Business capabilities. 
Participants in this study represented the accessibility of professional procurement 
experts, delivered through SCP, in their organisation for solo procurement projects as 
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well as for joint purchase groups. Also, the resource of more critical special 
procurement knowledge, like the commodities, social care, youth care, rubbish 
management, IT and buildings. Similarly, the use of innovative multi-functional 
procurement teams through SCP for improvements or innovative procurement projects 
has been recognised as a latent variable, which has an effect on Resource sharing & 
Business capabilities (Rainville, 2016). Furthermore, the use of legal tender services for 
procurement has been recognised as a remarkable source SCP for LAs. Also, the 
pooling of procurement expertise and capacity has been recognised as Resource sharing 
& Business capabilities (Bals & Turkulainen, 2017). Central execution of IT equipment 
and sharing procurement business information between LAs through SCP has been 
recognised as a latent item, which contributes to Resource sharing & Business 
capabilities (Borman & Janssen, 2013). 
 
Besides the services provided by SCP, LAs professed the positive effects of these 
services on their procurement functions. The participants of this study perceive a 
positive correlation between more benefits for LAs in terms of product development, 
increased standardisation and uniformity in procurement services, increased 
professional expertise and therefore the need for fewer external commercial 
procurement consultants. A participant in this study noticed the contribution in 
exchange of procurement expertise between the SCP and the civil servants of the LAs 
(Dewah & Mutula, 2014).  
 
From a deductive perspective, these findings can be traced back and explained using 
two theories set out in chapter 2, which are the backbones of this research – namely the 
RBT, and the TCT (Coase, 1937; Wernerfelt, 1984). This factor/dimension is 
theoretically mainly supported by the RBT through sources of power of complementary 
resources and capability. This is measured via the key performance indicators: data 
benchmarking of procurement information as strategies, specifications, contracts, and 
key performance indicators, jointly using E-procurement systems, indirect transfer of 
procurement skills, training, and decentralised availability of procurement practitioners.  
 
From theoretical considerations, this factor dimension is founded through sources of 
power of diminishing business risks, whereby the respondents mentioned that they are 
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more able to focus on core competences and material and content aspects instead of 
procurement (Barney, 2001; Hamel & Prahalad, 1990).  
 
The resources aspects contribute to the LA in terms of access for critical/special 
procurement knowledge and resources through an SCP. Theoretically, the SCP’s source 
of power diminishes the dependence, which can make the business process less 
uncertain (Emerson, 1962; Malatesta & Smith, 2014) and less dependent on external 
commercial procurement consultants (Subramaniam, Collier, Phang, & Burke, 2011). 
TCT supports greater standardisation and uniformity in the procurement services 
provided, which contributes to greater efficiency in the procurement business processes 
(Coulson, 1997; McIvor, 2009). However, these findings also indicate that this applies 
to a lesser extent to larger LAs. This study provides a detailed overview of the 
procurement  expertise that an LA can access when it is affiliated with an SCP. Earlier 
studies such as those by (Walker et al., 2013) reviewed several enablers of collaborative 
procurement. This research contributes by extending these enablers, including less 
dependence on external procurement consultants, added access to product/technological 
developments, extra-legal procurement resources and access to dedicated personnel to 
manage the collaborative process. Though the present study is restricted to local 
government organisations, this could also be taken as an opportunity to gain 
professionalism resources in-house.   
 
Agility and flexibility 
Table 5-12 displays the variables/items which were measured in the factor loading 
analyses in Chapter 4.  
 
Table 5-12 Variables - Agility and Flexibility 
Variable/Item Theory Description  
SCPCCT1 RBT LAs have quicker new and innovative product/services 
through SCP. 
SCPCCT2 RBT LAs have more flexibility and agility regarding ad hoc 
demands through SCP. 
SCPCCT6 RBT LAs have greater access to innovation in their 
products/services/works by outsourcing the 
procurement function through SCP. 
SCPTC8 TCT LAs have a shorter cycle time during execution of 
procurement procedures through SCP. 
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The fifth factor, agility and flexibility, is related to the ability to be flexible in 
procurement processes when there is a high act of power uncertainty on the part of LAs. 
This factor affects speed and flexibility of deliveries, supply of innovative public 
products to the citizens, and fast response to political demands (Freytag et al., 2012). 
LAs show that SCP is capable of responding rapidly to unpredictable demand. Also, 
LAs perceive a faster cycle time of individual procurement procedures by outsourcing 
these activities to the SCP (Gottschalk & Solli-Sæther, 2005). Concentration on core 
competence activities in combination with extending the activities of LAs has led to 
outsourcing of this specialism (Hamel & Prahalad, 1990). The core competence of 
public function for professional procurement of those outsourced activities of LAs, is 
the SCP. This can be in the area of services, health and social care, infrastructure and 
safety. SCP gives LAs the ability to combine the power of several highly specialised 
procurement contributions into a single, flexible, value-adding entity. Research by 
Paagmana et al. (2015) indicates limited attention for innovation, although they suggest 
in the future including innovation as an achievable value for SSCs. An answer on this is 
that LAs attribute innovation, flexibility and cycle time to the approach of the SCP. In 
this study, business managers, who were responsible for the output product/services, 
were for the questionnaire, and they felt the urgency of the politics directly. Paagmana 
et al. (2015) studied managers of finance and IT, who were indirectly involved with the 
output /services. Possible interpretations include the effective involvement of the SCP 
in the direction and primary procurement projects. 
 
5.3.2 To what extent does collaboration lead to less uncertainty in the 
procurement function (RO2)? 
In this section, the factors have been analysed which answer this study’s second 
research objective. The dimensions Control of information and Uncertainty are 
connected to this objective. 
 
Control of information 
Table 5-13 displays the variables/items which have been measured in the factor loading 
analyses in chapter 4.  
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Table 5-13 Variables - Control of Information 
Variable/Item Theory Description  
SCPAT6 TCT LAs make annual joint procurement plans with their 
SCP. 
SCPAT7 TCT LAs jointly control and update SCP procurement plans 
periodically. 
SCPAT8 TCT LAs jointly decide about exceptions and deviations 
regarding joint procurement plans. 
 
Finally, the dimension ‘control of information’ is founded on the three variables related 
to the management mechanism planning. The establishment of annual joint procurement 
plans has been recognised to control LAs’ demands for procurement information. The 
individual procurement plans have been devolved from the LAs’ strategic council 
program and the strategic financial forecast. Within the context of this long-term and 
rough-cut planning, demand needs to be translated into the operational requirements of 
individual LAs and their operational divisions. These plans contain the capacity and 
items to complete the services. Although collaborative LAs are a similar type of public 
organisation, Hill (2005, pp. 335-336) explained why organisations cannot have 
identical operation control systems. This can make it more complex to consolidate LAs’ 
individual procurement plans. On the other hand, the internal span of the procurement 
process of LAs is renowned by purchasing final products and services from outside, 
making the operational plans of the internal process simpler (Harland et al., 2005). The 
former two recognised variables have a more upkeep character of the annual 
consolidated procurement plan. These have been acknowledged as necessary to keep the 
procurement plan updated. This dimension and the variables related to it demand that a 
dynamic collaborative procurement plan is in place between LAs. This provides insight 
into the resolution of steering problems between LAs in SCP (Eisenhardt, 1985). The 
SCP has to juggle the goals and demands of all of the LAs involved. Differences in 
goals makes it difficult to serve all members’ demands. Therefore actual, dynamic 
consolidated procurement plans are necessary besides trust between LAs mutually and 
SCP. SCP will become more powerful over the long term; in addition, those who 
perform procurement activities are by definition closer to the source of information 
(Hudson et al., 1999). The research by Kastberg (2014) addressed the problems of 
collaboration for coordination. However, there were also problems of a more 
coordinative nature and connecting to the problem of securing communication flows 
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between the participants. This is not to say that it frames the relations between 
established LAs, but more that it is significantly about framing and stabilising these 
organisations through a structure that is in control of information. 
 
Uncertainty 
Table 5-14 displays the variables /items which have been measured in the factor loading 
analyses in Chapter 4.  
 
Table 5-14 Variables - Uncertainty 
Variable/Item Theory Description  
SCPRDT8 RBT LAs have more volume together in the market through 
SCP. 
SCPRDT10 RBT LAs hitchhike on the collaborative brand of SCP. 
SCPRDT9 RBT LAs use legitimacy via SCP organisations. 
SCPRDT6 TCT Procurement processes are more transparent through 
SCP. 
SCPRDT2 TCT LAs have more buying power regarding strategic contract 
terms through SCP. 
SCPRDT4 TCT LAs have more control over information/positions in 
communication flows through SCP. 
SCPRDT3 TCT LAs have more awareness of alternative 
specifications/demands through SCP. 
 
The third factor, uncertainty in the business function, covers a wide scope. Here, 
uncertainty predominantly concerns the degree of dependence on the selling power of 
enterprises. The test here is that collaborations based on structural jointly resource 
consolidate, serve a mutual benefit and, over time, decrease uncertainty for 
organisations over their resource supply (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Besides the benefits 
of buying power and more volume mentioned above, less obvious arguments have also 
been stated. In previous research, LAs have been seen to adopt collaborative 
mechanisms such as SCP in order to reduce uncertainty and increase their legitimacy 
(Malatesta & Smith, 2014). This is in contrast to the study by Pazirandeh and Herlin 
(2014), in which the drop-out of one of the buyers disturbed the benefits that increased 
volume could have brought for the group. One interpretation could be that structural 
collaboration, such as an SCP, could prevent that by reducing non-commitment. 
Meehan et al. (2016) provides insight into ‘a border’ between the technical and 
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procurement staff, which hampered the functionality of the specifications. This study 
reveals the entrance for alternative specifications through the SCP. One interpretation 
could be the homogeneity between the LAs in this study, which is in contrast with 
Meehan’s study Meehan et al. (2016). 
 
5.3.3 To what extent does collaboration lead to cost reduction in the procurement 
function (RO3)? 
In this section, the factors have been analysed which answer the third research 
objective. The dimensions Cost reductions and Coordination and mechanism are 
connected to this objective. 
 
Cost reductions 
Table 5-15 displays the variables/items which have been measured in the factor loading 
analyses in Chapter 4 via the quantitative questionnaire.  
 
Table 5-15 Variables - Costs Reduction 
Variable/Item Theory Description  
SCPTC3 TCT LAs have less management costs for procurement 
functions through SCP. 
SCPTC12 TCT LAs have more financial cost savings through SCP. 
SCPCCT3 TCT LAs have lower costs through outsourcing procurement 
functions through SCP. 
SCPTC1 TCT LAs have lower procurement and transaction costs 
through SCP. 
SCPTC6 TCT LAs have lower external-independent costs for legal 
advice regarding procedures or contracts through SCP. 
SCPTC5 TCT LAs have fewer costs for external procurement consults 
through SCP.  
SCPTC2 TCT LAs have lower procurement contract management costs 
through SCP. 
SCPTC4 TCT LAs have lower procurement IT costs through SCP. 
 
The second factor was structural collaborative procurement and cost reduction. LAs 
recognise that structural collaborative procurement involves cost reduction (Murray et 
al., 2008). These findings support and guide the findings of the qualitative study found 
earlier in this chapter. The findings of the interviews and case study are generalised by 
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the quantitative study. The case study also provides fundamental detailed 
comprehensive facts and figures about quantitative potential savings by collaborative 
arrangements on transaction cost by JPG and procurement IT systems. The study by 
Janssen and Joha (2006) and also recent research by Richter and Brühl (2017), which 
made a further development to output-orientated perspective, confirm the variable of 
lower IT costs. Paagmana et al. (2015) signalled the first collaborative needs 15 years 
ago. The difference is that the SSC started from the centralisation of secondary 
supporting services in the Netherlands, mainly IT, human resources management and 
facility procurement. However, this could also be taken as an outsourcing construct for 
supporting operational activities. This research confirms cost-efficiency for the primary 
business procurement function, also for the direct public services.  
 
On the other hand, the quantitative study also found cost savings in managing the 
procurement function. Similarly, cost savings were found for LAs from managing 
procurement contracts and outsourcing procurement functions. Possible interpretations 
include strategical, tactical, operational and legal procurement activities. 
 
It thus appears that in the context of SCP, the TCT and TCT theoretical lenses have a 
more nuanced relationship than linear, as suggested in the mind map in chapter 2. These 
quantitative findings suggest that TCE and RBT will reinforce one another when they 
offer complimentary forecasts. The fear of opportunism appears to determine the extent 
of procurement outsourcing, while the stage of structural or initial collaborative 
resource position is a better predictor of the procurement performance resulting from 
decision to outsource procurement to SCP (Brewer et al., 2014).  
 
Coordination and mechanism 
Table 5-16 displays the variables/items which have been measured in the factor loading 
analyses in Chapter 4.  
 
Table 5-16 Variables - Coordination and Mechanism 
Variable/Item Theory Description  
SCPAT1 TCT LAs agree on procurement goals and strategies in SCP. 
SCPAT2 TCT LAs agree how JPG should be executed in SCP. 
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Coordination and mechanism, the fourth factor, encompass two commitments, which 
are conditional on the performance of the structural collaboration (Schalk, 2013). When 
no goal conflict exists in a collaborative relationship, SCP will perform as expected 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Management coordination mechanisms such as annual procurement 
plans and guidelines for rules and procedures for the execution of JPG can be more 
attractive than outcome-based mechanisms (Eisenhardt, 1989). From the view of the 
TCT, the effectiveness of the collaborative arrangement is served by formal 
commitments of goals and strategies of JPGs. If there is no goal conflict and if the 
objectives are generally agreed, the collaboration can behave most effectively, as the 
LAs would like, to the benefit of the LAs (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
This dimension, coordination and mechanism, supports the earlier research of 
Eisenhardt (1989). TCT is most relevant in situations in which contracting problems are 
challenging. In this thesis in which there is substantial goal conflict between LAs, such 
that SCP opportunism or the opposite, risk aversion is likely. Opportunism can lead in 
this context to where the outcome of the JPG does not fit with the demands of the LAs 
or does so only partially, or where procurement policies have been trimmed. In such 
instances, innovation, green procurement, aspects of quality, business concepts and 
sustainability may have been affected during the execution of the JPG (Pazirandeh & 
Herlin, 2014). Besides the differences in policies between LAs, diversity between JPG 
objectives can cause this through the degree of insourcing or outsourcing of activities 
(Bals & Turkulainen, 2017) in individual LAs and thus in no synchronised 
specifications of the demands of the JPG (Schotanus et al., 2010). 
 
Alternative management mechanisms are mentioned in the factor analyses as a latent 
variable that explains coordination and mechanism. Explicit commitments and 
guidelines about how JPG is to be executed are necessary for decent coordination and 
mechanism during the execution of JPGs. Therefore, agreements and commitments 
force LAs to consider standard supply procedures in SCP for additional efficiency in the 
execution of JPGs (Caers et al., 2006). An earlier study by Meehan et al. (2016) showed 
that bundled national framework agreements had a suffocating effect on LAs, because 
they were not linked with the local market and the demands of heterogeneous public 
organisations. Alternatively, it could be an effect of compulsory participation and 
shortage binding with participants.    
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 The Guiding Hypotheses and the Research Objectives 
The effectiveness and efficiency of the SCP cooperation concept have been given 
direction and studied by the three hypotheses. Hypotheses 1 and 3 provide insight into 
which dimensions and variables affect structure and coordination in the collaboration 
concept. Hypothesis 2 tests the added value of the SCP for the LAs and is directly 
connected with the three research objectives. 
 
The predictive assessment of the six dimensions of collaboration for structural 
procurement organisations has been tested through regression analysis. Similarly, the 
extrapolative quality of the six dimensions of actors of SCP has been tested through 
regression analysis, based on (Green & Salkind, 2014) and (Pallant, 2010). Figure 5-6 
shows this regression analysis with probability p < 0.05. 
 
 
Figure 5-6 Best Predictive Variables in Outcome by Multiple Regression Analyses 
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In Table 5-17, the dimensions are linked to the guiding hypotheses, which explain the 
research objectives of this study.  
 
Table 5-17 Hypothesis related to the Research Objectives 




To what extent does 
collaboration lead to more 
value in the internal 
business processes of the 
procurement function 
(RO1)? 
Resource sharing & business 
capabilities 
 
Agility and flexibility 
 
 




To what extent does 
collaboration lead to less 
uncertainty in the 
procurement function 
(RO2)? 






To what extent does 
collaboration lead to cost 
reduction in the 
procurement function(RO3)? 








In the next section, the underlying variables of the hypotheses will be explained related 
to the research objectives.  
 
5.4.1 Hypothesis 1  
Structural collaborative procurement has a significant positive effect on collaborative 
benefit 
It adds a strategic structural organisation to the effective performance of the 
collaboration. This has been tested by the hypothesis through a regression from the 





Two related variables have a positive contribution to the performance of SCP in the 
dimension “Coordination Mechanism”. 
 
Table 5-18 Multi-Regression Coordination Mechanism  
Model/Item Model Coordination Mechanism SCPAT1 SCPAT2 
R .851   
R2 .724   
Adjusted 
R2 
.714   
Std. error of the estimate .525   
F 73.490   
Sig. .000 .000 .011 
Β  .662 .250 
 
 SCPAT1, LAs have agreed procurement goals and strategies in the SCP. 
 SCPAT2, LAs have agreed how to execute joint procurement groups in the SCP. 
 
The results in Table 5-18 support Hypothesis 1. The regression β figures are .662  
and .250, which is statistically significant at the level of 0.000 and 0.011. This supports 
the claim that coordination mechanism in structural collaborative procurement has a 
significant positive effect on collaborative benefits. Hypothesis 1 is confirmed.  
 
The instrument structure in the collaboration has been recognised as a positive effect on 
the benefits of collaboration. Structure forms the line of commitment about goals, 
strategies and how to execute JPGs in the SCP. The variable SCPAT1 involved agreed 
procurement goals and strategies, such as green procurement, social aspects and 
savings. Harmonisation of goals and strategies contribute to the efficiency and 
effectivity of the collaboration. This corresponds with the investigation by Patrucco et 
al. (2018) of the degree of structure and the level of centralisation of the procurement 
function and attention for strategic procurement goals. The research by Kastberg (2014) 
recognises risks of goal incongruence in the public sector and argues for a more explicit 
awareness of processes of defining the joint services, which is similar to the variable 
SCPAT2 of this study. In sum, agreements on structure of the SCP include: agreements 
of procurement goals and strategies and agreements on how to execute joint 
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procurement groups, which have an impact on the efficiency in the collaborative 
concept, and influence cost reduction.   
 
5.4.2 Hypothesis 2  
The collaborative benefit has a significant positive effect on the procurement 
performance of the individual local government organisation.  
 
The essential condition for structural procurement collaboration, SCP, is that the 
members of collaboration are able to increase their total value through cooperation and 
gain these benefits into their individual procurement performance of their individual 
local government organisation. In the short term, local government organisations will 
see operational enhancements, such as an improvement in productivity (Borman & 
Janssen, 2013; Janssen & Joha, 2008; Janssen et al., 2007). In the long term, local 
governments expect more (product) innovation, more access for start-up and SME 
entrepreneurs to public tenders, more professionalism among staff, fewer legal 
complaints, shorter cycle times to execute procurement tenders, more value from 
procurement procedures, less operational business risk, and lower costs (McIvor et al., 
2011; Nehmelman, 2015; Pazirandeh & Herlin, 2014).  
 
This hypothesis has been tested through a regression from the variables of the 
dimension coordination mechanism. Chapter 4 provides the necessary static tests using 
SPSS. Hypothesis 2 is supported as outlined below – resource sharing/business 
capabilities, procurement costs etc. – and has a significant explicable impression of the 
collaborative benefits that have a positive effect on procurement performance of the 
LAs.  
 
Resource sharing/Business capabilities 
Therefore, six variables have a positive contribution to the performance of SCP from 













SCPRBT2 SCPRBT1 SCPTC11 SCPRDT7 SCPRBT4 SCPRBT8 
R .949       
R2 .901       
Adjusted 
R2 




.375       
F 23.988       
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .012 .036 .012 .028 
β  .475 .460 .258 .208 .215 .171 
 
 SCPRBT2, LAs have access to dedicated personnel to manage the collaborative 
process through SCP. 
 SCPRBT1, LAs use cross-organisational structural teams to design and improve 
processes through SCP. 
 SCPTC11, LAs have more standardisation and uniformity in procurement 
services through SCP. 
 SCPRDT7, LAs have more access to professional procurement experts and less 
external consultants through SCP. 
 SCPRBT4, LAs share technical knowledge through SCP. 
 SCPRBT8, LAs pool procurement and knowledge (training, time, money etc.) 
through SCP. 
 
There is a statistically significant difference between the number of inhabitants of LAs 
and the contribution of Resource sharing & Business capabilities of the SCP for the LA. 
This is intensified by the relative LA performance benefit hypothesis 2, where 
collaborative benefit has a significant positive effect on the procurement performance of 
the individual local government organisation. 
This is in line with the extended RBT view that inter-firm learning, knowledge and 
capacity (Sergeeva & Andreeva, 2015) is demanded in other related business areas and 
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thus generate more spill-over rents for small and medium LAs than large LAs (Allers & 
Van Ommeren, 2016).  
 
Procurement costs 
Two related variables have a positive contribution to the performance of SCP, in the 
dimension Procurement Costs. 
 
Table 5-20 Multi Regression, Procurement Costs 
Model/Item Model Procurement Costs SCPTC3 SCPTC6 
R .856   
R2 .733   
Adjusted R2 .683   
Std. error of the estimate .554   
F 14.912   
Sig. .000 .000 .050 
Β  .552 .262 
 
 SCPTC3, LAs have fewer management costs when their procurement functions 
are carried out by SCP. 
 SCPTC6, External-independent costs of legal know-how of procedures or 
contracts. 
 
Agility and flexibility 
Three related variables have a positive contribution to the performance of SCP, in the 
dimension Agility and flexibility.  
 
Table 5-21 Multi Regression, Agility and Flexibility 
Model/Item Model Agility & Flexibility SCPCCT1 SCPCCT6 SCPTC8 
R .874    
R2 .764    
Adjusted R2 .746    
Std. error of the estimate .502    
F 43.587    
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .046 




 SCPCCT1, LAs have new and innovative products/services more quickly 
through SCP. 
 SCPCCT6, LAs have more access to innovation in their products/services/works 
by outsourcing their procurement to SCP. 
 SCPTC8, LAs have shorter cycle times during the execution of procurement 
procedures through SCP. 
 
Uncertainty 
Four related variables have a positive contribution to the performance of SCP, in the 
dimension “Uncertainty”. 
 
Table 5-22 Multi Regression, Uncertainty 
Model/Item Model 
Uncertainty 
SCPRDT8 SCPRDT10 SCPRDT9 SCPRDT6 
R .898     
R2 .807     
Adjusted R2 .781     
Std. error of 
the estimate 
.402     
F 30.468     
Sig. .000 .000 .032 .001 .034 
Β  .505 .216 .397 .239 
 
 SCPRDT8, LAs have more volume in the market together through SCP. 
 SCPRDT10, LAs gain legitimacy from SCP. 
 SCPRDT9, LAs hitchhike on the collaborative brand of the SCP. 
 SCPRDT6, Procurement processes are more transparent in SCP. 
 
The results in Table 5-19, Table 5-20, Table 5-21 and Table 5-22 support Hypothesis 2. 
The regressions R2 are .901, .733, .764 and .807, which are statistically significant at 
the level of 0.000. This supports the claim that resource sharing & business capabilities, 
procurement costs, agility and flexibility, and uncertainty in structural collaborative 
procurement have a significant positive effect on the procurement performance of 
individual LAs. Hypothesis 2 is confirmed, with the intensification that collaborative 
benefits of the dimension resource sharing/business capabilities for large LAs differ to 
small and medium LAs.  
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As mentioned before, this hypothesis is directly linked to the output of the three 
research objectives. In the factor analysis of the SCP, six dimensions were identified. 
Four dimensions were linked with this hypothesis and explain the research objectives.  
  
Objective more value 
The factor Agility and Flexibility involved access to innovation in 
products/services/works and faster realisation. Participants in this study depicted agility 
and access to innovation as results of the SCP. This is in contrast with the study by 
Meehan et al. (2016). They mentioned that tension between stakeholders could cause 
incongruence goals, which hamper the collaborative procurement value.  
 
Objective less uncertainty 
Variable SCPRBT2 involves access to dedicated personnel to manage collaborative 
processes. In previous research, dedicated personnel has been linked to outcomes of 
professionalism of the staff at the SSCs (Richter & Brühl, 2017). The dimension of 
uncertainty-linked consolidation of demands provides buying power, especially in 
monopolistic or oligopolistic markets. This corresponds with the research of Walker et 
al. (2013), although they also demanded chances for SMEs. Involvement of the factor 
Resource sharing/Business capabilities encompassed many aspects of being a member 
of SCP. The availability of procurement experts to manage the collaborative 
procurement process was a significant variable, corresponding with an earlier study of 
Albano and Sparro (2010), they extended the expertise through cross-functional 
organisational procurement teams, which is also recognised in this study.  
 
Objective cost-reduction 
The factor of procurement costs involves perceiving to what extent collaboration leads 
to cost reduction in the procurement function. In the previous study by Karjalainen 
(2011) evidence was found of savings in internal procurement costs. The effects, 
although from a centralisation point of view, contain tendering process costs 
(economies of process). Besides confirmation of these findings, the reduction of 
procurement management costs was perceived in the current study. Reduction of costs 
was also powerfully influential in outsourcing of procurement in Ghodeswar and 
Vaidyanathan (2008). Lower legal consultants’ costs were recognised in this study, 
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through removing legal resources from outsourced external consultants to the SCP 
(Knol et al., 2014).   
 
Standardisation and uniformity, SCPTC11, involves efficiency, thus stimulate cost 
reduction in the procurement function of LAs. This parallels the findings of Borman and 
Janssen (2013), who determined that standardisation, as well as contract discounts, can 
be accessed effectively and operating expenses reduced.  
 
In short, the SCP includes benefits that have a significant positive effect on the 
procurement performance of the individual local government organisation: resource 
sharing & business capabilities, procurement costs, agility and flexibility, and reduced 
uncertainty. Although each dimension in itself provides valuable information, the full 
contribution to the PP can further offer data to organisations about the success or 
insufficiencies of structural collaboration in procurement activities.   
 
5.4.3 Hypothesis 3 
Coordination between structural collaborative procurement and the individual local 
government organisation moderates the procurement performance of a local 
government organisation. 
 
Conversely, collaboration between local government organisations increases additional 
costs, if not managed well. These can include the cost of coordination, compromise, 
inflexibility and doing parts of the procurement function twice (Karjalainen, 2011). The 
effect of structural procurement collaboration on collaborative benefits and procurement 
performance is complex and many-sided. Harmonisation between individual local 
governments and collaborative procurement organisations is an important issue of this 
multi-faceted and intricate procurement collaboration (Pazirandeh & Herlin, 2014). 
 
This hypothesis has been tested through a single regression from the variables of the 
dimension coordination mechanism.  Chapter 4 provides the necessary static tests using 
SPSS.  
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Control of information 
Two related variables have a positive contribution on the performance of SCP, in the 
dimension Control of information. 
 
Table 5-23 Multi Regression, Control of Information 
Model/Item Model Control of information SCPAT6 SCPAT8 
R .867   
R2 .752   
Adjusted R2 .739   
Std. error of the estimate .526   
F 55.739   
Sig. .000 .000 .004 
β  .521 .290 
 
 
 SCPAT6, LAs make annual joint procurement plans with the SCP. 
 SCPAT8, LAs jointly decide exceptions and deviations regarding the joint 
procurement plan.  
 
Coordination and harmonisation have been recognised in the dimension Control of 
information. Meehan et al. (2016) noted in their latest research the lack of quality 
procurement information, which hampers the performance of the collaborative 
arrangements between regional, national/government, and other public partners in the 
UK. Another study on this dimension by Pazirandeh and Herlin (2014) asserts that 
deviations during joint procurement project can disrupt both demand and supply 
understanding for suppliers and also buyers. This parallels the findings of this 
hypothesis, which indicated that the presence and actualisation of annual joint 
procurement plans contribute to the performance of the SCP and have an impact on the 
degree of uncertainty of the SCP.  
 
A MANOVA analysis showed that there is a statistically significant difference between 
the number of inhabitants of LAs and the contribution of control of information by the 
SCP for the LA. Additionally, the study by (Grossi, Mori, & Bardelli, 2014) identified 
an enhancement of comparability between similar-sized municipal bodies. It follows 
that it makes it more possible to exchange information between similar-sized LAs. 
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The results in Table 5-23 support Hypothesis 3. The regression R2 .752, is statistically 
significant at the level of 0.000. This supports the claim that control of information in 
structural collaborative procurement has a significant positive effect on collaborative 
benefits. Hypothesis 3 is recognised. 
 
The findings of this quantitative study have contributed to the development of an SCP 
framework, which provides an approach to the procurement performance of LAs who 
are participating in structural collaborative arrangements. Besides, the six dimensions in 
quantitative research guide the three hypotheses. 
 
Participants of collaborative arrangements are able to influence the performance of their 
value out of the structural collaboration. Factor analysis and, more predictably, 
regression analysis offer dimensions with variables that have a positive impact on the 
ability to enlarge resource sharing & business capabilities, to reduce procurement costs, 
to diminish the uncertainty of the procurement function, to reinforce the coordination 
mechanism to make JPGs more effective, to enlarge agility and flexibility in 
procurement functions, and to advance their control of information in collaboration. 
LAs who are participating, or are considering participating, cannot be naive regarding 
the functioning of their SCP because it has a direct effect on the procurement 
performance of their LA.  
 Summary 
Chapter 5 has discussed the study’s mixed findings in the context of the literature and 
the three research methods used herein. It has been structured using the three main 
research objectives, specified in sub-objectives and three hypotheses. 
 
This study has used mixed methods and exploratory design Creswell and Clark (2011, 
pp. 214-222). The three main research objectives and sub-objectives have been weaved 
together, as discussed in the interpretation section Creswell and Clark (2011, pp. 66-67). 
Section three of this chapter built on the initial qualitative results and tested and 
discussed the generalised quantitative results that were synthesising between qualitative 
and quantitative analyses. This hybrid mixed research design covers the business 
research objectives of a practical proved concept for SCP in the Southeast Netherlands, 
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namely the real findings, which have been copied in several other regions in the 
Netherlands (Affairs, 2015) with their generalisability tested in this study.  
 
The first section of the chapter discussed the three main research objectives and their 
translation to the SCP conceptual framework. The three overall research objectives were 
focused on values of SCP for individual LAs, uncertainty, and cost reduction through 
structural collaboration. Procurement performance for individual LAs has been 
allocated in potential efficiency and effectively areas of the procurement function. The 
model of van Van Weele (2006) has been extended with an accelerator, either positive 
or negative, affecting structural collaboration and structural collaborative benefits. The 
relationship between the conceptual framework and his model shows a distinction 
between efficient organisation of collaborative procurement, effectiveness, what can be 
influenced through structural collaboration. 
 
Furthermore, procurement performance has been elaborated upon in value aspects, 
uncertainty issues and costs reduction features. In addition, value has been deepened 
further from what emerged from the existing literature and the practical existing 
understanding of procurement performance in the public setting.  
 
The second part of the chapter considered nine value items, namely knowledge, 
professionalism, reputation, product development/innovation, complementary resources, 
quality of service, information asymmetry, cost-competitiveness and economies of scale 
and their impact on structural collaboration. Unpacking and analysing the component 
value in the context of this study represents the first examination of the value construct 
as it pertains to LAs in SCP, particularly the additional importance of lower transaction 
costs (Tella & Virolainen, 2005). In this research, economies of scale mean more than 
cost saving; this has been aggregated in resource sharing, product development, 
reputation quality of services, information symmetry and professionalism, which 
articulated the importance of collaboration in terms of ensuring that the structural 
setting (Meehan et al., 2016) of the cooperation is focussed on gaining performance for 
the member LAs.  
 
The three-dimensional exchange of knowledge between SCP, LAs and LAs reciprocally 
is a new phenomenon in a collaborative setting. This contrasts with the private sector 
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where mutual competition restricts the sharing of knowledge and experiences (Dorger, 
1999). In the national public sector, sharing of knowledge has been limited to overall 
collaborative arrangements, whereby there is tunnel vision focused on the least possible 
connection between participants (Meehan et al., 2016).  
 
Strategic and tactical professionalism and business approaches to procurement (White et 
al., 2016) have been directly influenced by the attitude towards business processes in 
LAs. The reputation of SCP, which gains legitimacy, is added through experiences – not 
just individual experiences but across the regional setting of the SCP and the consistent 
branding throughout regional LAs. Experiences built on buying power and transparency 
& accountability in procurement processes add to SCPs’ positive reputations, 
independently of formal institutions (Ingold & Leifeld, 2014).  
 
Another value item recognised for LAs was product development/innovation. In 
contrast with Meehan et al. (2016), product development/innovation processes at SCP 
take place in a voluntary and equal environment among dedicated LAs with a strong 
professional core of operational staff. LAs reinforce each other regarding new business 
or social issues decentralised from the central government. SCP guides LAs and 
entrepreneurs, resulting in new business product concepts (Rolfstam et al., 2011 al). 
Secure critical resources on behalf of LAs have been recognised as complementary 
resources through the lens of RBT. Complementary value resources have overlapping 
features with knowledge and capacity resources but also concern cost reduction by 
sharing IT procurement systems, as evidenced in the quantitative study as well as in the 
case study. 
 
Improving the quality of the procurement service has been identified as an enabler to 
extend the service of the SCP further than merely traditional execution of procurement 
procedures. More high-level applicable techniques in primary business line processes 
are demanded, which answers to the final product and services or policy of the councils.  
 
Greater information symmetry can be mentioned as a value, which also affects costs by 
not organising it efficiently. Fragmentation or overlapping of execution of procurement 
tasks between agencies of LAs causes limitations in terms of the benefits of the learning 
curve. Similarly, participation in JPGs has been identified as being aimed at saving 
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costs. However, other researchers found that small LAs are not particularly cost 
competitive (Allers & Van Ommeren, 2016; Van de Laar, 2010).  
 
The explanation why SCP influences value in internal business processes for LAs has 
been studied through the lens of the principles of RBT and TCT. This research shows 
that the interests between LAs and SCP are in line with each other, as joint ownership, 
which has a positive effect. Bounded rationality is a reality in the public sector that 
restricts the procurement manoeuvring space and is characteristic of the public sector 
and requires coordination. This coordination does not just happen because mayors say 
that it should. It means creating the right kind of framework (Challis et al., 1988). 
Furthermore, a symmetry of information, transparency of information and goal 
synchronisation are characteristics outside the borders of the RBT and TCT and have an 
influence on the performance of collaboration, which has a direct impact on its value for 
the business processes for the LAs.  
 
The uncertainty of the procurement function has been recognised as a business risk for 
small and medium LAs. SCP is a procurement concept, which restricts those bounds 
and contributes to continuity in the procurement business processes of those 
organisations. Aspects such as diminishing resource dependency, symmetry of 
procurement information, sharing demands and legitimacy caused by reputation are a 
source of power multiplied by the SCP. 
 
Besides the proliferation of values for primary business processes and the reduction of 
procurement business risks, what is interesting about this discussion chapter is the 
progressive variable of cost-savings to be achieved through JPGs (Nollet & Beaulieu, 
2003, 2005; Schotanus et al., 2010). This is in connection with the critical remarks of 
the structural and segmented approach to prevent ineffectiveness and inefficiency, 
particularly in the pre-phase of the procurement process.  
 
This chapter has provided a more accurate and comprehensive definition of structural 
procurement collaboration with both economic and managerial focuses. The 
quantitative phase – section three of this chapter – identified a set of seven 
interconnecting dimensions that make up effective structural procurement collaboration: 
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Resource sharing & Business capabilities, cost reduction, uncertainty, coordination 
mechanism, agility & flexibility and control information. 
 
Regional agreements about procurement and policy goals between LAs, and guidelines 
for executing JPGs, have been noticed as a coordination mechanism to ensure the 
benefits of structural collaboration. Sharing resources/business capabilities, diminishing 
procurement costs, extending agility/flexibility and reducing uncertainty have been 
recognised as enablers of procurement performance for LAs. The degree of enablers 
depends on the size of the LAs involved. To gain extra performance at LAs, the control 
of information by management mechanism has been recognised as a key item. The three 
hypotheses discussed above have been tested through regression analysis and 
recognised, with minor intensification. 
 
Now that both the quantitative and qualitative findings have been discussed in the 







Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 Introduction 
The conclusion of this thesis presents an evaluation of the backdrop, objectives and 
research process of the study. This final chapter provides an overview of the findings 
from the research objectives and engages the reader in the conceptualisation process 
regarding what the evidence shows. In addition, this section briefly recaps the research 
process, and makes recommendations for future research. 
 
Collaborative arrangements have been recognised as one of the magic solutions to 
achieve individual goals rather than operating individually (Hill & Lynn, 2003). This is 
because LAs have to deal with new responsibilities, which are decentralised to local 
governments, and can be criticised for a lack of political power and professional 
business organisation (Dijkhoff, 2014). This drives the public debate about 
amalgamation and the right size of municipalities and LAs (Allers & Van Ommeren, 
2016). The general opportunistic thought of organisations – “mass is cash” – is more 
complicated and not a one-size-fits-all solution for managing new demand issues and 
public developments. Therefore, it is of vital importance that more sophistication is 
needed to promote the usefulness and foresight of collaborative actions (Allers & Van 
Ommeren, 2016; Meehan et al., 2016; Pazirandeh & Herlin, 2014). In this section, a 
reflection on the research objectives of this thesis will be presented. 
 
This study aimed to identify fundamental factors that influence purchasing performance 
at Dutch local authorities through structural cooperation in their region, hence the 
contribution to the current collaborative public procurement research stream is twofold. 
This research has sought to address two gaps identified in the literature: (1) insufficient 
research on factors of structural collaborative procurement driving the efficiency and 
effectively of LAs and (2) presenting the implications of value, costs reduction and 




The aims of this chapter are to address the research objectives, to outline the new 
contributions to science, methods, practice and finally to suggest opportunities for new 
research ideas in the future. 
 Achieving the Research Aim and Objectives 
Collaborative public procurement concentrated on the concept of horizontal 
procurement partnership between equivalent and regional local authorities (Murray et 
al., 2008). Sharper insights after the first examinations suggested that structural 
collaboration significantly added efficiency and effectiveness to business processes and 
value to LAs’ procurement functions. In terms of knowledge exchange, professionalism, 
reputation, product development/innovation, complementary resources, quality of 
services, information symmetry, cost-competitiveness and economies of scale, ‘value’ 
has been recognised as being more comprehensive than cost-competitiveness 
(Karjalainen, 2011). All of this contributed to a deeper and more meaningful 
understanding of the increased procurement performance of individual LAs through 
SCP.  The research is outlined by three research objectives:  
 
Research Objective I: To what extent does collaboration lead to more value in the 
internal business processes of the procurement function? 
Research Objective II: To what extent does collaboration lead to less uncertainty in 
the procurement function? 
Research Objective III: To what extent does collaboration lead to cost reduction in the 
procurement function? 
 
6.2.1 Objective: To what extent does structural collaboration lead to more value 
in the internal business processes of the procurement function? 
This first research objective addressed the relationship between structural collaboration 
and improvements in procurement processes, better supplier management and 
(technological) innovation. Overall, the evidence from this study found that structural 
collaboration improved the procurement process and function of LAs. The variables of 
resource sharing & business capabilities, agility and flexibility are significantly related 
(with near zero correlation and factor analysis) in value internal business processes of 
the procurement function. 
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The first quantitative factor supported sharing knowledge, resources, and capabilities. 
Participants in this study identified factors such as access to professional procurement 
experts, access to procurement legal experts, application of cross-functional 
procurement teams, more standardisation in procurement services, harmonisation of one 
IT procurement system, being less dependent on external procurement experts, sharing 
material-technical knowledge, and pooling knowledge as the benefits that their LA 
enjoyed through their collaborative procurement organisation, which increased the 
effectiveness and efficiency of their procurement performance. Also, access to cross-
organisational design and improvement teams was stated as a valuable service of SCP. 
Similarly, the value of SCP was noted by applying innovative and technological 
development demands in procurement procedures. Furthermore, the request for 
critical/special procurement expertise and resources was accepted as a value provided 
by SCP. This left LAs more able to focus on their core business activities and adding 
value to product development and innovation. Uniformity in the procurement processes 
was acknowledged as a contribution of SCP. Indirectly, civil servants had been inspired 
by their adopted professional skills, such as the business attitude and processes of the 
SCP procedures and extended previous literature of Murray et al. (2008). Furthermore, 
SCP contributes to the value item professionalism, that civil servants are ‘daily trained 
by practicing’ had been generalised by these variables. Consequently in line with study 
of Proulx et al. (2014). 
 
Another aspect of identified value was agility and flexibility.  Both the interviews and 
the survey mentioned the vulnerability in business processes of procurement functions 
for small and medium LAs without SCP. A need for access to faster innovation 
products and services and agility in access to resources was approved. Agility and 
flexibility are important indicators of certainty in procurement business functions; on 
that basis, cycle times were generalised in innovative demands and in procurement 
processes overall. Organisational procurement risks can be positively influenced by 
outsourcing procurement function through SCP. This qualitative finding was 
generalised in the quantitative analysis for these variables. Innovation in business 
processes was also recognised as an improvements in the supply chains of LAs. 
 
Besides this, additional quantitative analysis reinforced the availability of procurement 
experts and sharing of knowledge and experiences, as a contribution of the SCP. 
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Hypothesis II, examined if (and which) the collaborative benefits have a significant 
positive effect on the procurement performance of the individual local government 
organisations. The dimensions Resource Sharing/Business Capabilities, Agility and 
Flexibility, reveal these new directions in this area. It becomes clear that the input from 
procurement expertise and having faster access to innovative products and services with 
more agility and flexibility, all create value in the business processes of the LAs. These 
stated values reinforce the professionalism of their procurement function and make it 
possible to meet the policy objectives and decentralised tasks of the national 
government and the European council. 
 
6.2.2 Objective: To what extent does structural collaboration lead to less 
uncertainty in the procurement function? 
Research objective two addressed the relationship between the influence of an SCP and 
the robustness of the procurement function in the LA. One key aspect in reducing 
uncertainty was the control of information.  In the interviews, the importance of annual 
joint procurement plans was mentioned. Also, regarding the strategic level, CEOs had 
been analysing overlapping financial processes in their public collaborative 
organisations, with the objective of streamlining joint financial management activities. 
The annual operating procurement plans of the LAs are elaborations of this task and 
directly linked by the impact on the financial budgets. Thus, this awareness of the 
essentially of this exercise and the jointly procurement plans had been significantly 
perceived. The quantitative generalising research confirmed this amongst the other 
SCPs in the Netherlands that were studied. Jointly conducting and periodically 
implementing amendments to the annual procurement plan had been recognised for 
ensuring the objectives of the individual LAs and applying effectiveness and efficiency 
in JPGs’ procurement activities. The transparency of procurement plans between 
internal stakeholders and external suppliers had been recognised to improve 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
Two direction hypotheses strengthened these findings. Hypothesis I examined if 
structural collaboration had a positive effect on the collaborative benefit. The outcomes 
narrowed the positive direction that joint agreements have concerning guidelines in 
SCPs, concerning executing JPG’s.  Hypothesis III examined if Coordination between 
structural collaborative procurement and individual local government organisations 
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moderates the procurement performance of local government organisations. This 
approves that coordination between the SCP and the individual local government 
organisation affects the degree of procurement performance of LAs. The confirmation 
that was made out of this is that, preparation and establishing of annual joint 
procurement plans through the participants and jointly deciding about exceptions of 
those plans, effects the contributions of the collaboration for finally the principal, LAs.  
 
Overall, the qualitative phase showed that structural collaborative arrangements gave 
LAs access to procurement professionals and made them less dependent on critical 
resources. This has been generalised in the quantitative phase. The qualitative findings 
stated LAs became less vulnerable by accessing the procurement resources of SCP as it 
reduced the continuity risks arising from their own in-house procurement functions. 
This finding was confirmed in the quantitative analysis within the dimension Resource 
sharing & Business capabilities. Besides the internal aspect mentioned, vulnerability 
had been acknowledged in the quantitative analysis variable less dependence and 
monopolistic suppliers through LAs having more influence on procurement conditions 
though SCP and therefore having better access to alternative procurement 
specifications. Consolidated aggregation of demands has led to balanced relationships 
whereby LAs are less dependent on monopolised and oligopolistic suppliers. This was 
confirmed in both the qualitative and quantitative studies. The limited qualitative 
endorsement that procurement processes are more controlled by the ‘four eyes 
principle’ is remarkable. On the other hand, the quantitative tests argued for additional 
control of information in the tender processes and more transparency in procurement 
processes executed through SCP. Both analyses reinforced the contribution of SCP to 
the information symmetry theme. Legitimacy and reputation were mentioned 
qualitatively as significant forces for effective collaboration across the region. SCPs had 
been used to guarantee the internal and external accountability of the individual LAs. 
Mayors and CEO also used the brand of the regional SCP in common political issues 
where procurement was involved. The quantitative part of the research generalised these 
qualitative findings, with the qualitative analysis showing that SCP reinforces 
legitimacy and reputation in the region on a political and strategic level. This study 
explains the influence of structure in the collaboration model, from two understandings: 
for an effective and efficient collaboration process between the participants and less 
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dependence on the individual internal organisation of the LAs for external procurement 
resources. 
 
6.2.3 Objective: To what extent does collaboration lead to cost reduction in the 
procurement function? 
The qualitative interviews presented clear evidence that LAs outsourcing their 
procurement function through SCP realise internal cost reductions. This has also been 
shown in the case study for JPGs and IT procurement systems. The learning curve 
demonstrated the diminishing of days spent on procurement in the learning concept. 
Complementary quantitative research revealed a significant relationship (with near zero 
correlation and factor analysis) between cost reduction and outsourcing procurement 
functions through structural collaboration. Variables linked to the themes such as 
procurement management costs, standardisation, transaction costs and external 
consultancy costs are significantly related to influencing the procurement performance 
of LAs through SCP. On the other hand, goal synchronisation and joint commitment 
were significantly related to coordination mechanism, which influenced the degree of 
cost reduction. 
 
In relation to procurement costs, the management costs during the execution of 
procurement projects and contract management had been acknowledged as cost 
component, which can be reduced by SCP. Standardisation during the procurement 
processes similarly leads to savings. Procurement IT costs, which could be saved by 
standardisation through the SCP, had been noticed. Contract management had 
additionally been recognised as a cost reduction variable. Also, lower external 
procurement consultancy costs had been realised through effective resources; 
procurement business and legal procurement of the SCP. In the qualitative phase, the 
interviewees were unanimously convinced that cost reduction was gained by 
standardisation, fewer transactions, synergies in procurement management costs, and 
lower external costs. These perceptions have been generalised in the variables of the 
quantitative phase. Besides this, cost savings for the standardisation of IT procurement 
systems had been analysed, and financial benefits had been calculated in the case study. 
Moreover, comparative analyses of 8 cases showed that the internal procurement costs 
for JPGs are lower compared with individual procurement and vary from 38.71 – 
75.62%. Although economies of scale in JPG were optimal for cost components 
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communication and procurement strategy and had an increasing proportional character, 
suggested caused beside the procurement features, the complexity of the 
product/services, and synchronisation of the procurement objectives among the 
participated LAs. The perception that outsourcing procurement functions to SCPs 
would lead to cost reduction had been generalised in the quantitative study but this was 
mentioned at first or linked to by all of the interviewees. Both studies recognised the 
diminishing costs of no longer using external consultancy, procurement and legal 
experts for their LAs. The general perception of cost-competitiveness, procurement 
resources for lowest cost for small/medium LAs’, was confirmed in both studies. 
 
Another aspect of cost reduction identified was coordination mechanism. In interviews 
the importance of jointly conducting the annual procurement plan as a primary 
coordination mechanism had been mentioned. Out of the analyses of the case study was 
mentioned the dissimilarity in procurement policies among the LAs, which 
malfunctioned the effectiveness and moreover the efficiency during the execution of the 
JPG’s. Similarly in the qualitative phase sluggish processes in JPGs’, what caused 
vulnerability in collaborative processes had also been remarked on. Generally the 
critical of coordination mechanism, for effective and efficient collaboration had been 
acknowledged. Harmonisation and joint agreements concerning procurement policies 
and an unambiguous, with committed, guideline for the execution of the JPGs had been 
quantitatively generalised for an effective and efficient SCP. 
 
Hypothesis I examined if structural collaboration had a positive effect on the 
collaborative benefit. The outcomes narrowed the positive contribution that joint 
agreements have concerning procurement goals and strategies.  
 
Having recapitulated the content and rationale of the thesis, the theoretical, 
methodological and managerial suggestions of this research, its limitations, and 
opportunities for additional future research can now be considered. 
 
6.2.4 Research process 
From position of a ‘reflective partner’, the potential improvement of the procurement 
function of LAs through SCP has been researched. The central view of reality in this 
research was overshadowed by the explanation of the research objectives observed 
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through the TCT and RBT. A worldview based on post-positivism was worked from the 
theory into the research objectives, interviews and hypotheses, combining deductive and 
inductive thinking and mixing both qualitative and quantitative research methods 
(Marsh & Stoker, 2002, p. 25). Originally the plan of the author was to take a positivist 
approach, but as a result of reflecting further on the research objectives, different 
research paradigms have emerged. This has been amended a little to explore qualitative 
data further in the case study. Therefore a post-positivist approach has been applied 
with generalisation of the SCP theory/concept.    
 
Conceptualising the evidence 
In this research, values have been identified, which can influence or improve the 
procurement performance of an individual LA through collaborative procurement. The 
conceptualisation of this achievement, which guided the research approach, can be seen 
in the framework below in Figure 6-1. Consequently a conceptual framework has been 
derived from the extant literature discussed in Chapter 2 and has been provided to 
collect the data.  
 
Figure 6-1 Conceptualising of the Empirical Research 
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The literature review in Chapter 2 identified the items that influence the power of SCP 
regarding the procurement performance of individual LAs. These items were derived 
from existing theories. In Figure 6-1, the process of generalisation of the quantitative 
findings, originated by the qualitative findings, was transformed in the operation model 
from Chapter 2.  
Method and variables 
Business research projects constitute systematic leaning about the real findings of 
phenomena in this subject area (Bryman, 2016b, pp. 65-70). The in-depth, semi-
structured interviews conducted with CEOs, a mayor, CFOs and CPOs from LAs 
provide rich information to reveal real enablers underpinned by theories and focused on 
the perspective of the end users of the SCP – the LAs.  These qualitative statements 
enriched the basis for measuring other SCPs in the Netherlands. The interviewees were 
also involved in the development of the questionnaire, as experts, whereby more 
comprehensive closed answers were generated and the operation scheme was refined.  
 
Through comparing and interpreting the qualitative and quantitative analysis, it was 
seen where the findings converged, diverged or were related. Because of the 
homogeneity of features of this target group, it was decided to follow up the qualitative 
findings with quantitative research, which allowed the scope and generalisability of the 
qualitative findings to be measured. Consequently, the qualitative data collection of this 
study was deemed suitable as an initial exploratory approach in addition to the hard 
evidence from the document analysis. 
 
6.2.5 Evaluation of the literature findings 
From a post-positivism view, composing theory and practice (Karatas-Ozkan, 
Anderson, Fayolle, Howells, & Condor, 2014) and focusing on the three research 
objectives, the key concepts were (collaborative) procurement performance, shared 
service centre (SSC), joint purchase group, value, outsourcing, procurement costs and 
uncertainty. The purpose of the literature review was to critically evaluate each of these 
key concepts and establish clear explanations between them. A summary of the three 




To what extent does structural collaboration lead to more value in the internal business 
processes of the procurement function (RO1)? 
 
The current literature on the value of SSCs, centralised and collaborative procurement, 
has concluded that creating a better performance of the procurement function is 
influenced via economies of scale, knowledge extending, professionalism, reputation, 
access to product development, complementary resources, quality of services, 
improveness of information asymmetry and cost-competitiveness.    
 
In contrast, these values have been examined to a limited extent in the structural 
collaborations with local authorities. Generally, the academic literature is mainly 
focused on JPGs, with less attention paid to structural coordination. The SSC concept is 
somewhat in line with this. Unfortunately, the procurement function is underrepresented 
in SSC research. Research into collaborative JPGs has shown values, exclusive to the 
concerned JPG, limited to the corporate procurement function in the long term, and with 
a limited direct connection with the strategic objectives of the organisation. 
 
Potential gaps for this study, concerning SCPs in the Netherlands, were: 
 
 Economies of scale: capacity, scale advantages on IT, learning, and execution; 
 Knowledge: awareness of cohesive collaboration between multi-discipline 
procurement teams and fragmented potentially deviating perceptions between 
product domains; 
 Professionalism: empowering and continuity of the availability of 
professionalism at the LAs as a result of SCP and potential transfer of 
professionalism to civil servants from SCP experts; 
 Reputation: the influence of regional inter-collegial links at mayor level and the 
influence of the activities of the SCP and their effects on the reputation of LAs; 
 Product development: improvements of processes and structures in service 
concepts; 
 Complementary resources: the effects of SCPs on the access of SMEs to public 
tenders and the standardisation and uniformity of the procurement processes; 
 Information asymmetry: the effect of SCPs on information asymmetry; 
 Cost-competitiveness: attention to cost-competitiveness as a driver. 
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To what extent does structural collaboration lead to less uncertainty in the procurement 
function (RO2)? 
Uncertainty has been recognised in the literature and drives demand for structural 
integrating of the procurement units in the LAs. Outstanding research has showed the 
contribution of SSC in the field of IT, finance, and human resource management 
regarding the continuity of these supporting services. Also the case study by Murray et 
al. (2008)in the UK, directly supports this research objective.  
 
To what extent does structural collaboration lead to cost reduction in the procurement 
function(RO3)? 
Various literature on research executed in the private and public sectors has shown cost 
reduction in JPGs. To a lesser extent, attention has been given to scale and saving 
opportunities in procurement expertise capabilities via structural collaboration. The 
following gaps have been recognised in the literature review of this research: 
 
 calculation of the learning curve in the execution of procurement procedures; 
 variance calculation between JPG and individual procurement projects in an 
SCP environment; 
 internal absorption costs: variance between up-scaling internal costs by merging 
and SCP; 
 fundamental research on procurement IT savings in an SCP environment; 
 research on lower external procurement consultancy costs; 
 research on lower external procurement legal consultancy costs; 
 research on lower management costs for the procurement function. 
 
The previous literature in this field gives an overview of collaborative procurement in 
structural, voluntary and involuntary arrangements. Excellent literature is focused on 
purchasing groups and researched through case studies and interviews where cost 
reduction and added value have been assumed but calculated limitaly.  
To a lesser extent have been focused on SCP, limited in exploratory method and non in 
the Netherlands. Academic science is acquainted with the characteristics of 
collaborative procurement but its direct structural influence on the performance of 





Underpinning this examination, two theories have been explored in Chapter II. What 
contributions do the theories make to the requested research objectives? The review of 
the literature in Chapter 2 suggested that the determinants of the enablers of 
collaborative procurement have been well thought-out from a wide range of academic 
perspectives. LAs are putting more and more resources into their business organisations 
in exchange to providing more outputs and more outcomes.  
 
A striking potential benefit is the contribution to cost-competitiveness through 
outsourcing business activities. Another interpretation of this is that economic benefits – 
like the synergy effects identified in the literature – can be spread out in complementary 
business activities through knowledge and experience, as in the operational phase (Bals 
& Turkulainen, 2017). Additionally, the TCT and RBT have been identified as 
influential theories, with recurrent explanations in social life, respectively business-
economic phenomena alongside cost-competitive characteristics. Regarding TCT, this 
research enfolds the ontological assumption, namely contract design of the transaction 
relation between the actors, LAs and SCP. It suggests that asymmetry of information 
and goal synchronisation can create ineffectiveness and inefficiency in the operation of 
LAs’ procurement (transaction) processes. Through the lens of the TCT, specifically 
with regard to the characteristics of the business activities of LAs, costs arise among 
other things as the quantity of buying on the market and cost of using markets (Coase, 
1937). These cost structure elements have been identified makings approximately the 
extent of JPGs, characteristics organisations, governance and alternative collaboration 
structures. 
 
However, the resource-based view enlightens the importance of resources such as 
procurement consultancy capabilities; procurement organisational processes; public 
procurement attributes; information; knowledge that is controlled by LAs and that 
enable and implement strategies to improve their efficiency and effectiveness. RBT 
helps in recognising the influence of collaboration on the outcomes of the procurement 
function.  
 
Otherwise, RBT had been interpreted as less robust and more volatile. Therefore, the 
interpretation was made to explore the potential extending of the RBT besides 
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knowledge with capabilities, and the establishing of the governance in the collaboration 
suggested support of this strategic theory in this research (Richter & Brühl, 2017).  
 
The core assumption of the RBT is that actors such as LAs who do not have a ‘constant 
flow of resources’ must enter into relationships with others in order to obtain these 
resources. This makes actors, here referring to LAs, dependent on each other and 
probably can be also supported by the resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).  Here the actors are looking for equal types of resources. However, this could 
also be taken, as the likelihood of willingness to engage in intensive cooperation will be 
greatest in this relationship. Alternatively, it could be a way to secure the uncertainty of 
business procurement processes regarding internal aspects. Viewing from the RBT to 
the external aspects, sharing market information and consolidation of demands had been 
identified, to use buying power (Herlin & Pazirandeh, 2012), to be less dependent on 
dominance in monopolistic or oligopolistic suppliers markets. In Table 6-1, the two 
supporting theories are presented.  
 
Table 6-1 Underpinning Theories of this Study 
Theory Description Author 
TCT (Transaction Costs 
Theory) 
Optimisation of the procurement process via 
specialisation, information and know-how 
sharing, investments in (mainly IT) 








An organisation’s requirement for a sustained 
competitive advantage, based on analysis of 
which elements an organisation need to deliver 
their output.  
“Tangible and intangible resources, as well as 
the capabilities required to deploy firm assets”. 
Warnier et al. 
(2013) 
Smith et al. 
(1996) 
 
For the control of the collaborative procurement function, supported by the RBT and  
TCT, the literature viewed the links between the variable parameters and business goals 
as well as the synchronisation of procurement goals, collaborative procurement IT 
management systems, consistent agreements regarding the execution of procurement 
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projects (tactically and operationally) and at least an unambiguously collaborative 
governance model. More specifically, the study results also confirmed that certain types 
of collaborative mechanism are more suited to each other, as RBT and TCT suggest; for 
instance, procurement capacity, legitimacy and reputation, coordination mechanism, 
and control of information.  
 
Richter & Brühl (2017) stated in their research that research into SSC was conducted to 
a lesser extent from the RBT perspective and not in a multi-point perspective with other 
theories; this also concerns TCT. This research has attempted to demonstrate a multi-
perspective approach with both the TCT and RBT.   
 Practice Contributions 
The bridge between the demands of academia and the requirements of business is best 
addressed through a professional UK doctorate (Sarros, Willis, & Palmer, 2005). In line 
with this, Murray (2011, pp. 50-52) stated “the professional doctorate is usually 
focussed on improving practice within the profession that is the subject of the 
research”. Similar in this thesis, the connection between theory and practice has been 
made by modelling the collaborative concept of what affects the performance of 
business processes of LAs in the real world. The opportunities that municipalities have 
to professionalise their procurement function with an SCP can help LAs to fulfil the 
decentralisation challenge they are facing and will have a ripple effect on the Dutch 
Government, LAs in the Netherlands, LAs in Europe, and Dutch entrepreneurs. 
 
6.3.1 Impact on the Dutch Government 
It is noteworthy that, at the start of this journey in 2014, the pressure on the national and 
regional government was to amalgamate with adjacent small municipalities, merge with 
large municipalities or a combination of the two. The argument was mainly twofold: 
more governmental sustainable power at local level and more organisational power, 
with a better capacity to deal with the decentralisations and the latest social public 
developments. In the last five years there has been a decrease of 25 municipalities. On 
the other hand cooperations have been exceeded in the field of social healthcare, 
environment, IT, taxes, security, innovations, spatial planning and procurement.  
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The latest local elections, in 2018, confirmed these collaboration developments, through 
large victories for local political parties that are in favour of permanent 
denationalisation. Perhaps, improvement based on intermunicipal collaboration achieves 
fewer sustainable effects than improvement based on a large-scale municipal 
amalgamation. The reason for this lies in the fact that, if a disagreement occurs between 
the cooperating municipalities, services to citizens can come to a halt altogether or be 
delayed. Furthermore after merging, municipalities are more able to realise large-scale 
tasks, as strategic thinking power and the ability to make major strategic decisions is 
increased. On the other hand, SCP has limited political involvement, but is 
supplementary, connecting demand, LAs and companies (supply) and able to bring LAs 
into a position to realise decisive projects. Likewise, it can create entrance innovation 
out of the market into procurement projects, faster and in a professional way.  
 
This study’s contribution to practice is twofold: regional and central. In the South of the 
Netherlands, several studies have been conducted on the administrative power of the 
municipalities. The region of North-Brabant (PNB) and the Association of 
Municipalities Brabant (VNG) explore how to strengthen municipalities’ clout in the 
future to face social challenges in the region. The effectiveness of a mean and lean 
organisation can contribute to a political board that would be able to address such social 
challenges in the most valuable way. The value can further be rephrased abstractly in 
terms of citizen satisfaction, and also be linked to general procurement objectives such 
as increased access for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), increased sustainability, 
cost savings, or a combination of these factors. 
 
It is hoped that the Dutch Government will recommend fragmented public organisations 
to build on the core strengths identified in this research, towards more structural and 
intense collaboration, through procurement via expert organisations. This research can 
bring the consideration on the political and management agenda. 
 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs has started the national project ‘Beter Aanbesteden’ 
(Better Procurement Process), to improve the quality of procurement in practice. The 
reason for this was the evaluation of the Public Procurement Act 2012, carried out in 
2015 (Parliamentary document 34 252, no. 1 and 2). That evaluation showed that the 
application of the procurement rules, both on the part of entrepreneurs and of 
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contracting authorities, could still be improved. Besides, the images of entrepreneurs on 
the one hand and contracting authorities on the other showed a clear difference in the 
perception of procurement practice. That is why ‘Beter Aanbesteden’ has opted for 
dialogue between both parties in order to bring those images, of problems and solutions, 
closer together. Through this national project, the Ministry has identified SCPs as a best 
practice alternative for public organisations and used them in the elaboration of the 
campaign. 
 
The Dutch foundation for Procurement (Nevi), Dutch national procurement expertise 
centre (Pianoo) and Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG) have indicated a 
great deal of interest in the results of this study. The researcher of this thesis has been 
consulted as an expert for Pianoo on the implementation of new SCPs. The VNG and 
the researcher of this thesis are exploring the possibilities of developing a national 
centre for JPGs, for routine commodities, in a joint venture with SCPs. 
 
6.3.2 Impact on Dutch Local Authorities (LAs) 
The results will be applicable to local organisations in the Netherlands and also to the 
region in the southeast of the Netherlands. The results of the research will also be 
applicable to other regions in the Netherlands, comparable with the 26 Joint 
Procurement Organisations for municipalities in the Netherlands, which are equivalents 
of the Bizob organisation. In an ideal situation, this cost-effectiveness should attract 
municipalities or LAs to an optimal way of collaboration, without forcing them. These 
two contributions provide a significant practical and theoretical application to 
knowledge in the field of collaboration in the public sector, especially local 
government. Whilst conducting the research, several LAs and regional SSC public 
organisations have shown interest in the SCP. Besides interest in the concept, 
participants in the research, from the interviews and survey, also indicated that they 
wanted to be kept informed of the findings and results. This research can bring the topic 
onto the political and management agenda. A short briefing paper will be developed 
highlighting the key findings and sent to all those who participated, as well as to 
relevant government officials and politicians.  
 
The economies of scale advantage, by upscaling internal business procurement 
activities, can be an argument for merging organisations. On the other hand, this study 
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presented a practical and empirical alternative regarding internal procurement costs 
through fundamental cooperation between counterpart public organisations in the same 
region. Smart expenditure of joint procurement capacity can save money compared to 
insourcing procurement facilities, apart from quality, continuity and flexibility. This can 
be attractive for LAs in the same region and operating in the same business environment 
who are struggling with their procurement capacity or are making long-term strategic 
plans for ‘outsourcing’ their procurement capacity to the SCP based on financial and 
continuity concerns. Economies of scale is an obvious driver for starting an SCP or 
expanding an existing SCP; reduction in purchasing and capacity costs results in 
concrete and direct benefits.  
 
In line with the economies of ‘collaboration’ for LAs, sharing and building knowledge 
through SCP can be a valuable opportunity for those LAs who endeavour to 
professionalise their procurement function. Continued skills and knowledge training 
and experienced public procurement are accessible via an SCP.  
 
The internal reputation of the procurement function to the stakeholder and council 
mostly depends on an integer procurement function and an unqualified audit opinion 
from the financial auditor of the procurement function. This study suggested a positive 
influence through SCPs regarding the reputation and legitimacy of the procurement 
function for their internal stakeholders; this is reinforced by the statement of the 
‘board’, councillors, mayors, aldermen, and town-managers, for an executive agenda for 
professionalism of the procurement function.  
 
For LAs aspiring towards innovation or product/services development from the 
suppliers’ market, this study suggested the power of collaboration for chasing up 
product development. These developments can meet the demands requested by citizens 
and help to address tasks imposed by the national government. Moreover looking at the 
enormous political agenda, after the local elections, 2018, mostly every LA has assigned 
the new municipality council to implement energy-neutral programmes, car-free 
housing areas, climate-friendly and waste-free action plans. SCPs, together with public 
regional agencies, are in the position to transfer these policy principles in the most 
appropriate procurement procedure. Besides that, by SCP more opportunities arise for 
strategical partnerships with suppliers, which effect more innovation and quality. 
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As implementing and continuing a professional procurement function is an activity that 
an LA cannot undertake on its own, the SCP concept framework extends procurement 
performance by identifying six dimensions: resources sharing and business capabilities; 
procurement costs; uncertainty; agility and flexibility; coordination mechanism; and 
control of information. These can contribute to secure business processes and achieve 
potential savings for LAs. The SCP concept benefits LAs which are interested in 
improving or measuring their procurement performance through structural 
collaboration. Empirically, it has been researched that access to procurement 
knowledge, sharing procurement knowledge and experiences and deployment of cross-
organisation procurement teams by SCP affects the procurement performance of 
participating organisations. The uncertainty of the procurement business processes can 
be improved by less dependency on resources; less information asymmetry; demand 
sharing and aggregation; and increased legitimacy and reputation through SCP. 
Coordination between collaborating LAs is essential for an effective and efficient 
collaborative procurement organisation. Synchronisation of procurement objectives, 
regarding social policies; access for SMEs; green procurement; sustainability; and the 
size of demand are determined for effectiveness. In line with this dimension, control of 
information, joint commitment and agreement on annual procurement plans is essential 
for an effective structure. Agility and flexibility affect the effectiveness of procurement 
functions and can contribute to the interests of their members, which are for more and 
quicker access to innovative concepts and ideas out of the market, and shorter cycle 
time for the execution of the procurement procedures. 
 
For years in the public sector, dealing responsibly with government money has been a 
key theme, and therefore efficiency in procurement functions has been part of the 
paradigm of this thesis regarding the contribution of collaboration. From that 
understanding, this thesis also presented practical and applicable financial arguments for 
engaging in collaborative arrangements. These financial motives include reducing 
transaction procurement costs; lowering management costs through ‘outsourcing’ the 
procurement function to SCP; lowering external consultancy costs; lowering 
procurement management costs; and lowering procurement IT costs. These perceived 
indicators provide arguments for councils and government officials to consider SCP as a 
stepping-stone for their public service organisation.  
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Certain results of this study had been discussed in the meantime with the VNG, who are 
very interested in the results and their role in the area of collaborative procurement. On 
a national level, the branch organisation of the municipalities, the VNG, could foster 
more interest in SCPs, possibly in cooperation with the national government and the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs. Also on a macro-national level, coordination between 
SCPs could provide exchanging experiences between those equal organisations. 
Similarly, national procurement initiatives for specifically purchasing commodities 
could then be considered, of which the critical success factors and pitfalls are 
highlighted by this thesis.  
 
6.3.3 Impact on LAs in Europe 
Alongside the international interest in SCP in the public sector, on a national level there 
has been a significant increase in the number of SCPs operating.  
 
The European Commission directorate-general for Inter-Market, Industry 
Entrepreneurship and SMEs recently (20-09-2017) organised a business visit to 
investigate SCP Bizob, with the general objective of seeing whether the concept of 
collaborative procurement is applicable to other member states in the EU – a concept 
explored and explained in great detail in this thesis. The author of this research recently 
joined as a member of the Commission Stakeholder Expert Group on Public 
Procurement of the European Commission, Directorate-General for Internal Market, 
Industry Entrepreneurs and SMEs. The author intends to present the result of this study 
to this expert group. 
 
6.3.4 Impact on Dutch entrepreneurs  
This study recognised that in terms of complementary resources, the SCP can encourage 
the creation of an ‘entrance gate’ for SMEs to public tenders and the ‘domain’ of public 
procurement, improve standardisation and uniformity of procurement services, and 
support shared IT structures and training equipment. LAs as suppliers could also benefit 
from having less asymmetry of information between each other.  
 
Branch organisations for the construction industry, SMEs, architects and IT have 
indicated that they find it less ambiguous when LAs jointly use standard tender 
 
292 
documents. They also find it more straightforward to discuss this regionally with one 
organisation, which also works directly for the LAs. On the other hand, abuse of 
dominant power must be prevented. 
 Academic Contributions 
This DBA thesis systematically investigates the concept of structural collaborative 
procurement in the public sector using a number of theories. The research identified 
clear relationships between procurement performance and structural collaborations. 
Perceived results such as increased knowledge; increased capacity; cost reduction; 
reduced uncertainty and value for LAs demonstrate the benefits of collaboration. The 
research also identified the dimensions of goal synchronisation and coordination 
mechanism, which can have a negative influence on these benefits. Deeper 
understanding of ‘what’ the values and benefits of structural collaborative procurement 
are has been demonstrated in this research. It may be that LAs that are already 
participating in an SCP could increase their procurement performance by optimising the 
SCP influencers, and the study thus offers important contributions both theoretically 
and methodologically.   
 
6.4.1 Theoretical contribution: Describing structural collaborative procurement 
(SCP) 
Notwithstanding the prominence of topics such as collaboration, centralisation, and 
shared services for the public sector (Albano & Sparro, 2010; Kastanioti et al., 2013; 
Murray et al., 2008; Provan & Kenis, 2007; Richter & Brühl, 2017), limited research 
has considered collaborative procurement performance within a structural jointly 
insourced concept context within an existing region. The following sections describe the 
conceptual and theoretical contributions to existing collaborative public procurement 
knowledge that have arisen from the first examination of procurement performance such 
as its effects on the business processes of LAs in terms of value, uncertainty and 
procurement costs.  
 
The contribution to knowledge of this research is fourfold. Firstly, this research 
provides structured systematic analysis of collaboration in the public sector and 
demonstrates a significant gap in the literature. Without a doubt, there is a scarcity of 
recent publications on this topic, and academic attention has been focused firstly on the 
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phenomenon of new tasks instead of smart ways to organise them. Previous literature 
has focused on volunteer purchase groups, initiated by procurement managers, and has 
put more attention on the direct and short-term gains of collaboration, which has 
probably motivated independent and fragmented organisations to act alone or use hybrid 
forms of collaboration. Besides these studies, there is more and more research in the 
area of shared service centres, often with the gains of collaborative procurement 
receiving a disappointingly superficial treatment. This research has added to the 
academic knowledge that structural organised collaboration, with a mix of central 
organised (knowledge) and decentralise (capacity) in the organisations, can bring 
sustainable revenues and financial benefits to a professional function. Quantitative study 
and the comparative cost analyses from the joint purchase groups supported the request 
of Murray et al. (2008) for more research into relative cost advantage through structural 
collaboration.  
 
Secondly, this research provides new insights by applying a strategic and economic 
theory lens to collaboration in using the procurement dataset of fragmented local 
government organisations. Although the RBT had a great explanatory power for 
collaboration – especially for the objectives of value and less uncertainty – its approach 
identifies complementary resources and capabilities; it does not provide expert or 
management resources in relation to procurement. This study has extended the value of 
complementary resources by offering the first examination of LAs’ structural 
procurement collaboration arrangements in the Netherlands and procurement 
performance. This revealed that the contribution LAs receive from SCP impacts a large 
scale of resources, such as management expertise, legal expertise, experts for 
collaborative projects, IT procurement systems and sustainable exchanging of technical 
expertise between the members of the SCP, concerning procurement. These wider 
contributions of the RBT multiplied the procurement professionalism of the participants 
in the SCP. Furthermore, in addition to the volatile availability of the RBT, this study 
demonstrated that SCP, endemic the robustness and sustainable availability of 
professional procurement resources. 
Murray et al. (2008); Nollet and Beaulieu (2005); Walker et al. (2013) called for more 
evidence of the gains of structural collaborative procurement, having shown the value of 
significant cost synergies and standardisation of tactical and operational procurement 
processes themselves. The TCT had an excessive explanatory influence on the research 
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objective of cost reduction. However, in this study the TCT identified the assessment of 
cost reduction as wider than transactions only between entrepreneurs and clients. 
Transaction costs have extended in the procurement costs within JPGs, collaborative IT 
e-procurement systems, and in the costs for procurement and legal experts. 
Furthermore, from the direction of LA and SCP, this study has shown the value of 
harmonisation of procurement policies and objectives, and conducting joint 
procurement plans, which has an effect on cost reduction and effectiveness in the 
operation of collaboration. 
 
Thirdly, a significant contribution has been made in a departure from the previous 
research by providing more insights into the cost reductions: 
 
 The collaborative procurement cost comparative analysis was beneficial 
when contrasted with the interviews. 
 The calculation of the learning curve showed applicability of the learning 
concept in executing procurement procedures. 
 Organisation costs and variance between upscaling and structural 
collaboration were investigated. 
 Joint use of procurement IT-system for conducting individual and 
collaborative tenders enabled cost reductions.  
 
A fourth, final significant contribution is made through deeper study notice of the 
coordination and control of information between SCP and LAs by examining the 
efficiency and effectiveness. The study has shown that more control of information 
through the execution of annual individual procurement plans and the consolidation of 
individual plans into a consolidated JPG, and the harmonisation of procurement policy 
and goals, affect the efficiency and effectivity of the collaboration.   
 
6.4.2 Theoretical contribution: Procurement performance framework for SCP 
One of the contributions that this thesis makes is the creation of a procurement 
performance conceptual framework for SCPs, which provides themes, dimensions and 
variables. These have been informed by theoretical and empirical considerations that 
affect the procurement performance of individual LAs participating in structural 
collaborative arrangements.  
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The study offers an SCP conceptual procurement performance framework, which 
represents this thesis’ re-conceptualisation of the procurement performance of LAs. 
This is considered an original contribution to knowledge because it is a significant 
original contribution that has emerged from small gaps within the comprehensive 
research of Murray et al. (2008) and provides a novel interpretation of this current 
problem in the Netherlands. It is reinforced by its primarily original approach and 
focused through the lens of two complementary theories, RBT (strategic) and TCT 
(economical) (Richter & Brühl, 2017).  
 
 
Figure 6-2 SCP Conceptual Framework 
These theories consider the fundamental power of sources, which affects the output of 
the collaboration. This is the first study to have identified hidden dimensions for 
effective and efficient structural collaborative public procurement and established them 
empirically. This conceptual framework, in Figure 6-2, meets a demand and a gap in the 
 
296 
literature of Janssen and Joha (2008) for empirical exploration of the benefits, issues 
and business uncertainties of SCPs.  
 
6.4.3 Theoretical contribution: Value items in the internal processes 
Research by Murray et al. (2008) requested for further research to explore the benefits 
of in-house collaborative arrangements between LAs. This study makes a contribution 
towards achieving a more concrete understanding of the value of SCPs for individual 
LAs by presenting an examination of value items in the public procurement function for 
internal processes such as knowledge; professionalism; reputation; product 
development/innovation; complementary resources; quality of services, information 
asymmetry; cost-competitiveness and economies of scale.  
 
Figure 6-3 SCP value items 
These nine items, which support the value of the SCP for LAs, are shown in Figure 6-3. 
They help understanding what the values and contributions of SCP are for LAs’ 
procurement functions, which previous research neglected.  
 
Value 
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6.4.4 Methodological Contribution 
The first methodological contribution and unique aspect of this study is that it captures 
data for LAs, especially municipalities in the Netherlands, that had previously not been 
applied to SCP in the public sector. The design of the methodology of the primary 
investigative instrument – a semi-structured interview – and the case study provided 
strong support for the use indicators to influence procurement performance in the public 
sector through SCP. Exclusively with exploratory design, which was comprised of 
consecutive qualitative and quantitative strand to illustrate the quantitative findings. 
Collaborative procurement and the measurement of procurement performance for LAs 
is predominantly prepossessed by interpretivists in single or multi-case studies and 
general statistics measuring models. In line with Hesse-Biber (2015) and Van Weele 
(2007), who argued for more mixed studies that build on each other rather than contrast 
with each other, this study used an exploratory approach to reinforce its separate 
researches and to triangulate the results. Also, in line with Murray (2009), who 
commented that their “findings were not triangulated with those of other actors, for 
example, politicians, and there may therefore be questions of validity”, in this study, 
primary data from public sector sources (pre-selected key respondents from the areas of 
strategic management and politics) was used alongside triangulation.  
 
The second methodological contribution of this research is the validation and 
application of SCP conceptual framework as well as the ‘value items’. The SCP model 
represents a significant step forwards in the development of a measurement of the 
performance of structural collaboration for LAs and the value items provide insight in 
the impact of SCP for LAs. The combination of semi-structured, in-depth interviews 
and a questionnaire gave a comprehensible view of experts’ perceptions, experiences 
and responses regarding how organised SCP performs for LAs. The complementary 
research of the case study made the findings more applicable and accurate. The 
concurrent use of these three techniques enriched the primary data and triangulated it. 
Firstly, the semi-structured, in-depth interviews with CEOs, a mayor, and CPOs 
provided in-depth, strategic and managerial insights into the dimensions that affect 
procurement performance in the business processes of LAs through structural 
collaborations. Secondly, these findings refined the operational scheme and the 
variables versus questionnaire, connecting the quantitative strand to the initial 
qualitative strand. The questionnaire used in this study was initially tested using a pilot 
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study in order to check its suitability and make sure it was not over-specialised for the 
procurement voice in a public management context. Thirdly, the additional initial 
calculations and analyses from the case study regarding procurement cost reductions vs. 
the individual-collaborative approach provide deep fundamental evidence and insight 
into currently unknown areas. Before testing the hypotheses, the qualitative and 
quantitative data were assessed side-by-side, fortified by triangulation and explanation.  
 
The final contribution this study makes is the application of a mixed-methodology 
design. The applied mixed studies method had been considered as a contribution to the 
previous solo qualitative and quantitative approaches, besides the explorative character 
of this mixed study, followed by the generalised quantitative study. Therefore, the 
mixed research approach of this thesis have lead to a fuller and deeper understanding of 
the reality of LAs in terms of structural collaboration and procurement performance. 
Not only an understanding of the size of differences, but contributed knowledge of the 
different power of sources which leads to the degree of performance and how these 
function.  This study presents the first mixed methods of analysis of the procurement 
performances of LAs and structural collaboration in the Netherlands. 
 Limitations of this Study 
While the research has made significant contributions to science and practice, all 
research is subject to limitations and boundaries, which must be acknowledged (Collis 
& Hussey, 2014, pp. 110-111). The potential limitations of this research will be 
discussed in terms of those that are concerned with the research methodology and 
related to the SCP conceptual framework. The context of this research – local 
authorities in the Netherlands – started at local level with LAs that are members of SCP 
and those that are not. The second phase of this study has been executed at the national 
level, with existing SCPs as the research population. LAs consisted of municipalities 
and affiliated public organisations, like safety organisations.  
 
The population sample of the interviews (n=9) were thoughtfully selected and included 
in the expert-review group for the questionnaire. The exploratory mixed study approach 
provided an enormous volume of data, which allowed the researcher to argument the 
varying research objectives (Creswell & Clark, 2011, pp. 1-18). The post-positivism 
approach enriched understanding of the phenomena of this study, which provided 
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satisfactory answers about the SCP theory/concept and reinforced the systematic 
empirical test.  
 
The quantitative measurement model had 57 items covering 51 variables. This was quite 
large compared to other investigations’ questionnaires. However, a good response rate 
of 73.5% was achieved. 
 
The respondents included pre-selected public (procurement) managers (directors and 
managers). In the semi-structured in-depth interviews, a mix of politicians (mayor), 
CEOs and managers were included. There may be significant differences in relationship 
perceptions between mayor, CEO and managers and directors. The number of 
observations (112) was absolutely limited, but relatively not and not restricted for the 
reliability and validity. Also the statistics tests conducted (Skewness and Kurtosis 
analysis; scale consistency; Cronbach’s Alpha; correlation and regression), which were 
successfully tested and approved, showed that communalities are high and thus sample 
size is of minor importance (Treiblmaier & Filzmoser, 2010).  
 
This case study was conducted to gain answers for underlying questions; these results 
cannot be used for generalising as the results depend on the individual performance of 
the SCP. These can be further extended and are interesting for benchmarking purposes, 
provided they are executed with an appropriate procedure (Yin, 2013).  
 
This research was conducted in the Netherlands, particularly in local government, at a 
particular point in time (2014-2018) when many responsibilities were being devolved to 
LAs. It is unclear if these results would be generalisable to other countries.  
 Future Research Directions  
Coordination of regional collaborations 
Areas that have not received attention, which can be considered interesting for the 
success of structural collaboration arrangements, is leadership and governance. With the 
protection of the back office, integrated in the public official process, procurement can 
afford to do their best and try to do their best. Mayors, aldermen, councillors and town-
managers in the boardroom expect the SCP to realise the instructed goals and targets. 
Interesting areas of leadership can be the essence and the scope of the SCP, cooperation 
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with the primary business activities, changes and improvements, how to manage the 
links between the boardrooms of the LAs and other regional collaborative 
arrangements. Another intriguing area is the management of expectations guiding the 
LAs. For example behaviour, situational or contingent theories could provide new 
insights. Likewise, for the continuity and control of the collaboration the governance is 
an interesting research field in the case of SCP. Have all the SCPs in the Netherlands 
the same governance, and if not, why are they different? Is there an optimal governance 
structure for SCPs? 
 
Transforming the collaborative concept into other branches 
This research has focussed on LAs, SCP and procurement performance for local 
authorities. It is obviously possible that this conceptual structural collaboration concept 
could be executed in other business functions, like collaboration of human resource 
management or finance or legal etc. within (public) organisations, and could be 
researched empirically. Moreover, it would be interesting to investigate to what degree 
this SCP concept could be used to evaluate other collaborative arrangements in the 
public sector and outsourcing arrangements. Further research is required to discover the 
financial benefits in financial buying savings, and what the impact of consolidating the 
demands of LAs would be for supplier markets. Furthermore, it is worth examining in 
what ways the activities of SCP can be centralised for LAs, or if parts of the activities of 
SCPs can be merged in the Netherlands, or a form of cooperation between several 
collaborative organisations can be implemented in the same region. 
 
Publication  
In continuation of this thesis, an invitation was received by the International Journal of 
Collaborative Engineering to publish an article. The area of interest concerns the value, 
notably in innovation and flexibility, for the LAs of collaborative procurement in the 
construction commodities. Another area is efficiency in tendering costs through JPGs. 
Data can be drawn from the qualitative or quantitative research in this study and can 
possibly be extended with additional research. The researcher also has a VNG request to 
publish a two-page article (Autumn, 2019) in Binnelands Bestuur, which is a weekly 
public services journal distributed to LAs public members. 
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The researcher of this thesis intends to build on the power of horizontal collaboration in 
and between homogeneous organisations and explore further interest in effective 
structures of an optimal mechanism for collaboration tailored to the situation. This work 
will initially focus on the public sector, but does not exclude the private sector in the 
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 Adapted formula of 
Costantino et al. (2012) 
 
⌈𝑨𝑪𝑷𝒄𝒂 = 𝑪𝒆 + 𝑪𝒊𝒇 + 𝑪𝒊𝒔 + 𝑪𝒃 + 𝑪𝒂𝒘 + 𝑪𝒅⌉  (1)          
𝑪𝒆 = Equipping cost, costs to arrange the tender publication. 
𝐶𝑒 = 𝐶𝑐 + 𝐶𝑓 + 𝐶𝑠 + 𝑇𝑒 
 
𝐶𝑐 = Costs paid for assessment purchase committee.  
𝐶𝑓 = Fixed costs for using national government system to publish announcement. 
𝐶𝑠 = Hours costs of the administrative employer. 
𝑇𝑒 = Equipping time. 
 
𝑪𝒊𝒇 = Information costs, costs which provide bidding firms with information on 
detailed tender. 
𝐶𝑖𝑓 = 𝑁 ∗ 𝐶𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑓 
𝑁 = Number of tenders. 
𝐶𝑠 = Hours costs of administrative employer. 
𝑇𝑖𝑓 = Average time by procurement professional to clarify tender details to each 
bidder. 
 
𝑪𝒊𝒔 = Inspection costs to visit the outlets. 
𝐶𝑖𝑓 = 𝑁 ∗ 𝐶𝑛𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑠 
𝑁 = Number of tenders. 
𝐶𝑛𝑠 = Hours costs rate of responsible employee for inspection. 
𝑇𝑖𝑠 = Average inspection time per bid. 
 
𝑪𝒃 = Costs to evaluate bids. 
𝐶𝑖𝑓 = 𝑁 ∗ 𝐶𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑏 
𝑁 = Number of tenders. 
𝐶𝑠 = Hours costs of administrative employer. 
𝑇𝑏 = Average evaluating time per bid. 
 




𝑪𝒂𝒘 = Costs to formally contract the chosen bidder. 
𝐶𝑖𝑓 = 𝑁 ∗ 𝐶𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑏 
𝐶𝑠 = Hours rate costs of administrative employer. 
𝑇𝑎𝑤 = Representing awarding time. 
 
𝑪𝒅 = Costs to draft, approve and sign contract. 
𝐶𝑑 = 𝐶𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑑 
𝐶𝑠 = Hours rate costs of administrative employer. 








 Interview Transcript and 









SP1: Of ie nou loopt? Ja. 8 januari, interview met……  
  
SP2: Ja, heel goed. 
  
SP1: Dan leg ik hier wel op en dan eens even kijken. Had jij hier eerst nog wat vragen over, dat is 
misschien het makkelijkste? 
  
SP2: Nee, ik heb er geen vragen over. Voor mij was de opzet wel helder hè. Zeker met de 
toelichting, die je nou hebt gegeven. Ook de relatie tussen, zeg maar inkoopsamenwerking, 
maar eigenlijk ook, zeg maar, bovenliggend gewoon samenwerken in zijn algemeenheid. 
  
SP1: Ja, dat speelt dan, eigenlijk zou het mooiste straks zijn Rien, dat zeg ik ook al, heb ik al vaak 
gezegd, ik heb het op inkoop, maar als iemand nou dadelijk zou zeggen ik ga het eens op 
HRM bekijken dan moeten we het model ombouwen, dan moet dat kunnen. Dat is het mooie 
van het verhaal. 
  
SP2: Want wat ik nu heb gedaan in de voorbereiding, is even naar aanleiding van de stukken heb 
ik voor mezelf gewoon opgeschreven, even van nou, wat zijn nou de belangrijkste 
aandachtspunten bij mij hè, gewoon als het gaat ook over de inkoopsamenwerking binnen het 
BIZOB-verband, welke dingen vallen mij daarbij op? Wat vind ik sterk? Wat vind ik eventueel 
risicofactoren, aandachtspunten? En zo heb ik er even naar gekeken, ik weet niet of dat de 
bedoeling was? 
  
SP1: Ja, ja, heel graag, want ik heb dus zelf, die laat ik dadelijk wel bij jouw achter een aantal 
meetpunten gemaakt op basis van die 5 theorieën, dat is in het Engels, maar dat is voor jou 
geen probleem denk ik deze. Als jij die dan een keer eens door wil kijken, daarna nog, na het 
gesprek, want ik vul hem aan want geheid zitten daar dingen in die jij, die ik hier niet in heb 
staan, deze komen uit de literatuur. 
  
SP2: Oké. Ja. 
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SP1: En het mooiste is vaak, dat de literatuur andere dingen, die heeft tekortkomingen ten opzichte 
van wat er in de praktijk gebeurt, en dat is net het interessante om achter te komen in dit 
verhaal. Dus ik geef deze tabellen alvast aan jou.  
  
SP2: Ja, prima. 
  
SP1: En dan ga ik dadelijk even wat dichten, wat schrijven, noteren. 
  
SP2: Ja, je moet, we hebben Wi-Fi problemen.  
   
 RBT sources  TCT cost control 
 RBT risk sources  RBT relation LAs 
 TCT SCP 
 
SP1: Ja, dat kan in Word. 
 
  
SP2: Nee, dacht dat je misschien, want anders dan moet je even via hotspot. We hebben toevallig, 
gisteren hebben we wifi problemen, met de hele Dommelvallei, met de … (00:01:56) 
organisatie en er moet iets van hardware komen vanuit Amerika, dat is er pas vrijdagmiddag, 
ja, dus dat is nou vanmiddag, maar het speelt vanaf woensdagavond. Dus ik zit nou hier even 
via hotspot heb ik gewoon effetjes verbinding gemaakt. 
  
SP1: Dat is wel lastig hè, want bij ons. 
  
SP2: Nou wij hebben zelf wel gewoon, op de hardware hebben wij zelf wel gewoon verbinding, 
maar wij zitten even met wifi hebben wij problemen. 
  
SP1: Met wifi in het gebouw. 
  
SP2: Maar wij werken natuurlijk steeds meer al met, ja, mobiele devices natuurlijk. 
  
SP1: Ja, ja, ja. Zullen we eens kijken wat jij hebt Rien, als jij eerst eens begint met jouw. 
  
SP2: Nou ik had even ook aan de hand van de eerste bijlage, zeg maar, het overzichtsverhaal van 
de inkoopsamenwerking en dan vanuit, zeg maar, de effectiviteit en efficiency related 
aspecten. Had ik voor mijzelf even van nou, ik begon eerst even voor mijzelf bij die 
strategische visie van, hadden wij een visie toen wij, zeg maar, aansloten bij BIZOB hè, bij 
inkoopsamenwerking, nou dat, goed wij waren ook een van de eersten, zeg maar. 
  





SP2: Ja, de eerste 10. Nou ik denk zelf dat we eigenlijk geen echte strategische visie hadden op de 
samenwerking bij inkoop. Dus, ik denk, daar zijn geen, d’r was geen strategische 
argumentatie eigenlijk van, nou het zat meer eigenlijk gewoon in de operationele 
doelstellingen en daar kom ik zo meteen nog wel effetjes ook op terug, maar dat is denk ik 
wel goed om te weten, want ik dacht dat ook wel dat even terug te lezen eigenlijk in de 
stukken hè van, is dat nou, ligt daar nou echt een strategische visie onder of is het toch meer 
de operationele doelstelling, ik denk dat dat bij ons ook zo was van, nou aan de hand van 




SP2: Nou daar ben jij zelf, weet je natuurlijk alles van. 
  
SP1: Daar was ik directeur, ja klopt, oprichter. 
 
 RBT sources  TCT cost control 
 RBT risk sources  RBT relation LAs 
 TCT SCP 
 
SP2: Nou ja, zeg maar, het voorbeeld van elders en vervolgens spiegelen aan je eigen organisatie 
en als je dan ziet van nou, van wat je dan ziet aan tekortkomingen, aan aandachtspunten, 
aan verbeterpunten dan is gewoon de operationele doelstelling om daar verbetering in te 
brengen, dat was eigenlijk denk ik vooral leidend. Dus ja, het goeie voorbeeld spiegelen aan 
je eigen situatie en zien dat er gewoon verbeterpunten zijn en dan ook zien dat je dat gewoon 
als kleinschalige en kleine gemeente nou, zeg maar, die verbeterpunten niet zou kunnen 
bereiken zelfstandig. Dus dat is eigenlijk, denk ik, het belangrijkste punt en anders zitten we 
dan meteen onder ook, zeg maar, de, dat is denk ik wel goed van BIZOB, dat is ook een van 
de voordelen van het kunnen laten zien van de voordelen, dus, zeg maar, het goeie 
voorbeeld van West-Brabant dat liet ook zien van, dat gewoon, zeg maar, … 
  
SP1: Ja, ja, ja. 
  
SP2: … dat er ook voordelen te behalen waren, waardoor, zeg maar, het geloof in theorie, want dat 
gewoon door samenwerking, zeg maar, je ook zelf sterker kunt zijn als dat onderbouwd wordt 
met gewoon, zeg maar, praktijkinformatie waaruit blijkt dat dat inderdaad ook zo is dat 
versterkt het geloof in … 
  
SP1: Omdat te gaan doen. 
  
SP2: … om dat te gaan doen. Dus dat is denk ik gewoon een belangrijk punt. 
  
SP1: Want wel sterk, zoals jij zegt, maar dat kun je natuurlijk ook terughalen op een van die 
theorieën is die core competence theorie en de resource theorie waarbij je zegt, van die 
University of South Wales 
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operatie wij hadden een aantal dingen, kwamen wij tekort en die zagen wij zeker dat wij die 
daar met zo’n samenwerking konden bereiken, aantal capaciteiten. 
  
SP2: Ja, ja. 
  
SP1: En dat is het vertrek geweest, niet omdat we strategisch we wilden dit met een groep gaan 
doen, nee, we hadden gewoon behoefte aan operationele invulling. 
  
SP2: Kijk in zijn algemeenheid heb je natuurlijk van dat speelde ook al in, want wanneer is het 




SP2: 2003 al, oké, in zijn algemeenheid zie je natuurlijk dat dit in gebied is hè, Zuidoost-Brabant 
waarin samenwerking hè, zeg maar gewoon altijd een belangrijk aandachtspunt is geweest 
we hebben natuurlijk ook vanuit het verleden hè, de SRE, want daarvoor had je eigenlijk al, 
zeg maar, rondom regio Eindhoven had je natuurlijk op een gegeven moment de WGR. En je 
had in Kempenland, had je, zeg maar, een apart samenwerkingsverband, ze zijn op een 
gegeven moment samengegaan in het SRE, ja van oudsher is wel in deze regio is 
samenwerking en, zeg maar, de gedachte achter samenwerking en de voordelen die je 
daarmee kunt halen die zijn altijd wel, denk ik, ondersteund en die zijn ook behoorlijk 
uitgedragen, dus daarbinnen valt zo’n inkoopsamenwerking die valt wel in een redelijk, ja, 
warm nest, zal ik maar even zo zeggen. 
 
 RBT sources  TCT cost control 
 RBT risk sources  RBT relation LAs 
 TCT SCP 
 
  
SP1: Dat klopt, dat herken ik als ik zelf dat vergelijk met West-Brabant dan herken ik precies wat je 
zegt, want Zuidoost-Brabant is zo ontwikkeld en waarom puur omdat de samenwerking en 
hadden veel meer al overleg in allerlei andere gremia en kenden elkaar al en in West-Brabant 
was het heel vaak ze zaten tegenover elkaar en ze kenden elkaar amper. Dat klopt 
  
SP2: Dus dat zijn twee dingen die denk ik ook wel meespelen, sowieso dezelfde cultuur gericht op 
samenwerking, samen bij je sterker dan alleen en, ja, de operationele doelstellingen eigenlijk, 
of dus een klein beetje strategische visie zit er misschien onder, maar dan meer eigenlijk 
gewoon meer gebiedsgericht eigenlijk en minder op het taakveld zelf. Dus dat was even als 
opwarmertje. Ik heb even gewoon wat punten opgeschreven, enerzijds als je kijkt naar 
BIZOB, naar de inkoopsamenwerking, laat ik het even zo zeggen en dan eens kijk naar 
efficiency en effectiviteit dan zijn er eigenlijk wat andere dingen die wat mij betreft er wat 
uitspringen. Die noem ik maar gewoon eventjes, kunnen we het daar misschien even over 
hebben. Dat is gewoon, ja, eigenlijk, zeg maar, gewoon kwaliteit. De vraag is even nou van, 





SP1: Kwaliteit, ja, bij effectiviteit een beetje, ja precies. 
  
SP2: Maar het speelt ook wel … 
  
SP1: Ja, ja. 
  
SP2: … bij efficiency, want daar kom ik zo meteen wel ook nog  eventjes op terug, dat denk ik. Ja 
inkoopkracht, gewoon getalsmatig, maar ook speler op de markt. Hè dat zijn denk ik gewoon, 
heb ik eventjes punten opgeschreven voor mijzelf, maar als ik dan even dat spiegel naar ons 
zelf dan zeg ik, ja, we zijn zelf eigenlijk gewoon, de organisatie was te klein, we hadden het 
versnipperd, we hadden wel verschillende inkoopfuncties binnen onze organisatie. Die waren 
vaak gelieerd aan de inhoud en daardoor had je een versnippering, dus een grote diversiteit 
binnen je organisatie ook. Maar als je dan kijkt ook naar kennisvergaring, natuurlijk erg 
belangrijk is ook gewoon, als je kijkt naar de ontwikkeling van het aanbestedingsbeleid en als 
kleine organisatie, je hebt gewoon, zeg maar, een grote diversiteit in je organisatie maar ook 
een versnippering, ja, dan is het een feit, dan zie je vaak dat de praktijk leidend blijft in de 
uitvoering, en zeker wel een in de vorm dat een taakveld zich ontwikkelt en ingewikkelder 
wordt, complexer wordt door Europese regelgeving, ja, dan is het gevaar, van dat je gewoon, 
zeg maar, bij kennis vergaring en als kennisinstituut onvoldoende meegaat, en dus speler op, 
een goeie speler op de markt bent en dus vervolgens ook, als je kijkt naar fouten maken, 
verkeerd inkopen, kosten, risico, en dat soort zaken, nou ja goed, dus dan spiegel ik even 
mijn eigen organisatie, dan zeg ik van oké, dat zijn niet alleen voordelen van de 
inkooporganisatie, maar het is ook eigenlijk vermindering van die risico’s in je eigen 
organisatie, daar zijn eigenlijk tegen … (00:09:07?). 
  
SP1: Door die samenwerking kun je op een gegeven moment dat soort risico’s beperken. 
 
 RBT sources  TCT cost control 
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SP2: Ja, ja, ja. Nou ja goed, wat ik zelf, moet ik even kijken hoor, ik heb net wat aantekeningen in 
dit stuk gezet, het loopt allemaal door elkaar heen. Wat ook een voordeel is van, nou van dat 
de efficiency, wat ik ook al even zei, voordeel van, bij de start ten opzichte van West-Brabant 
was, daar werd aangetoond, dat is toch vaak in een kleine organisatie het gewoon hard 
maken van het voordeel. Waardoor je dan ziet, van nou we hebben een investering, zeg 
maar, dit zijn onze lasten van, dat is inzet bijvoorbeeld van personeel en wat levert het dan 
op? Dat is vaak, dat is gewoon door de professionaliteit, ja, nou de professionaliteit van 
BIZOB heb je gewoon aantoonbaar, je kunt laten zien, je hebt lasten, dat zijn gewoon, zeg 
maar, de lasten zijn eigenlijk, je hebt een inkooporganisatie waar je gewoon deelnemer van 
bent, waar je gewoon kosten in maakt, maar tegelijkertijd ben je in staat om gewoon, ja, 
transparant te maken wat je baten zijn. Ja, dat is denk ik een belangrijk aspect. 
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SP1: Ja, zeker. 
  
SP2: Ja, ik heb het er nog even bijgeschreven, nou ja goed, minder fouten. Ze heeft minder fouten, 
dus vind ik, denk ik gewoon dat heeft natuurlijk met professionaliteit iets te maken, met die 
kennisvergaring, dat heeft te maken met gewoon de kwalitatief maar ook kwantitatief, je kunt 
meer specialiseren, dat soort aspecten. Daar komt bij als je het in eigen beheer doet dan 
worden fouten, die ongetwijfeld gemaakt worden door, zeg maar, die tegen, die andere 
argumenten, ja, die komen vaak gewoon niet boven tafel, die zijn niet zichtbaar. Die blijven, 
zeg maar, gewoon in een soort van onderstroom zitten en die worden wel gemaakt, maar die 
worden vaak in een één op één situatie, een inkoper in je eigen organisatie die koopt in en die 
laat het resultaat zien en als er dan fouten in gemaakt worden, ja, dat komt, onvoldoende 
komt dat boven tafel. Dus dat zelf reinigende vermogen, dat kritisch naar jezelf zijn, zo 
allemaal, nou dat is in een professionele organisatie is dat denk ik, komt dat beter aan tafel. 
En je ziet ook van dat, en het voordeel daarvan is ook van dat je gescheiden functies hebt, en 
die gescheiden functie leidt ook, dat, zeg maar, de inhoud ook de inkoop controleert eigenlijk 
hè, dat is gewoon. 
  
SP1: Het controleert elkaar beiden op deze manier en dat is heel sterk, dat klopt. 
  
SP2: Ja. En terwijl als het weer in een hand zit, ik bedoel, we hebben bijvoorbeeld onze collega in 




SP2: Dat is, zeg maar, dat vraag ik mij altijd af van, ja, nou hoe zit dat met het vier ogen principe, 
laat ik heb maar even zo zeggen, maar bij ons in de organisatie je kunt het ook overdrijven 
hè, maar dat is, dat is, dat wordt ook door de accountant en ook op allerlei manieren wordt 
vier ogen principe, waarin je eigenlijk, zeg maar, gewoon kijkt naar een prestatielevering, en 
goed als je zelf je eigen prestatielevering moet controleren en daar kritisch op moet zijn, nou 
dan kun je de vraag stellen of dat dat. Dus dat vind ik een belangrijk aandachtspunt. 
  
 RBT sources  TCT cost control 
 RBT risk sources  RBT relation LAs 
 TCT SCP 
 
SP1: Dat is een heel belangrijke, ja, die had ik ook niet zozeer uit de literatuur nog niet. Want die 




SP1: Maar dat is wel heel belangrijk natuurlijk vanuit transpar, ja, transpar, hoe heet het 
transparency, om het zo maar te zeggen, om daar de zichtbaarheid en die controle zou op 
een gegeven moment buiten je structurele accountancy, net wat jij zegt, om het ook op een 





SP2: Dan heb ik verder wat risico’s voor mijzelf, die zitten ook vaak wel in een, gewoon in zijn 
algemeenheid in samenwerkingsverbanden. Wat wij bijvoorbeeld nou zelf hebben, wij hebben 
gewoon onze bedrijfsvoering, want ja we hebben inkoop eigenlijk op afstand gezet, laat ik het 
maar even zo zeggen, tenminste even verzelfstandigd die functie. Op veel grotere schaal 
hebben we natuurlijk bedrijfsvoering op afstand gezet bij de gemeenschappelijke regeling. 
Waarbij de filosofie is van, ja ‘t is toch van ons, zeg maar, de dienst over waar wij praten dan 
even over, wij konden daar, daar voelden wij toch wel een aantal risico’s bij en die speelden 
ook wel een beetje bij BIZOB, daarmee kan ik ze ook even veralgemeniseren dus, zeg maar, 
dat is enerzijds op afstand plaatsen, daar kom ik zo meteen nog wel effetjes op terug. De 
tweede is eigenlijk, zeg maar, de professionalisering en de verzakelijking aan de ene kant 
versus, ja, zeg maar, wel bekend zijn met de cultuur van de organisatie, zeg maar, ja, couleur 
locale noemen ze dat, maar weten wat belangrijk wordt gevonden in een organisatie, weten 
hoe men omgaat met, waardoor, zeg maar, ja, die afstand. Daar moet wel een nabijheid zijn, 
je moet wel, ja, de dienstverlening moet wel klantgericht zijn. ‘t Moet wel, dus ook in die 
cultuur moet hij wel afgestemd zijn op de eigenheid van de organisatie, waarbij, ja, juist, zeg 
maar, een balans moet gevonden worden tussen die professionalisering, een spiegel 
voorhouden aan die organisatie en tegelijkertijd wel meenemen dat die organisatie eigenlijk 
graag … (00:14:08?) 
  
SP1: Dat is wel heel interessant deze en ik denk dat, oké vooral dit, vooral meer speelt bij kleinere 
gemeentes. 
  
SP2: Het zou kunnen, ja. 
  
SP1: Gevoelsmatig dat blijkt straks wel. Maar is wel interessant, want de literatuur zegt daar niks 
over. 
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SP2: Oké, oké, maar ik kan mij voorstellen dat jij het ook van anderen kent. Wat ik zelf vind dat is, 
zeg maar, wat mij ook wel opvalt, wat ik ook al wel terug krijg, is van dat, als je natuurlijk 
samenwerkt of binnen … (00:14:30?) het leidt natuurlijk wel tot overlegstructuren, tot 
afstemming en soms daardoor ook gewoon, ja, een wat stroperige, wat stroperige processen 
met langere doorlooptijden waarbij je snap je, waarbij je, zeg maar, kijk ik zal maar even een 
voorbeeld geven van, als wij, zeg maar, zelf iets rechtstreeks zouden inkopen bijvoorbeeld als 
het gaat over iets van personeel en we zouden zeggen we hebben vijf bureaus nodig, dat kan 
bij wijze van spreken over twee maanden kan het geregeld zijn. Het samenwerkingsverband 
moet natuurlijk toch, die moet het eerst ophalen bij alle deelnemers. Die moet vervolgens 
kijken van, nou ja goed, die moet vervolgens dus kijken van nou goed van zitten daar 
tegenstrijdigheden in, want die kun je niet op de markt zetten in een aanbesteding, dus je 
moet eerst, dan krijg je eerst het interne afstemmingsproces. 









SP1: … (00:15:14?) 
  
 
SP2: … (00:15:15?) ja. En dat is als je nou, zeg maar, daar als deelnemer tegen aan kijkt, en daar 
moet je eigenlijk, zeg maar, de eenvoudige beslissing moet je altijd voor lief nemen ten 
opzichte van de ingewikkelde beslissing, dus je moet eigenlijk, ik bedoel, van die 
afstemmingsprocessen ben je soms helemaal, heel eenvoudig opwerpen, je zou eigenlijk, als 
je het zelf zou doen had je er voordeel bij, dan zou je het sneller kunnen doen, risico’s van 
verkeerde inkopen en zo zijn misschien over het algemeen wat kleiner, dus. 
  
SP1: Nou dat zouden we eens kunnen uitwerken, want ik vind een heel mooi voorbeeld daarvan, 
die mail heb jij ook gehad, van die gezamenlijke indiening van personeel die is net gedaan. 
En dan zie ik die mail van Barry bij ons voorbijgaan, hartstikke goed, goed aangepakt, los van 
de inhoud, maar dan denk ik in één keer van wowowo wat moet er nog gebeuren, krijgen we 
een overleg? We krijgen helemaal geen overleg, een … (00:15:59?) erbij hè, want, zit jij ook 
erin? 
   
SP2: Ja. 
  
SP1: Ja, jij zat erin precies, d’r zit Joost zat erin en nog, dan denk ik van nou, tuig het eens 
allemaal op bij mekaar, dat is ook een beetje wat jij zegt nu. 
  
SP2: En dan komen wij tot een afspraak, want ik heb nu inmiddels een stuk of 10 reserveringen al 
in mijn agenda en dan gaat er weer eentje weg, en dan zeggen ze kijk wat … (00:16:18?) dit 
was eigenlijk meer een soort van, ja, wij zijn meer als klankbordgroep eigenlijk bedoeld, nou 
ja goed op zich, die dag dat dus die mail kwam toen heb ik er even op gereageerd, nou dat 
vind ik eigenlijk wel leuk om. 
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SP1: Nee, kijk kwalitatief, en dat is jouw eerdere punt geweest, denk ik zeker, ik sta er helemaal 
achter natuurlijk, daar gaat het niet om, maar als je er gewoon ook wetenschappelijk naar 
kijkt, en gewoon vanuit onafhankelijk dan kun je wel zo daar vraagtekens bij zetten. 
  





SP1: En wat een raad heel gauw zal doen natuurlijk. 
  
SP2: Ja, nou ook al omdat, zeg maar, dit is nou een onderwerp, ik bedoel, daar was ook wel reden 
waarom ik denk van, nou dat vind ik wel leuk om er even over mee te praten, ook hoe een 
andere collega ermee omgaat, dit is nou een onderwerp, dat zie je ook bij inkoop van 
personeel dat is natuurlijk al vaker gebeurd, waarin we altijd voorbehouden maken met 
betrekking tot de aanbesteding, waarvan we zeggen ze moeten altijd onze handen vrij 
hebben om een klant, dit is echt zo’n onderwerp waarvan je. 
  
SP1: We hebben altijd specials die wij overal tussendoor moeten kunnen fietsen. 
  
SP2: Ja. En dat gebeurt heel vaak, omdat je netwerk, zeg maar, snel kunnen reageren, ik heb nu 
een probleem, maar ik moet eigenlijk morgen dat is, je hebt bureaus, maar die bureaus, ja, 
die staan toch wel verder van je af, het gaat uiteindelijk in dit soort processen vaak toch om 
de persoon die je krijgt. Dat is, dat is bijvoorbeeld zelfs met de inkoop van projectleiderschap 
van grote projecten, daar zie je ook vaak, die balans tussen, zeg maar, tussen de prijs en de 
kwaliteit, dan zie je ook dat de presentatie van de projectleider, het goeie gevoel bij een 
persoon moet hebben die het uiteindelijk voor hem kan doen, want het verhaal van die 
bureaus, ja, wij hebben hier zelf, wij werken nou inmiddels met een ZZP-er in onze nieuwe 
wijk, maar die komt voort eigenlijk vanuit een aanbestedingstraject, dan zie je vaak, als 
voordeel wordt vaak gepresenteerd de backoffice van zo’n organisatie. 
  
SP1: Van zo’n organisatie, ja dat wordt gezegd, ja, ja, precies. 
  
SP2: Wij hebben kennis, en op het moment, hij staat er niet alleen voor hij kan terugvallen op, maar 
mijn ervaring is gewoon in die jaren geweest, is gewoon geweest van, nou ja goed, dat is zeer 
beperkt. En op het moment dat je echt gewoon, zeg maar, gebruik maakt van het backoffice, 
krijgen gewoon toch, dan begint men meteen te praten over de rekening. 
  
SP1: Klopt, komt er weer bij. 
  
SP2: En dan heb je wel eens dat je denkt bij jezelf, nou dan had ik liever die kennis weer elders 
ingekocht, bij wijze van spreken, ‘t is niet altijd een voordeel, want dan word je, eigenlijk heb 
je dan zelfs een vorm van gedwongen winkelnering. En dat is een beetje het punt van, nou 
dat vind ik toch wel aardig, maar dat is in de relatie met die stroperigheid. 
  
SP1: Ja, ja, ja, zeker. 
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SP2: D’r staat in de, ik weet niet precies waar die toe moeten leiden van inhuren personeel en als 
je dan dadelijk zou kijken van, goh wanneer de eerste mail is gekomen en wanneer we het 
dadelijk op de markt hebben gezet en wanneer het resultaat er is. 
  
SP1: En wanneer het contract er is en wat daar dan uitkomt. Nou ik heb ook een heel leuk 
voorbeeld, wij hadden namelijk zelf, je weet, bij Eindhoven gaat het nu steeds beter bij ons, 
we hebben het verzoek zelfs liggen om heel het contractmanagement te doen voor het 
sociale stuk daar. Nou daar moeten we twee mensen volledig gaan leveren daarvoor en de 
voorman, dus we hadden ook echt zo’n inkoopbureau dat gespecialiseerd is in de werving 
van mensen, dat doen wij anders nooit, daar is voor het eerst op ingezet. Nou die komen met 
kandidaten aan, die kunnen bij ons koffie drinken en die kunnen weg. Dat was helemaal niks 
en dan denk je ook wel eens wat is dan de toegevoegde waarde van zo’n bureau in dit geval, 
en dat was hier dus niks. Maar dat denk je ook zijn wij zo kritisch, of zijn wij zo? En dat heeft 
er ook mee te maken en ik snap ook Barry met zo’n aanpak wel van dat ie, jullie wil kijken wat 
leeft er nou, en wij hebben allerlei functies, en hij heeft natuurlijk de special functies en hij 
heeft de gewone routine functies, maar alles kun jij toch niet helemaal coveren denk ik. 
  
SP2: Nee, nee, nee. 
  
SP1: En dan zal het misschien ook wel uit het overleg komen. 
  
SP2: Ja dat zou kunnen, dat zou kunnen, kijk dit moet ook niet te lang voortduren dit zoeken naar 
die gezamenlijke agenda want anders had ik ook zoiets van nou ja, vanmorgen toevallig weer 
vier, vijf reserveringen gekregen, want ja ze zoeken naar die gemeenschappelijke datum, ‘t 
zal wel best zijn. Ja goed, kijk wij hebben natuurlijk allemaal volle agenda’s. 
  
SP1: Tuurlijk. Een keer zou ik zeggen voor te focussen en voor te brainstormen.  
  
SP2: ’t Is gewoon natuurlijk heel gemakkelijk om met mij een aparte afspraak te maken, maar op 
het moment dat je gewoon, ja, vijf, zes mensen, ja, dan is die gemeenschappelijkheid van 
lege plekken in je agenda, ja, … 
  
SP1: Wordt lastig. 
  
SP2: … dat hebben jullie natuurlijk ook, dus dat. 
  
SP1: Ik ken het, ken het. 
  
SP2: Dat waren even, in hoofdlijnen waren dit mijn opmerkingen Marcel. Was in de voorbereiding, 
ik denk van ja, toen ik het stuk had gelezen, ik denk van wat is nou daar spontaan voor mijzelf 
even zeg van nou van Peer verdeel nou gewoon de BIZOB strategie, nou daar hebben we het 
eerder over gehad, de voordelen van het spiegelen aan van tekortkomingen, even aan het 
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SP1: Ja, als ik dan nog even terugpak naar die bijlage, als ik die dan even afpel. Nou die waarde 
heb jij eigenlijk ook al duidelijk aangegeven en dan zie je ook die kwaliteit, ja, oh ja, die valt bij 
mij een beetje onder die value hier, als we daar dan naar kijken zie jij dan ook bijvoorbeeld 
kwaliteit, en duurzaamheid, en dat soort zaken in inkooptrajecten zelf. Dat je zegt van nou we 
hebben daar bijvoorbeeld, pak maar iets, we hebben daar een MFA gerealiseerd en dat heeft 
toch echt wel tot betere kwaliteit gedaan, of als ze dat zelf hadden gedaan dan was er een 
bepaalde richting gekozen die. 
  
SP2: Ja, nou wat je gewoon ziet is eigenlijk ‘t is niet altijd een voordeel, maar als ik bijvoorbeeld kijk 
naar het bestuurlijk ’t aanbesteed, nou dat is, we hebben nou   bijvoorbeeld ook bij het sociale 
domein hebben gedaan de Dommelvallei plus het gesprek aangegaan en nou ik bedoel dat 
is, ja, kijk dat is ook een nieuwe methode eigenlijk, laat ik het maar zo zeggen, tenminste voor 
ons gevoel. 
  
SP1: Ja, dat is ook. 
  
SP2: Dus dat is, als je dat nou ook al heel zou zeggen onder, ja, duurzaam, ik weet niet precies wat 
jij eronder verstaat die relatie met inkoop, maar wat ik wel merk is gewoon, van dat, zeg maar, 
dat zouden wij zelf niet hebben gedaan denk ik gewoon van, omdat je toch gewoon vrij snel 
terugvalt op je traditionele, ja, nieuwe procedures verwerken, procedureel hè dat was ook, 
wat ik straks even zei hè die kennisvergaring, zeg maar gewoon, zeg maar, nieuwe dingen 
zien, ja, dat wordt dat bestuurlijk aanbesteden. Bijvoorbeeld, dat is uiteindelijk niet 
doorgegaan, dat is uiteindelijk een heel slopend proces geworden, maar het aanbesteden van 
de Rooijseweg bijvoorbeeld bij ons, nou daar zijn we ook heel lang mee bezig, uiteindelijk 
doen we het nou gewoon op de traditionele manier, maar uiteindelijk vanuit ontwerp tot 
gewoon ‘t onderhoudt hè, is misschien voor een grote gemeente is dat gewoon, zeg maar, 
zoals wij al eerder echt bedacht hebben die zouden op tijd maar goed. 
  
SP1: Die doen design and construct en dat hebben ze al vaker gedaan en dan gaat het gelijk goed 
en jullie doen het een keer en het leidt tot allerlei vraagtekens. 
  
SP2: Maar, zeg maar, maar op zich gewoon, zeg maar, het er over nadenken, ‘t, zeg maar, de 
ondersteuning daarin, nou daar zijn gewoon wel kwalitatieve, zeg maar, bijdrages die je 
levert, die je normaal gesproken gewoon niet als je gewoon zoals je, of je zou ze toevallig net 
maar moeten inhuren. 
  
SP1: Of pak die ZZP-ers even. 
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SP2: Dus in die zin kwaliteit en kwaliteit ook in de relatie met dus minder fouten maken en daarom 
legde ik even die relatie met efficiency als je meer naar de kostenkant kan goed daar 
effectiviteit daarom speelt kwaliteit eigenlijk speelt wat mij betreft gewoon eigenlijk breder. 
  
SP1: Dat klopt, zeker die minder fouten maken draagt ook bij aan de kwaliteit, absoluut. 
 
 RBT sources  TCT cost control 
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SP1: En dan had ik die tweede hier ook nog beschreven van, hoe kunnen nou die waarden die ik 
net noem zouden die ook door die structureel, zie jij ook dat die zaken, ja, eigenlijk zij het net 
ook al, doordat je structureel samenwerkt, want als je een keer een ZZP-er, of zo hebt die is 
weer weg hè. Daar zijn ook heel veel vragen over geweest en ook heel veel onderzoeken 
van, ja, men wordt afhankelijk van een ZZP-er, maar is zo weer weg, die gaat ergens anders 
naar toe, of whatever. Die tijd is vaak beperkt zo’n structurele samenwerking die is van jezelf 
die gaat door eigenlijk, tenzij je zelf de stekker eruit trekt maar dan moet het wel meer. 
  
SP2: Daar zit een gelaagdheid in. Ik weet niet of je ons gesprek van een jaar of anderhalf geleden 
kunt herinneren toen hebben we het even gehad inderdaad over die structurele 




SP2: Waarbij ik toen heb gepleit voor, zeg maar, gewoon voor vastere. 
  
SP1: Ja, ja, ja, zeker. 
  
SP2: Voor vastere contacten, dus je hebt er een soort onderlaag, zeg maar, een basis laag van 
structurele samenwerking, dat zit in de organisatie, dat zit in het systeem, dat zit in de 
kwaliteitsverbetering, dat zit in de deskundigheidsbevordering, vervolgens heb je gewoon 




SP2: Zeg maar, en je hebt daarom is het wel heel mooi dat ISO-project met gewoon, zeg maar, 
collectieve inkooptrajecten en meer inkooptrajecten die eigenlijk, zeg maar, specifiek zijn, op 
de gemeente gericht. En kijk die structurele samenwerking bij de collectieve projecten moet je 
gewoon kijken naar dat neem je gewoon af als gemeente omdat je meedraait bij een totaal 
grote massa-inkoop. Daar waar het gaat om meer specifieke gemeentelijke inkoop is die 
vaste relatie ook erg belangrijk, dat weet je nog wel dat ik toen heb gezegd, luister van ik vind 







SP2: … wisselen. 
  
SP1: Ja, ja, klopt. 
  
SP2: Daar zit eigenlijk die gedachtegang wel in van, nou van kijk maar jij bracht straks. 
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SP1: Dat ben ik met jou eens, ja. 
  
SP2: Plots straks maakte jij de opmerking, met de manier van samenwerken, structureel 
samenwerken, of gewoon, zeg maar, meer een lichtere vorm van samenwerken en daar ben 
ik wel, want dan kom je eigenlijk gewoon meer op de theorie van de wet gemeenschappelijke 
regelingen met de vormen van samenwerken. Je hebt gewoon de meest lichte vorm van 
samenwerking is van, ja, gewoon je hebt een onderwerp en je zoekt daarin een informeel, je 
hebt informele samenwerking en kijk dat is een beetje op dit moment nog, ja, mijn collega’s 
zullen het mij niet in dank afnemen, de samenwerking tussen Best en Veldhoven, nou waarin 
je gewoon als je praat met anderen dan mijn twee collega’s dan hoor je wel, dan zeggen ze 
helaas, ja, dat is toch nog redelijk diffuus en dat is toch nog, ik bedoel gewoon, wat moet dat 
nou precies opleveren en terwijl, ja, de meer, een hechtere samenwerking met een 
gestructureerde samenwerking daar denk ik van de voordelen van elkaar kennen, zeg maar, 
de cultuur van elkaar kennen, ook gewoon vaste protocollen hebben, procedures vast hebben 
liggen van nou, van wie welke rol en verantwoordelijkheden heeft, dat levert gewoon 




SP2: Nou dus dat is meer tussen gemeentes zelf, nou goed, dat kun je ook vertalen naar de 
samenwerking tussen een gemeente en BIZOB. 
  
SP1: Ja, zeker, zeker. Maar dat is wel heel herkenbaar wat jij zegt ook een aantal punten van hoe 
die deskundigheid, die inkopers niet teveel wisselen, dat geldt ook voor managers, dat ze op 
een gegeven moment die structurele samenwerking dat is wel heel scherp, die heeft daar 




SP1: ’t Is van twee kanten, snap je? Dus dan moet je ook niet continu, want hoe herkent zich 
namelijk niet structurele samenwerking dat je andere gezichten ziet en dat je ook de levering 
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niet helemaal kunt veiligstellen van de resources die je wil ontvangen door die samenwerking, 
dus dan is het ook terecht dus dat de gemeente zo kritisch kijkt van wat ze geleverd krijgen in 
die samenwerking, zitten er vaste mensen op, zitten er protocollen op, wat jij zegt. 
  
SP2: Ja, ja. 
  
SP1: Ja, ‘t is wel interessant. 
 
 RBT sources  TCT cost control 
 RBT risk sources  RBT relation LAs 
 TCT SCP 
 
SP2: Kijk je hebt ze eigenlijk, zeg maar, je hebt je inkooptraject hè specifiek, je hebt je 
inkooptrajecten collectief, en je hebt gewoon, zeg maar, je basisdienstverlening, want 
bijvoorbeeld wij hebben met Inge hebben wij afgelopen tijd, ja, ik vind dat zelf wel een leuk 
project, daarom ben ik er zelf ook af en toe gewoon bij betrokken. Daar hebben we gekeken 
van, nou hoe komt het nou dat in onze organisatie toch nog, zeg maar, te vaak de 
inkoopstrategieën, zeg maar, niet gevolgd worden en dan krijgen we uiteindelijk bij de 
rechtmatigheidscontrole van de accountants moeten we een inhaalslag doen. Dat hebben wij 
nou al twee jaar achter elkaar gezegd, goed dat gaan we verbeteren. Nou we hebben in de 




SP1: Dat zei ze ja. 
  
SP2: Ja goed en toen hebben we gekeken van, nou van goh, en wij zijn daar nou ook zo’n beetje 
pilot gemeente mee, van nou van, hoe kun je nou veel beter in je organisatie waar, zeg maar, 
eigenlijk zo’n inkoopstrategie wat nou best wel een leesdocument is, hoe kun je zorgen dat 
dat gewoon een werkdocument wordt, waardoor gewoon, zeg maar, als je dat gewoon 
inbrengt in je adviesnota’s gewoon in de dingen, in de voorbereiding dat je eigenlijk gewoon 
niet voorbij kunt gaan voordat je gewoon een aantal stappen moet nemen. Nou dat, ik bedoel, 
dat ziet er nou, dat is klaar eigenlijk nou hè. Dat gaan wij gebruiken en dat zal ook zijn effect 
hebben op, zeg maar, op de manier waarop wij weer gaan werken. 
  
SP1: Ja precies. 
  
SP2: En dat vind ik wel mooi, dat is echt zo’n voorbeeld van basisdienstverlening dat zouden wij 
zelf gewoon niet kunnen, nou jullie moeten het uiteindelijk toch gaan doen dadelijk voor alle 
deelnemers. 
  
SP1: Dus hier kunnen wij meenemen, wat ze hier hebben gedaan kunnen ze in een andere regio 





SP2: Nou dus je bent bereid om, zeg maar, gewoon in overleggen en in, zeg maar, iets 
voorbereiden om te investeren in één gemeente, omdat je het gewoon meeneemt ook naar 
een andere gemeenten, nou dat geldt ook weer omgekeerd, dus dat is wel echt een, dat zijn, 
dat zijn nou echt voordelen van de structurele samenwerking. 
  
SP1: Ja, en die zijn echt ook op kwaliteit in de processen, daar worden processen dadelijk veel 
effectiever van en efficiënter, en dat is kwaliteit, want dan komt het toch weer in beiden terug 
kwaliteit, zowel in effectiviteit als in efficiëntie. Dat is heel interessant. 
  
SP2: Nou ja, ik kan het natuurlijk alleen maar vanuit de praktijk vertellen, maar dat is wat je ziet 
gebeuren. 
 
 RBT sources  TCT cost control 
 RBT risk sources  RBT relation LAs 
 TCT SCP 
  
SP1: Maar dat is ook de bedoeling, hè. Want het mooiste is dadelijk om te kijken van sluit nou ook 
het model aan bij de praktijk en waar kunnen we het dan bijschaven en waar hebben jullie er 
straks wel iets aan, dat is ook van belang. Even kijken naar de volgende Rien, of die nog, of 
we die al een beetje gecoverd te hebben? Ja jullie hebben het een beetje gehad over de 
guarantee en de internal processen, dus dan gaat het eigenlijk om het veiligstellen van die 
capaciteiten wat jij in het begin al aangaf. Zekerheid, onzekerheid, kun jij door samenwerking, 
heb jij meer grip, heb jij het idee dat jij door die inkoopsamenwerking met BIZOB of ook 
bijvoorbeeld … (00:29:55?) ook wel leuk om ze neer te leggen bij Nuenen en anderen dat 
jouw processen, dat je daar zekerder over bent dat daar minder hiccups inzitten dat je niet 
hebt van hé ik ben afhankelijk van, er is iemand ziek, of ik, mijn capaciteit staat onder druk 
omdat ik, worden daardoor beter geborgd. 
  
SP2: Ja. Ja, dat is eigenlijk, zeg maar, kijk we hebben samenwerking, we hebben het even niet, ik 
had het ook niet echt genoemd, maar goed dat is natuurlijk wel een punt denk ik. Als je kijkt 
naar de doelstelling van samenwerken dan heb je dus, bijna heel Nederland hanteert bijna 
dezelfde doelstelling en soms zie je dan, zeg maar, of ook op regioniveau zie je dan ook nog 
een toegevoegde argumentatie, maar eigenlijk zie je gewoon, zeg maar, kwaliteit is natuurlijk 
een belangrijk argument, zeg maar, kostenbeheersing, soms kostenreductie, dat hebben wij 
bijvoorbeeld vaak als argument, maar de kwetsbaarheid dat is vaak gewoon, zeg maar, ik 
bedoel, vaak wordt via de vier K’s, kwaliteit, kosten, kwetsbaarheid en kortere doorlooptijden, 
zeg maar eventjes hè, dat is dus, denk ik, dat soort zaken. Maar die kwetsbaarheid die is 
gewoon wel heel erg belangrijk en dat zal misschien in een grotere organisatie minder spelen, 
maar wel daar speelt heel vaak van, verkokering hè, dus dat is van, in feite van. 
  
SP1: Tunnelvisies, hè. 
  
SP2: Tunnelvisies inderdaad, waardoor je, zeg maar, eigenlijk ook gewoon kwetsbaar bent, kunt 
zijn op het moment dat iemand wegvalt, want dan kan een ander die kan het overnemen, 
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gewoon in de verticale kolom, maar veel minder in de horizontale kolom hè, want vaak zie je 
inkooptrajecten, die hebben vaak gewoon integrale aspecten. 
  




SP1: Maar daar zie je dus heel duidelijk, als ik daar even iets op mag doorzagen, je hebt die 
verticale kolom van sociale zaken, precies wat jij zegt heel het inkoop vindt daar plaats. Ze 
hebben daar een centrale inkoop nog zitten corporate, om het zo maar te zeggen, voor heel 
de gemeente, maar die heeft helemaal geen invloed in die verticale kolom van sociale zaken. 
  
SP2: Dat is eigenlijk toch vreemd hè. 
  
SP1: Ja, dat is heel vreemd. 
 
 RBT sources  TCT cost control 
 RBT risk sources  RBT relation LAs 
 TCT SCP 
 
SP2: Dat is eigenlijk vreemd, je zou zeggen daar zitten toch bepaalde kwaliteiten en kennis ook 
van andere taakvelden die wel hebben te maken met het sociale domein die je eigenlijk mee 
zou moeten nemen. 
  
SP1: Ja, absoluut. En dan gaan ze zelfs dat stuk, dat onderste stuk, gaan ze bij ons neerleggen, 
dus. 
  
SP2: Ja. Nou kwetsbaarheid is eigenlijk gewoon, ja goed, kijk als je kijkt naar continuïteit, ja, ik 
noemde het straks even versnippering bijvoorbeeld in je eigen organisatie, natuurlijk weer 
andere termen die, zeg maar, ook kunnen leiden tot discontinuïteit en tot kwetsbaarheid. Dat 
ben je natuurlijk, ik bedoel, want wij hebben gewoon, zeg maar, ook de taakvelden hebben wij 
dus eigenlijk, bijvoorbeeld 1 FTE beleidsmedewerker of een beleidsuitvoerder en die gaat dat 
inkooptraject ook doen. Nou daar zitten die aspecten, wat ik straks zei hè, van vier ogen 
principe, van onafhankelijkheid, kritisch zijn op je eigen proces, maar ook gewoon je 
kwetsbaarheid, op het moment dat zo iemand wegvalt, ja, dan ben je je continuïteit in het 
proces kwijt. Dan moet je eigenlijk al gaan winkelen bij een andere organisatie, of een 
externe, nou ja goed, daar zit nou gewoon veel meer continuïteit in dus dat is gewoon 
gegarandeerd, dus dat is denk ik gewoon een belangrijk, maar die kwetsbaarheid die is 
gewoon minder. 
  
SP1: Ja, vooral wat ik wel bij jou er echt duidelijk uit hoor is wel van, structureel zeker die 
meerwaarde zie ik, maar brengt het ook op de mensen niet teveel wissel, om het zo maar 




organisatie. En dat heeft met personeel te maken, maar ook met procedures, met alles, 
manier van werken dat dat ook niet elke keer verandert. 
  
SP2: Nou, kijk jullie zijn natuurlijk, zeg maar, ook een, ja, een kennisinstituut, om het maar even zo 
te zeggen, tenminste zo zie ik het even ten opzichte van onze eigen organisatie, en ook al, 
zeg maar, wissel je regelmatig van de directe contactpersoon, of die directe inkoper hè, dan 
blijft die basis hè, van nou, want je bent als organisatie kwaliteitsinstituut, kennisinstituut, en 
zo zou ik willen, maar ook leverancier van vaardigheden, van inkoopvaardigheden, nou dat 
blijf je gewoon natuurlijk, maar daar zit die bovenlaag in, van dat dat ook herkenbaarheid 
moet zijn, een stukje continuïteit, dus daar zit een beetje spanningsveld tussen die 
verschillende onderdelen.  
  
SP1: Jawel, maar ik denk zeker met die individuele trajecten willen ze een gezicht zien en dat kan 
ook twee of drie gezichten zijn voor werken en voor … (00:34:15?) maar dat zijn de 
gezichten. 
  
SP2: Jullie hebben nou wat met meer … (00:34:18?) schaal hè. 
  
SP1: Ja, zodat je ook die hele diepte in kunt gaan voor die vragen van, die bij de gemeente leven, 




 RBT sources  TCT cost control 
 RBT risk sources  RBT relation LAs 
 TCT SCP 
 
 
SP1: Want dan kun je weer de vraag stellen over die structuraliteit, in hoeverre is die nou echt 
wordt die … (00:34:33?). 
  
SP2: Dus eigenlijk, zou je kunnen, ik heb, het menselijk kapitaal van jullie zelf, van jullie eigen 
organisatie, of van een samenwerkings, of van inkoopsamenwerking dat blijft toch belangrijk, 
het is, het zijn protocollen, het is wet- en regelgeving, maar het is ook gewoon menselijk 
gedrag, ‘t is ook handelen, dus elkaar kennen, op elkaar kunnen inspelen, zeg maar, 
daarmee zit ook, zeg maar, andere aspecten die je net noemde, ja, dat blijft wel een 
belangrijk aspect om, zeg maar, die basis, wat leverancier, die basis dienstverlening die je 
eigenlijk hebt om die tot een goed product te brengen heb je wel het menselijk kapitaal nodig. 
  
SP1: Ja. HRM is daar heel makkelijk in die kapitaal, met de mensen hoe zij het doen, moet je ze 
ook binden, en wij hebben gelukkig nog weinig verloop. Onlangs, misschien die ken jij nog 
wel is Ignas vertrokken, maar die heeft acht jaar bij ons toch gewerkt, een stuk of zes, zeven 
jaar. Dus dat kan een keer. 
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SP2: Die heeft ook bij ons gezeten. 
 SP1: Die heeft bij jullie gezeten daarom denk ik, ik haal hem maar even aan. Maar het is wel, ik 




SP1: En ik geloof, dat haal ik niet zozeer uit de literatuur, maar ik vind het wel, ik kan het wel 
plaatsen, dus dat gaan we zeker meenemen in het onderzoek. 
  
SP2: Nee, maar het zelfde geldt voor, als je kijkt naar samenwerking tussen een shared service 
center en dat zijn jullie natuurlijk eigenlijk ook en de drie gemeentes. Ik merk gewoon we zijn 
nou ook de dienst Dommelvallei aan het evalueren. Voor mij is gewoon zelf al heel erg 
belangrijk, gewoon kijk, er is een basisorganisatie en die doet een aantal zaken, maar, zeg 
maar, de contactpersoon erin, die dicht bij je organisatie staan, die je kennen, de nabijheid, 
maar die ook weten van in elk geval wat er speelt in de gemeente, dat is gewoon vaak wel 
heel erg belangrijk om uiteindelijk een product ook gewoon op maat te hebben. En dat is 
bijvoorbeeld bij de dienst Dommelvallei, van zie je dat gewoon per taakveld verschillen, 
bijvoorbeeld op financiën daar komt een hele hoge mate van tevredenheid over, die hebben 
een vaste, hebben een vaste consulente, die overigens ook voor andere gemeenten werkt, 
maar wel gewoon, inderdaad ook die taakvelden hè, dan weet je wie je hebt, maar daarboven 
hebben we nog iemand die zich gewoon, zeg maar, die is voor, zeg maar, ja, de 
accountmanager, maar wel op inhoudelijk niveau voor de gemeente Son en Breugel, en dat is 
gewoon heel erg belangrijk. Die weet meer van de gemeente Son en Breugel. 
  
SP1: Want die heeft het gevoel. 
 
 RBT sources  TCT cost control 
 RBT risk sources  RBT relation LAs 
 TCT SCP 
 
  
SP2: Ja, die heeft het gevoel, hè die staat ook dicht bij het bestuur en bij het management, dat zijn 
dus meer de zachtere aspecten van samenwerking. 
  
SP1: Kun je het niet een beetje vergelijken met Inge. 
  
SP2: Ja, nou die heeft eigenlijk dezelfde functie hè. 
  
SP1: Ja, dezelfde rol. 
  
SP2: Maar goed, alleen daar is natuurlijk, de intensiteit daarvan is natuurlijk minder. 
  





SP2: Maar dat is gewoon heel erg belangrijk, kijk in samenwerking zijn de, het gaat vaak om de 
harde factoren, maar eigenlijk zijn de zachte aspecten, zijn vaak veel belangrijker. Maar waar 
wij het net ook over hadden bij zo’n projectleider. Hè die projectleider daar moet je het goeie 
gevoel bij hebben, hè dus dan praat je over vertrouwen, dan praat je over van nou spreek je 
dezelfde taal, kun je je inleven in elkaars aspecten, nou dan zie je vaak, dat zie je vaak in 
samenwerkingsverbanden, zie je dat gewoon minder terugkomen, dat zie je vaak pas terug bij 




SP2: ’t Vertrouwen, kijk dat is ook met, ook op bestuurlijk niveau samenwerken van, waarom gaat 
de ene samenwerken, maar goed, we hadden al net een voorbeeld over Bladel en wat is er 
meer, waarom gaat het met anderen soms fout. Kijk als mensen op het hoogste niveau elkaar 
niet opzoeken en niet dezelfde taal spreken, of willen spreken, ja, dat is vaak een conflict, de 
basis hè voor het niet doorgaan van die samenwerking. 
  
SP1: Dan verkrampt eigenlijk alles hè, om het zo maar te zeggen hè. 
  
SP2: Ja. Dus dat is ook, dat zit ook in die vaste contacten hè, met jullie, met die inkopers hè, vanaf 
het moment dat het vertrouwen er is, ook de bekendheid, ja, gewoon, zeg maar, ja, inderdaad 
de, meer de cultuurfactoren, ja, die zijn wel wezenlijk. 
  
SP1: Helder. Rien dan heb ik de volgende, dat vind ik ook nog wel even interessant, op 
kostenreductie hè. Merk jij nou echt in jouw begroting dat zo’n structurele 
inkoopsamenwerking dat dat ook een voordelige, of een nadelige, dat mag ook hè, zonder 
daar een waarde aan, maar heeft het effect op jou kosten? Of zeg jij van nou heel eerlijk 
gezegd zie ik er eigenlijk niks van, of? 
 
 RBT sources  TCT cost control 
 RBT risk sources  RBT relation LAs 
 TCT SCP 
 
  
SP2: Nou, wij zien dat wel, maar wij moeten wel echt moeite doen om het te laten zien. En dat 
heeft te maken met ook de manier van administreren binnen de gemeente, dat het. Je hebt, je 
hebt algemene ramingen, laat ik maar zo zeggen, soms zijn ze heel specifiek, je hebt 
algemene ramingen, je hebt eigenlijk. Aan de kostenkant is de inzet van BIZOB helder, d’r zijn 
een aantal dagen en die kun je precies herleiden. Met jullie manier van werken kun je de 
kostenkant, kun je helder maken. Vervolgens hebben we, op een project hebben we, zeg 
maar, een aanbesteding en daar zit een voordeel in. Dan is vaak is gewoon, wat zou het 
voordeel zijn geweest als je het zelf hebt gedaan? Dat wordt natuurlijk nooit eigenlijk duidelijk 
hè. 
  
SP1: Nee, nee, dat moet je parallel laat lopen, synchroon hè. 




SP2: Precies, dus degene eigenlijk die, zeg maar, denken dat ze het zelf kunnen die halen daar 
altijd hun gelijk. Hè die zeggen. 
  
SP1: Want dan had ik zoveel. 
  
SP2: Ik had het ook kunnen doen, of ik had het misschien nog wel beter gekund. Is niet toetsbaar, 
dus dat is een en twee is dat het gewoon, zeg maar, we kunnen het moeilijk, zeg maar, 
uiteindelijk kwantificeren gewoon uiteindelijk in de begroting weer aan de voorkant, wel aan 
de achterkant, bij de jaarrekening hè. De jaarrekening en daarom maken wij altijd in onze 
paragraaf bedrijfsvoering maken wij een apart overzicht van inkooptrajecten, dus laten we 
zeggen, van nou goed, wat hadden we geraamd en dat is vaak algemeen. Van wat is 
uiteindelijk de inkoop geworden en wat was het, de gemiddelde inkoop hè, waarin je eigenlijk 
kunt zien, van nou van goh, ze ramen een gemiddelde inkoop en wat is uiteindelijk de laagste 
dan en wat is je voordeel. Nou dat laten wij wel in onze … 
  
SP1: Staat bij jullie in de jaarrekening? 
  
SP2: In de jaarrekening, ja. Maken wij altijd een overzicht, wat hebben wij gedaan? Om, ja dat zijn 
natuurlijk een beetje boterzachte overzichten, maar die laten wel zien, van wat het effect is 
van de inkoopfunctie. Dus niet zozeer van de inkoopsamenwerking, maar alleen van de 
inkoopfunctie. En ja dan gaat het er vervolgens om dat wij ervan overtuigd zijn dat, met alle 
argumenten die ik net genoemd heb, dat gewoon, zeg maar, de kwaliteitsorganisatie die 
eronder ligt dat die een belangrijke bijdrage levert. 
  
SP1: Daaraan heeft geleverd om dat te kunnen bereiken. Ja. 
  
SP2: Ja, ja, ja. Zo op die manier verwoorden wij het. Ik weet niet of dat ik hier zo’n jaarrekening bij 
de hand heb, maar ik kan het je dadelijk wel effe laten zien, maar wij. 
  
SP1: Zijn die openbaar, mag ik die? 
  
SP2: Ja, ja, ja. 
  
SP1: Ooh dat vind ik wel handig, wel prettig. Dus dan, ge kunt op een of andere manier toch, 
weliswaar zacht, kunt ge het aantonen en wat er voor wel is, is dus dan wel een uitdaging 
natuurlijk van, ‘t kost wel heel veel moeite om het te laten zien. 
 
 RBT sources  TCT cost control 
 RBT risk sources  RBT relation LAs 
 TCT SCP 
 
SP2: Om te laten zien en dat heeft ook te maken met gewoon de manier van financiële 




hebt gecalculeerd wat, en dat gebeurt natuurlijk wel, want we hebben wel projecten erbij wat 
we doen, dan zeggen we nou vandaag hebben we het op basis van kennis die we zelf 
hebben en de marktverkenning die we zelf hebben gedaan, zo is dit het bedrag wat 
opgenomen is in de begroting. En vervolgens heb je gewoon, zeg maar, de aanbesteding van 
het project en dan moet je het ook alleen maar enten op datgene waar je dan eigenlijk, zeg 
maar, ook van tevoren van hebt gezegd hier gaat het om, nou dan kun je kijken wat er onder 
aan de streep uit is gekomen, dan heb je natuurlijk nog, vervolgens dan heb je je 
aanbesteding en vervolgens krijg je gewoon van, in feite van, ja, is die aanbesteding zodanig 
van dat je ook precies krijgt in je aanbesteding wat je van tevoren hebt geraamd, want 
bijvoorbeeld het meer en minder werk.  
  
SP1: Ja, ja, ja. 
  
SP2: Dit zijn allemaal aspecten die het allemaal, net wat diffuser maken om eigenlijk precies de 
goeie vergelijking te maken. Dus wat wij dus in feite vaak willen laten zien wat de begroting, 
wat in de begroting stond en vervolgens laten we zien van, nou wat was eigenlijk het 
gemiddelde van de aanbestedingen, zo werken jullie zelf, of zo werken jullie, ja, … 
  
SP1: Klopt, nee hoor klopt. 
  
SP2: … en vervolgens laten we gewoon zien van wat het is geworden, gewoon in dit specifieke 
geval en dat geeft het inkoopresultaat, nou en dan is het gewoon, ja. Zeg maar wat meer die 
zachtere argumentatie van, nou ja goed, het geloof hebben dat we gewoon daar de 
samenwerkingsorganisatie bijdrage heeft geleverd, door de kwaliteit, door de manier waarop 
ze het hebben aangepakt en dat vertaalt zich dan, als we daar dan de kosten tegen afzetten. 
  
SP1: Dat maakt het een stukje plausibel. Ja, ja. Maar als je dan even over die kosten doorgaat, 
want het kost natuurlijk ook geld zo’n inkoopsamenwerking, ook de Dommelvallei kost geld, 
levert het dan die kosten op? Zeg je dan van, ja, als ik het zelf had moeten organiseren dan 
was ik meer kwijt geweest? Los van de zekerheid en de. 
  
SP2: Meer kwijt geweest, of het dan minder opgebracht. 
  
SP1: Ja, ja. 
 
 RBT sources  TCT cost control 
 RBT risk sources  RBT relation LAs 
 TCT SCP 
 
 
SP2: Wat meer kwijt, meer kostgeld dat denk ik niet, want omdat, maar dat heeft te maken met, zeg 
maar, die eerste argumentatie, over de versnippering, ja, jongens daar had je het 
waarschijnlijk gewoon nog in je eigen organisatie laten zitten bij de functie waar het zit. Kijk en 
wij betalen, denk ik op dit moment, iets van € 90.000 euro, of zo geloof ik, vier dagen, of zo, 
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goed, kijk dat is gewoon wel een FTE. Dus ik had er ook voor kunnen kiezen om, zeg maar, 
voor € 90.000 euro hier een FTE inkoop te kunnen doen, dan valt er een stukje van, hè, dat 
hadden we dus kunnen organiseren, wij hebben hier een aantal één mensfuncties wat 
specifieke staftaken, waarmee laat ik die dus dan staftaken zou noemen hè, wij hebben ook 
gewoon een jurist. 
  
 
SP1: Maar het is natuurlijk wel zo, dan zou je een aantal dingen denk ik wel op die kennis en die 
zou je dan kunnen doen hè, want je kan die man binnenhalen, alleen ook het uitvoeren van 
die gezamenlijke trajecten die zijn natuurlijk ook, maken het goedkoper ook voor de lijn weer. 
  
SP2: Nee, maar daarom kijk, zeg maar, … 
  
SP1: Ik zit ook effe te denken. 
  
SP2: … nee, maar daar heb je helemaal gelijk in, maar kijk er zijn dus meerdere redenen om, zeg 
maar, in zo’n inkooporganisatie om daarin deel te nemen aan zo’n samenwerkingsverband. 
Als je puur sec op de kosten praat dan zou je zeggen, oké goed, dat kost mij € 90.000 euro, 
daar had ik zelf een FTE voor kunnen doen, nou goed dan had ik waarschijnlijk ook wel een 
stuk van, van kwaliteit binnengehaald. Vervolgens heb je inderdaad te maken van, ja goed, 
daar zitten dan toch ook nadelen aan, kun je meten met collectieve inkoopproducten, nou wat 
gebeurt er, nou dan pak je het punt van kwetsbaarheid, wat als die man verlof heeft, of ziek 
is, of vrouw, van ja goed, dan moet je toch hè, dus je hebt geen achtervang. Dat soort dan, 
dan gaan andere argumenten die gaan spelen van, waarom dat je zegt, luister ik moet dit niet 
als een inkoop, niet als een één mensfunctie in je eigen organisatie organiseren, maar het 
haalt wat nadelen weg, een van die nadelen van dat het versnippert, dat er bijvoorbeeld één 





SP2: Nou, dat kun je wel hè, een aantal negatieve argumenten haal je weg door het ook zelfstandig 
in je eigen organisatie te doen. Dat daar zijn we zo eerlijk. 
  
SP1: Je hebt je vaste persoon altijd, noem het maar op. 
  
SP2: Daar zijn voordelen van, maar de kwetsbaarheid bijvoorbeeld en, zeg maar, de kwaliteit in de 
breedte, het vormen van collectieve inkoop, meedoen met andere gemeenten, en zo. 
  
SP1: Kennisuitwisseling, et cetera. 
  
SP2: Kennisuitwisseling, nou ‘t zijn allemaal de argumenten die, zeg maar, niet gelden als je het 





 RBT sources  TCT cost control 
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SP1: Ja, ja. Helder. Dan had ik nog een belangrijke, dat is eigenlijk die samenwerking. Ik haalde 
hem in het begin ook al een beetje aan. Een van de theorieën die zegt ook heel duidelijk, die 
agency kosten theorie van, als jij in heel veel samenwerkingen zit is het verrekte moeilijk, ik 
zeg het maar even plat, maar daar komt het op neer, om die samenwerking goed op elkaar af 
te stemmen. En daar gaat heel veel ineffectiviteit en inefficiency in zitten. Ik pak er even een 
paar hier, je hebt voor het sociaal domein een stuk Eindhoven, je hebt de Dommelvallei, je 
hebt een stukje BIZOB, je hebt hoe heet die club, de ODZOB hebben we nog voor een stuk 
zitten, we hebben de GGD nog voor een stuk zitten. Al die organisaties bij mekaar, los van 
dat het heel veel tijd kost om die te besturen, dat parkeer ik even, maar het heeft ook heel 
veel inefficiency in de uitvoering van trajecten. 
  
SP2: Dat is ook zo. 
  
SP1: Herken jij dat? 
  
SP2: Nou dat is natuurlijk wel zo, maar dat is altijd een afweging tussen, zeg maar, kijk want het is 
heel gemakkelijk, om vanuit de veelheid aan samenwerkingsverbanden die er zijn te zeggen 
van, luister dat leidt tot een bepaalde inefficiency, dat is zo, want je hebt gewoon veel overleg, 
je hebt verloren uren, je hebt afstemming, je moet het met elkaar eens worden, dat af te 
zetten tegenover, ja, gooi het maar op één hoop, want dat is eigenlijk het alternatief. En dan 
raak je meteen in een discussie over, zeg maar, ja, gemeentelijke herindelingen en over van, 
ja, zou het goed zijn als we hier een grote organisatie zouden hebben voor heel de regio 
Zuidoost-Brabant, of bijvoorbeeld het stedelijk gebied. Ja dat is gewoon een bestuurlijke 
discussie en dan heb je toch te maken met gewoon heel andere argumenten. Die spelen van 
nou, maar die zitten meer gewoon, die zitten misschien minder in de efficiency van de 
organisatie, maar die zitten meer in de relatie met het maatschappelijk middenveld, met je 
eigen bevolking, met identiteit en dus, zeg maar, nou sec, zeg maar, bedrijfsvoering in 
organisatie van samenwerkingsverbanden. Nou we zeggen van, ja, daar gaat gewoon, daar 
gaat inefficiëntie, dat kan inefficiënt zijn, daar gaat gewoon energie in, daar gaat energie in 
die gewoon overbodig is in een aantal gevallen, maar daar staat veel tegenover en dat is, ja, 
is ook een, een democratisch politieke. 
  
SP1: ’t Levert veel op. 
  
SP2: Ja. Het levert veel op en dan moet je misschien niet alleen altijd naar de organisatie kijken, 
maar ook kijken naar voor wie doe je het. Voor wie doe je het? En dat is misschien minder bij 
inkoop, maar meer bijvoorbeeld ik bedoel, ja, aspecten die ik net al noemde, het 
maatschappelijk middenveld, je nabijheid bij de bevolking, … (00:48:16?). 
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SP1: Dat zijn belangrijke punten. 
  
SP2: Dus dat is, maar dat, zeg maar, de veelheid aan samenwerkingsverbanden dat leidt tot 
inefficiency, maar ook gewoon democratische controle bijvoorbeeld hè. 
  
SP1: Ik heb een keer gekeken. Ik pak het er eens even bij, hoeveel ik er hier heb gehad.  
 
 RBT sources  TCT cost control 
 RBT risk sources  RBT relation LAs 
 TCT SCP 
  
SP2: Wij zitten zelf in 35 samenwerkingsverbanden. Dus ik weet niet. 
  
SP1: Dat had ik hier wel ergens zien staan volgens mij, maar 35 Rien. 
  




SP2: Daar zitten ook een aantal, zeg maar, ja, BIZOB zit daar bijvoorbeeld bij. 
  
SP1: Ja, die zit er ook bij hè. 
  
SP2: Er zitten een aantal gemeenschappelijke regelingen bij, ODZOB noemde je net al, MRE, we 
zitten natuurlijk in Dommelvallei, in onze uitvoeringsorganisatie, GGD zit er natuurlijk, maar wij 
hebben bijvoorbeeld ook, zeg maar, een begraafplaats dat doen wij samen met een 
ondernemer. Dus je hebt gewoon, op allerlei terreinen heb je gewoon 
samenwerkingsverbanden. 
  
SP1: Effe kijken hoor. Hier had ik een. Een aantal had ik niet naar jullie denk ik ofwel? Nee. Heb ik 
gewoon een paar gemeentes gekeken, bijvoorbeeld de gemeente Asten, die zat hier en dan 
heb ik ze denk ik lang niet allemaal, maar in de Atlantgroep, in de Blink, in de Brabant Water, 
in de Gemeenschappelijke Regeling, Peel 6.1 
  
SP2: Ja. Als je gewoon naar de jaarrekening gaat van hun, daar hadden we het net over …  
  
SP1: Daar staan ze allemaal in. 
  
SP2: … daar heb je ook de paragraaf verbonden partijen. 
  
SP1: Aah, dan moet ik daar eens even kijken. Dit was maar gewoon een eerste ideetje om. 
  





SP1: Kijk want wat je wel zou kunnen doen natuurlijk, dat geeft die theorie ook een beetje aan, je 
zou veel meer aan de symmetrie kunnen gaan van die informatie, dat je daar iets gaat tussen 
organiseren. 
  
SP2: Nou, daar zijn wij mee bezig … 
  
SP1: Tussen die clubs hè. 
 
 RBT sources  TCT cost control 
 RBT risk sources  RBT relation LAs 
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SP2: … voor een stukje, daar ben ik zelf de trekker van. Wij zijn bezig met de planning en control 
cyclus van de vier belangrijkste gemeenschappelijke regelingen, die dus eigenlijk ook gewoon 
democratisch worden aangestuurd, want jullie zitten natuurlijk toch het andere vormen, maar 
er zijn er vier, zijn er bij die alle 21 gemeentes bedienen, dat is de MRE, dat is ODZOB, dat is 
degene die je dus net zelf noemt en de Veiligheidsregio. En Harry Timmermans en ik zitten 
bijvoorbeeld in de adviescommissie bedrijfsvoering en financiën van de Veiligheidsregio, wij 
zijn ook benoemd hè de enige organisatie, de enige gemeenschap die dat heeft, behalve 
BIZOB dat is dan weer op een andere manier. 
  
SP1: Andere manier ja. 
  
SP2: Maar wij zijn er tegenaan gelopen dat wij, zeg maar, die wet gemeenschappelijke regeling is 
veranderd en waar wij nou tegen aanlopen is van dat wij eigenlijk, zeg maar, we krijgen dus 
21 gemeentes, krijgen we kadernota aangeboden, krijgen een begroting aangeboden, krijgen 
een jaarrekening aangeboden, moeten wij zienswijzen ook in doen en vaak zie je dan dat op 
een aantal algemene uitgangspunten de gemeentes reageren, die reageren verschillend. Die 
reageren allemaal vanuit hun eigen invalshoek. 
  
SP1: Dat zien we bij BIZOB al. Ja. 
  
SP2: Ja. Dat heb ik als voorbeeld hoor, maar pak maar even bijvoorbeeld de ene, zeg maar, de 
GGD die zegt, bij wijze van spreken, nou onze prijsindexering, loonprijs indexering, is 1,5 zeg 
maar, even gemiddeld en de GGD zegt 1,4 de Veiligheidsregio zegt 1,7. 
  
SP1: Maar wij hebben ook iets in de begroting staan. Nee, dat klopt. 
  
SP2: Ja, ja. Nou ja en goed, en vervolgens gaat elke gemeente gaat daar naar kijken vanuit zijn 
eigen vertrekpunt, dus hun krijgen nog 21 zienswijzen. Nou wij doen dat, als Dommelvallei 
gemeentes met zijn drieën doen wij dat de laatste twee jaar vort samen. Zijn eigenlijk die 
afspraken om een onderwerp, dus wij houden, we hebben die vier regelingen, die hebben 
gemeentesecretarissen die de regeling hebben geadopteerd dat zijn koppeltjes van twee, dus 
ik doe het samen met Harry Timmermans, omdat wij sowieso … (00:51:39?) van twee, nou 
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goed. Dat was stap één en vervolgens hebben wij gezegd, luister van weet je wat we moeten 
doen, we moeten proberen, en daar moeten wij niet te ambitieus, te hoogdravend in zijn, 
maar we gaan proberen om een aantal dingen al op dezelfde manier te doen, en dat betekent 
uiteindelijk, en daar trek ik nou de kar van, dat doe ik samen met Ad Verbakel, ik weet niet of 
jij die kent, de concern controller van de gemeente Eindhoven en iemand van Dienst 
Dommelvallei, met … (00:52:00?) even over gehad. 
  
SP1: Daar heb ik het laatst is over gehad. Ja. 
 
 RBT sources  TCT cost control 
 RBT risk sources  RBT relation LAs 
 TCT SCP 
 
  
SP2: Dat zou wel kunnen. En binnenkort vindt het eerste gesprek plaats. We hebben met de vier 
directeuren gesproken, we zeggen wat vinden jullie ervan, die hebben dat binnen hun DB 
afgekaart. Van nou als we proberen op een aantal uitgangspunten zowel de planning en 
control cyclus komt het op hetzelfde moment, we hebben met de kadernota, wat is het 
karakter van die kadernota, en de uitgangspunten voor de begroting en de jaarrekening. Dus 
uiteindelijk zijn we die loon en prijsindexering, … 
  
SP1: Ja, ja, ja, afstemmen. 
  
SP2: … dat is een. Twee, vervolgens gaan we straks, de volgende stap zou zijn, zodra we het met 
elkaar eens worden, even overeenstemming over, zeg maar, bijvoorbeeld die 
weerstandsbeleid, over die risico’s. 
  
SP1: Dat is ook vooral discussie in BIZOB ook geweest. 
  
SP2: Ja. Nou dat soort dingen, en je kunt die ene organisatie net zien anders dan anders maar dat 
is dan de volgende stap. En de laatste stap is, maar daarvan hebben wij allemaal even 
gezegd dat moeten wij nu even nog niet doen, want dat is meteen een bedreiging, is gewoon 
shared services. Ook kijken of dat je uiteindelijk gewoon, zeg maar, misschien via shared 
services ook nog tot een Shared Service Center zou kunnen komen, want waarom hebben 
nou die vier … 
  
SP1: Ja, precies. 
  
SP2: … GR-en die hebben ook hun eigen P&O. 
  
SP1: En dat is eigenlijk een beetje. Ja, waar wij nou op terugkomen. 
  





SP1: Dat is interessant. 
  




SP2: Zodra we de afspraken krijgen we hebben het gewoon al … (00:53:13?), maar dan zijn we 
wel bezig. We gaan dat niet doen, niet meer doen voor de begroting 2017, want de 
kadernota’s van de organisaties hebben wij al gehad, nou we moeten wel klaar zijn, als we 
met de volgende kadernota. 
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SP1: Vind ik wel heel interessant ook voor mijn onderzoek, omdat dat daar heel erg ook naar voren 
komt, je hebt dus die informatie die meer symmetrisch te gaan verlopen, nou wat jij al zegt, 
met zo’n Super Shared Services, of Central Shared Services eventueel, van dat we weer 
terug gaan naar de inkoop. SRE doet inkoop, of ODZOB biedt dingetjes aan, daar zit op een 
gegeven moment ook een overlapping in. De VRZLK, of de VRZOB dan niet, omdat daar 
helemaal geen … (00:53:48?) op zit, maar pak een andere, een GGD daar zitten ook nog 
twee, drie inkopers maar dingen te doen, ook eigenlijk indirect voor die gemeentes die 
eigendom zijn van BIZOB. 
  
SP2: Het punt is natuurlijk wel, waar wij nou tegen aanlopen wel, in de eerste discussie die hebben 
we gehad van nou van, je hebt, dat speelt bij de GR-en heel sterk. Je hebt, zeg maar, je hebt 
de verticale kolom en daar de horizontale kolom. De GGD bijvoorbeeld hè, als we daar gaan 
praten over planning, control, dat is prima, maar als we het vervolgens hebben over 
verantwoording en over indicatoren bijvoorbeeld, dat gaat dan wel ver, die zeggen luister ja 
ho, maar wij hebben onze eigen kwaliteitscertificering en wij werken eigenlijk met andere 
GGD’en. Dus je moet als gemeentes, moet je ook wel oppassen dat je dus niet oplegt, je kunt 
niet alles opleggen, want je moet accepteren dat er ook een verticale kolom is in Nederland 
van kwaliteitsinstituten. 
  
SP1: Kopen ze naar nationaal in. Maar je zou daar wel in kunnen kijken, want daar heb jij een punt 
in hoor, je hebt dingen die kopen zij lokaal in, je hebt dingen die kopen ze regionaal in en ze 
kopen ze landelijk in en eigenlijk in die drie en je zou kunnen zeggen natuurlijk voor dit stuk. 
Die GGD’s zijn van die gemeentes die hebben structurele inkoopsamenwerking. Waarvoor hij 
dit nou, daar zitten twee mannen apart. En zo zijn er, dat kwam hier ook uit, dat is ook heel 
interessant natuurlijk om te zien dat jullie al in die gedachte vanuit financiën, want daar begint 
het toch wel eigenlijk met zo’n, ernaar te kijken. 
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SP2: Ik zal jou, dat is denk ik, ik zal jou dat memootje, dat is heel kort, we hebben er bewust voor 
gekozen om het gewoon allemaal heel kort te houden, en vooral eerst praten met elkaar over 
de intentie. En niet meteen, want daar zijn we allemaal erg goed in, om heel veel meteen op 
papier te zetten. 
   
SP1: Ja, ja, ja. 
  
SP2: Maar ik zal jou die, ik zal jou die memo stuur ik effe toe.  
  
SP1: Dat is leuk. 
  
SP2: Dat is eigenlijk, zeg maar, het vertrekpuntje even, daar staat verder geen geheime informatie 
in 
  
SP1: Nou het is puur ook voor het onderzoek waar ik het voor wil hebben. 
  
SP2: Maar dan heb je een beetje van, nou dat ligt ook in de lijn van waar we het nou over hebben, 
of over hebben gehad. 
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SP1: Hetzelfde geldt eigenlijk voor het stukje, maar dat staat daar los van, maar je hebt ook vaak 
dat je met die, wat wij zien, die vele samenwerkingen dat die doelstelling ook niet altijd gelijk 
loopt bij gezamenlijke inkopen. En dan merk je op een gegeven moment ook wel eens, en dat 
is een punt waarin je op een gegeven moment inefficiency krijgt, op een gegeven moment 
eigenlijk de Kempen, binnen de Kempen gemeentes zelfs al een gemeente heel iets anders 
wil dan de rest met het inkooptraject. En dat zijn ook nadelen waarin men op een gegeven 
moment kan zeggen, ja, ik ga het zelf doen. Pak maar een voorbeeldje, over een Reusel en 
Mierlo dan maar even die zaten heel erg op laagste kosten dat is ook best lastig met de 
begroting terwijl Bladel in dit geval zegt, ja, maar luister eens wij willen … (00:56:18?) als jij 
bent, dus dat mag, dat mag er een beetje mooier uitzien, die weg en die aansluiting, en dit en 
dat. Dan krijg je al dat die doelstellingen niet met mekaar vergelijkbaar zijn. 
  
SP2: Die discussie hadden wij ook constant in het … (00:56:28?) dat gaat over die nieuwe wijk. 
Nou dat ben ik zelf gewoon, ik heb een hele bedrijfsvoering achtergrond dus de afgelopen 
jaren heel vaak, vanuit de crisis hebben wij vaak discussie gehad, maar we hebben natuurlijk 
volop aanbiedingen gekregen van projectontwikkelaars. Wij hadden daar een mooi stukje 
grond liggen, mooie wijk, als we de prijs maar wat verlaagde, maar dan zie je binnen ons 
college was er ook, maar ook wel inderdaad toch een stroming die zegt, luister ho kwaliteit. 
Wij zijn Son en Breugel, en wij zitten in het groen ruim opgezet en dan wil je niet dat je over, 





SP1: Ja, ja, ja, dan heb je wel je hele leven er last van. 
  
SP2: Terwijl als je meer naar de centen kijkt. Nou ik zat zelf wat meer op de lijn, van ja goed, maar 
we hadden al behoorlijk wat af geraamd en zo, afgeboekt en zo, ik zeg van nou moeten we 
onderhand toch, nou dus ik was wel voor wat verdichting, natuurlijk altijd nog een beetje op 
de Son en Breugelse maat, maar dat is, dat waren heel interessante discussies. 
  
SP1: Dat is heel interessant ja.  
  
SP2: Die heb je daar natuurlijk ook tussen. 
  
SP1: Ja, ja, ja, precies en dat merken wij met die gezamenlijke trajecten ook vaak wel. En als je 
daar niet duidelijk van tevoren, die goals, die doelstellingen met mekaar ook gecentreerd 
afstemt dan heb je er heel veel last van in het traject. Maar dat herken ik wel. 
  
SP2: ik heb om half elf een gesprek met twee wethouders. ’t Was toch wel af hè. 
  
SP1: Dan zet ik hem uit als jij het goed vindt 
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 Operation Scheme 
 
THEMES, DIMENSIONS, SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
 
Introduction 
In chapter 3, the relation between Structural Procurement collaboration and collaborative advantage had been established. Focus on the joint 
relationship between local governments.  
 
Earlier, in chapter 1 and 2 has been argued the occasion of the two theories and expectations, which may improve procurement performance by 
local governments through structural collaborative procurement. By the conducted hypothesis in chapter 3, will be researched if these hypotheses 
in the researched business environment will be accepted or rejected.  
 
In the qualitative approach will identify the items, key performance indicators. Once the key indicators have been recognised in the qualitative 
element, a quantitative will be used to utilise statistical techniques to generalise. Creswell described this method as ‘dominant – less dominant’ 
design. In this study, a dominant-less dominant design will be applied with the emphasis being on the quantitative instrument (structural 
questionnaire) over the qualitative semi structured interviews.  
 
Theoretical Foundation: Structural Collaborative Procurement is a tool to achieve more value for local governments. 
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In chapter 4 will be researched more specifying the explanatory of this model, sourced by the two theories, that respects this theoretical funding 
in the ‘reality world’ of local government organisations in the Netherlands.   
 
In the table bellows are those advantages diverted off the theories of the literature, further defined and operationalised in dimensions, items and 
collected with key performance indicators. The objective of item generation is to achieve the content validity of constructs by reviewing literature 
(Chapter 2) and consulting with local government experts. The dimensions are reviewed, out of the extensive literature, which involve the 
procurement performance of the organisation by collaboration.  
 
These characterises will be discussed with experts of the local government organisations. These experts are Chief Financial officers (CFO’s), 
Chief Executive officers (CEO’s), Chief Procurement officers (CPO’s), and one mayor. All these experts are willing to take part in the focus 
group. The goal of the focus group is to check the collected item generations out of the literature, with the relevance and clarity of each item of 















Our local government 
organisation use cross 
organisational teams 
structural for process 
design and improvement 
-  Number innovative 
procedures 
- Number of improvement 
projects 
 
E-actions, click mini tenders, 
Design & Construct & 
Maintenance, Product 
development integrated in 
Procurement contracts 









Our local government 
organisations have access 
of dedicate personnel to 
manage the collaborative 
process 





signs, Dust collection, 
Students transport, health-
care  









Our local government 
organisations have access 
of professional 
procurement specialists to 
manage individual 
procurement projects 
- Number of procurement 




procurement project, public 
real estate, multi functional, 







Our local governments 
share technical knowledge 
- Number of external hiring of 
experts 
 
Sewerage, public lightning, 
transport, health-care 
- Survey 
Resource Effectively Resource Our local government - Number of innovative Collection dust 3 - Survey 







Dimensions Item Key Performance Indicator Examples Measuring 
Based 
Theory 




products, services and works. compartments in one 
vehicle, order systems, 







Our local government 
organisations have better 
relationships with 
suppliers 
- Number of complaints about 
performance suppliers 
- Additional costs  
 
Willingness to do more for 








Our local government 
organisations share 
equipment (network, IT, 
computers) 
- Number of procurements 
systems. 
- Costs per procurement 
project  
Tenderned, Negomatrix and 
Bizob information system 
- Documents 









Ours local government 
organisations pool 
procurement and no 
procurement resources 
(training, time, money, 
e.d.) 
Procurement hrm cost per 
turnover local government 
organisation 
Allocating technical 
knowledge between local 
government organisations in 
the same SCP 








Civil servant of local 
governments  are 
Number of project plans and 
time schedule 
Business working approach 
in public projects 









Dimensions Item Key Performance Indicator Examples Measuring 
Theory indirectly trained in 




















Number of experts per 
commodity in the collaboration 
region 














have more buying 
power to strategic 
contract terms 
Consolidated spend related to 
the individual spend 
Collaborated joint 
procurement projects 









have awareness of the 
demands 
Variety between specification 
of products of services 
Preference for technical 
systems 
- Semi structured 
interview 
- Survey 












have more control 
over 
information/position 
in the communication 
flow 
- Number communication 
documents. 
- Response rate 
Information and single point 
communication  











e of the supply market 
Number market analyses More structural up to date 










Number of legal objections  Information and single point 
communication  









Number of procurement expert 
related to spend 
Exchange and availability of 
procurement experts 





Effectively Demand share Local governments 
have together more 
Individual spend related to the 
collaborative spend 







Dimensions Item Key Performance Indicator Examples Measuring 
volume in the market - Survey 
Resource 
Based Theory 
Effectively Reputation Local governments 
uses the legitimacy 
Number of references to the 
collaborative organisation in 
business documents  




Effectively Reputation Local government 
hitchhike with 
collaborative brand 
Acquaintance in the market  Branch organisations of Local 















have agreement on 
the procurement goals 
and strategy 
Number of plans Long term collaborative 
commodity plans 









have agreement on 
the role of 
collaboration in the 
procurement 
processes 
Cycle time of collaborative 
procurement project 
The cycle time to achieve a 
desired output in 
collaborative procurement 
project 
- Semi structured 
interview 
- Survey 













make use of 
participation in few 
collaborative 
organisations for 
procurement projects  
Number of (external) 
organisations for procurement 
Affiliated public  (pps) 
organisations with insourced 
procurement organisation. 
For example: environment, 
health care, taxes, fire 
department etc.  










make use of a central 
organisation for 
procurement in the 
region 
Number of central agencies for 
procurement 









agree that the 
individual goals can be 
achieved through 
working toward the 
goals of the 
procurement 
processes. 
- Number of uniform strategic 
policy documents 
- Number collaborative 
procurement projects 
-  
Commitment, formal and 
acting 












Dimensions Item Key Performance Indicator Examples Measuring 
Cost Theory information jointly layout 
collaboration 
implementation plans 








Effectively Transparency of 
information 
Joint development of 
demand forecasts 
related to the market 
(demand/supply) 
Central forecast plans Follow up system for 
allocating the supply of the 
market in health market 
- Survey 




Effectively  Joint resolution on 
forecast exceptions  
Number of exceptions or 
modifications 
Demand allocating in the 
health market 
- Survey 










Number of formal strategic 
meetings  
Strategic meeting about 
procurement policy 
- Survey 




Effectively Transparency of 
information 
Joint plan about 
product-services, 
works commodities 
Central procurement plan for a 
region 





Transaction Effectively Transparency of Laws and regulations Central agency for procurement Joint legal procurement - Survey 







Dimensions Item Key Performance Indicator Examples Measuring 
Cost Theory information for local government 
strategy and mandate  















transaction costs in 
the sourcing phase 
Cost rate per procurement 
demand 












transaction costs in 
the supply phase 
Cost rate pro procurement 
contract 
No or limited procurement 
costs 
- Survey 












Management costs pro 
procurement contract 










IT-costs for execution 
of the procurement 
IT costs per procurement 
contract 











Dimensions Item Key Performance Indicator Example Measuring 















Costs of external independent 
experts pre procurement 
tender 
Central function (project 














Costs of external legal 
independent experts pre 
procurement project 
Central function (legal) for 
collaborative organisations 








public tender costs 
Costs of re-established tender 
per tender 
Caused by failures in the 
tender procedure 
- Survey 






Costs arising from the 
delay in 
implementation of 
Delay costs per tender Establishing of project. 
 
- Survey 
- Semi structured 
interview 













Cost of lawsuit Lawsuit costs per tender Lawsuit costs - Survey 




Effectively Standardisation Uniformity in the 
demand and 
specification 










Efficiency Standardisation Uniformity in the 
Human resources 
Number of standardized 
personnel characteristics 
Standardisation in 
organisation and profession 
skills of staff and 





Efficiency Standardisation Uniformity in the 
procurement process 
Standardised procurement 





process for supply 
Standardisation in research 
on potential suppliers, 
supplier selection, 















Dimensions Item Key Performance Indicator Example Measuring 
Resource 
Based Theory 
Effectively Value Introduce new services 
to citizen more rapidly 
Number of (innovative) product 
development 
Collecting dust - Survey 




Effectively Value Introduce flexibility to 
political or citizen 
demand 
Number of unexpected, not 
planned demand 
Take care of refugees - Survey 




Effectively Value Faster delivery of 
services to our citizen 
Number of realised projects Surplus of realised projects - Survey 











Efficiency Capabilities Focus on core activities Number of questions in the 
tender procedure 









Number  (and availability) and 
scope of central procurement 
management IT system 
Central procurement 
management IT system 
- Survey 
- Semi structured 
interview 
Resource Effectively Value Increases innovation Number of innovative products, Digital library IT system - Documents 







Dimensions Item Key Performance Indicator Example Measuring 






Effectively Capabilities Reduces 
(procurement) 
organisational risks 






Effectively Capabilities Improves strategic 
position 
Time registration Direct on call and available of 
procurement management 
- Survey 




Effectively Capabilities Get rid of problem 
functions 
General organisation policy Outsourcing or insourcing of 
procurement function 
- Survey 









  Themes content of  Interviews. 
 
The Dimensions of Resource Sharing divided into Themes 
Interviewees 
Themes 




- Necessary for 
small 
organisations.  







- Necessary if 
products and 
services are too 
diverse 
- Civil servant is 
too generally 
skilled 





especially at the 





especially at the 










Access to capacity - Constant 
contacts; not to 





- Relationship with 
procurement 
experts 
- Continuity of 
skilled experts 
- Continuity of 
skilled experts 






- Continuity of 
skilled experts 
- Continuity of 
skilled experts 
Public SSC are 
sluggish and  
Bureaucratic:  
not agile 
Access to - A lot of meetings - Professionalism - Procurement - Professionalism - Professional-ism - Profess-ionalism - Safety category 




















- Secure interest of 
LA 
expertise expertise national purchase 
groups 
- Facilities product/ 
services purchase 
groups at the regional 
level 






- Interesting to 
evaluate how 
other LAs handle 
EU procedures 











  - Civil servant 
sufficiently 
empowered by Bizob 
skills, especially 
collaborations skills 
- Share material 




- National and 
regional level 
 





teams for process 
design and 
improvement 
Pilot for one LA 
then available for 
each member 
    Pilot for one LA 








A B C D E F G 
Quality More quality in 
the procurement 
function 
More quality in 
the procurement 
function 
More quality in 
the procurement 
function 
More quality in the 
procurement 
function 
More quality in 
the procurement 
function 
More quality in 
the procurement 
function 








Visible in the LA 
organisation 
Visible in the LA 
organisation 
Visible in the LA 
organisation 
 Visible in the LA 
organisation 
Visible in the LA 
organisation 
 
Resource sharing   - Sharing of 
technical experts 
- Limited sharing 
experts, only from 
Helmond 
- Innovation out of 
ideas of individual 
organisation 
- Learning from 
Bizob experts 




- Not innovation 




- Sharing of 
technical experts 
- P&O funds 
benchmark 




standards, values and 
culture, the more the  
technical experts can 
be shared 














- Stronger buying 
partner in the 
market 










- Stronger buying 
partner in the 
market 









- Stronger buying 
partner in the market 













- Stronger buying 
partner in the 
market 
 













- Stronger buying 
partner in the 
market 





- Stronger buying 
partner in the market 
- Procurement 
function is less 
vulnerable but 




- Control of civil 
servants and Bizob 
by each other  
- Expectations - 
No hard facts and 
figures  
   - Developing 
structural IT 
procurement 
information for LA 
with SCP 
- Develop key 
figures for reliable 












A B C D E F G 
Demand and 
resources share 
- Stronger buying 
























partner in the 
market 
Stronger buying 

























LAs use reputation 
of Bizob for their 
internal control. 
 
Control by mayors if 











































 - Therefore 
insource 
procurement 








failures and risks 
 
- Decreased 
failures and risks 
 
- Decreased failures 
and risks 
 
Product Sustainability Sustainability Sustainability Collaborative Social value is also Sustainability Sustainability 





A B C D E F G 
development procurement procurement 
- Innovation will 





been too rarely 
transferred to 
civil servants 
through the SCP 
 
procurement 
Innovation will be 
created from 
external advisors  
procurement 







- Unknown if 
innovation 
procurement 









approach of SCP 
procurement 
 
Focus on core 
business LA 
- Specialisation 
- Function division 




Specialisation - Specialisation - Procurement 
function integral to 
civil service  
profession  










- On agenda of 
board/ politician 
- Civil servant is 
depend of Bizob 
- Familiar with 
processes versus 
ability to make 
processes 
- Professionalism 
- Not on agenda 
of board/ 
politician 
- Only difficult 
procurement issues 









More developed by 
SCP 
- Professionalism 
More developed by 
SCP 
- The indifference 
point: give in 
autonomy and  
SCP value 
Insourcing    - Cut budgets 
- Procurement = 
core business of 






A B C D E F G 
civil servant 
- Civil servant must 
know the market to 
decide to 
participate with 
joint tender or not 
 
 
Dimensions of Transaction Costs divided into Themes 
Interviewees 
Themes 




- Savings & gains 
plausible but not 
measurable 





- Savings & gains 
plausible but not 
measurable 












- Savings & gains 
plausible but not 
measurable 
- Lack of 
synchronisation 
results, no evidence 
- Focus of the 
politics  
 
- Procurement cost 
are not decreased, 
even more slightly 
increased  
- Procurement cost 
are concealed over 
departments 
- To realise hard 
savings, you have to 
















Procurement Expect Expect   - Higher Lower costs, costs Exchange 





A B C D E F G 






are divided over 
more LAs instead 


























- Uniformity of 
procurement 
dossiers 




By cut budgets 
    Structural 
collaboration caused 
by saving for: 
sewerage, water 
management, 








- Advice council of 
business control 
and finance 
- Alignment of 
financial 
information of all 
participating 





They are more 
focused on the 
 Linking with other 
collaborative 
arrangements in the 
region: Bizob has 
lead in time 







- Also symmetry 
of information 
depends on the 
maturity stage of 
the procurement 







A B C D E F G 
public 
organisations 
- Sluggishness of 
processes 
indivdual LAs activities between 
collaborative LA to 




















E-procurement - Civil servants must 
have knowledge 
about procurement 
to be critical and to 
understand Bizob 
 
E-procurement  - Consolidated 
procurement 
forecast plans 
- Short, middle and 
long term 
- Procurement 





























Yes Yes Yes GGD and ODZOB, 
government 
approved. 
- Directors do not 
want to be obliged 
to use services of 
SSCs 
- LA with most 
interest is leader  
- Fragmented with 
several LA 
procurement 
organisations in the 
region 
Yes  
Increase lower - Not measurable  -Not measurable  Not measurable  -Not measurable  -Not measurable  Measurable  - The indifference 





A B C D E F G 
costs (financial) value 
between in or 
outsourcing 
- Instinctively but 
no hard data  
- Converted fixed 
costs to variables 
costs 
(financial) value 
between in or 
outsourcing 





between in or 
outsourcing 





between in or 
outsourcing 





between in or 
outsourcing 
- Instinctively but no 
hard data 
- Expectations defining 
- Converted fixed costs 
to variables costs 
(financial) value 




point: give in 
autonomy and  
SCP value 
- Converted fixed 





    Costs a lot of money 
and time  
Costs a lot of 

















primary business  
- Not interested in 
goals of other 
members 








to inefficiency  
 
- Bad experience 




- Collaboration can 
be seen as a step to 
merging LAs 
- Independence is 
the goal; that 
delays 
collaboration 
- No goal alignment 
between LAs and IT 
SSCs 
- LA manager 
determines the 
- Few discussions 
about content 
specifications 
between LAs in joint 
procurement 
groups: unknown on 
board level 









initiated on cost 
reduction or product 
development 
 
- Depends on the 
ambition level of 




goals from the 
organisation 
goals? 
- Advantage for 
non-commercial 
services 




- Depends on the 







A B C D E F G 
extent of 
collaboration. 


















 Code scheme Questionnaire 
 
In the table bellows are those advantages diverted off the theories of the literature, further defined and operationalised in 
dimensions, items and collected with key performance indicators. The objective of item generation is to achieve the content validity 
of constructs by reviewing literature (Chapter 2) and consulting with local government experts. The dimensions are reviewed, out of 
the extensive literature, which involve the procurement performance of the organisation by collaboration.  
 






Our local government organisation use structural cross 
organisational teams for process design and improvement 
 
Mijn gemeente maakt structureel gebruik van multidisciplinaire 
teams/werkgroepen van een structurele inkoopsamenwerking voor 
innovatieve - en verbeteringsprojecten  
- Number innovative 
procedures 
- Number of improvement 
projects 
 
E-actions, click mini tenders, Design & Construct & 
Maintenance, Product development integrated in 
Procurement contracts 
 1: Never/Not al all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often  
  
SCPRBT2 Our local government organisation has access of dedicate 
personnel to manage the collaborative process 
 
Mijn gemeente kan over gespecialiseerde medewerkers beschikken van 
- Number of collaborative 
procurement projects 
Insurances, human flex-resources, energy, 
telecommunication, traffic signs, Dust collection, 
Students transport, health-care  
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Code Question / Item  Key Performance Indicator Examples 
een structurele inkoopsamenwerking om het gezamenlijk (inkoop) proces 
te leiden 




5: Strongly agree 
  
SCPRBT3 Our local government organisation has access of 
professional procurement specialists out of the structural 
collaborative procurement organisation to manage 
individual procurement projects 
 
Mijn gemeente kan beschikken over een professionele inkoper  
van een structurele inkoopsamenwerking, om individuele inkooptrajecten 
te begeleiden voor mijn gemeente 
- Number of procurement 
projects executed by 
professional procurement 
specialist.  
Each individual procurement project, public real 
estate, multi functional, IT hardware  




5: Strongly agree 
  
SCPRBT4 Our local governments share technical knowledge 
 
Mijn gemeente deelt materiedeskundigheid met andere gemeenten uit de 
- Number of external hiring of 
experts 




Code Question / Item  Key Performance Indicator Examples 
regio 
 1: Never/Not at all (0) 
2: Seldom/Rarely (1-2 dossiers/ times per year) 
3: Sometimes (3-5 dossiers/ times per year) 
4: Most of the time/Regular (6-10 dossiers/ times per year) 
5: All of the time/Often (>10 dossiers/ times per year) 
  
SCPRBT5 Our local government organisations have more advantages 
to product/technological developments comparing without 
structural collaborative procurement organisation 
 
Mijn gemeente heeft meer voordelen, door de structurele 
inkoopsamenwerking, met het toepassen van innovatieve uitvragen bij 
product en technologische ontwikkelingen 
- Number of innovative 
products, services and works. 
Collection dust 3 compartments in one vehicle, 
order systems, catering, cleaning services, health-
care 
 1: Much worse 
2: Worse 
3: About the same 
4: Better 
5: Much better 
  
SCPRBT6 Our local government organisation have better 
relationships with suppliers comparing without structural 
collaborative procurement organisation 
 
Mijn gemeente haalt meer uit haar zakelijke relatie met leveranciers, dan 
- Number of complaints about 
performance suppliers 
- Additional costs  
Willingness to do more for the same conditions in 
the contract 
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Code Question / Item  Key Performance Indicator Examples 
zonder gebruikt te maken van een structurele inkoopsamenwerking 
 1: Much worse 
2: Worse 
3: About the same 
4: Better 
5: Much better 
  
SCPRBT7 Our local government organisations share procurement 
equipment (network, IT, computers) 
 
Mijn gemeente deelt (o.a. ICT)  inkoop  software met andere gemeenten 
binnen de structurele inkoopsamenwerking  
- Number of procurements 
systems. 
- Costs per procurement 
project  
Tenderned, Negometrix and Bizob information 
system (project management) 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often  
  
SCPRBT8 Our local government organisations pool procurement and 
non procurement resources (training, time, money, e.d.) 
 
Mijn gemeente wisselt inkoopcapaciteit, opleidingen, kennis uit binnen de 
regio via een structurele inkoopsamenwerking 
Procurement hrm cost per 
turnover local government 
organisation 
Allocating technical knowledge between local 
government organisations in the same BIZOB 
region 
 1: Never/Not at all  





Code Question / Item  Key Performance Indicator Examples 
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often  
SCPRBT9 Civil servant of local governments are indirectly trained in 
business skills through the collaborative procurement 
organisation 
 
Ambtenaren binnen mijn gemeente hebben indirect vaardigheden en 
kennis overgenomen van de structurele inkoopsamenwerking 
Number of project plans and 
time schedule 
Business working approach in public projects 














Local government share/get access to critical procurement 
knowledge, expertise and resources via structural 
collaborative procurement organisation 
 
Mijn gemeente deelt en/of heeft de beschikking over schaarse 
inkoopkennis en inkoopcapaciteit via de structurele inkoopsamenwerking 
Number of experts per 
commodity in the 
collaboration region 
Allocation of knowledge and responsibilities: Dust 
management, sewerage management 
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Code Item Key Performance Indicator Examples 




5: Strongly agree 
  
SCPRDT2 Local governments have more buying power to strategic 
contract terms of monopolistic suppliers via structural 
collaborative procurement organisation 
 
Mijn gemeente heeft meer invloed op de voorwaarden van monopolistische 
leveranciers via de structurele inkoopsamenwerking 
Consolidated spend related to 
the individual spend 
Collaborated joint procurement projects 




5: Strongly agree 
  
SCPRDT3 Local governments have awareness of the demands and of 
the alternatives via structural collaborative procurement 
organisation 
 
Mijn gemeente is zich bewust van de verschillende en alternatieve 
specificaties van producten/diensten/werken via de structurele 
inkoopsamenwerking 
Variety between specification 
of products of services 




Code Item Key Performance Indicator Examples 




5: Strongly agree 
  
SCPRDT4 Local governments have more control over 
information/position in the communication flow via 
structural collaborative procurement organisation 
 
Mijn gemeente heeft meer grip op de informatievoorziening en 
communicatie in inkoopprocessen via de structurele inkoopsamenwerking 
- Number communication 
documents. 
- Response rate 
Information and single point communication  




5: Strongly agree 
  
SCPRDT5 Local governments have more information/knowledge of 
the supply market via structural collaborative procurement 
organisation 
 
Mijn gemeente ontvangt meer informatie en kennis uit de markt via de 
structurele inkoopsamenwerking 
Number market analyses More structural up to date information and 
experience available 
 1: Strongly disagree   
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5: Strongly agree 
SCPRDT6 Transparency of information during the procurement 
process via structural collaborative procurement 
organisation 
 
Inkoopprocessen worden transparanter uitgevoerd via de structurele 
inkoopsamenwerking 
Number of legal objections  Information and single point communication  
 1: Much worse 
2: Worse 
3: About the same 
4: Better 
5: Much better 
  
SCPRDT7 Local governments have more access to competitions/more 
buyers available via structural collaborative procurement 
organisation 
 
Mijn gemeente heeft meer beschikking over professionele inkopers via de 
structurele inkoopsamenwerking 
Number of procurement 
expert related to spend 
Exchange and availability of procurement experts 






Code Item Key Performance Indicator Examples 
3: Neutral 
4: Agree 
5: Strongly agree 
SCPRDT8 Local governments have together more volume in the 
market 
via structural collaborative procurement organisation 
 
Mijn gemeente koop via de structurele inkoopsamenwerking met meer 
volume in (schaalvoordelen) 
Individual spend related to 
the collaborative spend 
Consolidated spend 




5: Strongly agree 
  
SCPRDT9 Local governments uses the legitimacy via structural 
collaborative procurement organisation 
 
De inkoopsamenwerking heeft ook een legitimerend effect van goed 
opdrachtgeverschap voor mijn gemeente 
Number of references to the 
collaborative organisation in 
business documents  
Internal business documents 
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Code Item Key Performance Indicator Examples 
5: Strongly agree 
SCPRDT10 Local government hitchhike with collaborative brand via 
structural collaborative procurement organisation 
 
Mijn gemeente lift mee  met de bekendheid van de structurele 
inkoopsamenwerking 
Acquaintance in the market  Branch organisations of Local suppliers and 
national government  















Local governments have agreement on the procurement 
goals and strategy 
 
Mijn gemeente heeft binnen haar (sub)regio voor de middellange- en lange 
termijn dezelfde tactische inkoopdoelstellingen en strategische 
inkoopplannen  
Number of plans Long term collaborative commodity plans 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  





Code Item Key Performance Indicator Examples 
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
SCPAT2 Local governments have agreement on the role of 
collaboration in the procurement processes 
 
Mijn gemeente heeft afspraken met andere gemeenten, binnen de (inkoop) 
regio over gezamenlijke inkoopprocessen 
Cycle time of collaborative 
procurement project 
The cycle time to achieve a desired output in 
collaborative procurement project 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
  
SCPAT3 Local governments make use of (collaborative) public 
organisations where procurement function is integrated and 
executing the procurement function  
 
Regionale publieke organisaties voeren voor mijn gemeente publieke 
activiteiten, inclusief de aanbesteding/inkoop uit (geen Bizob). 
 
Number of (external) public 
organisations for 
procurement 
Affiliated public  (pps) organisations with insourced 
procurement organisation. For example: 
environment, health care, taxes, fire department etc. 
(GGD, ODZOB, gemeente, Werkvoorzieningsschap) 
 1: Never/Not al all (0) 
2: Seldom/Rarely (1 organisation) 
3: Sometimes (2-3 organisations) 
4: Most of the time/Regular (4-5 organisations) 
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Code Item Key Performance Indicator Examples 
5: All of the time/Often (>5 organisations) 
SCPAT4 Local government makes use of a central organisation for 
procurement in the region 
 
Mijn gemeente maakt gebruikt van een publieke structurele organisatie(s) 
in de regio voor haar inkoopvraagstukken  
Number of central agencies 
for procurement 
Agency Rijk, Bizob, Inkoop gemeente Eindhoven, 
Inkoop gemeente Helmond, etc. 
 1: Never/Not al all (0) 
2: Limited (1-2) 
3: Several (3-5) 
4: Substantial (6-10) 
5: Many (>10) 
  
SCPAT5 Local governments agree that the individual goals can be 
achieved through working toward the goals of the 
collaborative procurement processes. 
 
Mijn gemeente herkent dat haar individuele inkoop doelen bereikt worden 
door gezamenlijke inkoop en niet beperkt worden door de structurele 
(inkoop) samenwerking  
- Number of uniform 
strategic policy documents 
- Number collaborative 
procurement projects 
- Central project managers 
Commitment, formal and acting 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  





Code Item Key Performance Indicator Examples 
SCPAT6 Local governments jointly layout collaboration 
implementation plans under supervision of the structural 
collaborative procurement organistion to achieve the goals 
of the procurement function  
 
Mijn gemeente stelt samen met haar regio gemeenten onder leiding van de 
structurele inkoopsamenwerking jaarlijkse inkoopplanen op, om haar 
doelstellen te realiseren 
Consolidated procurement 
plans 
Annual procurement plans 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
  
SCPAT7 Local government develops jointly plans for the demand 
forecasts related to the market (demand/supply) under 
supervision of the structural collaborative procurement 
organistion 
Mijn gemeente bewaakt en actualiseert periodiek de inkoopplannen met 
haar regio gemeenten en houdt daarbij rekening met marktontwikkelingen 
onder begeleiding van de inkoopsamenwerking 
Central forecast plans Follow up system for allocating the supply of the 
market in health market 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
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Code Item Key Performance Indicator Examples 
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
SCPAT8 Local government take jointly resolutions on forecast 
exceptions if occurs under supervision of the structural 
collaborative procurement organisation 
Mijn gemeente neemt gezamenlijk met regio gemeenten van de 
inkoopsamenwerking, besluiten over uitzonderingen /afwijkingen t.o.v. het 
gezamenlijk inkoopplan 
Number of exceptions or 
modifications 
Demand allocating in the health market 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
  
SCPAT9 Local government structurally consulting concerning 
procurement policy with their partners out of the region  
Mijn gemeente heeft periodiek overleg inzake het inkoopbeleid met andere 
gemeenten van de structurele inkoopsamenwerking 
Number of formal strategic 
meetings  
Strategic meeting about procurement policy 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  





Code Item Key Performance Indicator Examples 
5: All of the time/Often 
SCPAT10 Local governments in your region have joint procurement 
plan about product-services, works commodities 
De gemeenten in de regio hebben gezamenlijke inkoopplannen voor 
leveringen/diensten, werken en het Sociale domein 
Central procurement plan for 
a region 
Central tactical procurement plan 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
  
SCPAT11 Your local government make use of a legal procurement 
center for law and regulations 
Mijn gemeente heeft beschikking tot een juridsche aanbestedings helpdesk 
binnen haar structurele inkoopsamenwerking 
Central agency for 
procurement law and 
regulation 
Joint legal procurement department 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
  
 












Minimising of transaction costs in the sourcing phase, 
tender phase  
 
Structurele inkoopsamenwerking leidt tot lagere inkoopkosten en 
transactiekosten van inkoop en aanbetedignstrajecten.  
 
Cost rate per procurement 
demand 
No or limited procurement costs 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
  
SCPTC2 Minimising of transaction costs in the supply phase 
 
Structurele inkoopsamenwerking leidt tot lagere inkoopkosten en 
transactiekosten van bewaken en managen van contracten  
 
Cost rate pro procurement 
contract 
No or limited procurement costs 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  





SCPTC3 Minimising of procurement management costs 
 
Structurele inkoopsamenwerking leidt tot lagere kosten van managen van 
de inkoopfunctie  
 
Management costs pro 
procurement contract 
No or limited procurement costs 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
  
SCPTC4 IT-costs for execution of the procurement processes  
 
Structurele inkoopsamenwerking leidt tot lagere kosten van ICT om 
inkooptrajecten te kunnen uitvoeren 
IT costs per procurement 
contract 
No or limited procurement costs 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
  
SCPTC5 Number of independent procurement experts 
Number of independent technical experts 
 
Structurele inkoopsamenwerking leidt tot lagere kosten t.b.v. het inhuren 
van externe (privaat) t.b.v. inkoop en aanbestedingstrajecten.  
Costs of external independent 
experts pre procurement 
tender 
Central function (project or/and technical) for 
collaborative organisations 




 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
  
SCPTC6 External-independent costs of legal knowhow of procedures 
or contracts  
 
Structurele inkoopsamenwerking leidt tot lagere kosten van het inhuren 
van externe (privaat) juridische aanbestedingskennis 
Costs of external legal 
independent experts pre 
procurement project 
Central function (legal) for collaborative 
organisations 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
  
SCPTC7 Re-establishing of public tender costs 
 
Structurele inkoopsamenwerking  voorkomt van fouten/ minder fouten in 
de inkoopprocedure? 
Costs of re-established tender 
per tender 
Caused by failures in the tender procedure 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  





5: All of the time/Often 
SCPTC8 Costs arising from the delay in implementation of public 
contracts 
 
Structurele inkoopsamenwerking leidt tot snellere doorlooptijd van de 
uitvoering/ implementatie van contracten 
Delay costs per tender Establishing of project. 
 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
  
SCPTC9 Cost of lawsuit 
 
Structurele inkoopsamenwerking leidt tot minder rechtszaken (lagere 
juridische kosten) ten aanzien van aanbestedingsprocedures 
Lawsuit costs per tender Lawsuit costs 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
  
SCPTC10 Uniformity in the demand and specification 
 
Structurele inkoopsamenwerking leidt tot standaardisatie en uniformiteit 
in behoefte en specificatie 
Number of product or brands 
characteristics: 
Standardisation in specifications, quality standards, 
after-sales requirements 
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 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
  
SCPTC11 Uniformity in the Human resources 
Structurele inkoopsamenwerking leidt tot standaardisatie en uniformiteit 
in de inkoopdienstverlening  
Number of standardized 
personnel characteristics 
Standardisation in organisation and profession 
skills of staff and management of staff 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
  
SCPTC12 Uniformity in the procurement process 
Structurele inkoopsamenwerking leidt tot standaardisatie en uniformiteit 
binnen het inkoopproces 
 
Standardised procurement 
process for sourcing  
Standardised procurement 
process for supply 
Standardisation in research on potential suppliers, 
supplier selection, negotiation and contracting. 
Standardization in evaluation and follow-up 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  





5: All of the time/Often 
 
 








Introduce new services to citizen more rapidly via structural 
collaborative procurement organisation 
 
 
Nieuwe/ Innovatieve dienstverlening en producten zijn sneller bij de 
burger door betrokkenheid van de structurele inkoopsamenwerking 
Number of (innovative) 
product development 
Collecting dust 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
  
SCPCCT2 Introduce flexibility to political or citizen demand via 
structural collaborative procurement organisation 
 
Meer flexibiliteit t.b.v. het realiseren van ‘ad hoc’ ontstane inkoopbehoefte 
(geinitieerd door politiek en uiteindelijk voor de burgers) via de structurele 
inkoopsamenwerking 
 
Number of unexpected, not 
planned demand 
Take care of refugees 
 1: Never/Not at all    
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2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
SCPCCT3 Increase lower costs via structural collaborative 
procurement organisation 
 
Lagere kosten voor de inkoopfunctie via structurele inkoopsamenwerking 
Lower procurement costs Reduction of costs out of the procurement function 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
  
SCPCCT6 Increases innovation via structural collaborative 
procurement organisation 
 
Meer innovatie in leveringen/diensten , werken en binnen het sociale 
domein via de structurele inkoopsamenwerking 
Number of innovative 
products, services and 
infrastructural works 
Digital library IT system 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  





SCPCCT8 Reduces (procurement) operational risks via structural 
collaborative procurement organisation 
 
Vermindering van operationele capaciteit risico. 
Structurele inkoopsamenwerking is minder gevoelig voor verstoringen in 
de beschikbaarheid van (human) resource 
Time registration Consistent in procurement function capacity 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
5: All of the time/Often 
  
SCPCCT7 Improves strategic position via structural collaborative 
procurement organisation 
 
Direct beschikking over inkoopmanagers indien noodzakelijk bij 
vraagstukken via de structurele inkoopsamenwerking 
Time registration Direct on call and available of procurement 
management 
 1: Never/Not at all  
2: Seldom/Rarely  
3: Sometimes  
4: Most of the time/Regular  
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Synthesising into mixed methods research 
A pilot study to establish the procedures and parameters was worthwhile in mixed 
methods research to determine applicable levels of independent variables and to 
determine the reliability and validity of the observational methods used, which are 
crucial for success (Bordens & Abott, 2002). Although it takes additional time, it can 
help to prevent confusion or misinterpretations, which ultimately saves time. In this 
mixed methods research, it was useful to run a pilot study by formulating the 
hypotheses and conducting interviews. For the second phase, it made sense to test the 
questionnaire. For the consistency of the research, the same group of experts for testing 
were used.  
 
Bizob and process cost of public tenders 
The collaborative public procurement organisation Bizob is described in chapter 1. In 
this paragraph, the time spent on sourcing commodities individually or jointly for more 
local governments will compared. This pilot-case study applies the technique from 
Karjalainen (2011) to financial procurement cost data from the Bizob region. In further 
chapters, the basis of the data analysis, data collection, methods and research plan will 
be developed.  
 
The data have been measured in an intra-compaction table digital E-time-management 
system. Procurement practitioners, who have executed procurement projects, are 
obligated to register time spent in this system. An external accountant controls the 
system. Table 6 presents a download of the management report of the pilot-case study in 
the Bizob environment. 
 
In the table below, the difference in time, ex-ante procurement cost, for executing 
several procurement projects is shown. These procurement projects have been executed 
for local government organisations in the Southeast of the Netherlands by the Bizob 
procurement organisation. These are compared to those procurement product/service 







Tender: Municipality Days spent 
for 
individual: 
Days spent by 
collaboration: 
Difference in days 
spent 
Transport of elderly people Asten - Someren 8 6.3 -1.7 
Transport of elderly people Deurne 9 6.3 -2.7 
Transport of elderly people Asten 7 6.3 -0.7 
Transport of elderly people Deurne 12.5 6.3 -6.2 
Transport of elderly people Gemert-Bakel 10.5 6.3 -4.2 
Transport of elderly people Son en Breugel 16.3 6.3 -10 
Insurance Best 3 1.8 -1.2 
Social health Peel 9 7.2 -1.8 
Social health Waalre 23.5 7.2 -16.3 
Inspection and control of sewerage Asten 3.2 4 0.8 
Inspection and control of sewerage Bladel 3 4 1 
Inspection and control of sewerage Someren 4.5 4 -0.5 
Inspection and control of sewerage Someren 3 4 1 
Stair lifts Son en Breugel 5.5 5.8 0.3 
Stair lifts 5 Kempen 
gemeenten 
4.4 5.8 1.4 
Printed materials Oirschot 3 2 -1 
Printed materials Reusel- De Mierden 3 2 -1 




It is interesting that for 72% of the procurement projects, the collaborative approach 
took less time compared to the individual approach. 
 
The graph below shows for one commodity – the transport of elderly people – the 
difference in time spent of the ex-ante procurement time between individual 





Collaborative procurement versus individual procurement






It is interesting in this commodity that the collaborative approach for time spent is less 
for every municipality. On the other hand, for the commodities inspection and control, 
sewerage and stair lifts, this conclusion is not always valid and follow-up studies are 
required in great depth. 
 
The coming up table shows the chains of agencies for the (principal) local government 
municipalities in South East of Brabant. The listed LAs have the financial risk of the 











Deurne Asten Deurne Gemert-Bakel Son en Breugel
Collaborative procurement of transport of elderly people per 
municipallity
Days for combined purchasing Days per municipallity
Agency ODZOB/ODBN GGD Bizob BNG Peel	6.1 VRBZO VHHBZO MRE/SRE GRSK GRSA2 WVK KBP Dommelvallei Brainport
Local	Authority
Asten x x x x x x x x x
Bergeijk x x x x x x x x x x
Best x x x x x x x x
Bladel	 x x x x x x x x x x
Cranendonck x x x x x x x x
Deurne x x x x x x x x
Eersel x x x x x x x x x x
Geldrop-Mierlo x x x x x x x x
Gemert-Bakel x x x x x x x x
Haaren x x x x x
Heeze-Leende x x x x x x x x
Laarbeek x x x x x x x x
Nuenen x x x x x x x x
Oirschot x x x x x x x x
Reusel-De	Mierden x x x x x x x x x x
Someren x x x x x x x x
Son	en	Breugel x x x x x x x x
Uden x x x x x x
Valkenswaard x x x x x x x
Veldhoven x x x x x x x x
Vught x x x x x







































































































 Sub-scale consistency 
 
1. Sub-Scale consistency dimension: Resource Dependency Diminishing 
With concern to the consistency subscale resource dependence diminishing a Cronbach 
α coefficient of 0,706 was resumed, which stated an acceptable internal consistency as 
implied in Table IV-1 
 
Table IV-1 
Reliability Statistics: Resource Dependence Diminishing 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
,706 ,708 2 
 
Moreover, the statistics dimension resource sharing, table….., shows only positive 
correlations, which anew suggest that each item is measuring the same underlying 
construct and the corrected item-total correlation is 0,548, above the recommended 0.3 
level (Pallant, 2010, p. 100; Pavot et al., 1991).  
Thirdly the statistics dimension resource sharing, Table IV-2 item-total statistics shows 
only positive correlations, which suggest that each item is measuring the same 
underlying construct and the corrected item-total correlation is above the recommended 
0.3 level (Pallant, 2010, p. 100; Pavot et al., 1991).  
 
Table IV-2 
Item-Total Statistics: : Resource Dependence Diminishing 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 







if Item Deleted 
SCPRDT1 4,38 2,721 ,548 ,300 . 
SCPRDT2 5,17 2,330 ,548 ,300 . 
 
The Cronbach α if deleted, the split-half coefficient and coefficient alpha are not 
calculated for this subscale dimension because there are only two items, which is too 
few for a Cronbach α if deleted, the split-half coefficient and coefficient alpha (Green & 
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2) Sub-Scale consistency dimension: Information Asymmetry 
With regard to Information Asymmetry subscale a Cronbach α coefficient of 0,890 was 
returned submitting a satisfactory internal consistency and reliability for the scale as 
show in Table IV-3. 
Table IV-3 
Reliability Statistics: Information Asymmetry 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
,890 ,893 4 
 
Item analyses, the inter-item correlations were conducted on the four items 
hypothesised to assess Information Asymmetry. Initially, each of the four items were 
correlated with the total score for Information Asymmetry. All the corrected item-total 
correlations were positive and greater than 0.30, viewed in Table IV-4 
 
Table IV-4 
Item-Total Statistics: Information Asymmetry 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 







if Item Deleted 
SCPRDT3 13,73 14,398 ,816 ,699 ,838 
SCPRDT4 14,08 14,313 ,816 ,697 ,837 
SCPRDT5 13,89 14,867 ,711 ,519 ,876 
SCPRDT6 13,74 13,865 ,706 ,508 ,882 
 
 
To finish, two internal consistency estimates of reliability were computed for the 
Resource sharing scale: a split-half coefficient expressed as a Spearman_Brown 
corrected correlation and coefficient alpha. For the split-half coefficient, the scale was 
split into two halves such that the two halves would be as equivalent as possible. In 
splitting the items/variables, one of the halves included even and odd item/variable of 
resource sharing. Values for coefficient alpha an the split-half coefficient were the same 









Reliability Statistics: : Information Asymmetry 
Cronbach's Alpha Part 1 Value ,816 
N of Items 2a 
Part 2 Value ,806 
N of Items 2b 
Total N of Items 4 
Correlation Between Forms ,789 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient Equal Length ,882 
Unequal Length ,882 
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient ,881 
a. The items are: SCPRDT3, SCPRDT5. 
b. The items are: SCPRDT4, SCPRDT6. 
 
3) Sub-Scale consistency dimension: Demand Share 
Once again a Cronbach α coefficient of 0,708 was returned submitting a satisfactory 
internal consistency and reliability for the scale as show in Table IV-6. 
 
Table IV-6 
Reliability Statistics: Demand Share 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
,708 ,708 2 
 
 
The inter-item correlation was also conducted and checked for positive correlations to 
confirm that separately items were measuring the similar underlying construct. Again 
correct item-total correlation was above 0.3 (here 0.548) (Green & Salkind, 2014; 
Pallant, 2010, p. 100).  
 
Table IV-7 
Item-Total Statistics: Demand Share 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 







if Item Deleted 
SCPRDT7 5,30 2,190 ,548 ,300 . 
SCPRDT8 5,17 2,293 ,548 ,300 . 
 
The Cronbach α if deleted, the split-half coefficient and coefficient alpha are not 
calculated for this subscale dimension because there are only two items, which is too 
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few for a Cronbach α if deleted, the split-half coefficient and coefficient alpha (Green & 
Salkind, 2014, pp. 293-300). 
 
4) Sub-Scale consistency dimension: Reputation 
The dimension Reputation contents two items. With regard to Information Asymmetry 
subscale a Cronbach α coefficient of 0,849 was returned submitting a satisfactory 
internal consistency and reliability for the scale as show in Table IV-8. 
 
Table IV-8 
Reliability Statistics: Reputation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
,849 ,849 2 
 
The item-total Statics in Table IV-9, shows analyses on two items which are component 




Item-Total Statistics: Reputation 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 







if Item Deleted 
SCPRDT9 4,66 2,165 ,737 ,543 . 
SCPRDT10 4,80 2,076 ,737 ,543 . 
 
The Cronbach α if deleted, the split-half coefficient and coefficient alpha are not 
calculated for this subscale dimension because there are only two items, which is too 
few for a Cronbach α if deleted, the split-half coefficient and coefficient alpha (Green & 
Salkind, 2014, pp. 293-300). 
 
5) Sub-Scale consistency dimension: Goal Synchronisation 
With concern to the consistency subscale Goal Synchronisation five significant tests are 
executed. 
First a Cronbach α coefficient of 0,482 was resumed, which stated an insufficient 
consistency for respondents, as implied in Table IV-10, Reliability statistics (Green & 






Reliability Statistics: Goal Synchronisation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
,482 ,459 5 
 
 
Secondly, Table IV-11item-total shows Cronbach’s Alpha if item deleted, of Cronbach 
α coefficient of 0.640 if item SCPAT5 will be deleted. Thirdly also the Corrected Item-
Total Correlation is negative for item SCPAT 5, which indicates that SCPAT5 is not 
measuring the same underlying construct in this sub-scale (Green & Salkind, 2014; 




Item-Total Statistics: Goal Synchronisation 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 







if Item Deleted 
SCPAT1 17,93 12,846 ,356 ,478 ,356 
SCPAT2 17,48 13,333 ,412 ,526 ,331 
SCPAT3 17,95 13,124 ,305 ,286 ,394 
SCPAT4 18,13 11,881 ,422 ,278 ,300 
SCPAT5 18,60 19,438 -,148 ,094 ,640 
 
 
Conversely, the occasion of negative values correlated with item SCPAT5 ‘My LA 
recognises that her individual procurement goals are restricted by SCP’, suggested that 
this item/question required supplementary investigation and was possibly a negatively 
expressed question, among other questions of this sub-scale dimension.  
 
The other items/questions SCPAT1, SCPAT2, SCPAT3 and SCPAT4, are more in an 
objective and neutral way wording, comparing with SCPAT5. 
SCPAT1 “My LA has agreements about Procurement strategy with the participants”; 
SCPAT2 “My LA has agreements about Procurement operation with the participants”; 
SCPAT3  “Regional public agencies procure primarily business besides SCP” 
SCPAT4 “My LA uses often SCP or other public agencies for her procurement 
function”  
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Nevertheless, comparing SCPAT5 with SCPAT1, SPCAT1 had a positive/neutral 
position and SPCAT5 a more negative wording. High ranking suits on the confirmation 
of the proposition of the item, therefore SCPAT5 was not inverted. For the other items, 
SCPAT1, SCPAT2, SCPAT3, SCPAT4, the corrected item-total correlation was 
exceeding the mentioned level of 0.3.  
 
Finally two internal consistency estimates of reliability were computed for the Goal 
Synchronisation scale: a split-half coefficient expressed as a Spearman_Brown 
corrected correlation and coefficient alpha. For the split-half coefficient, the scale was 
split into two halves such that the two halves would be as equivalent as possible. In 
splitting the items/variables, one of the halves included even and odd item/variable of 
resource sharing. Values for coefficient alpha an the split-half coefficient were the same 
0.810 each indicating acceptable reliability, showed in Table IV-12 
 
Table IV-12 
Reliability Statistics: Goal Synchronisation 
Cronbach's Alpha Part 1 Value ,126 
N of Items 2a 
Part 2 Value ,372 
N of Items 2b 
Total N of Items 4 
Correlation Between Forms ,681 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient Equal Length ,810 
Unequal Length ,810 
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient ,810 
a. The items are: SCPAT1, SCPAT3. 
b. The items are: SCPAT2, SCPAT4. 
 
6) Sub-Scale consistency dimension: Transparency of Information 
Once again the Cronbach α was assessed for the subscale Transparency of Information, 





Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 





The Table IV-14 shows firstly that the item corrected correlations are positive. Secondly 
the table showed for SCPAT9 correlation < 0.3, which needed more examination. The 
item SCPAT9, “My LA has frequently consultation about procurement policy with 
member of the SCP”, had a correlation value 0.275. On the other hand in combination 
with the overall score of Cronbach α coefficient 0.970 item SCPAT9 has not been 
removed (Pallant, 2010, p. 100). 
 
Table IV-14 
Item-Total Statistics: Transparency of information 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 







if Item Deleted 
SCPAT6 21,27 41,359 ,657 ,615 ,766 
SCPAT7 22,00 42,447 ,773 ,659 ,743 
SCPAT8 22,53 42,831 ,651 ,455 ,768 
SCPAT9 21,99 52,960 ,275 ,243 ,845 
SCPAT10 21,43 49,195 ,506 ,281 ,800 
SCPAT11 21,62 43,606 ,629 ,493 ,773 
 
Completely two internal consistency estimates of reliability were calculated for the Goal 
Synchronisation scale: a split-half coefficient expressed as a Spearman_Brown 
corrected correlation and coefficient alpha. For the split-half coefficient, the scale was 
split into two halves such that the two halves would be as equivalent as possible. In 
splitting the items/variables, one of the halves included even and odd item/variable of 
Transparency of Information. Values for coefficient alpha an the split-half coefficient 
were the same 0.870 each demonstrating acceptable reliability, showed in Table IV-12. 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha Part 1 Value ,688 
N of Items 3a 
Part 2 Value ,601 
N of Items 3b 
Total N of Items 6 
Correlation Between Forms ,771 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient Equal Length ,870 
Unequal Length ,870 
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient ,868 
a. The items are: SCPAT6, SCPAT8, SCPAT10. 
b. The items are: SCPAT7, SCPAT9, SCPAT11. 
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7) Sub-Scale consistency dimension: Procurement Cost 
Again, primarily the Cronbach α coefficient of 0.896 demonstrated good internal 
consistency reliability in the sub-scale Procurement Cost (Table IV-15).  
 
Table IV-15 
Reliability Statistics: Procurement Costs 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
,896 ,899 9 
 
The positive correlations validated, the strength association with the items in this sub-
scale. Furthermore the correct item-total correlations of this sub-scale are higher than 
0.3. Hence, the variable/items construct of the sub-scale, emphasis strength linear 
relationship (J. Collis & Hussey, 2014, p. 270).  Nevertheless for SCPTC4 Cronbach α 
coefficient if item deleted showed a marginally increasing of 0,004. Unrushed with the 
Corrected Item-Total Correlation > 0.3 and the high Cronbach’s Alpha, SCPTC4 has 
not been removed.  
 
Table IV-16 
Item-Total Statistics: Procurement Costs 
 
Scale Mean if Item 
Deleted 







if Item Deleted 
SCPTC1 32,14 80,419 ,785 ,699 ,875 
SCPTC2 33,02 83,949 ,596 ,461 ,889 
SCPTC3 32,74 81,544 ,755 ,611 ,877 
SCPTC4 33,17 85,295 ,484 ,316 ,900 
SCPTC5 32,07 84,019 ,705 ,738 ,882 
SCPTC6 32,30 83,111 ,686 ,740 ,883 
SCPTC7 32,23 79,207 ,719 ,690 ,880 
SCPTC8 33,40 85,392 ,566 ,391 ,892 
SCPTC9 32,75 81,363 ,678 ,655 ,883 
At least two internal consistency estimates of reliability were calculated for the 
Procurement Cost sub-scale: a split-half coefficient expressed as a Spearman_Brown 
corrected correlation and coefficient alpha. For the split-half coefficient, the scale was 
split into two halves such that the two halves would be as equivalent as possible. In 
splitting the items/variables, one of the halves included even and odd item/variable of 
Procurement Costs. Values for coefficient alpha and the split-half coefficient were 







Reliability Statistics: Procurement Costs 
Cronbach's Alpha Part 1 Value ,883 
N of Items 5a 
Part 2 Value ,712 
N of Items 4b 
Total N of Items 9 
Correlation Between Forms ,774 
Spearman-Brown  
Coefficient 
Equal Length ,872 
Unequal Length ,874 
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient ,849 
a. The items are: SCPTC1, SCPTC3, SCPTC5, SCPTC7, SCPTC9. 
b. The items are: SCPTC2, SCPTC4, SCPTC6, SCPTC8. 
 
8) Sub-Scale consistency dimension: Standardisation 
Concerning to the consistency of the sub-scale Standardisation (Table IV-18), which 
contents three variables/items, the Cronbach α coefficient of 0,856 showed sufficient 





Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
,856 ,857 3 
 
Completed with positive Corrected Item-Total Correlation no variables/items have been 
removed. Subsequent, correlation contents value were greater than 0.3 (Green & 
Salkind, 2014, p. 311). At least, Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted were no greater by 
deleting one of the variables/items than the Cronbach Alpha 0.856. So no variable/item 





Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 







if Item Deleted 
SCPTC10 9,29 7,103 ,710 ,507 ,817 
SCPTC11 9,14 6,521 ,752 ,566 ,777 
SCPTC12 9,45 6,463 ,727 ,532 ,802 
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The split-half coefficient and coefficient alpha are not calculated for this subscale 
dimension because there are only three items, which is too few for a, the split-half 
coefficient and coefficient alpha (Green & Salkind, 2014, pp. 293-300). 
 
9) Sub-Scale consistency dimension: Value 
Concerning to the consistency of the sub-scale Value (Table IV-20), which contents 
four variables/items, the Cronbach α coefficient of 0,740 showed necessary consistency 
reliability in the sub-scale.  
 
Table IV-20 
Reliability Statistics: Value 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
,740 ,744 4 
 
As consequence of calculations the Table IV-21 demonstrate positive corrected item-
total Correlations for SPCCT1, SPCCT2, SPCCT3 and SPCCCT6. Supplemented with 
corrected item-total correlations greater than 0.3, indicated for reliable construct (J. 
Collis & Hussey, 2014; Green & Salkind, 2014; Pallant, 2010). At least, Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item Deleted were no superior by deleting one of the variables/items than the 
Cronbach Alpha 0.740. So no variable/item has been removed. 
 
Table IV-21 
Item-Total Statistics: Value 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 







if Item Deleted 
SCPCCT1 11,14 13,169 ,636 ,493 ,628 
SCPCCT2 11,04 12,011 ,606 ,454 ,636 
SCPCCT3 10,31 13,541 ,453 ,256 ,729 
SCPCCT6 10,74 14,319 ,456 ,308 ,722 
 
 
Finally two internal consistency estimates of reliability were computed for the Value 
scale: a split-half coefficient expressed as a Spearman_Brown corrected correlation and 
coefficient alpha. For the split-half coefficient, the scale was split into two halves such 
that the two halves would be as equivalent as possible. In splitting the items/variables, 




Completely two internal consistency estimates of reliability were calculated for the Goal 
Synchronisation scale: a split-half coefficient expressed as a Spearman_Brown 
corrected correlation and coefficient alpha. For the split-half coefficient, the scale was 
split into two halves such that the two halves would be as equivalent as possible. In 
splitting the items/variables, one of the halves included even and odd item/variable of 
Transparency of Information. Values for coefficient alpha an the split-half coefficient 
were the same 0.834 each indicating acceptable reliability, showed in Table IV-22. 
 
Table IV-22 
Reliability Statistics: Value 
Cronbach's Alpha Part 1 Value ,477 
N of Items 2a 
Part 2 Value ,470 
N of Items 2b 
Total N of Items 4 
Correlation Between Forms ,716 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient Equal Length ,834 
Unequal Length ,834 
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient ,834 
a. The items are: SCPCCT1, SCPCCT3. 
b. The items are: SCPCCT2, SCPCCT6. 
 
10) Sub-Scale consistency dimension: Capabilities 
For the last sub-scale, Capabilities, again 5 assessments have been executed. Firstly the 
Cronbach α coefficient of 0.843 suggested that the scale scores are reasonably reliable 





Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
,843 ,846 4 
 
Subsequently, the positive Corrected Item-Total Correlation and the corresponding 
value of greater than 0.3 performed, that each item is measuring the same underlying 
construct. The corrected item-total correlations are above recommended 0.3 level 
(Pallant, 2010, p. 100; Pavot et al., 1991). Fourthly Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted 
were no superior by deleting one of the variables/items than the Cronbach Alpha 0.843, 
hence no variable/item has been removed. 







Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 







if Item Deleted 
SCPCCT4 12,51 18,301 ,698 ,503 ,794 
SCPCCT5 12,82 18,457 ,642 ,431 ,816 
SCPCCT7 13,06 17,389 ,707 ,514 ,788 
SCPCCT8 13,00 15,810 ,681 ,480 ,805 
 
Completely two internal consistency estimates of reliability were calculated for the Goal 
Synchronisation scale: a split-half coefficient expressed as a Spearman_Brown 
corrected correlation and coefficient alpha. For the split-half coefficient, the scale was 
split into two halves such that the two halves would be as equivalent as possible. In 
splitting the items/variables, one of the halves included even and odd item/variable of 
Transparency of Information. Values for coefficient alpha a the split-half coefficient 
were the same 0.851 each validating adequate reliability, showed in Table IV-25 
 
Table IV-25 
Reliability Statistics: Capabilities 
Cronbach's Alpha Part 1 Value ,759 
N of Items 2a 
Part 2 Value ,687 
N of Items 2b 
Total N of Items 4 
Correlation Between Forms ,741 
Spearman-Brown Coefficient Equal Length ,851 
Unequal Length ,851 
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient ,850 
a. The items are: SCPCCT4, SCPCCT7. 







 Skewness and Kurtosis 
analysis  
 
Table Skewness and Kurtosis Analysis 
Skewness and Kurtosis analysis 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Sta Std. Error 
SCPRBT1 110 1 6 4.34 1.396 -.479 .230 -.660 .457 
SCPRBT2 109 1 7 5.35 1.696 -.923 .231 -.042 .459 
SCPRBT3 107 1 7 5.32 1.886 -1.038 .234 -.040 .463 
SCPRBT4 109 1 7 4.69 1.631 -.434 .231 -.514 .459 
SCPRBT5 108 1 7 4.65 1.584 -.521 .233 -.579 .461 
SCPRBT6 107 1 7 4.51 1.568 -.527 .234 -.349 .463 
SCPRBT7 106 1 7 4.24 2.012 -.266 .235 -1.341 .465 
SCPRBT8 108 1 7 4.02 1.829 -.047 .233 -1.158 .461 
SCPRBT9 109 1 7 4.39 1.509 -.748 .231 -.220 .459 
SCPRDT1 97 1 7 5.18 1.521 -.920 .245 .564 .485 
SCPRDT2 96 1 7 4.38 1.650 -.608 .246 -.279 .488 
SCPRDT3 96 1 7 4.75 1.353 -.625 .246 .494 .488 
SCPRDT4 95 1 7 4.40 1.356 -.556 .247 .068 .490 
SCPRDT5 95 1 7 4.62 1.423 -.680 .247 .000 .490 
SCPRDT6 94 1 7 4.73 1.560 -.604 .249 -.082 .493 
SCPRDT7 95 1 7 5.17 1.506 -.961 .247 .520 .490 
SCPRDT8 95 1 7 5.26 1.510 -1.161 .247 1.040 .490 
SCPRDT9 96 1 7 4.80 1.441 -.744 .246 .031 .488 
SCPRDT10 96 1 7 4.66 1.471 -.678 .246 -.031 .488 
SCPAT1 92 1 7 4.53 1.620 -.709 .251 -.276 .498 
SCPAT2 92 1 7 5.01 1.410 -.789 .251 .594 .498 
SCPAT3 89 1 7 4.57 1.651 -.574 .255 -.418 .506 
SCPAT4 91 1 7 4.36 1.683 -.450 .253 -.650 .500 
SCPAT5 90 1 7 3.93 1.364 -.040 .254 -.551 .503 
SCPAT6 87 1 7 4.80 2.068 -.653 .258 -.829 .511 
SCPAT7 88 1 7 4.17 1.750 -.359 .257 -.824 .508 
SCPAT8 86 1 7 3.59 1.894 .172 .260 -1.231 .514 
SCPAT9 89 1 7 4.13 1.772 -.209 .255 -.927 .506 
SCPAT10 86 1 7 4.76 1.586 -.945 .260 .226 .514 
SCPAT11 88 1 7 4.53 1.881 -.590 .257 -.798 .508 
SCPTC1 89 1 7 4.58 1.444 -.670 .255 -.073 .506 
SCPTC2 89 1 7 3.70 1.562 -.027 .255 -1.005 .506 
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SCPTC3 89 1 6 4.00 1.438 -.586 .255 -.574 .506 
SCPTC4 87 1 7 3.60 1.653 -.026 .258 -.937 .511 
SCPTC5 89 1 7 4.56 1.406 -.682 .255 .153 .506 
SCPTC6 87 1 7 4.41 1.427 -.424 .258 -.476 .511 
SCPTC7 89 1 7 4.52 1.603 -.691 .255 -.050 .506 
SCPTC8 89 1 6 3.39 1.474 -.015 .255 -1.045 .506 
SCPTC9 85 1 7 3.94 1.599 -.403 .261 -.882 .517 
SCPTC10 87 1 7 4.64 1.347 -.752 .258 .103 .511 
SCPTC11 88 1 7 4.77 1.428 -.920 .257 .243 .508 
SCPTC12 89 1 7 4.48 1.455 -.736 .255 -.252 .506 
SCPCCT1 89 1 6 3.30 1.473 .003 .255 -.849 .506 
SCPCCT2 88 1 7 3.44 1.674 .109 .257 -.825 .508 
SCPCCT3 87 1 7 4.11 1.617 -.393 .258 -.641 .511 
SCPCCT4 88 1 7 4.65 1.486 -1.026 .257 .419 .508 
SCPCCT5 85 1 7 4.31 1.566 -.716 .261 -.480 .517 
SCPCCT6 84 1 7 3.68 1.474 -.117 .263 -.441 .520 
SCPCCT7 87 1 7 4.07 1.627 -.346 .258 -.729 .511 













 Factor analyses 
 
1) Reliability measurements 
First has been analysed the KMO, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test (Cerny & Kaiser, 1977; H. 
Kaiser, 1974) to verify that the data is suitable for factor analysis. The test measures 
sampling adequacy for each variable in the model and for the complete model. The 
statistic is a measure of the proportion of variance among variables that might be 
common variance. The value is 0,643, which indicates that the sample size is sufficient 
to give reliable results (J. Collis & Hussey, 2014, p. 280; Pallant, 2010). The second 
verify test for this analyses, was the Bartlett’s (Bartlett, 1954)  test for sphericity, which 
shows that the sphericity is significant appropriate at p < 0.05 for the factor analysis 
(Pallant, 2010, p. 183).  
  
Table D-1 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. ,643 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 




Subsequently the components identified in Table D-1, the rotated components analysis, 
are supported by the correlation matrix. Principal components analysis revealed the 
presence of eleven components with eigenvalues exceeding 1, clarifying 42.5%, 6.1%, 
5.0%, 4.3%, 3.6%, 3.2%, 3.0%, 2,6%, 2,5%, 2,2% and 2.0% of the variance 
respectively.  
 
2) Correlation matrix 
Appearance at the Correlation Matrix (R) produced on the Table D-2 “A matrix that is 
factorable should include several substantial correlations. “If no correlation exceeds .30, 
use of FA is questionable because there is probably nothing to factor analyse” 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006). Hence for factor analysis, the correlation should show at 
lease some correlations or r => 0,3. The correlation matrix < appendix>  represented 
correlations coefficients of 0.3 and above.  
 




Rotated Component Matrixa 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
SCPRBT2 ,781           
SCPRBT3 ,767           
SCPRBT1 ,729  ,342         
SCPRBT5 ,675      ,313     
SCPRDT1 ,638 ,331          
SCPTC11 ,611 ,449  ,311        
SCPAT11 ,591     ,513      
SCPCCT4 ,562 ,399   ,331       
SCPRDT7 ,534 ,529 ,302         
SCPRBT4 ,530   ,304     ,399 ,379  
SCPRBT9 ,529  ,465         
SCPRBT8 ,509   ,385     ,365   
SCPRBT7 ,500   ,427       ,437 
SCPCCT8 ,492 ,304   ,421   ,325    
SCPTC7 ,489 ,459 ,321   ,337      
SCPRBT6 ,437 ,359 ,428    ,343     
SCPTC3  ,805          
SCPTC12  ,719          
SCPCCT3 ,363 ,717          
SCPTC1  ,669 ,331         
SCPTC6  ,643  ,360        
SCPTC5  ,605  ,378        
SCPTC2  ,568     ,390     
SCPTC4  ,516  ,470        
SCPTC10  ,499  ,339       -,368 
SCPRDT5 ,402 ,437 ,387         
SCPTC9 ,330 ,436        ,343 -,370 
SCPRDT8 ,327  ,741         
SCPRDT10   ,731 ,436        
SCPRDT9  ,311 ,715         
SCPRDT6 ,355  ,700         
SCPRDT2   ,683         
SCPRDT4 ,481 ,389 ,532         
SCPRDT3 ,455  ,528         
SCPAT2    ,815        
SCPAT1    ,751        
SCPAT10    ,485   ,331  ,345   
SCPCCT1     ,775       
SCPCCT6     ,709      -,328 
SCPCCT2  ,306   ,610      ,366 
SCPTC8 ,309 ,446   ,556       
SCPCCT7 ,301    ,403 ,327 ,399     
SCPAT8      ,739   ,304   
SCPAT7 ,369     ,710      
SCPAT6 ,386     ,686      
SCPAT3       ,664 ,358    
SCPCCT5 ,309    ,340 ,329 ,629     
SCPAT4        ,783    
SCPAT9         ,835   
SCPAT5          -,816  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.a 
a. Rotation converged in 20 iterations. 
 




The executed procedure is an often-applied statistical procedure in quantitative research. 
Parker et al. (Parker, Chang, & Thomas, 2016) find evidence in their research, the path 
analysis group, in which the factor analysis in  the period 2010-2014 has been more 
often applied as in the period 2006-2009.  
The aim of factor analysis is to expose any latent variables that cause the noticeable 
variables to determine. Factor extraction technique widely used.  
 
There are different types of factor analysis, each with its own purpose. The same 
analysis can thus be used in the same set of items in order to determine the underlying 
structure (exploratory), or to predict specific pattern of relationships based on theory or 
preliminary analytical results 
The first distinction is made between common factor analysis and component analysis; 
wherein component analysis is typically used to summarize multiple variables together 
in a kind of super-variable; common factor aims to describe overlap between variables. 
 
By increasing the frequency, these terms are used in order to show a difference between 
different types of analytical tools, instead of between different topics of research. The 
term confirmatory factor analysis refers to methods that are based on the structural 
equation model, SEM (structural equation modeling). Standard factor analysis methods 
can be used in both the exploratory as in the confirmatory technique confirmatory.  
 
 
4) Technical aspects of factor analysis: factor extraction technique 
There are a several number of factor extraction approaches obtainable. Henson, Capraro 
and Capraro (Henson, Capraro, & Capraro, 2004) classified generally as either a 
components or common factor approach. 
Principal components analysis (PCA) and principal axis factoring (PAF) with 
predictable communalities tend to be most common high-quality extraction strategies 
used (Green & Salkind, 2014; S. M. Kennedy, Grossman, & Ehrenreich-May, 2016; 
Parker et al., 2016) 
 
PCA produces components, which characterises the linear combinations of variables 
that retain as much information as possible about the original measured variables. PAFs, 
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though, produce factors that reveal the latent structure of the original measured 
variables (Parker et al., 2016; Reio & Shuck, 2014). 
Although the terms are often used interchangeably for ease of discussion, there are 
“theoretical and semantically differences” between the two extraction models (S. M. 
Kennedy et al., 2016). 
 
The main difference between the two methods is their particular drive and objectives. 
The aim of a PCA is to reduce large numbers of variables into something more 
manageable that retains as much as possible of a set of variables’ observed variance, 
with little attention to interpreting latent constructs (Berenson & Levine, 1996; Green & 
Salkind, 2014). Thus, all the observed variables’ variance is analysed in a PCA. 
Conversely, the aim of PAF is to “understand the latent (undetected) variables that 
account for relationships among measured variables”(Straub et al., 2004). PAF uses 
communality estimates, which have been measured of shared variance with values 
between 0 and 1, instead of one in the correlation matrix’s diagonal.  A PCA procedures 
ones that represent both common and unique variance in the observed variables, to 
eliminate measurement error due to common variance (Blaikie, 2010; Straub et al., 
2004). 
In this research the purpose is to recognise the latent structure of a set of variables, PAF 
would be most appropriate. PCA and PAF often produce equivalent results; it would 
make more sense using PAF in most cases because, generally, researchers want to better 
understand a set of variables’ in a more latent structure (Bordens & Abott, 2002, pp. 
425-435; R.L. Gorsuch, 1990).  
By applying both methods, the results can be heavily biased by non-normally 
distributed data and outliers (Green & Salkind, 2014; Pallant, 2010).  As showed in 
paragraph 3.6.3., the quantitative data in this part of the study in normally distributed.  
 
5) How many Factors to be retained 
For determining the factors that will be retained three tests have been conducted. 
Namely the eigenvalues >1 of, secondly the scree test of Catell  (Cattell, 1966)  and 
parallel analysis (Horn, 1965). Add value of parallel analysis is also recognised by 





The non-attendance in most statistical software packages is to retain all factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1.0. There is broad harmony in the literature that this is among 
the least truthful methods for selecting the number of factors to retain (Velicer & 
Jackson, 1990). 
 
Factor eigenvalues, eigenvalues are an index of the variance explained by a factor, 
greater than one are considered interpretable (H. F. Kaiser, 1956). Gorsuch (R.L.  
Gorsuch, 1983), followed by Kahn (Kahn, 2006) made an additional statement to this 
theory with that, the percentage of variance enlightened by each factor should be 
reported, as well as item communalities related to the rotated factors. As Bartlett’s chi-
square test (Bartlett, 1954) is heavily influenced by sample size.  
 
Both MAP and parallel analyses have been found to be relatively accurate factor 
retention rules, with parallel analysis emerging as the most accurate (Fabrigar et al., 
1999; Henson et al., 2004). Parallel analysis compares sample data eigenvalues to 
eigenvalues that would be expected from random data. The factors with eigenvalues 
larger than the random eigenvalues are retained. Because the procedure remains absent 
in most statistical packages. Besides several manual calculation options, the procedure 
has limited use in social science research (Kahn, 2006). In this part of the research has 
been focused on the EV > 1 rule, scree test, and a priori theory for the purposes of this 
discussion as they are by far the most common methods used by social science 
researchers. For triangulation, also a manual parallel analysis calculation has been 
conducted. 
 
Based on Kaiser  (H. Kaiser, 1974) criterion eigenvalues must be > 1. Therefore, 
components that have eigenvalue > 1 are interested in this analyses.  
The dimensionality of the 50 items from the SCP was analyses using maximum PCA 
analyses.  Table D-3 shows the actual factors that were extracted. Analysing the section 
marked “Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings,” it shows those factors that met your cut-
off criterion (extraction method). In this case, there were eleven factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1. SPSS always extracts as many factors initially as there are 
variables in the dataset, but the rest of these didn’t make the grade. The “% of variance” 
column expresses how much of the total variability (in all of the variables together) can 
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be accounted for by each of these summary scales or factors. Factor 1 accounts for 
41.953% of the variability in all 50 variables. 
 
Table D-3 
Total Variance Explained 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 













1 21,248 42,496 42,496 20,977 41,953 41,953 7,776 15,552 15,552 
2 3,068 6,136 48,632 2,779 5,559 47,512 6,597 13,194 28,746 
3 2,524 5,047 53,679 2,207 4,413 51,925 4,781 9,562 38,307 
4 2,174 4,347 58,026 1,900 3,800 55,725 3,191 6,382 44,689 
5 1,811 3,622 61,648 1,507 3,015 58,739 3,118 6,235 50,924 
6 1,646 3,292 64,941 1,321 2,641 61,381 2,855 5,711 56,635 
7 1,496 2,991 67,932 1,168 2,335 63,716 1,949 3,897 60,532 
8 1,335 2,671 70,602 1,013 2,026 65,742 1,468 2,935 63,468 
9 1,234 2,468 73,071 ,913 1,825 67,567 1,377 2,755 66,222 
10 1,114 2,228 75,299 ,807 1,614 69,181 1,275 2,551 68,773 
11 1,024 2,048 77,347 ,724 1,448 70,629 ,928 1,856 70,629 
….          
50          
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
 
Catell’s scree test analysis (Cattell, 1966)  is a graphical method where the number of 
eigenvalues is plotted in sloping order alongside the number of factors. The researcher 
is inspecting and finding a visual “elbow” in the graph where there is a distinct 
transition from large to small eigenvalues. Unfortunately, a clear elbow is not always 
recognisable. Accordingly, the researcher is forced to make a vague subjective decision 
about the number of factors to retain (Ruscio & Roche, 2012). 
The scree plot lead to a slightly different conclusion, it demonstrations the slope of this 
curve levels out after just three – eight factors, rather than eleven.  Interesting is that 
instead of eleven factors“ three –eight factors lead to fewer errors when factor loadings 
were estimated. Identifying too many factors might lead to the conception of constructs 
with tiny theoretical value (Ruscio & Roche, 2012, p. 199). Thus, in this EFA has been 
triangulate the factor extraction results of the EV > 1 rule and scree test and parallel 







To determine the number of factors a parallel analysis has been executed. This web-
based program calculated the average eigenvalues for these 1000 randomly generated 
samples. The results are demonstrated in Table D-4 and support the decision form the 




Comparison of eigen values from PCA and criterion values 
from parallel analysis 
Component number Actual eigenvalue from 
pca 
Criterion value form 
parallel analysis 
Decision 
1 21.248 2.731635 Accept 
2 3.068 2.546789 Accept 
3 2.524 2.360255 Accept 
4 2.174 2.246918 Accept/Reject 
5 1.811 2.136141 Accept/Reject 
6 1.646 2.028405 Accept/Reject 
7 1.496 1.941067 Reject 
8 1.335 1.855154 Reject 
9 1.234 1.768941 Reject 
10 1.114 1.701408 Reject 
11 1.024 1.634360 Reject 
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Table D-5 suggest for eleven latent variables,  
 
Table D-5 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
SCPRBT2 ,781           
SCPRBT3 ,767           
SCPRBT1 ,729  ,342         
SCPRBT5 ,675      ,313     
SCPRDT1 ,638 ,331          
SCPTC11 ,611 ,449  ,311        
SCPAT11 ,591     ,513      
SCPCCT4 ,562 ,399   ,331       
SCPRDT7 ,534 ,529 ,302         
SCPRBT4 ,530   ,304     ,399 ,379  
SCPRBT9 ,529  ,465         
SCPRBT8 ,509   ,385     ,365   
SCPRBT7 ,500   ,427       ,437 
SCPCCT8 ,492 ,304   ,421   ,325    
SCPTC7 ,489 ,459 ,321   ,337      
SCPRBT6 ,437 ,359 ,428    ,343     
SCPTC3  ,805          
SCPTC12  ,719          
SCPCCT3 ,363 ,717          
SCPTC1  ,669 ,331         
SCPTC6  ,643  ,360        
SCPTC5  ,605  ,378        
SCPTC2  ,568     ,390     
SCPTC4  ,516  ,470        
SCPTC10  ,499  ,339       -,368 
SCPRDT5 ,402 ,437 ,387         
SCPTC9 ,330 ,436        ,343 -,370 
SCPRDT8 ,327  ,741         
SCPRDT10   ,731 ,436        
SCPRDT9  ,311 ,715         
SCPRDT6 ,355  ,700         
SCPRDT2   ,683         
SCPRDT4 ,481 ,389 ,532         
SCPRDT3 ,455  ,528         
SCPAT2    ,815        
SCPAT1    ,751        
SCPAT10    ,485   ,331  ,345   
SCPCCT1     ,775       
SCPCCT6     ,709      -,328 
SCPCCT2  ,306   ,610      ,366 
SCPTC8 ,309 ,446   ,556       
SCPCCT7 ,301    ,403 ,327 ,399     
SCPAT8      ,739   ,304   
SCPAT7 ,369     ,710      
SCPAT6 ,386     ,686      
SCPAT3       ,664 ,358    
SCPCCT5 ,309    ,340 ,329 ,629     
SCPAT4        ,783    
SCPAT9         ,835   
SCPAT5          -,816  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.a 





 Regression analyses 
 
Factor 2: “Cost reduction by the SCP” has been put in the multiple regression model for 
the dependent variable.  Variables have been moved as independent variables to the 
model. The description of the values / items are viewed below: 
 
 SCPRDT7 LAs have more procurement experts available by the SCP, thereby 
less dependence of external 
 SCPTC3 LAs have less management costs for the procurement function by the 
SCP 
 SCPTC12 LAs have more financial cost savings by the SCP 
 SCPCCT3 LAs have lower costs through outsourcing procurement function by 
the SCP 
 SCPTC1 LAs have lower procurement and transaction costs by the SCP 
 SCPTC6 External-independent costs of legal knowhow of procedures or 
contracts 
 SCPTC5 LAs have fewer costs for external procurement consulting by the SCP  
 SCPTC2 LAs have lower procurement management costs by the SCP 
 SCPTC4 LAs have lower procurement IT cost by the SCP 
 
1) Linear regression “Cost reduction by the SCP” 
1.1) Checking the assumptions 
For determining these assumptions, the data have been checked on outliers, normality, 
homoscedasticity, independence of residuals and linearity. The normal probability plot 
of the regression standardised residual and the scatterplot were investigated. The P-P 
plot in figure 3-4 shows points in a reasonably straight diagonal line form bottom left 
tot top right. This indicates no major deviations form normality. The homoscedasticity 
requires that the variation around the line of the regression is constant for all values of 
X. Also the scatterplot, showed no systematic pattern to your residuals values. 
Correspondingly the statement of Tabachnick and Fidell (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006), 
the scatterplot shows in 3-5, that the values contents minimal of outlying residuals of 
more than 3.3 or less than -3.3.  
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For controlling the multicollinearity the VIF, variance inflationary factor, and Tolerance 
has been checked for each explanatory variable. If a set of explanatory variable are 
uncorrelated, then the VIF will we be equal to 1.  If the set were highly intercorrelated, 
then VIF might even exceed 10. Marquardt (1980) suggests that if VIF is > 10, there is 
too much correlation between variable and the other explanatory variables. However 
Snee (1973) suggest a more conservative criterion that would imply alternatives to least 
squares regression if the maximum VIF, were to exceed 5. Examining the data of Factor 
1, Resource sharing, noted of table 3-49, the VIF (2 < VIF < 6). As well of conservative 
as the progressive stream, the VIF, the conclusion has been made that there is no reason 
to suspect any multicollinearity for variable Resource Sharing.  
 
The parameter tolerance has been checked on the value > 0.10 if not this indicates a 
high multiple correlations with other variables, suggesting the possibility on 







1.2) Research questions 
Secondly, research questions had been set up to determine the goal of the multiple 
regression analysis.  
 




How well do the measures of 9 independent variables / items predict perceived 
“Procurement costs by the SCP”? How much variance in perceived “Procurement Costs 
(internal) by the SCP” can be explained by scores on these 9 scales? 
 
Research Question2: 
Which is the best predictor of “Procurement costs (internal) by the SCP”? 
 
Towards exploring these two questions, a standard multiple regression will be 
performed. In this model have been put variables / items which have been uncovered 
with the factor analysis of paragraph 3.5. Consequently, for the procedure of conducting 
this analysis is followed of Pallant (Pallant, 2010, pp. 153-162). 
 
1.3) Evaluating the model 
The third step in the multiple regression procedure of Pallant (Pallant, 2010, pp. 160-
161) starts with analysing of the Model Summary viewed in Table   The R Square and 
the Adjusted R Square presented a high value of 0.733 and 0.683 explains 73.3 and 68.3 
per cent of the variance in perceived  “Procurement Costs (internal) by the SCP”.  
Tabachnick and Fidell (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006), explain this high value to a small 
sample. On the other hand other statisticians (Berenson & Levine, 1996; Bierman et al., 
1991, pp. 66-69;713-780) are debating about how high should R-squared be. In this 
study the objective of this analysis main goal is to determine which predictors are 
statistically significant and how changes in the predictors relate to changes in the 
response variable, so R-squared is less irrelevant (Berenson & Levine, 1996; Green & 
Salkind, 2014). 
However the regression equation with all sixteen strength predictors was significantly 





Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,856a ,733 ,683 ,55838942 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SCPTC4, SCPTC1, SCPTC6, SCPRDT7, SCPTC2, SCPCCT3, SCPTC5, 
SCPTC3, SCPTC12 
b. Dependent Variable: FAC2_1 








Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 41,847 9 4,650 14,912 ,000b 
Residual 15,278 49 ,312   
Total 57,125 58    
a. Dependent Variable: FAC2_1 
b. Predictors: (Constant), SCPTC4, SCPTC1, SCPTC6, SCPRDT7, SCPTC2, SCPCCT3, SCPTC5, SCPTC3, 
SCPTC12 
 
1.4) Evaluating each of the independent variables 
Anew primarily has been checked the value of the variables in Table E-3 the column 
marked Sig..  This value must be not greater than 0.05, formerly the variable is making a 
significant unique contribution to the prediction of the dependent variable. 
 
The marked variables have a significant unique contribution to the prediction of the 
dependent variable. Thereafter, interesting is comparing the contribution of each 

































-8,693 ,000 -3,285 -2,052 
     
SCPRD
T7 
-,061 ,073 -,093 -,837 ,406 -,208 ,086 ,544 -,119 -,062 ,445 2,247 
SCPTC
3 
,381 ,095 ,552 4,023 ,000 ,191 ,572 ,801 ,498 ,297 ,289 3,455 
SCPTC
12 
,163 ,100 ,238 1,623 ,111 -,039 ,364 ,703 ,226 ,120 ,253 3,949 
SCPCC
T3 
,023 ,078 ,037 ,296 ,769 -,133 ,179 ,664 ,042 ,022 ,342 2,927 
SCPTC
1 
-,062 ,094 -,090 -,660 ,512 -,251 ,127 ,643 -,094 -,049 ,292 3,421 
SCPTC
6 
,182 ,094 ,262 1,930 ,050 -,007 ,372 ,666 ,266 ,143 ,297 3,368 
SCPTC
5 






-,002 ,065 -,003 -,030 ,976 -,133 ,129 ,516 -,004 -,002 ,519 1,925 
SCPTC
4 
,005 ,056 ,009 ,095 ,925 -,107 ,118 ,445 ,014 ,007 ,631 1,585 
a. Dependent Variable: FAC2_1 
 
1.5) Recap 
In the final model SCPTC3 and SCPTC6 have strength relation with the Factor 2, 
Procurement Costs and are determined explainable in this latent variable.  
SCPTC3 (b* 0.552, p < .001), Reducing of procurement management costs to manage 
the procurement function, have been recognised by the LAs as the most significant 
value of the dimension Resource Sharing of the SCP to perform the procurement 
function. 
SCPTC6 (b* 0.262, p = .05), SCP leads to lower costs of consulting legal external 
expertise, have been seen by the LAs as the second most significant value of the 
dimension Resource Sharing produced by the SCP. 
 
2) Linear regression “Demand share, Reputation, Information asymmetry, 
Resource dependence diminishing,  Access to external power by the SCP” 
Factor 3 has been put in the multiple regression model for the dependent variable.  
Variables have been moved as independent variables to the model. The description of 
the values / items are viewed below: 
 SCPRDT8 LAs have together more volume in the market by the SCP 
 SCPRDT10  LAs governments uses the legitimacy by the SCP 
 SCPRDT9  LAs government hitchhike with collaborative brand of the SCP 
 SCPRDT6  Procurement processes are more transparencies by the SCP 
 SCPRDT2 LAs have more buying power to strategic contract terms by the 
SCP 
 SCPRDT4  LAs have more control over information/position in the 
communication flow by the SCP 
 SCPRDT3  LAs have more awareness of the alternative 
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2.1) Checking the assumptions 
For determining these assumptions, the data have been tested on outliers, normality, 
homoscedasticity, independence of residuals and linearity. The normal probability plot 
of the regression standardised residual and the scatterplot coexisted examined. The P-P 
plot in figure 3-6 shows points in a judiciously straight diagonal line form bottom left 
tot top right. This implies no major deviations from normality. The homoscedasticity 
requires that the variation around the line of the regression is constant for all values of 
X. Also the scatterplot showed in figure 3-7, no systematic pattern to the residuals 
values. Correspondingly the statement of Tabachnick and Fidell (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2006), the scatterplot shows that the values contents minimal of outlying residuals of 
more than 3.3 or less than -3.3.  
 
For controlling the multicollinearity the VIF, variance inflationary factor, and Tolerance 
has been checked for each explanatory variable. If a set of explanatory variables are 
uncorrelated, then the VIF will we be equal to 1.  If the set were highly intercorrelated, 
then VIF might even exceed 10. Marquardt (1980) suggests that if VIF is > 10, there is 
too much correlation between variable and the other explanatory variables. However 
Snee (1973) suggest a more conservative criterion that would emply alternatives to least 
squares regression if the maximum VIF, were to exceed 5. Examining the data of Factor 
1, Resource sharing, noted of table 3-52, the VIF (2 < VIF < 6). As well of conservative 
as the progressive stream, the VIF, the conclusion has been made that there is no reason 
to suspect any multicollinearity for variable Resource Sharing. The values have shown 
in table 3-52, grey shaded.  
 
The parameter tolerance has been checked on the value > 0.10 if not this indicates on 
high multiple correlations with other variables, suggesting the possibility on 
multicollinearity. The tolerance in table… is > 0.10. The value have shown in table 3-










2.2) Research questions 
Furthermore, research questions had been set up to establish the goal of the multiple 
regression analysis.  
 
RQ1:  
How well do the measures of seven independent variables / items predict perceived 
“Procurement costs by the SCP”? How much variance in perceived “” by the SCP” can 
be explained by scores on these 7 scales? 
 
RQ2: 
Which is the best predictor of “Demand share, Reputation, Information asymmetry, 
Resource dependence diminishing”, access to external power by the SCP?” 
 
Towards exploring these two questions, a standard multiple regressions has been 
presented. In this model have been put variables / items which have been uncovered 
with the factor analysis of paragraph 3.8. Consequently, for the procedure of conducting 
this analysis is followed of Pallant (Pallant, 2010, pp. 153-162). 
 
2.3) Evaluating the model 
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The third step in the multiple regression procedure of Pallant (Pallant, 2010, pp. 160-
161) starts with analysing  the Model Summary viewed in Table E-4The R Square and 
the Adjusted R Square presented a high value of 0.807 and 0.781 explains 80.7 and 78.1 
per cent of the variance in perceived  “Procurement Costs (internal) by the SCP”.  
Tabachnick and Fidell (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006), explain this high value to a small 
sample. On the other hand other statisticians (Berenson & Levine, 1996; Bierman et al., 
1991, pp. 66-69;713-780) are debating about how high should R-squared be. In this 
study the objective of this analysis main goal is to determine which predictors are 
statistically significant and how changes in the predictors relate to changes in the 
response variable, so R-squared is less irrelevant (Berenson & Levine, 1996; Green & 
Salkind, 2014). 
However the regression equation with all sixteen strength predictors was significantly 





Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,898a ,807 ,781 ,40212462 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SCPRDT3, SCPRDT9, SCPRDT2, SCPRDT8, SCPRDT10, SCPRDT6, SCPRDT4 
b. Dependent Variable: FAC3_1 
 
 
The ANOVA in Table E-5 indicates that the model as a whole is significant Sig.= .000. 
Also, that the difference between the variables is 80.7 per cent (34,488/42,734 * 100%) 





Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 34,488 7 4,927 30,468 ,000b 
Residual 8,247 51 ,162   
Total 42,734 58    
a. Dependent Variable: FAC3_1 
b. Predictors: (Constant), SCPRDT3, SCPRDT9, SCPRDT2, SCPRDT8, SCPRDT10, SCPRDT6, SCPRDT4 
 




Afresh primarily has checked the value of the variables in Table E-6 the column marked 
Sig..  This value must be less than 0.05; formerly the variable is making a significant 
unique contribution to the prediction of the dependent variable. 
 
The green shaded variables have significant unique contribution to the prediction of the 
dependent variable. Thereafter, interesting is comparing the contribution of each 





































-12,190 ,000 -3,151 -2,260 
     
SCPRD
T8 
,287 ,056 ,505 5,102 ,000 ,174 ,400 ,807 ,581 ,314 ,387 2,584 
SCPRD
T10 
,126 ,057 ,216 2,204 ,032 ,011 ,241 ,739 ,295 ,136 ,394 2,537 
SCPRD
T9 
,236 ,067 ,397 3,555 ,001 ,103 ,370 ,759 ,446 ,219 ,304 3,294 
SCPRD
T6 
-,132 ,061 -,239 -2,174 ,034 -,253 -,010 ,620 -,291 -,134 ,313 3,199 
SCPRD
T2 
,078 ,049 ,151 1,587 ,119 -,021 ,177 ,637 ,217 ,098 ,421 2,377 
SCPRD
T4 
-,064 ,072 -,101 -,893 ,376 -,208 ,080 ,569 -,124 -,055 ,296 3,383 
SCPRD
T3 
,052 ,070 ,082 ,746 ,459 -,088 ,191 ,595 ,104 ,046 ,315 3,174 
a. Dependent Variable: FAC3_1 
 
2.5) Recap 
The highest predictor of “by the SCP” is SCPRDT8, b* = 0.505  (Question 2). 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions of 
normality, linearity, multicollinearity and homoscedasticity were noticed.  After entry of 
the seven variables at the second step, the total variance explained by the model as 
whole was 80.7 per cent, F (7,51) = 30.47, p < .001.  
 
In the final model SCPRDT8 and SCPRDT9 have strength relation with the Factor 3, 
Demand share, Reputation, Information asymmetry, Resource dependence diminishing, 
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Access to external power by the SCP and are determined explainable in this latent 
variable.  
SCPRDT8 (b* 0.505, p < .001), LAs have together more volume in the market by the 
SCP, have been recognised by the LAs as the most significant value of the dimension 
……. of the SCP to perform the procurement function. 
SCPRDT9 (b* 0.397, p = .05), LAs government hitchhike with collaborative brand of 
the SCP, have been seen by the Las as the second most significant value of the 
dimension “Demand share, Reputation, Information asymmetry, Resource dependence 
diminishing” produced by the SCP. 
 
3) Linear regression “Goal synchronisation” 
A multiple regression analysis was conducted to evaluate how well the strength 
measures predicted Goal synchronisation. Factor 4: “Goal synchronisation” has been 
put in the multiple regression model for the dependent variable.  Variables have been 
moved as independent variables to the model. The description of the values / items are 
viewed below: 
 
 SCPAT1 LAs have agreements procurement goals and strategies in the SCP 
 SCPAT2 LAs have agreements about how executing Joint procurement groups 
in the SCP 
 
3.1) Checking the assumptions 
The normal probability plot of the regression standardised residual and the scatterplot 
were coexisted examined. The P-P plot in figure 3-8 shows points in a judiciously 
straight diagonal line from bottom left tot top right. This implies no major deviations 
form normality. The homoscedasticity requires that the variation around the line of the 
regression is constant for all values of X. Also the scatterplot in figure 3-9, showed no 
systematic pattern to your residuals values. Correspondingly the statement of 
Tabachnick and Fidell (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2006), the scatterplot shows that the 
values contents minimal of outlying residuals of more than 3.3 or less than -3.3 and are 
reflected well on the zero axe.  
 
For controlling the multicollinearity the VIF, variance inflationary factor, and Tolerance 




uncorrelated, then the VIF will we be equal to 1.  If the set were highly intercorrelated, 
then VIF might even exceed 10. Marquardt (1980) suggests that if VIF is > 10, there is 
too much correlation between variable and the other explanatory variables. However 
Snee (1973) suggest a more conservative criterion that would indicate alternatives to 
least squares regression if the maximum VIF, were to exceed 5. Examining the data of 
Factor 1, Resource sharing, noted of table ….., the VIF (2 < VIF < 6). As well of 
conservative as the progressive stream, the VIF, the conclusion has been made that there 
is no reason to suspect any multicollinearity for variable Resource Sharing. The values 
have shown in table 3-55, grey shaded.  
 
The parameter tolerance has been checked on the value > 0.10 if not this indicates on 
high multiple correlations with other variables, suggesting the possibility on 
multicollinearity. The tolerance in table… is > 0.10. The values have shown in table 3-







3.2) Research questions 
Furthermore, research questions have been set up to establish the goal of the multiple 
regression analysis.  
 
Research Question 1:  
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How well do the measures of two independent variables / items predict perceived “Goal 
Synchronisation by the SCP”? How much variance in perceived “” by the SCP” can be 
explained by scores on these 2 scales? 
 
Research Question2: 
Which is the best predictor of the factor dimension “Goal Synchronisation”? 
 
Concerning exploring these two subjects, a standard multiple regressions have been be 
presented. In this model have been put variables / items which have been examined with 
the factor analysis of paragraph 3.8…….Consequently, the procedure for conducting 
this analysis is followed of Pallant (Pallant, 2010, pp. 153-162). 
 
3.3) Evaluating the model 
Over the third step in the multiple regression procedure of Pallant (Pallant, 2010, pp. 
160-161) starts with analysing of the Model Summary viewed in Table E-7 The R 
Square and the Adjusted R Square presented a high value of 0.724 and 0.714 explains 
72.4 and 71.4 per cent of the variance in perceived  “Procurement Costs (internal) by 





Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,851a ,724 ,714 ,52479011 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SCPAT1, SCPAT2 
b. Dependent Variable: FAC4_1 
 
In this study the objective of this analysis main goal is to determine which predictors are 
statistically significant and how changes in the predictors relate to changes in the 
response variable, so R-squared is less irrelevant (Berenson & Levine, 1996; Green & 
Salkind, 2014). 
However, the regression equation with all sixteen strength predictors was significantly 





The ANOVA in Table E-8 indicates that the model as a whole is significant Sig.= .000. 
Also, that the difference between the variables is 72.3 per cent (40,479/55,902 * 100%) 
of the total variation. De power of the causality of Goal Synchronisation and the two 




Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 40,479 2 20,240 73,490 ,000b 
Residual 15,423 56 ,275   
Total 55,902 58    
a. Dependent Variable: FAC4_1 
b. Predictors: (Constant), SCPAT1, SCPAT2 
 
3.4) Evaluating each of the independent variables 
Primarily has been checked the value of the variables in the column marked Sig..  This 
value must be less than 0.05, than the variable is making a significant unique 
contribution to the prediction of the dependent variable, Goal Synchronisation. 
 
The marked variables (Table E-9) have significant unique contribution to the prediction 
of the dependent variable. Thereafter, interesting is comparing the contribution of each 
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-11,303 ,000 -3,418 -2,389 
     
SCPAT2 ,461 ,066 ,662 6,955 ,000 ,328 ,594 ,831 ,681 ,488 ,544 1,839 
SCPAT1 ,151 ,058 ,250 2,624 ,011 ,036 ,267 ,697 ,331 ,184 ,544 1,839 
a. Dependent Variable: FAC4_1 
 
3.5) Recap 
Also for this factor dimension “Goal Synchronisation” multiple regression analysis was 
conduced to evaluate how well the strength measures predicted. Two variables were 
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making a significant unique contribution to the prediction of the  “Goal 
Synchronisation” (Question 1). 
The best predictor of “Goal Synchronisation” is SCPAT2, b* = 0.662  (Question 2). 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions of 
normality, linearity, multicollinearity and homoscedasticity.  After entry of the two 
variables at the second step, the total variance explained by the model as whole was 
72.4 per cent, F (2,56) = 73.49, p < .001.  
 
In the final model SCPATT2 and SCPAT1 have strength relation with the Factor 4, 
Goal Synchronisation and are determined explainable in this latent variable.  
SCPAT2 (b* 0.662, p < .001), LAs have agreements about how executing Joint 
procurement groups in the SCP, have been recognised by the LAs as the most 
significant value of the dimension Goal Synchronisation of the SCP to perform the 
procurement function. 
SCPAT1 (b* 0.250, p < .001), SCPAT1 LAs have agreements procurement goals and 
strategies in the SCP, have been seen by the LAs as the second most significant value of 
the dimension Goal Synchronisation produced by the SCP. 
 
4) Linear regression “Value by the SCP” 
Factor 5: ‘Value by the SCP’ has been put in the multiple regression model for the 
dependent variable.  Variables SCPCCT1, SCPCCT2, SCPCCT6, SCPTC8, have been 
moved as independent variables to the model. The description of the values / items are 
viewed below: 
 SPCCCT1 LAs has quicker new and innovative product / services by the 
SCP 
 SPCCCT2 LAs has more flexibility and agility for demands ad hoc by the 
SCP 
 SPCCCT6 LAs has more access for innovation in their products / services / 
works by outsourcing the procurement function by the SCP 
 SCPTC8 LAs has shorter cycle time during execution of procurement 
procedures by the SCP 
 




“Value” by the SCP can be explained by the independent variables. Besides that, it 
provides indication of the relative contribution of each independent variable. This has 
been translated to several research questions.  
 
Research question I:  
How well do the measures of four independent variables / items predict perceived 
“Value by the SCP”?  
How much variance in perceived “Value by the SCP”, scores can explained on these 
four scales? 
 
Research question II: 
Which is the best predictor of “Value by the SCP”? 
 
To explore these two questions, a standard multiple regression has been executed. In 
this model have been put variables / items which have been uncovered with the factor 
analysis of paragraph. The procedure for conducting this analysis is followed of Pallant 
(Pallant, 2010, pp. 153-162) 
 
4.2) Checking the assumptions 
Multiple regressions is one of the exacting of the statistical techniques (Berenson & 
Levine, 1996, pp. 714-785).  Therefore the appropriated application is dependent on 
starting with analysis of a set of assumptions, which are necessary for regression and 
correlation analysis (Berenson & Levine, 1996; Pallant, 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2006). The five major assumptions are normality, homoscedasticity, independence of 
errors, linearity and (no) multicollinearity.  
 
For determining these assumptions, the data have been checked on outliers, normality, 
homoscedasticity, independence of residuals and linearity. The normal probability plot 
of the regression standardised residual and the scatterplot were investigated. The P-P 
plot in figure 3-10 shows points in a reasonably straight diagonal line form bottom left 
tot top right. This indicates no major deviations form normality. The homoscedasticity  
requires that the varation around the line of the regression be constant for all values of 
X. 
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Also the scatterplot in figure 3-11, showed no systematic pattern to your residuals 
values. Correspondingly the statement of Tabachnick and Fidell (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2006), the scatterplot shows that the values contents minimal of outlying residuals of 
more than 3.3 or less than -3.3 and parallel deviation.  
 
For controlling the multicollinearity the VIF, variance inflationary factor, and Tolerance 
has been checked for each explanatory variable. If a set of explanatory variable are 
uncorrelated, then the VIF will we be equal to 1.  If the set were highly intercorrelated, 
then VIF might even exceed 10. Marquardt (1980) suggests that if VIF is > 10, there is 
too much correlation between variable and the other explanatory variables. However 
Snee (1973) suggest a more conservative criterion that would suggest alternatives to 
least squares regression if the maximum VIF, were to exceed 5. Examining the data of 
Factor 1, Resource sharing, noted of table ….., the VIF (1.5 < VIF < 6). As well of 
conservative as the progressive stream, the VIF, the conclusion has been made that there 
is no reason to suspect any multicollinearity for variable Resource Sharing.  
 
The parameter tolerance has been checked on the value > 0.10 if not this indicates on 
high multiple correlations wit other variables, suggesting the possibility on 










The second step in the multiple regression procedure of Pallant (Pallant, 2010, pp. 160-
161) starts with analysing of the Model Summary viewed in table 3-56  The R Square 
and the Adjusted R Square presented a high value of 0.764 and 0.746 explains 76.4 and 
74.6 per cent of the variance in perceived “Value by the SCP”. In this study the 
objective of this analysis main goal is to determine which predictors are statistically 
significant and how changes in the predictors relate to changes in the response variable, 
R-squared is less irrelevant (Berenson & Levine, 1996; Green & Salkind, 2014). 
Nevertheless the regression equation (Table E-10) with all sixteen strength predictors 




Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,874a ,764 ,746 ,50247421 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SCPTC8, SCPCCT6, SCPCCT2, SCPCCT1 
b. Dependent Variable: FAC5_1 
 
In Table E-11 The statistical significance of the result has been checked. The model 
reaches statistical significance p< .0005. Besides this, the df is equal to the number of 





Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 44,020 4 11,005 43,587 ,000b 
Residual 13,634 54 ,252   
Total 57,654 58    
a. Dependent Variable: FAC5_1 
b. Predictors: (Constant), SCPTC8, SCPCCT6, SCPCCT2, SCPCCT1 
 
4.4) Evaluating each of the independent variables 
Firstly has been checked the value of the variables in Table E-12 the column marked Sig..  
This value must be less than 0.05, than the variable is making a significant unique 
contribution to the prediction of the dependent variable. 
 
The marked variables have significant unique contribution to the prediction of the 
dependent variable. Thereafter, interesting is comparing the contribution of each 
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order Partial Part 
Toleran
ce VIF 
1 (Constant) -2,631 ,207  -12,729 ,000 -3,045 -2,216      
SCPCCT1 ,251 ,066 ,370 3,816 ,000 ,119 ,382 ,759 ,461 ,253 ,465 2,151 
SCPCCT6 ,289 ,055 ,428 5,266 ,000 ,179 ,400 ,737 ,582 ,348 ,663 1,508 
SCPCCT2 ,069 ,055 ,117 1,272 ,209 -,040 ,179 ,578 ,171 ,084 ,521 1,919 
SCPTC8 ,114 ,056 ,169 2,042 ,046 ,002 ,227 ,589 ,268 ,135 ,637 1,569 
a. Dependent Variable: FAC5_1 
 
4.5) Recap 
A multiple regression analysis was conduced to evaluate how well the strength 
measures predicted “Value by the SCP” level. Four variables were making a significant 
unique contribution to the prediction of the  “Value by the SCP” (Question 1). 
The best predictor of “Value by the SCP” is SCPCCT6, b* = 0.428 0 (Question 2). 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions of 
normality, linearity, multicollinearity and homoscedasticity.  After entry of the six 
variables at the second step, the total variance explained by the model as whole was 
76.4 per cent, F (4,54) = 43.587, p < .001.  
 
In the final model SCPCCT6 and SCPCCT1 have strength relation with the Factor 5, 
‘Value’ are determined explainable in this latent variable.  
SCPCCT6 (b* 0.428, p < .001), LAs has more access for innovation in their products / 
services / works by outsourcing the procurement function by the SPC , have been 
recognised by the LAs as the most significant value of the dimension of the SCP to 
perform the procurement function. 
SCPCCT1 (b* 0.370, p < .001), LAs has quicker new and innovative products / services 
by the SCP, have been seen by the LAs as the second most significant value of the 
dimension Value produced by the SCP. SCPTC8, has been excluded because of the 
deeper determined in this latent variable. 
 
5) Linear regression “Access to professional Public Procurement knowledge 




Factor 6: ‘Transparency of information’ by the SCP has been put in the multiple 
regression model for the dependent variable. SCPAT6, SCPAT7 SCPAT8 variables 
have been moved as independent variables to the model. The description of the values / 
items are viewed below: 
 
 SCPAT6 LAs make annual jointly procurement plans with the SCP 
 SCPAT7 LAs, jointly controls and update periodical the procurement plans 
with the SCP 
 SCPAT8 LAs jointly decides about exceptions and deviations about the 
jointly procurement plan  
 
5.1) Research questions 
For the last factor, multiple regression explains in this research how much of the 
variance in the dependent variable, Transparency of information by the SCP can be 
explained by the independent variables. Moreover, it provides indication of the relative 
contribution of each independent variable. This has been translated to several research 
questions.  
 
Research question I:  
How well do the measures of 3 independent variables / items predict perceived “Access 
to professional Public Procurement knowledge (internal) by the SCP”? How much 
variance in perceived “Transparency of information by the SCP” can be explained by 
scores on these 3 variables? 
 
Research question II: 
Which is the best predictor of “Transparency of information by the SCP”? 
 
To explore this two questions, a standard multiple regression will be executed. In this 
model have been put variables / items which have been uncovered with the factor 
analysis of paragraph 3.8. 
Again, the procedure for conducting this analysis is followed of Pallant (Pallant, 2010, 
pp. 153-162). 
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5.2) Checking the assumptions 
Multiple regressions is one of the exacting of the statistical techniques (Berenson & 
Levine, 1996, pp. 714-785).  Therefore the appropriated application is dependent on 
starting with analysis of a set of assumptions, which are necessary for regression and 
correlation analysis (Berenson & Levine, 1996; Pallant, 2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2006). The five major assumptions are normality, homoscedasticity, independence of 
errors, linearity and (no) multicollinearity.  
 
For determining these assumptions, the data have been checked on outliers, normality, 
homoscedasticity, independence of residuals and linearity. The normal probability plot 
of the regression standardised residual and the scatterplot were investigated. The P-P 
plot in figure 3-12 shows points in a reasonably straight diagonal line from bottom left 
to top right. This indicates no major deviations form normality. The homoscedasticity 
requires that the variation around the line of the regression be constant for all values of 
X. 
Also the scatterplot in figure 3-13, showed no systematic pattern to your residuals 
values. Correspondingly the statement of Tabachnick and Fidell (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2006), the scatterplot shows that the values contents minimal of outlying residuals of 
more than 3.3 or less than -3.3 and the values are parallel distributed.  
 
For controlling the multicollinearity the VIF, variance inflationary factor, and Tolerance 
has been checked for each explanatory variable. If a set of explanatory variable are 
uncorrelated, then the VIF will we be equal to 1.  If the set were highly intercorrelated, 
then VIF might even exceed 10. Marquardt (1980) suggests that if VIF is > 10, there is 
too much correlation between variable and the other explanatory variables. However 
Snee (1973) suggest a more conservative criterion that would emply alternatives to least 
squares regression if the maximum VIF, were to exceed 5. Examining the data of Factor 
1, Resource sharing, noted of table 3-61, the VIF (1.5 < VIF < 6). As well of 
conservative as the progressive stream, the VIF, the conclusion has been made that there 





The parameter tolerance has been checked on the value > 0.10 if not this indicates on 
high multiple correlations wit other variables, suggesting the possibility on 







5.3) Evaluating the model 
The second step in the multiple regression procedure of Pallant (Pallant, 2010, pp. 160-
161) starts with analysing of the Model Summary viewed in Table E-15. The R Square 
and the Adjusted R Square presented a high value of 0.752 and 0.739 explains 75.2 and 




Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,867a ,752 ,739 ,52551010 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SCPAT6, SCPAT8, SCPAT7 
b. Dependent Variable: FAC6_1 
 
In Table E-14The statistical significance of the result has been checked. The model 
reaches statistical significance p< .0005. Besides this, the df is equal to the number of 
independents variables.  
 





Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 46,179 3 15,393 55,739 ,000b 
Residual 15,189 55 ,276   
Total 61,368 58    
a. Dependent Variable: FAC6_1 
b. Predictors: (Constant), SCPAT6, SCPAT8, SCPAT7 
 
 
5.4) Evaluating each of the independent variables 
Firstly has been checked the value of the variables in the column marked Sig..  This value 
must be less than 0.05, than the variable is making a significant unique contribution to 
the prediction of the dependent variable. 
 
The marked variables (Table E-15) have significant unique contribution to the 
prediction of the dependent variable. Thereafter, interesting is comparing the 






























1 (Constant) -2,247 ,191  -11,783 ,000 -2,629 -1,865      
SCPAT8 ,283 ,047 ,521 6,006 ,000 ,189 ,378 ,792 ,629 ,403 ,597 1,674 
SCPAT7 ,112 ,061 ,191 1,826 ,073 -,011 ,235 ,720 ,239 ,123 ,413 2,421 
SCPAT6 ,144 ,048 ,290 3,021 ,004 ,049 ,240 ,698 ,377 ,203 ,489 2,044 
a. Dependent Variable: FAC6_1 
 
5.5) Recap 
A multiple regression analysis was conduced to evaluate how well the strength 
measures predicted “Access to professional Public Procurement knowledge (internal) by 
the SCP” level. Two variables were variable is making a significant unique contribution 
to the prediction of the  “Transparency of information by the SCP” (Question 1). 
The best predictor of “Transparency of information by the SCP” is SCPAT8, b* = 0.521  
(Question 2). Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the 




of the three variables at the second step, the total variance explained by the model as 
whole was 75.2 per cent, F (3,55) = 55.74, p < .001.  
 
In the final model SCPAT8 and SCPAT6 have strength relation with the Factor 1, 
Resource sharing and are determined explainable in this latent variable.  
SCPAT8 (b* 0.521, p < .001), LAs jointly decides about exceptions and deviations 
about the jointly procurement plan, have been recognised by the LAs as the most 
significant value of the dimension Transparency of information of the SCP to perform 
the procurement function. 
SCPAT6 (b* 0.290, p < .001), LAs make annual jointly procurement plans with the SCP 
, have been seen by the LAs as the second most significant value of the dimension 
Transparency of Information produced by the SCP. 
 
SCPAT7 (b* 0.191, p = .073), LAs, jointly controls and update periodical the 
procurement plans with the SCP has been excluding deeper determined in this latent 
variable, Factor 6, Transparency of Information. 
 
  







 MANOVA Analyses 
 
“Resource sharing and business capabilities” 
 SCPRBT2: LAs have access to dedicate personnel to manage the collaborative 
process by the SCP 
 SCPRBT1: LAs use cross-organisational teams for process design and 
improvement in procurement projects by the SCP 
 
D1Profession: The ‘profession’ group was not significantly different from each other.   
D2Function: ‘The organisational’ group was not significantly different from each other. 
D3Frequence: The ‘frequency’ group was not significantly different from each other.  
Although variable / item statically was not significant, the actual difference SCPRBT2 
was not very small, almost more than 2 scale points (3,000 versus 4,875) 
D4Inhab: The “Inhab group was significantly different from each other. Wilk’s 
Lambada value, showed in Table F-1 of .789 with a significance value 0.017. This is 
less than 0.05; therefore there is a statistically significant difference between the number 





Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept Pillai's Trace ,900 452,124b 2,000 101,000 ,000 ,900 
Wilks' Lambda ,100 452,124b 2,000 101,000 ,000 ,900 
Hotelling's Trace 8,953 452,124b 2,000 101,000 ,000 ,900 
Roy's Largest Root 8,953 452,124b 2,000 101,000 ,000 ,900 
D4INHAB Pillai's Trace ,222 2,122 12,000 204,000 ,017 ,111 
Wilks' Lambda ,789 2,116b 12,000 202,000 ,017 ,112 
Hotelling's Trace ,253 2,110 12,000 200,000 ,018 ,112 
Roy's Largest Root ,172 2,923c 6,000 102,000 ,011 ,147 
a. Design: Intercept + D4INHAB 
b. Exact statistic 
c. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
 
“Cost Reduction by the SCP” 
SCPTC6: SCP leads to lower costs of consulting legal external expertise 
SCPTC3: Reducing of procurement management costs to manage the procurement 
function 
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D1Profession: The ‘profession’ group was not significantly different from each other.  
D2Function: The ‘function’ group was not significantly different from each other 
D3Frequence: The ‘Frequence’ group was significantly different from each other. 
Wilk’s Lambada valu, showed in Table F-2of .844 with a significance value 0.029. This 
is less than 0.05; therefore there is a statistically significant difference between the 
frequency how often the respondents are dealing with procurement of the LAs and the 




Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept Pillai's Trace ,908 405,999b 2,000 82,000 ,000 ,908 
Wilks' Lambda ,092 405,999b 2,000 82,000 ,000 ,908 
Hotelling's Trace 9,902 405,999b 2,000 82,000 ,000 ,908 
Roy's Largest Root 9,902 405,999b 2,000 82,000 ,000 ,908 
D3Frequence Pillai's Trace ,157 2,360 6,000 166,000 ,033 ,079 
Wilks' Lambda ,844 2,422b 6,000 164,000 ,029 ,081 
Hotelling's Trace ,184 2,482 6,000 162,000 ,025 ,084 
Roy's Largest Root ,177 4,898c 3,000 83,000 ,003 ,150 
a. Design: Intercept + D3Frequence 
b. Exact statistic 
c. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
 
D4Inhab: The ‘inhabitants’ group were not significantly different from each other 
 
“Uncertainty” 
SCPRDT8: LAs have together more volume in the market by the SCP,  
SCPRDT9: LAs government hitchhike with collaborative brand of the SCP, 
D1Profession: The ‘profession’ group was not significantly different from each other.  
D2Function: The ‘function’ group was not significantly different from each other. 
D3Frequence: The ‘frequence’ group was not significantly different from each other. 
D4Inhab: The ‘inhabitants’ group was not significantly different from each other. 
 
“Coordination mechanism” 
SCPAT2 LAs have agreements about how executing Joint procurement groups in the 
SCP 
SCPAT1 LAs have agreements procurement goals and strategies in the SCP 




D2Function: The ‘function’ group was not significantly different from each other. 
D3Frequence: The ‘frequence’  group was not significantly different from each other. 
D4Inhab: The ‘inhabitants’ group was not significantly different from each other. 
 
“Agility & flexibility” 
SCPCCT6 LAs has more access for innovation in their products / services / works by 
outsourcing the procurement function by the SPC  
SCPCCT1 LAs has quicker new and innovative products / services by the SCP. 
D1Profession: The ‘profession’ group was not significantly different from each other.  
D2Function: The ‘function’ group was not significantly different from each other. 
D3Frequence: The ‘frequence’ group was not significantly different from each other. 
D4Inhab: The ‘inhab’ group was not significantly different from each other. 
 
“Control of information” 
SCPAT8 LAs jointly decides about exceptions and deviations about the jointly 
procurement plan 
SCPAT6 LAs make annual jointly procurement plans with the SCP 
D1Profession: The profession group was not significantly different from each other.  
D2Function: The profession group was not significantly different from each other 
D3Frequence: The profession group was not significantly different from each other 
D4Inhab: The ‘Inhab’ group was significantly different from each other. Wilk’s 
Lambada valu, showed in Table F-3of .714 with a significance value 0.010. This is less 
than 0.05; therefore there is a statistically significant difference between the number of 









Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Intercept Pillai's Trace ,786 137,879b 2,000 75,000 ,000 ,786 
Wilks' Lambda ,214 137,879b 2,000 75,000 ,000 ,786 
Hotelling's Trace 3,677 137,879b 2,000 75,000 ,000 ,786 
Roy's Largest Root 3,677 137,879b 2,000 75,000 ,000 ,786 
D4INHAB Pillai's Trace ,305 2,278 12,000 152,000 ,011 ,152 
Wilks' Lambda ,714 2,294b 12,000 150,000 ,010 ,155 
Hotelling's Trace ,374 2,309 12,000 148,000 ,010 ,158 
Roy's Largest Root ,281 3,557c 6,000 76,000 ,004 ,219 
a. Design: Intercept + D4INHAB 
b. Exact statistic 
c. The statistic is an upper bound on F that yields a lower bound on the significance level. 
 
 
